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Since the early days of formal semantics (starting with Montague 1973) issues
concerning quantification, pluralities, and countability have been of central im-
portance for the study of meaning in natural language. A substantial body of re-
search has been dedicated to these topics, which led to a number of influential the-
ories (e.g., Barwise & Cooper 1981; Scha 1981; Link 1983; Hoeksema 1983; Gillon
1987; Krifka 1989; Schwarzschild 1996; Landman 2000; Winter 2001). Within this
tradition since at least Scha (1981) to present, e.g., Champollion (2017), the pre-
vailing view is that denotations of count nouns are atomic or, in other words,
involve atoms, i.e., entities that have no proper parts in a mereological sense.
Though at first blush this seems unintuitive since we know very well from our
common experience that often things do have parts, there seemed to be good
reasons to assume that compositional semantics ignores this fact and treats ref-
erents of count noun as indivisible units. The achievements of that strand of
research are indisputable. At the same time, I believe that the attachment to the
notion of atomicity originates from a limited scope of investigation and in the
face of novel linguistic evidence to be presented needs to revised. The motivation
behind this book is to explore what could be gained for semantic theory if we
adopted a different perspective.
1.1 What’s this all about
This book is about parts of singular concrete things such as apples, walls, and
crowns, and how we quantify over them. It is also about parts of pluralities of
things such as collections of apples, walls, and crowns, and why we do not quan-
tify over them unless very specific individuating criteria are satisfied. It is about
various types of partitives, e.g., structures such as half of the apple, multiplier
phrases, e.g., expressions like double crown, and other natural language expres-
sions, e.g., adjective phrases such as whole apple. What all these constructions
have in common is that they involve what I will call throughout this study sub-
atomic quantification. Subatomic quantification is quantification over parts
of things that constitute building blocks of denotations of nominal expressions
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such as apple, wall, and crown. Though the use of the word “subatomic” in the
title of this book suggests that I will also adopt the concept of an atom, in fact I
will argue against approaches to nominal semantics based on the notion of atom-
icity. I decided for the use of that term since I believe that it intuitively evokes
what I intend to focus on. Ironically, however, I believe the evidence concerning
subatomic quantification forces us to reconsider what building blocks of denota-
tions of count nouns actually are. The great source of inspiration for this study
has been the work of Grimm (2012a,b) who proposes a novel view on how to
capture the semantic relevance of the mass/count distinction without reference
to atoms.
The empirical aim of this book is to provide novel linguistic evidence showing
that natural language semantics is sensitive to subatomic part-whole structures
and to topological relations holding between elements within such structures.
Furthermore, I intend to demonstrate the linguistic relevance of subatomic quan-
tification as well as the fact that quantification over parts of a whole is subject to
identical restrictions as quantification over wholes. The evidence to be examined
indicates that some quantificational operations including counting presuppose
particular topological relations.
From a theoretical point of view, this book is intended to provide a novel ar-
gument for adopting a theory of wholes called mereotopology, i.e., a system in
which standardmereology based on parthood is extended with the primitive rela-
tion of connectedness as well as nuanced derived topological notions that allow
for capturing various spatial configurations of parts. The origins of mereotopol-
ogy trace back to Whitehead (1920; 1929) and the theory was further developed
within formal ontology and artificial intelligence (e.g., Clarke 1981; Smith 1996;
Roeper 1997; Casati & Varzi 1999; Varzi 2007). It was introduced to linguistics by
Grimm (2012a,b).
Some of the key questions concerning natural language semantics I want to
address in this book are the following.
Q1: Are there different types of parts of entities similar to different types of
wholes?
Q2: How do we count parts of an object?
Q3: Why can we not count parts of a plurality as one thing unless certain indi-
viduating criteria are satisfied?
At first blush, the answers at which I arrive might seem somewhat surprising.
2
1.1 What’s this all about
A1: Yes, there are continuous and discontinuous parts. The former resemble
referents of singular count nouns, whereas the latter are more like plural-
ities.
A2: We count parts of an object in the very same way to how we count whole
objects. The mechanism is unified, thus identical restrictions apply.
A3: For the same reason we cannot count pluralities as one thing unless spe-
cific individuating criteria are met. Only objects with certain topological
characteristics can be assigned a number in numerical quantification.
The most important result of this study is a proposal of an account for sub-
atomic quantification. I will argue not only that it correctly predicts why only
some parts are countable, but also that extending it to the level of wholes will
enable us to provide more advantageous explanations for known problems. For
instance, it could explain why a natural language expression such as two apples
refers to a plurality of two apples rather than to two pluralities of apples. Or why
object mass nouns such as furniture are not countable despite involving reference
to discrete entities. There are also a number of other questions I will attempt to
tackle, many of which will remain without a definite answer. However, I believe
that both the evidence presented here and the proposed account provide a novel
exciting perspective to think about partitivity and countability.
Note that though I will sometimes mention certain nominal categories in pass-
ing, this study is not about abstract terms (see, e.g., Asher 1993; Tovena 2001;
Nicolas 2002; Moltmann 2013), event nominals (see, e.g., Grimshaw 1990; 2011;
Bierwisch 1990; Borer 2005b), or collective nouns (see, e.g., Landman 1989a,b;
Barker 1992; Schwarzschild 1996; Pearson 2011; de Vries 2015), nor about parts
of their referents. Despite the fact that in principle I believe that the approach
developed here can be extended to these expressions, for the most part I will not
consider part-whole structures of abstract entities. Before I introduce the main
claims of this book in a bit more detail and then delve into intricacies of linguistic
evidence, let us first consider my view on what it intuitively means to be a whole
and part.
1.1.1 Intuitive notions of a whole and part
The starting point of this journey concerns an ontological intuition dating back
at least to the Pre-Socratics that entities are often made up of smaller entities
which are related to each other in a particular manner (see Varzi 2016 for a his-
torical overview). In other words, when thinking about what is, humans often
3
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assume that objects are generally configurations of parts. This ontological in-
tuition seems to stem from a cognitive fact that human beings often conceive
of entities as being made up of smaller entities related to each other in certain
ways. In fact, psychological evidence demonstrates that at least from early child-
hood humans are able to perceive entities simultaneously in a twofold way (e.g.,
Elkind et al. 1964; Kimchi 1993; Boisvert et al. 1999). On the one hand, we can dis-
criminate parts from a whole making them more salient than the entire object,
whereas on the other hand we have the ability to integrate the parts in such a
way that the perception of a complete whole emerges in our cognition. In other
words, humans are able to see entities as collections of parts and as integrated
wholes simultaneously.
At the same time, since the very early considerations on the part-whole re-
lation in Plato’s Parmenides and Theaetetus a topic of much concern has been
unity. What interests Plato is how to differentiate between a true unity and an
arbitrary sum of parts. The crucial property of the former is that it is provided
by structure which distinguishes it from the latter. Without going into details of
Plato’s ontological views (but see, e.g., Priest 2014), it seems that the key intuition
behind his deliberations is that the crucial component of what it means to be a
whole is given by the manner of arrangement of parts. In other words, a whole
is not simply reducible to the sum of its parts (see also Casati & Varzi 1999), e.g.,
a glass is not an arbitrary sum of shards, but rather a particular configuration of
shards. It happens that I also share this intuition.
When considering how objects are conceptualized, I believe it is instructive
to make use of categories such as unity, boundedness, and integrity. The first
is about capturing an individual as a complete whole in itself, i.e., distinguish-
ing between discrete objects as opposed to fragmentary portions of a continuum
of a larger entity. The second category concerns boundaries. Objects are well-
defined in space in contrast to scattered fragments of entities or a diffused con-
tinuum of matter. Finally, integrity characterizes a mutual bond between entities
perceived as being parts of a certain whole. Though this bond can be conceptu-
alized in many different ways, one significant mode of integrity is viewed in
terms of topology. Specifically, objects involve elements that are connected to
each other, i.e., stuck together, and thus move along the same trajectories as one
unit. The vital question that inspired this study is to what extent these categories
are relevant for the architecture of natural language semantics? In the following
chapters, I will argue that there are good reasons to believe that it is indeed rel-
evant. Specifically, I will provide linguistic evidence not only that the meaning
of nominal expressions involves information concerning integrity but also that
grammar is sensitive to such a notion.
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Crucially, I argue that the same way of thinking should apply when talking
about parts of wholes. When describing parthood with respect to entities ex-
tended in space or time, employing the topological notion of contiguity might
allow us to capture some non-trivial facts about part-whole structures. In par-
ticular, some parts constitute individuated continuous strings of matter within a
whole, whereas other parts are just arbitrary sums of portions of substances. To
demonstrate the difference let us discuss the following example (see Acquaviva
2008: pp. 90–93). Consider two parts of a table, its leg and a splinter. Under ordi-
nary circumstances, we would definitely agree that both these entities are parts
of the table; however, each of them in a somewhat different sense. A splinter is
just some arbitrary portion of matter making up the table, an element among
numerous similar fragments of the whole. Before mentioning it, we probably
had no or at least very little expectations with respect to its appearance. We
might even question whether it exists as a splinter before being detached from
the whole since normally tables are not perceived as collections of splinters. On
the other hand, a leg is easily identifiable among a definite number of similar el-
ements. We perceive it as having a clearly specified function and expect certain
traits of its appearance. Furthermore, there is also a sense in which two separate
disconnected splinters or two disjoint legs are part of the table since they consti-
tute some fragment of its material make-up. Importantly, however, this type of
parthood seems to resemble the relationship between a splinter and the whole
rather than the relationship between a leg and the whole table. In other words,
under ordinary circumstances a plurality of disjoint legs seems to be a material
rather than a functional part of the table despite the fact that each of the legs
constituting that plurality definitely is its functional part.
In the philosophical literature, this distinction has been attributed to differ-
ent modes of partitioning an object. For instance, Krecz (1986) proposes differ-
ent terms for specific subdivisions of a whole, i.e., parts, as opposed to arbitrary
subdivisions, i.e., pieces. The former would correspond, e.g., to a leg of a table,
whereas the latter would be used with respect to, e.g., a splinter. In a similar vein,
Markosian (1998) draws an analogous distinction between what he calls meta-
physical parts, i.e., parts that can be considered as objects in their own right,
and conceptual parts, i.e., equivalents of arbitrary parts. Finally, Jennings (2010)
proposes to differentiate between parts viewed as arbitrary bits of an object one
could cut off, and functional parts defined as parts that are considered essential
for an object since they fulfill a particular function. Crucially, the distinction
is conceptually valid but it is also reflected in grammar. For instance, English
distinguishes between the two different flavors of parthood discussed above syn-
tactically as can be witnessed in (1) (see also Champollion & Krifka 2016). The use
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of the bare mass noun part in the sentence in (1a) indicates arbitrary partitioning
of the table. On the other hand, the full DP a part in (1b) corresponds to a specific
division in parts. Notice also that only the latter use is countable.
(1) English (Acquaviva 2008: p. 90, adapted)
a. A splinter is part of the table.
b. A leg is a part of the table.
It has been acknowledged that the distinction discussed above seems to have
some further linguistic implications (Champollion & Krifka 2016). For instance,
consider the minimal pairs in (2) and (3).1 The contrast suggests that transitivity
does not hold for specific parts.2 In other words, the fact that the thumb is a part
of a hand does not guarantee that it would be linguistically treated as a part of
what that hand is part of, i.e., an arm.
(2) English (Champollion & Krifka 2016: p. 513; adapted)
a. the thumb of this hand
b. a hand without a thumb
(3) English (Champollion & Krifka 2016: p. 513; adapted)
a. #the thumb of this arm
b. #an arm without a thumb
Despite these facts the role of the distinction between arbitrary and specific parts
in natural language semantics is usually either totally neglected or reduced to lex-
ical relations such asmeronymy, i.e., relations betweenmeronyms and holonyms,
e.g. wing and bird, and hyponymy, i.e., the relation between hyponyms and hy-
peronyms, e.g., sparrow and bird. Although it has been recognized that meron-
ymy and hyponymy have some general properties that establish taxonomies and
structure large parts of the lexicon in natural language (Cruse 1986), composi-
tional approaches to meaning did not assume that such categories play any role
in the proposed models. One of the aims of this book is to provide linguistic ev-
idence for the relevance of the two aspects of what it means to be part of some-
thing and to propose how first steps towards accommodating a less naive view
on parthood into semantic theory could look like.
1In the original examples in (2b) and (3b), Champollion & Krifka use the bare count NP thumb
inside the PP, which some speakers find marked. However, using an indefinite does not seem
to change the felicity judgments.
2Champollion & Krifka use the terms structured and unstructured parthood in order to refer
specific and arbitrary subdivisions, respectively.
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1.1.2 The claims in a nutshell
In this book, I will argue that a proper treatment of countability in natural lan-
guage should take into account the interaction between partitivity, topology, and
quantification. In other words, I believe that exploring subatomic quantification
can reveal some non-trivial phenomena that were otherwise obscure, and thus
contribute to our understanding of the interaction between nominal semantics
and the meaning of numerical expressions in general. The central claims of this
book are the following.
First, natural language is sensitive to the fact that entities denoted by nomi-
nal expressions have parts as well as topological relations holding between them.
The relevance of part-whole structures is typically acknowledged with respect
to pluralities. However, my claim is stronger. I postulate that natural language
is also sensitive to subatomic part-whole structures. This is in discordance with
the mainstream view that utilizes the notion of atomicity in order to capture se-
mantic properties of count nouns. Such an approach postulates that atoms, i.e.,
building blocks of denotations of expressions like apple and crown, are entities
that from a linguistic perspective are treated as having no proper parts. Conse-
quently, countability can be accounted for in terms of quantification over atoms.
Nevertheless, the linguistic evidence I will present in the following chapters will
demonstrate that in fact there are a number of natural language expressions in-
volving quantification over such subatomic parts. Crucially, based on the distri-
bution of partitives I will argue for a unified parthood relation for both singulari-
ties and pluralities. Furthermore, I will postulate that the difference between the
two is a result of different topological relations encoded in the corresponding
part-whole structures. The claim is that prototypical referents of count singulars
are conceptualized as integrated wholes, whereas regular plurals require entities
in their denotations to comprise such cohesive objects as their parts but impose
no topological constraints on a spatial configuration of those parts. As we will
see from the data concerning topologically sensitive partitive expressions, the
distinction between integrated wholes and scattered entities also applies at the
subatomic level. Specifically, the novel evidence shows that the contrast between
continuous and discontinuous parts is relevant for the interpretation of natural
language expressions. Hence, the notion of topological integrity should be ac-
commodated into semantic theory.
The second claim concerns counting. In particular, I will argue that countabil-
ity is not some syntactic feature nor is it a meaning postulate on a certain lexical
item, but rather it follows from what I refer to as the general counting principles.
In particular, the principle of non-overlap ensures that entities one quantifies
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over are disjoint, i.e., they do not share a part. In other words, things can be
counted once and once only. This rule excludes a possibility of counting enti-
ties involving multiple overlapping parts as denoted by mass nouns and pluralia
tantum. Furthermore, the principle of maximality guarantees that when counted
entities are associated with numbers in their entirety, i.e., no part is left out. This
is especially relevant with respect to homogeneous entities referred to by nouns
such as twig and fence. Given a particular counting situation, what counts as one
always needs to be the maximal entity no matter how its part-whole structure is
defined in that situation. Finally, the principle of integrity requires that what can
be counted needs to be conceptualized as an entity that comes in one piece. This
restriction rules out arbitrary sums of entities as well as discontinuous portions
of substances. Consequently, counting pluralities as one thing is not allowed,
unless there are certain topological conditions that apply.3 In other words, be-
ing a plurality is neither necessary nor sufficient for counting as a single entity.
All things considered, only predicates denoting entities that satisfy the general
counting principles can be modified by cardinals.
The third and final claim extends the general mechanism behind counting to
the subatomic level. More specifically, I will postulate that the general counting
principles constitute a universal set of constraints regulating what is fit for being
counted and what is not, irrespective of whether it is a whole or a part. In other
words, I will argue that it follows from the principles of non-overlap, maximal-
ity, and integrity that certain parts are countable whereas others are not. The
evidence from partitive constructions involving cardinal numerals demonstrates
that it is not allowed to count discontinuous parts of entities. Moreover, the claim
is further corroborated by the fact that natural language developed expressions
dedicated to subatomic quantification.
Linguistic evidence for the three claims introduced above comes from a num-
ber of natural language expressions. Specifically, I will examine different types
of partitives, whole-adjectives as well as multipliers such as English double. Some
parts of this book will also investigate the data considering plurals and cardinal
numerals. In order to provide a more general picture, the evidence will be exam-
ined from a cross-linguistic perspective. The languages which will be discussed
mostly include Polish, German, Italian, and English, but throughout the text I
will also address examples from (in alphabetical order) Basque, Bosnian/Croat-
ian/Serbian (BCS), Brazilian Portuguese, Czech, Dutch, Finnish, French, Hebrew,
Hungarian, Irish, Japanese, Lithuanian, Maltese, Mandarin, Mi’gmaq, Russian,
and Yucuna.
3Notice that group nouns are more than pluralities. In fact, I assume that they denote abstract




There are several issues concerning conceptual grounds that require a short com-
mentary. In this section, I will present my view on natural language semantics
and discuss the ontology assumed for the purpose of developing an account for
subatomic quantification.
1.2.1 Cognitive view of meaning
The view on theory of meaning I adopt here is on a par with the position ex-
pressed by Krifka (1998) and shared, e.g., by Partee (2018) and Grimm (2012b)
(see also Chomsky 2000). Though model-theoretic semantics in the tradition of
Montague has commonly been assumed to necessarily endorse some form of se-
mantic externalism (see, e.g., Putnam 1975; Davidson 1987), i.e., a view on which
expressions of natural language designate objects in the world, and as such is
incompatible with approaches to meaning that seek to develop cognitive mod-
els of the world (assuming that meanings are in the head after all), such a sharp
distinction does not seem plausible. In fact, as pointed out by Krifka, it is pos-
sible to combine the use of the methods and techniques developed within the
model-theoretic tradition with an assumption that natural language expressions
are interpreted by conceptual structures that in turn are associated with exter-
nal entities by some pragmatic mechanism responsible for how we use language.
Therefore, I assume that model-theoretic representations discussed in this study
are compatible with a cognitive view of meaning and can be seen as tools one
can use to try to grasp human mental reality.
In other words, in the system developed here I make no metaphysical claims,
nor do I embrace any form of semantic externalism. Instead, I adopt a view that
natural language ontology does not reveal what there is, but rather what people
talk as if there is (see Bach 1986a; Pelletier 2011; Bach & Chao 2012; Moltmann
2017). Therefore, I would like to see the postulated notions and structures as at-
tempts to capture the way we conceptualize certain aspects of external reality.
That is to say, the theory of subatomic quantification to follow is assumed to
characterize some properties of how human beings perceive things in the world,
not to describe them how they are. This means that both primitive objects and
more complex conceptual forms are assumed to “be in the head” (see Chomsky
2000). Of course, it is not unlikely that properties of such semantic objects may
often correspond to the properties of mind/language-external entities. Conse-
quently, the former could be used to talk about the latter assuming matching by
some extra-linguistic mechanism. In any case, I do not presume that meanings
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are out there in the world. Rather, I will often emphasize the significance for nat-
ural language semantics of how entities are conceptualized. In the next section,
I will describe the minimal assumptions concerning primitive objects grouped
together in the domains of the model.
1.2.2 Ontology
In standard Montague semantics, the domain of discourse is simply a collection
of disjoint non-empty sets of entities from which denotations of basic expres-
sions as well as more complex constituents are built. It is usually assumed that
the domain of entities is supplemented with the set of truth values as well as
sets of events, possible worlds, degrees and others. Since the focus of this study
is very specific, I will limit the number of distinct types of primitive objects al-
most to a minimum. In doing so, I will try to be faithful to the position famously
formulated by Link (1983) that the guide in ontological considerations should be
natural language itself.
I will use the term entity to talk about anything that can be referred to by
proper names, such as Noam Chomsky and Nim Chimpsky, and by definite de-
scriptions, like the author of “Syntactic Structures” and that chimpanzee, as well
as denoted by common nouns such as apple and juice. I assume that entities can be
either well-defined discrete objects, pluralities thereof, or shapeless amorphous
substances. Though there are significant differences between them, they all fall
into one domain. In general, I will refer to a thing in the denotation of a count
noun as individual or object. Sometimes, I will use the term scattered entity
to indicate referents of mass terms and arbitrary sum to talk about denotations
of plurals. The notions entity and thing are assumed to be general terms cov-
ering both individuals/objects, portions of matter as well as pluralities.
I do not assume that all nouns designate entities. Some classes of nominals
such as nominalizations, measure words as well as role nouns arguably make
reference to eventualities, degrees, and roles, respectively. For instance, murder
denotes a set of murdering events (e.g., Grimshaw 1990; 2011), liter refers to an in-
terval or a set of degrees on a scale of volume (e.g., von Stechow 1984; Heim 1985),
whereas president designates a social role, i.e., a function or capacity independent
of the individuals that bear it (Sowa 1984; Steimann 2000). Such social constructs
can be associated with individuals by a special shifting mechanism (Zobel 2017).
Though in this study I will restrict my focus to entities, or specifically concrete
entities, I believe that at least some of the ideas introduced here can serve as an
inspiration for developing a new way of thinking of partialness with respect to
somewhat more abstract things such as eventualities, degrees, and roles.
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Since kinds, or more generally concepts (see Krifka 1995; Mueller-Reichau
2006), do not play any role in this study, I will refrain from the discussion con-
cerning their ontological status as well as their role in nominal semantics. Nev-
ertheless, in principle the approach developed here is compatible with accounts
modeling kinds in the spirit of Carlson (1977; 1980) and Krifka (1995), where they
are treated as entities in their own right that unlike object-level things are not
spatio-temporally bounded.
A considerable amount of attention in this study will be dedicated to numeri-
cal expressions including cardinal numerals, fractions, and multipliers. I assume
that all those lexical items involve some sort of reference tomathematical entities.
I will use the term number to refer to abstract entities that definite descriptions
such as the number two designate. I adopt here an intuitionist perspective on
the epistemology of mathematics (see, e.g., Kitcher 1984). According to this view,
mathematical objects are constructions of the human mind and do not exist in
the external world. Notice, however, that numbers in this sense do not neces-
sarily coincide with objects defined by Peano’s axioms. For instance, I do not
assume that “artificial” integers (in the sense of Dehaene 1997: pp. 238–242), i.e.,
non-standard and counterintuitive arithmetical objects that nevertheless satisfy
Peano’s axioms, are part of the ontology described here. Rather, numbers are
what we refer to when we use our everyday language and what might coincide
with human number sense.
1.3 Conventions
Both glossing and notational conventions used in this book are more or less stan-
dard in academic linguistics. Nonetheless, for the sake of clarity I provide a com-
plete list of what to expect in examples and formulae.
1.3.1 Examples
Since in many parts of this book I discuss phrases and sentences from various
languages some of which are not very well-known, in order to avoid confusion I
will always indicate the language of an example, even if that language is English.
Furthermore, I will provide information on the bibliographical source or a name
of a native speaker or native speakers with whom I have consulted a particular
example. In the case of evidence from Polish, almost all examples and judgments
are my own though I have often confirmed them with other native speakers who
confirmedmy intuitions. Most of the data come from introspection with some ex-
ceptions found in corpora. I use the symbol # to indicate both semantic infelicity,
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i.e., awkwardness in terms of meaning, and constructions that lack a particular
interpretation that is crucial from the perspective of a discussed phenomenon.
For the sake of clarity, in the latter case I will always provide relevant readings
and mark the one that is non-existent with the symbol #. In other words, when
# appears on object language, then it means semantic infelicity; when # appears
on an interpretation line, then it means that that reading is not available. Unless
explicitly stated otherwise, I will always consider uncoerced meanings of nom-
inal expressions, i.e., I will ignore the mass-count as well as count-mass shifts.
Occasionally, I will use the symbol * in the examples to indicate ungrammatical-
ity.
Concerning glossing, I will introduce the complete grammatical information
only when relevant morpho-syntactic issues are discussed or its lack might cause
confusion. Otherwise, for the sake of simplicity I limit it to the minimum. The
list of abbreviations used in the examples can be found at the beginning of this
book.
1.3.2 Notation
In the following text, I will use a relatively standard notation. For completeness,
I specify the following. The symbols 𝑥 , 𝑦 , 𝑧, and 𝑤 are used to represent entity
variables, whereas 𝑛 and 𝑃 are dedicated for number and predicate variables, re-
spectively. The small letters 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, and 𝑑 stand for entity constants, whereas
Arabic numbers, e.g., 1, 2, and 3, stand for integers. On the other hand, metalin-
guistic constants designating particular properties are transcribed with small
capitals, e.g., apple stands for the property of being an apple, whereas logical
constants designating various operations are typeset using the sans-serif font,
e.g., MAX for the maximization operation. The primitive semantic types of enti-
ties, numbers, and truth values are represented by the symbols 𝑒, 𝑛, and 𝑡 , re-
spectively. Only complex types are given in angle brackets, e.g., ⟨𝑒, 𝑡⟩ as opposed
to 𝑒. Furthermore, the scope of both the 𝜆 operator and quantifiers ∃ and ∀ is
indicated by square brackets, e.g., 𝜆𝑥[apple(𝑥)] and ∃𝑥[apple(𝑥)]. For conve-
nience, in complex formulae I use small and big brackets in order to designate
scope of particular operators. Finally, presuppositions are introduced always
following a colon immediately after the relevant 𝜆 operator, e.g., in the term
𝜆𝑥 ∶ fruit(𝑥) 𝜆𝑃[*𝑃(𝑥) ∧ #(𝑃)(𝑥) = 3] the sequence fruit(𝑥) is a presupposi-
tion.
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1.4 The things to come
A substantial body of linguistic research has been dedicated to quantification in
natural language. This monograph is intended to contribute to that enterprise by
presenting novel data concerning subatomic quantification and proposing novel
arguments in favor of a mereotopological approach to nominal semantics. The
book is structured as follows. The next three chapters will provide linguistic evi-
dence on the relevance of subatomic quantificationmainly from a cross-linguistic
perspective. I will examine a broad range of constructions involving different
types of partitives, whole-adjectives, and multipliers such as English double.
In Chapter 2, I will discuss certain patterns observed in partitive construc-
tions cross-linguistically that suggest a unified meaning of partitive words such
as part and half as well as the importance of the topological notion of integrity
in subatomic quantification. The main focus will be dedicated to the interaction
between numerals, partitive words, and nominals involving count singulars, reg-
ular plurals as well as Italian irregular plurals.
Chapter 3 will provide further evidence for the significance of integrity in
quantification over parts. In particular, I will present novel data concerning topo-
logy-sensitive partitive words that require the whole to be an integrated object or
yield only integrated parts of the whole. Though the evidence will come mainly
from Polish, parallels with other languages will also be drawn including English,
German, and Mandarin.
In Chapter 4, I will explore the meaning of multipliers, i.e., a neglected class of
numerical expressions that is specialized to count parts of entities denoted by the
modified noun. The discussed data will come from Slavic where morphological
evidence supports semantic complexity of those expressions.
The main purpose of Chapter 5 is to provide the three claims that constitute
the conceptual background for the analysis. For that purpose, I will relate the pre-
viously introduced linguistic evidence to psychological findings concerning the
role integrity and part-whole structures play in human cognition and especially
in counting.
In Chapter 6, I will introduce mereotopology, i.e., a theory of wholes extending
themereological framework based on the notion of parthoodwith the topological
concept of connectedness. Mereotopology allows us to capture the difference
between distinct types of things, such as integrated wholes, arbitrary sums of
individuals, and scattered entities corresponding to substances, and will prove
advantageous in modeling quantification over parts.
Chapter 7 will be dedicated to spelling out a formal analysis of selected issues
in subatomic quantification. The account will be based on the mereotopological
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framework with the intuitive notion of integrity playing the main role in the
semantic representation of countable parts.
Finally, Chapter 8 will conclude the book and suggest how further research
could extend the approach in order to tackle some open questions. For conve-
nience, the most relevant contribution of a given part is summarized at the end
of each chapter.
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In this chapter, I will examine cross-linguistic evidence for the relevance of sub-
atomic quantification in natural language. In particular, I will focus on the dis-
tribution and semantic properties of distinct types of partitives some of which
have not received much attention in the linguistic literature oriented towards
the study of meaning. Specifically, I will investigate constructions involving pro-
portional expressions such as part and half in order to reveal some non-trivial
facts about partitivity. I will provide novel data indicating that singulars and plu-
rals share one unified parthood relation. Furthermore, I will show that distinct
part-whole structures result from the fact that certain entities are conceptualized
as cohesive individuals whereas others are not. Crucially, the distinction turns
out to be relevant from the perspective of countability. In particular, partitive
constructions indicate that cardinal numerals select only for predicates denoting
entities conceptualized as integrated wholes.1
2.1 Partitives
As already mentioned in the introduction, the part-whole relation is an impor-
tant notion in human cognition and natural language. For instance, large parts of
the lexicon are structured by means of meronymy, i.e., the relation that holds be-
tween expressions denoting entities conceptualized as whole objects (holonyms)
and expressions denoting parts of such wholes (meronyms), e.g., the relationship
between cat and tail. However, the relevance of partitivity in natural language
is not restricted to lexical associations but it is also reflected in grammar. As no-
ticed by Hoeksema (1996), its importance for the syntax-semantics interface is
1I would like to sincerely thank my informants with whom I have consulted the structures
and meanings of particular constructions. Specifically, many thanks to Muriel Assmann,
Katie Fraser, Berit Gehrke, Nina Haslinger, Aitor Lizardi Ituarte, Tetiana Kamyshanova, Rad-
van Markus, Erlinde Meertens, Lilla Pintér, Martin Prinzhorn, Adam Przepiórkowski, Viola
Schmitt, Hana Strachoňová, Yasutada Sudo, Balázs Surányi, Peter Sutton, and Guy Tabachnick.
Finally, I am deeply grateful to Enrico Flor and Chiara Masnovo for their judgments and the
discussion of the Italian data. Their introspective reports and insightful comments were of
invaluable help for the relevant parts of this chapter.
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corroborated by the fact that the link between a whole and its parts can support
definite descriptions, as witnessed in (1).
(1) English (Hoeksema 1996: p. 1)
I still have a jar of gooseberry jam, but I cannot get the lid off.
There are many ways in which the part-whole relation can be expressed syn-
tactically and languages differ in what means they employ in order to indicate
it. Sometimes even though a particular construction lacks a formal exponent ex-
pressing partitivity, the relation between the elements is well understood. For
example, English compounds lack morphological means to express partitivity,
but often the part-whole relation between the referents of the first stem and the
referents of the second stem is semantically transparent and can be readily re-
trieved, as in (2) (Hoeksema 1996).




In this book, however, I will restrict my focus to the structure that expresses the
part-whole relation formally, i.e. the so-called partitive construction. The parti-
tive is an expression of natural language that indicates partialness. In English,
nominal partitives commonly take the form as in (3).2
(3) Partitive structure (Martí i Girbau 2010)
a. [DP Det [PP of [DP Det NP]]]
b. [three [of [my friends]]]
The upstairs determiner is a quantifier, whereas the preposition of links it with
the larger whole denoted by its complement, i.e., the embedded definite or spe-
cific DP, from which it is partitioned. A similar frame is found in many other
Germanic languages as well as in Romance, as demonstrated in (4) and (5).
2The structure in (3) is just one possible analysis. In fact, there are several different proposals
concerning the syntax of partitives. For instance Ionin et al. (2006) argue for different structures
for distinct types of partitives, see (i). However, for the most part I will ignore all the syntactic
intricacies here.
(i) English (Ionin et al. 2006)
a. [NP half [PP of [DP these [NP eight apples]]]]





















On the other hand, in languages such as Estonian and Finnish, a special partitive
case can be used instead of the prepositional element, see (6) (de Hoop 2003),
whereas, e.g., German and many Slavic languages can express the partitive with
the genitive (the so-called partitive genitive), see (7) (see, e.g., Hoeing 1997 for
German and Valkova 1999; Rutkowski 2007 for Slavic).3

















‘Oleg drank half the milk.’
In terms ofmeaning, the partitive picks out a part from awhole. The part is associ-
ated with the upstairs quantifier, whereas the whole is denoted by the embedded
DP and can be either a singular entity or a plurality (e.g., Jackendoff 1977; Selkirk
1977; Ladusaw 1982). Thus, partitives can denote parts of individuals, see (8a), as
well as subsets of larger sets of individuals, see (8b), and portions of substances,
see (8c).
(8) English
a. most of the apple
b. most of the apples
c. most of the juice
3Notice, however, that Finnish also has another construction in which the embedded noun ap-
pears in the elative case, as in (i). For more examples and discussion, see Anttila & Fong (2000).





‘five of the women’
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An important observation concerning partitive constructions is that not every
kind of DP can be embedded within the structure. A restriction called the Parti-
tive Constraint excludes certain expressions from this position (e.g., Jackendoff
1977; Selkirk 1977; Barwise & Cooper 1981; Ladusaw 1982). In particular, its early
formulations posited that only definites can appear in the downstairs DP.4 Later
approaches redefined the restriction in semantic terms postulating that the em-
bedded DP needs to denote an entity, i.e., it needs to be either definite or specific
(de Hoop 1997).
Before I begin a detailed discussion of the relationship between partitivity
and countability it will be useful to make several terminological remarks. First, I
will use the terms part-words and half-words to refer to expressions such as
English part and half, respectively. Despite significant syntactic differences be-
tween those lexical items suggesting more fine-grained categorial distinctions,
they both can appear in the upstairs Det position in partitives like (8a), on a par
with quantifiers such as most and all. From a cross-linguistic perspective differ-
ent types of half-words often fall into different syntactic categories. For instance,
German Hälfte ‘half1’ appears to have nominal properties, whereas halb ‘half2’
is a standard adjective. As demonstrated in (9a)–(9c), while Hälfte has a gender
value and either assigns the genitive case or combines with the prepositional
von-phrase assigning the dative (Durrell 1996; see also Hoeing 1997; Asbury 2007



























Since this book is primarily concerned with semantic aspects of partitivity, I take
the terms part-word and half-word introduced above to refer to expressions ex-
plicitly designating a part of a whole. Therefore, despite the different syntactic




structures expressions such as Hälfte and halb occur in, I will treat them as se-
mantically related linguistic objects. The general term partitive words will be
used to cover part-words and half-words aswell as different types of proportional
quantifiers that can be found in partitives.5
Another issue concerns the grammatical number of the downstairs DP in the
partitive construction. There is a tradition in the literature on partitivity to dis-
tinguish between partitive expressions referring to a portion of a singular entity
and those referring to a subset of a set of individuals. The former are often called
mass partitives and the latter group partitives (e.g., Hoeksema 1996; Abbott 1996).
However, despite this tradition I will follow de Hoop (1997; 2003) and refer to
phrases such as (8a) as entity partitives and to phrases such as (8b) as set
partitives.6 Typically, entity partitives involve a singular term in the embed-
ded DP, whereas set partitives comprise a quantifier combining with a plural DP.
I will restrict the use of the term mass partitives to constructions such as (8c)
where the upstairs determiner combines with the of -phrase taking a mass term
as its complement. The main reason is that I found the terms mass and group
partitives confusing in that they suggest a correspondence with the mass/count
distinction, contrary to fact (see also Martí i Girbau 2010).
Furthermore, I will refer to constructions involving an overt part-word such
as those in (10a) as explicit partitives. On the other hand, I will call phrases
containing proportional quantifiers such asmost or half, see (10b), proportional
partitives, whereas those involving fractions, see (10c), will be referred to as
fraction partitives.
(10) English
a. part of the apple
b. half of the apple
c. two thirds of the apple
Finally, I will use the terms count explicit partitives and count propor-
tional partitives to refer to phrases such as (11a) and (11b), respectively, where
the partitive word is modified by the cardinal numeral. These should not be con-
fused with count partitives, the term sometimes used for phrases such as (11c)
(e.g., Ionin et al. 2006).7
5The term more or less corresponds to what Quirk et al. (1985: p. 249) call general partitive
nouns excluding measure terms.
6Yet another term is used by Korat (2016) to refer to partitives involving regular count singular
nouns as well as collective nouns, namely singular quantified terms. However, since I do not
focus on group nouns in this book, I will ignore the potential distinction.
7Quirk et al. (1985: p. 249) call them plural partitives.
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(11) English
a. two parts of the apple
b. two halves of the apple
c. two of the apples
The next sections of this chapter will be dedicated to the interaction between
cardinal numerals and partitives involving different types of expressions both in
the upstairs DP head as well as in the embedded DP.
2.2 The analogy
At least since Link (1983) it is often assumed that it is necessary to distinguish be-
tween two distinct yet corresponding part-whole structures employed in natural
language, namely one corresponding to the material constitution of objects and
one capturing collections of distinct objects. Hence, the material part relation
provides ordering for structures representing the relationship between portions
of matter and individuals made out of that matter, whereas the individual part re-
lation concerns particular objects and sums thereof. The distinction is motivated
by the fact that things and stuff they consist of are apparently differentiated in
natural language. The famous example concerns two golden rings. If they were
forged recently out of some old Egyptian gold, then it is definitely true to state
that the rings are new although the gold is old.
However, there are some data that might be interpreted as suggesting that
at least in some expressions natural language semantics does not distinguish
between the two distinct part relations postulated by Link (1983) and instead
employs a unified part-whole structure for different types of nominal expressions.
Moltmann (1997; 1998) observes an analogy between partitives involving singular
and plural terms. For instance, in German the same expression Teil ‘part’ can be
used both in entity and set partitive constructions in order to quantify over parts
of singular individuals and subsets of groups of individuals, see (12)–(13).8
8In fact, Moltmann (1997; 1998) provides English examples to argue for her point, see (i). How-
ever, since the reported felicity judgments for English contrast with Moltmann’s claim (see
Schwarzschild 1996), I use the uncontroversial German examples in (12)–(13) instead.
(i) English (Moltmann 1997: p. 11)
a. {all of / some of / part of} the book
b. {all of / some of / part of} the wine
c. {all of / some of / part of} the books
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‘some of the apples’




















‘some of the apples’
In particular, when used in the entity partitive, Teil quantifies over material parts
of singular objects, i.e., functional parts or portions of a substance making up the
whole individual. For instance, (12a) and (13a) denote a set of parts of the relevant
apple. It could be used to refer, e.g., to the stem end of the apple in question or
its blossom end as well as its pulp or pips. On the other hand, when Teil takes
the plural DP as its complement, it quantifies over whole individuals, e.g., (12b)
and (13b) make reference to a part of a particular collection, i.e., a subset of the
apples rather than to a set of arbitrary parts of singular apples. For instance,
given a situation in which there are three relevant apples 𝑎1, 𝑎2, and 𝑎3, (12b) and
(13b) could not be used to refer to a set involving the stem end of 𝑎1 and a pip of
𝑎2. Instead, it would be true of a set of some of the apples in question, e.g., a set
comprising 𝑎1 and 𝑎2.
Notice that in German there is yet another interpretation an expression such
as (12b) and (13b) can get. For instance, consider the two possible readings of (14).



















‘A minority of the ten apples are moldy.’ or
‘A small part of each of the ten apples is moldy.’
The sentence in (14) would definitely be true in a situation where there are ten
apples and two of them are completely moldy. Yet, there is also a different sce-
nario where uttering (14) would be truthful, namely if there were ten apples and
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each apple had a small patch of mold. At first blush, this behavior might appear
to contradict what I claimed in the previous paragraph. However, there are good
reasons to assume that this reading is independent from the two discussed above
and results from a silent distributivity operator. Notice that the sentence would
be judged false in a scenario where there were ten apples seven of which had a
small patch of mold, whereas the others were notmoldy. This shows that German
explicit set partitives such as (13b) have another interpretation in addition to the
subset reading discussed above. Crucially, this interpretation does not involve
quantification over arbitrary material parts. Rather, the definite seems to have
a distributive interpretation with wide scope over the indefinite. Though it was
important to draw the distinction between the two possible interpretations, I will
ignore this additional distributive reading in the remaining part of this chapter.9
Thus, it appears that the same expression can form either an entity partitive
or a set partitive depending on the number value on its complement. This phe-
nomenon seems intriguing and might imply a puzzle with respect to a proper
treatment of German explicit partitives. But is it just a German idiosyncrasy?
Or does the data in (12)–(13) actually reveal something deep about the way the
human mind conceptualizes the difference between objects and collections of
objects? And if so, to what extent is such a difference relevant for the semantic
distinction between singularities and pluralities outside the domain of partitiv-
ity? I believe that, if approached in a systematic manner, an attempt to provide
answers to these questions can shed new light on what it means to be an individ-
uated entity and, as we will see, what it means to be countable.
Prima facie, it seems that there are two ways in which one could account for
the phenomenon in question. A radical solution is to conclude that the data in
(12)–(13) suggest a unified parthood structure for both singular and plural individ-
uals across the board (Moltmann 1997; 1998). In other words, it is to posit that sin-
gularities and pluralities are in fact much less distinct than standardly assumed.
On such an approach, the relationship between an object and its parts would
be the same relationship as the one holding between a collection of objects and
objects being part of that collection. Another way to explain the analogy would
be to assume that partitive expressions such as Teil employ a derived notion of
parthood which generalizes over two distinct yet corresponding part-structures
(Barker 1998; Ionin et al. 2006).
9In fact, this interpretation might turn out to be a German idiosyncrasy since it seems to be
unavailable in some other languages, e.g., in Polish. Though it is an interesting issue on its




In the next section, I will present novel evidence indicating the source of the
analogy in question. I will argue that the data to be examined suggests non-trivial
implications for the part-whole structures that singular and plural expressions
employ.
2.2.1 Ambiguity or indeterminacy
The data we began with in (12)–(13) might be interpreted as suggesting that both
singulars and plurals employ a unified part-whole structure. Another way of
looking at the evidence involves preserving distinct mereologies and at the same
time postulating that partitive words are either ambiguous between two different
meanings or that they encode a generalized parthood relation which enables
them to operate on both part-whole structures. A question I will attempt to tackle
in this section concerns the one as to what extent there is an empirical basis
broad enough to provide a solid argument in favor of one of the approaches.
In particular, I will propose an independent test whose results provide evidence
against the ambiguity account.
A standard diagnostic to detect ambiguity is the so-called zeugma test (Laser-
sohn 1995; see also Zwicky et al. 1975). The test works as follows. The examined
lexical item is put in a syntactic configuration with a coordination structure. If
the expression in question is in fact ambiguous, then it must take the same inter-
pretation with respect to both conjuncts. Otherwise the zeugma effect arises, i.e.,
the sentence takes on the flavor of a joke. On the other hand, if the tested item
is unspecific or indeterminate, it can take different interpretations with respect
to different conjuncts without any hilarious effect.
To illustrate this, let us consider the two examples in (15).
(15) English (Lasersohn 1995: p. 94; adapted)
a. John rented a car and a house.
b. John described a car and a house.
The verb rent must have the same interpretation with respect to both DPs, a
car and a house, i.e., it is either the case that John owned a car and a house and
he rented them out to someone, or it is the case that John rented a car and a
house from someone. But crucially it cannot be the case that John rented out
a car and rented a house as a tenant or vice versa. Therefore, since rent must
have the same interpretation with respect to the DPs a car and a house, it is
ambiguous between the two described readings. On the other hand, the verb
describe in (15b) is indeterminate with respect to whether describing is done in
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speech or in writing. Since it is perfectly natural to understand the sentence in a
way implying that John described a car in speech, whereas he described a house
in writing, describe is not ambiguous but rather merely unspecific.
The zeugma test has been used commonly in the study of natural language
semantics including the research on pluralities (see, e.g., Dowty 1987; Lasersohn
1995; Nouwen 2016).10 Let us then examine whether part-words are ambiguous
between two different readings giving rise to a part-of-a-singularity reading in
entity partitives, on the one hand, and to a part-of-a-singularity reading in set
partitives, on the other, or, alternatively, they are merely indeterminate in this
respect. To this end, let us first consider the well-formed and felicitous German
sentences in (16).






































‘Some of the pears and the apples got spoiled.’
In the explicit entity partitive in (16a) the partitive word Teil ‘part’ takes a struc-
ture involving coordination of two singular DPs as a complement. As witnessed
by the translation, the meaning of the sentence involves material partitivity, i.e.,
quantification over parts of the relevant singular objects, namely the apple and
the pear. In other words, (16a) would be true if part of the apple and part of
the pear got spoiled. On the other hand, Teil in (16b) combines with a conjoined
phrase involving two plural conjuncts. In this case, Teil quantifies over parts of
pluralities, i.e., the whole sentence designates that a subset of the apples and a
subset of the pears got spoiled.
Now let us consider the interaction between Teil and a coordinate structure
conjoining a singular and a plural DP, as in (17).



















‘Part of the apple and some of the pears got spoiled.’
10However, Lasersohn (1995: p. 95) points out that in fact the zeugma test does not detect ambi-
guity, but rather it reveals whether a particular item always makes the same contribution to





















‘Some of the pears and part of the apple got spoiled.’
The assumption behind (17) is that if Teil were merely indeterminate with re-
spect to a part-of-a-singularity and part-of-a-plurality reading, it should be able
to take the former interpretation with respect to the first conjunct and the lat-
ter interpretation with respect to the second conjunct in (17a) and vice versa in
(17b). On the other hand, if it were ambiguous between two different meanings
such behavior should not be possible. Interestingly, Teil not only can combine
felicitously with a construction involving coordination of a singular and plural
DP, but also irrespective of the linear order of the conjuncts, see (17a) and (17b),
it can take simultaneously two different readings.
The very same effect arises in (18), where one of the conjuncts is a singulare
tantum noun, specifically the object mass noun Geschirr ‘tableware’ can refer
either to one piece of tableware or to a collection thereof.






































‘Part of the kitchen sink and some of the tableware got rusted.’
Both (18a) and (18b) are felicitous and they both can get the intended meaning,
i.e., Teil can simultaneously quantify over material parts of the kitchen sink and
over individual items making up the tableware. Hence, the mismatch between
the values of grammatical number on conjunct nominals in (17) definitely does
not play a role here and the effect seems to be purely semantic.
At this point, a conclusion can be drawn. Given the results of the zeugma test,
I deduce that part-words in German are not ambiguous between two different
interpretations. Rather, they are semantically underspecified in the sense that
their meaning is general enough to cover configurations involving both material
and individual parthood. As a result a part-of-a-singularity understanding is de-
rived in entity partitives whereas a part-of-a-plurality understanding arises in
set partitives.
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Having identified the source of the analogy between entity and set partitives,
let us now examine to what extent it is valid from a wider cross-linguistic per-
spective.
2.2.2 Entity and set partitives across languages
For some reason, the analogy between explicit entity and set partitives does not
hold in English. As observed by Schwarzschild (1996: pp. 165–166), there is a con-
trast between (19a) and (19c), on the one hand, and (19b), on the other.
(19) English (Schwarzschild 1996)
a. Part of the car was painted.
b. #Part of the boys were in Texas.
c. Part of the group was in Texas.
The reason why (19b) is infelicitous is that English allows only for explicit entity
partitives of the form in (20a) whereas explicit set partitives such as (20b) are
not well-formed expressions in the language. In order to refer to a subset of the
relevant entities, one needs to use a partitive construction such as (20c) where
the existential quantifier some is employed as the upstairs determiner.11
(20) English (Guy Tabachnick, p.c.)
a. part of the apple
b. #part of the apples
c. some of the apples
If English were like German, it would be possible to use the sentence in (19b) to
describe a situation where some of the boys were in Texas. But the sentence is
odd. Schwarzschild concludes that since English part of cannot co-occur with
count plurals, it selects for singularity-denoting complements exclusively.
Schwarzschild examines explicit entity and set partitives for a particular rea-
son. On the basis of the contrast between (19b) and (19c) and other facts con-
cerning predicate non-sharing, he argues against analyses positing that group
nouns denote impure atoms, i.e., entities that have complex internal structure
but at the same time differ from mere sums of individuals in that they behave
as if they were units in their own right.12 However, what is interesting from the
perspective of this study are some possible consequences of the data in (19) and
(20) for the ontology encoded in that part of natural language semantics that
11Similar contrasts were also reported by Chierchia (2010).
12See also de Vries (2015) for a different approach building on the same conclusion.
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deals with parthood. Specifically, what is implied by the argument put forward
by Schwarzschild is that singularities and pluralities involve two distinct part-
whole structures, or, in other words, there is a fundamental difference between
how we conceptualize the relationship between material parts of an object and
that object, on the one hand, and members of a set of objects and that set, on
the other. In fact, that is the received view in theories of parthood (e.g., Link
1983; Simons 1987). On the discussed approach, English part of is modeled as
an existential ‘pieces’ quantifier. Simplifying a bit, part of only takes arguments
denoting singularities and ensures that the intersection of the sets of parts of a
singularity with the set corresponding to the verbal predicate is non-empty.
Whatever the reason English does not allow for explicit set partitives, i.e., par-
titives headed by part with embedded plural DPs, it is not an ordinary behavior
from a typological point of view. On the contrary, the analogy introduced in
(12)–(13) holds in multiple languages displaying the singular/plural distinction
including at least representatives of such diverse language families as Germanic,
Slavic, Romance, Celtic, Finno-Ugric, Semitic, and Basque, see (21)–(28). In all
the languages listed below, explicit partitives allow for both singular and plural
DPs. For instance, (21a) is an example of the Dutch explicit entity partitive on a
par with the English construction in (20a). As in German, see (12b), in order to
quantify over parts of a plurality, i.e., particular apples, the same partitive word
deel ‘part’ can be used with the plural DP, as witnessed by the felicity of (21b).


















‘some of the apples’
The same holds in other Indo-European languages such as Polish, see (22), Rus-











‘some of the apples’
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‘some of the apples’














‘some of the walls’














‘some of the apples’
















‘some of the apples’
Moreover, the same phenomenon can be observed outside the Indo-European
language family. For instance, in an agglutinative language such as Hungarian
both explicit entity partitives and explicit set partitives are possible, see (27).




















‘some of the apples’
Similarly, the Hebrew explicit entity partitive construction in (28a) refers to a set
of parts of the relevant boy, i.e., his body parts, whereas the phrase with the same
xelek ‘part’ expression in (28b) would be true of some of the boys.










‘some of the boys’
Finally, as attested in (29) the analogy holds in the isolate Basque language.13














‘some of the apples’
A similar phenomenon can be observed in partitives involving proportional ex-
pressions including half-words and fractions. This time also English does show
the discussed pattern. For instance, half, most, and two thirds in (30a), (31a), and
(32a), respectively, quantify over parts of a singular entity, i.e., yield a portion
of stuff constituting the whole, whereas in (30b), (31b), and (32b) they quantify
over parts of a plural individual, i.e., indicate a subset of individuals making up
the total plurality.
13That seems to be the case at least in the Biscayan dialect. The speakers of the Gipuzkoan dialect
I questioned disagree. Many thanks to Aitor Lizardi Ituarte, Gillen Martinez de la Hidalga, and
Itziar Orbegozo Arrizabalaga for their judgments, and to Katie Fraser for putting me in touch
with them.
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(30) English
a. half of the apple
b. half of the apples
(31) English
a. most of the apple
b. most of the apples
(32) English
a. two thirds of the apple
b. two thirds of the apples
Again, this kind of pattern is attested cross-linguistically, as witnessed in the ex-
amples from Polish in (33)–(35) and German in (36)–(38). In all the phrases pro-
vided below, the proportional quantifier can quantify either over material parts
of the relevant object, i.e., apple, or over individual objects, i.e., apples, making

















‘most of the apple’
b. większość jabłek
most apples.gen















‘two thirds of the apples’
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‘half of the apples’


















‘most of the apples’


















‘two thirds of the apples’
Furthermore, it is well known that in many languages displaying the singular/-
plural distinction, there are classes of number-neutral nominals referring to in-
dividuated discrete entities such as object mass nouns (known also as fake or
neat mass nouns; see, e.g., Gillon 1992; Chierchia 1998a; 2010; Barner & Snedeker
2005; Bale & Barner 2009; Landman 2011) and pluralia tantum, i.e., plural nouns
without singular counterparts (e.g., Wierzbicka 1988; Corbett 2000; Koptjevskaja-
Tamm & Wälchli 2001; Wisniewski 2010; see also Wągiel 2015a; 2017). The exam-
ples of the first category in English are jewelry, furniture, and mail, whereas scis-
sors, eyeglasses, and pants fall into the second class. Both types of expressions are
systematically ambiguous between a singular and a plural reading, i.e., they can
either refer to one individual or to a sum of individuals. For instance, furniture
can denote either one or many pieces of furniture. Consequently, (39a) would be
true if there were, say, one wardrobe in the room as well as if there were several
chairs or a chair, a table, and a wardrobe in the room. Similarly, since scissors is
number-neutral, (39b) would be true either if there were one or many utensils
on the table.
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(39) English
a. There is furniture in the room.
b. There are scissors on the table.
Interestingly, in many languages partitives including number-neutral nominals
such as object mass nouns and pluralia tantum are ambiguous between a part-of-
a-singularity and part-of-a-plurality reading. For instance, the Czech phrase in
(40a) would be true of a part of a singular shoe in question as well as of a subset
of the relevant shoes. Likewise, (40b) can either refer to a part of one utensil or
it can mean a subset of the total number of the relevant scissors.





‘part of the footwear’ or







‘part of the scissors’ or
‘some of the scissors’
(i) part-of-a-singularity reading
(ii) part-of-a-plurality reading
The same ambiguity appears in proportional partitives such as (41a) and (41b).

















A similar effect is reported to appear in some constructions in languages with
general number such as Japanese, as originally observed for proportional parti-
tives by Sauerland & Yatsushiro (2004). For instance, (42) would be true both in
a scenario where John read a number of books which is greater than a half of the
total number of books and in a scenario where John read more than a half of one
book.









‘John finished reading most of the books.’ or
‘John finished reading most parts of the book(s).’
a. part-of-a-singularity reading
b. part-of-a-plurality reading
Likewise, Watanabe (2013; 2017) discusses pairs of constructions involving both
explicit and proportional partitives such as those provided in (43)–(45). Different
linearizations in the doublets correlate with different interpretations. Construc-
tions in which partitive words follow nominals are ambiguous between a part-of-
a-singularity and a part-of-a-plurality reading, whereas sentences with partitive
words preceding the noun unambiguously refer to collections of objects. In par-
ticular, (43a) can either mean that a part of a single apple in question is rotten or
that a subset of all the relevant apples is rotten.14







‘Part of the apple is rotten.’ or









‘Some of the apples are rotten.’
(i) #part-of-a-singularity reading
(ii) part-of-a-plurality reading
14As explained in §1.3.1, the use of the symbol # in (43b-i) means that this reading is unavailable.
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Similarly, (44a) and (45a) mean that either more than half of one apple is rotten
or that the number of rotten apples exceeds a half of the total number. On the
other hand, the partitives with the reversed order in the sentences in (43b), (44b),
and (45b) do not give rise to such an ambiguity and can only make reference to
subsets of a larger set, i.e., some of the apples and most of the apples, respectively.







‘Most of the apple is rotten.’ or









‘Most of the apples are rotten.’
(i) #part-of-a-singularity reading
(ii) part-of-a-plurality reading







‘Most of the apple is rotten.’ or









‘Most of the apples are rotten.’
(i) #part-of-a-singularity reading
(ii) part-of-a-plurality reading
The cross-linguistic generalization based on the data discussed above is that the
pattern in which the same partitive word can appear in both entity and set par-
titives is very common. This fact in turn suggests that across languages singu-
lars and plurals generally employ a unified part-whole structure. Importantly,
the ability of singular and plural DPs to be coordinated within a single partitive
construction examined in the previous section, recall (17)–(18), is not a German
idiosyncrasy but is also attested in other languages. For instance, Polish allows
for sentences such as (46), where the genitive singular form arbuza ‘of the water-
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melon’ is conjoined with the genitive plural borówek ‘of the blueberries’ inside














‘Jaś ate a part of the watermelon and some of the blueberries.’
As witnessed by the translation above, (46) would be true if Jaś ate a material part
of a single watermelon and a subset of the relevant set of blueberries. Therefore,
the part-word część can simultaneously access the singular and the plural part-
whole structure.16
The intuition described above is further corroborated by a number of naturally
occurring examples attested in the National Corpus of Polish (NCP) (Przepiór-




















‘Some of the furniture and part of the floor burnt down as well as





































15Notice, however, that it is not always possible. For instance, an exact translation of the sen-
tences in (17) discussed in the previous section would be considered awkward. I hypothesize
that the reason for the infelicity of such examples has to do with the fact that these are con-
joined NPs rather than DPs. Assuming that the silent determiner sits above the coordinate
structure would explain why such partitives are impossible since DP-internal coordination
does not allow for mixing of singulars and plurals (Heycock & Zamparelli 2003).
16I would like to thank Adam Przepiórkowski for sharing his observations and the discussion of
the Polish data.
17The National Corpus of Polish (http://nkjp.pl/) is a representative digital corpus of the con-
temporary Polish language consisting of over 1.5 billion words with a balanced subcorpus of
300-million tokens.
35

















‘The leader of the USA visited […] the endangered regions in reac-
tion to the accusations by some of the media and part of the public
opinion […] that his reaction is too slow.’
In (47a), mebli ‘of the furniture’ is the genitive plural form, whereas podłogi ‘of
the floor’ is singular.18 The entire partitive construction occurs in subject posi-
tion and is interpreted as referring to some of the relevant furniture items and
a part of the floor. The same behavior can be observed in the so-called imper-
sonal construction in (47b) (see, e.g., Lavine 2005; Ruda 2014 for a discussion of
Polish impersonal constructions). Here, the part-word część is marked with the
accusative case and designates simultaneously a part of the plurality of rooms
and a part of the floor. Finally, (47c) gives an example of a partitive with a con-
joined singular and plural DP within the genitive construction. Again, część tar-
gets the part-whole structures of both nominals, i.e., the accusations were made
by a subset of the media and by a part of the public opinion.
The data discussed above suggest that in many languages part-words are able
to simultaneously access elements making up pluralities of individuals as well
as subatomic part-whole structures. Of course, there is no reason to believe that
part-words are simply reducible to the mereological parthood relation, just as
there is no reason to believe that the noun member is the natural language ex-
ponent of the set-theoretic membership relation (see Champollion 2010; 2017).
However, it is possible that such expressions do employ a notion of parthood
which might be modeled in terms of some primitive formal relation. For theories
that sort domains, and thus distinguish strictly between individual and material
parthood (e.g., Link 1983), the cross-linguistic behavior of partitive words might
be seen as problematic to account for in a systematic manner. In contrast, pos-
tulating a unified ontology for singular objects and pluralities thereof seems to
explain the discussed semantic behavior. However, as will be discussed in Chap-
ter 7, such a treatment may also encounter some problems to account for.
I believe that at this point an empirical conclusion can be drawn. Though the
sample of languages and constructions discussed in this section definitely does
not exhaust the cross-linguistic diversity in the domain of explicit and propor-
tional partitives (nor was it intended to), I conclude that the pattern involving
analogous structures for explicit and proportional entity and set partitives is ro-
bust. In multiple typologically and genetically different languages the same par-
titive word can be used to designate both parts of a single individual and subsets
of objects constituting a larger plurality. Given the facts concerning coordina-
tion discussed in the previous section, I conclude that the cross-linguistically
18Notice that the noun mebel ‘(item of) furniture’ is a count noun in Polish.
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widespread behavior of partitive words tells us something non-trivial about the
way discrete objects and sums thereof are conceptualized. I believe that system-
atic patterns as described in this section should not be neglected but instead guide
development of a proper approach.
The next section will provide a potentially problematic observation concern-
ing different properties of part-words in explicit entity and set partitives.
2.2.3 Partitivity and countability
At first blush, the cross-linguistically attested distribution of part-words and
other proportional expressions in entity and set partitives as well as their behav-
ior with respect to embedded conjunctions discussed in §2.2.1 and §2.2.2 suggests
at least a strong correspondence between subatomic and superatomic part-whole
structures. The fact that the very same expression can be used to quantify over
parts of a singular individual as well as over parts of a plurality in multiple ty-
pologically different and often unrelated languages indicates that an ambiguity
approach postulating two different lexical entries for the relevant proportional
expressions is quite implausible. To the contrary, it seems that something more
essential is happening here, and a more detailed examination of the phenomenon
might shed new light on the properties of that component of the language faculty
that is dedicated to the interpretation of part-whole relations.
However, Schwarzschild (1996) presents data that might seem to be a coun-
terargument against an approach postulating a semantics operating on a unified
part-whole structure that would allow for both quantification overwholes aswell
as subatomic quantification (see Moltmann 1997; 1998). The crucial observation
concerns the fact that part-words in explicit set partitives have different prop-
erties than part-words occurring in entity partitive constructions. Specifically,
such expressions are countable only if they refer to material parts of a singular
object. For instance, consider the contrast between the phrases in (48).






















2 Partitives and part-whole structures
The count explicit entity partitive in (48a) comprises the Italian singular DP del
muro ‘of the wall’ combined with the pluralized part-word parti ‘parts’ modified
by the cardinal numeral tre ‘three’. What the phrase can only denote is a set
of pluralities consisting of three parts of different individual walls, e.g., a set
including a sum of a part of the wall 𝑤1, a part of the wall 𝑤2, and a part of the
wall 𝑤3. Crucially though, (48a) cannot refer to parts of a plurality, i.e., three
individual walls or three pluralities of walls. To illustrate the distinction, let us
assume that there are 8 relevant walls: 𝑤1, … , 𝑤8. In such a scenario, (48b) is not
felicitous on the reading where one is counting parts of a plurality, e.g., it would
not be true of the set of three walls {𝑤1, 𝑤2, 𝑤3} or the set of three subsets of the
walls {{𝑤1, 𝑤2}, {𝑤3, 𝑤4, 𝑤5}, {𝑤6, 𝑤7}}.
This phenomenon is by no means an Italian idiosyncrasy. To the contrary, it is
attested cross-linguistically, as will be demonstrated in the the following exam-
ples. For instance, the very same pattern can be found in Brazilian Portuguese.
Similar to the interpretation of (48b), the sentence (49b) would be true if, say,
a brick of the wall 𝑤1 were red, two bricks of the wall 𝑤2 were red, and three
bricks of the wall 𝑤3 were red. However, given the scenario with the eight rele-
vant walls 𝑤1, … , 𝑤8 introduced above it would not be considered true if, e.g., 𝑤1,
𝑤2, and 𝑤3 were all painted red, nor if three subsets of the walls, e.g., {𝑤1, 𝑤2, 𝑤3},
{𝑤4, 𝑤5}, and {𝑤6, 𝑤7}, were all painted red.


























‘Three parts of the walls are red.’
(i) part-of-a-singularity reading
(ii) #part-of-a-plurality reading
Such a pattern is also attested outside Romance. For instance, the German sen-
tence in (50a) is true if there are three green spots on the relevant apple. How-
ever, (50b) cannot mean that three subsets of the apples are green. Rather, the
only possible interpretation of the sentence is that three parts of different apples
are green.




























‘Three parts of the apples are green.’
(i) part-of-a-singularity reading
(ii) #part-of-a-plurality reading
A similar effect is found in Slavic, e.g., (51) illustrates the relevant contrast in Pol-
ish.19 Again, the count explicit set partitive does not quantify over sub-pluralities
of the apples in question, but rather over parts of individual apples. The sentence























‘Three parts of the apples are green.’
(i) part-of-a-singularity reading
(ii) #part-of-a-plurality reading
Furthermore, there are two distinct constructions in Japanese that display the
same pattern, see (52). Despite the fact that the noun ringo ‘apple’ is number-
neutral and as such it can either refer to a single apple or to a collection of fruit,
the count explicit partitive in (52a) where the part-word bubun is modified by
a numeral forces a part-of-a-singularity reading.21 The sentence simply cannot
mean that three different subsets of whole apples are damaged. Similarly, the use
of the classifier construction involving a numeral and the classifier kasyo in order
to quantify over parts of referents of a number-neutral noun excludes a part-of-a-
plurality reading. As witnessed in (52b), the only possible interpretation involves
subatomic quantification, i.e., three parts of a singularity are damaged.
19As pointed out by a reviewer, for some speakers of Polish the part-word część ‘part’ is am-
biguous between a noun and a numeral, which may affect the availability of certain readings
discussed in this section. However, in this book I examine a variety of Polish in which there is
no such ambiguity.
20Notice that there is yet another reading of modified set partitives with DPs denoting food terms
in Polish. It involves the count-mass shift and indicates a fraction of volume, e.g., three-fourths
of the total volume of the apples. I ignore this interpretation here, but I will return to it in §3.3.
21Again, for the sake of simplicity I ignore here the attested distributive reading on which there
are multiple apples and three parts of each of them are damaged.
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‘Three parts of the apple are damaged.’
(i) part-of-a-singularity reading
(ii) #part-of-a-plurality reading
The effect is even stronger if we consider partitives with animate DPs. For in-
stance, notice the contrast between (53a) and (53b) in Italian. The first is felicitous
if a subset of the relevant boys were in Texas. However, the second sentence im-
plies an organ trafficking context since the only possible interpretation one can
get is that three body parts belonging to the boys were in Texas.




























Intended: ‘Three subsets of the boys were in Texas.’
A similar effect holds in Polish. While the sentence involving the explicit set
partitive in (54a) is perfectly fine and simply means that some of the relevant
boys sleep, its modified counterpart in (54b) is nonsensical since it asserts that
three body parts sleep. Unless one considers a macabre and/or comical scenario
in the spirit of the Addams Family with sentient animate disembodied hands,


















Intended: ‘Three subsets of the boys sleep.’
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Moreover, the phenomenon is not restricted to explicit partitives modified by
cardinal numerals but holds also for constructions involving other types of quan-
tifiers. For instance, let us consider the examples in (55) where the referents of
proportional partitives are arguments of a predicate involving the total adjective











































‘Most of the toy parts are clean.’
(i) part-of-a-singularity reading
(ii) #part-of-a-plurality reading
Analogously to adjectives such as full, flat, and closed, clean is an absolute grad-
able adjective that indicates the maximal degree of the property in question
(Unger 1975; Kennedy & McNally 2005). In other words, clean is true of an entity
that is completely clean or at least the degree of cleanliness falls near the maxi-
mal value on the scale. Let us now contemplate the contrast between (55a) and
(55c), on the one hand, and (55b) and (55d), on the other. The first two sentences
involve regular proportional partitives which quantify over whole individuals.
Therefore, if there are six relevant toys 𝑡1, …, 𝑡6 in total, (55a) and (55c) would be
true if three of the six toys, e.g., 𝑡1, 𝑡2, and 𝑡3, or at least four of the six toys, e.g., 𝑡1,
𝑡2, 𝑡3, and 𝑡4, were clean, respectively. However, when an explicit set partitive is
modified by proportional quantifiers such as połowa ‘half’ and większość ‘most’
the whole phrase does not quantify over wholes anymore but rather over parts
of singular individuals. Hence, (55b) and (55d) can be true even if it is not the case
that half or most of the toys are clean, respectively. In fact, they might be true if
none of the toys is actually clean. Imagine a scenario where there are six teddy
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bears and one paw of each of them is dirty. It follows that none of the teddy bears
is clean though most of their parts are clean.
The same distinction can also be detected in contexts regarding universal quan-
tification. Though in such environments it is hard to distinguish between quan-
tification over parts of singularities and quantification over parts of pluralities,
the difference becomes evident if an adverbial modifier such as almost is used.
Both (56a) and (56b) can be true even if none of the toys is completely clean. Since
it is sufficient for an object to be considered dirty if only one of its parts is dirty,
one can imagine a scenario where almost every part of the relevant six teddy
bears is clean and yet the teddy bears are dirty. And again, modified explicit par-
titives do not quantify over wholes but rather over parts of wholes despite the





























‘Almost all toy parts are clean.’
(i) part-of-a-singularity reading
(ii) #part-of-a-plurality reading
A brief investigation into the cross-linguistic behavior of partitive words sug-
gests that the discussed pattern is robust. Table 2.1 summarizes the observed se-
mantic behavior. The labels “bare” and “count” in the table stand for bare explicit
partitives and count explicit partitives, respectively, each of which can include a
singular or a plural DP.
Table 2.1: Properties of partitive words in explicit partitives
singulars plurals
bare count bare count
subatomic quantification   * 
quantification over wholes * *  *
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In entity partitives, i.e., constructions involving embedded singular count DPs,
both unmodified and modified partitive words quantify over material parts of
the relevant entity. On the other hand, the domain of quantification for partitive
words in set partitives, i.e., constructions with plural DPs, shifts when they com-
bine with quantifiers. Specifically, although explicit partitives with unmodified
partitive words quantify over parts of a plurality, in the presence of a quanti-
fier they are no longer able to count whole individuals and instead operate on
the subatomic level. In fact, it appears that there are no count explicit set parti-
tives since apparently no partitives quantify over subsets of the set denoted by
the downstairs DP in the first place. Rather, constructions such as (48b) in Ital-
ian are a special type of entity partitive with the only difference that material
parts do not belong to one object as in (48a) but are distributed onto a plurality
of individuals. This is puzzling because it suggests that despite the apparent ho-
mophony part-words in explicit entity partitives and count explicit partitives as
well as half-words in corresponding proportional partitives are in fact different
semantic expressions.
Based on the discussed contrasts in Italian, Schwarzschild (1996) concludes
that the uncountability of part-words in set partitives reveals that Italian and
English do not disagree with respect to their ontologies. Since English part of
selects for singularity-denoting complements and cannot co-occur with count
plurals, it is modeled as an existential “pieces” quantifier in his system. Presum-
ably Italian parte ‘part’ in entity partitives and count explicit partitives, see (24a)
and (48a), respectively, is an expression of the same type, whereas parte in set
partitives, see (24b) is a quantifier of a different sort.
As mentioned before, Schwarzschild’s (1996) argument concerns primarily ex-
tensions of group nouns. However, what his novel observation, further corrobo-
rated in this section, seems to imply is that in diverse languages singular individ-
uals and pluralities are associated with distinct mereological structures. This can
be seen as a valid counterargument against an approach attempting to unify part-
whole relations corresponding to extensions of singulars and plurals such as the
theory of Moltmann (1997; 1998) if the main empirical motivation concerns the
morphological parallelisms in quantification in entity, set, and mass partitives.
However, there are three interrelated issues concerning an approach that
posits multiple lexical entries for part-words to explain their non-trivial quantifi-
cational behavior. One problem has to do with cross-linguistic correspondences.
Since the same part-word is often used both in entity and set partitives cross-
linguistically as we saw in the previous section, a homophony would have to
be postulated in multiple diverse languages. Though of course it is not a logical
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impossibility, it seems very implausible that languages in general do not differ-
entiate morphologically between the two expressions in question.
Moreover, the behavior of partitive words with conjoined singular and plural
nominals in sentences like (17)–(18) in §2.2.1 provides compelling evidence that
at least in some cases their treatment based on ambiguity is unattainable. Rather,
one needs to propose an account based on semantic indeterminacy.
The final issue concerns intralinguistic systematicity. Aswitnessed by thewell-
formedness of English proportional and fraction partitives such as those in (30)–
(32) in §2.2.2, partitive words such as half and most as well as fractions such as
two thirds can be used both in entity and set partitives where they get a part-of-a-
singularity and part-of-a-plurality reading, respectively. Again, as we saw, such
distribution holds cross-linguistically. Interestingly, proportional quantifiers pat-
tern with part-words when modified by numerals. For instance, consider the Pol-























‘Two halves of the walls are red.’
(i) part-of-a-singularity reading
(ii) #part-of-a-plurality reading
In (57a), the count explicit partitive quantifies over material parts of the relevant
wall and the sentence is truth-conditionally equivalent with a statement that the
whole wall is red. Nonetheless, the count explicit partitive in (57b) does not mean
that all the walls are red but rather that among the walls there are two such that
they are half red-painted. Despite the downstairs plural DP, the whole phrase is
not interpreted as a set partitive and, similarly to (57a), it quantifies over parts of
distinct wholes.












‘Both halves of the wall are red.’













Intended: ‘Both halves of the walls are red.’
Since the quantifier both combines universal quantification with an inference
that the cardinality of counted objects equals two (see Barwise & Cooper 1981;
Schwarzschild 1996: pp. 139–145), in most cases it can be paraphrased by the defi-
nite numeral expression the two.23 Hence, the example in (58a) simply states that
the two halves of the wall are red, i.e., that all the halves are red and that there are
only two halves. However, when one tries to process (58b) on a non-distributive
reading, it gets confusing. Of course, if the modified partitive quantified over
whole walls, we would get a straightforward interpretation that all the walls are
red, but it is not what the phrase means. Instead, obie ‘both’ implies that the total
number of halves is two, whereas at the same time the plural DP infers that there
are at least two walls, thus at least four halves, which results in a contradictory
statement.
Likewise, the contrast in (59) makes a similar point. Since it is only possible for
an object to have two halves, the sentence in (59a) is strange because it asserts
that the wall has more than two parts forming 50% of its material constitution
each. On the other hand, there is nothing awkward about (59b). The sentence
does not state that there are more walls than there are walls but rather that























‘Three halves of the walls are red.’
At this point, I conclude that if one pursues an approach explaining the dis-
cussed behavior in terms of ambiguity, one is forced to assume that the cross-
linguistic as well as intra-linguistic patterns in question are just a remarkable
coincidence. Nevertheless, my own view is that systematic parallelism is some-
thing that should be approached with serious consideration since it may reveal
some deep aspects of the nature of natural language semantics. For instance, the
23But see Ladusaw (1982) for discussion of the asymmetry between the two quantifiers in ques-
tion in partitives.
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distinction between collective, distributive, and cumulative understandings of
sentences involving semantically plural DPs does hold in multiple environments
in multiple languages and the research on its roots has led to many prominent
theories in the study of pluralities (e.g., Scha 1981; Link 1983; 1984; Hoeksema
1983; Gillon 1987; Landman 1989a,b; 2000; Schwarzschild 1991; 1996; Schein 1993;
Lasersohn 1995; Beck & Sauerland 2000; Winter 2001; Champollion 2010; 2017;
Dotlačil 2010; Schmitt 2013; Zweig 2008). I would like to suggest that the dis-
cussed behavior of part-words modified by cardinal numerals and other quanti-
fiers can shed new light on the matter of countability. Therefore, I argue that the
morphological, syntactic and semantic evidence indicates that the analogy be-
tween entity and set partitives is not coincidental but rather it reveals a unified
notion of parthood in natural language.
Crucially, there is an intriguing twist concerning count explicit partitives sug-
gesting that the phenomenon discussed in this section results from an indepen-
dent factor, specifically from the type of entities plural expressions denote. In
particular, the extensions of regular plurals comprise arbitrary sums of individ-
uals, i.e., scattered entities which bear no topological commitments with respect
to the configuration of the parts of a plurality and it seems that natural language
does not consider such entities to be units one could quantify over. But what
if there were a language with a plural that similarly to, say, the German plu-
ral denotes sums of individuals but in addition asserts a specific spatial relation
holding between individuals making up a plurality that guarantees that such a
sum has object-like properties? If the claim relating countability with being an
integrated entity is on the right track, one would expect that when part-words
heading partitives involving such untypical plural expressions are modified by
numerals the quantificational behavior of the whole phrase should differ from
what we observed so far. The next section will examine the interaction between
cardinals and partitives involving so-called irregular plurals in Italian.
2.3 Italian irregular plurals
There is a relatively small set of irregular nouns in Italian that display both
morpho-syntactic and semantic peculiarities with respect to the singular/plural
distinction. These nouns form an inflectional class whose defining characteris-
tic is that it exhibits an idiosyncratic agreement pattern involving a gender shift
in the plural. For instance, let us consider a representative of the class, e.g., the
masculine noun dito ‘finger’. As witnessed by the well-formed phrases in (60),
the singular form dito is masculine, whereas the plural dita not only shows the
46
2.3 Italian irregular plurals
irregular inflectional marker -a (regular masculine nouns end in -i in the plural),
but also triggers feminine agreement (Acquaviva 2008: p. 125), as opposed to the
regular pattern in (61). In particular, while zii ‘uncles’ takes the regular plural
marker -i and combines with the masculine plural definite article i and mascu-
line plural possessive pronoun tuoi, dita can only be modified by their feminine
equivalents, i.e., le and tue respectively.






























Forms such as dita are sometimes referred to in the literature as Italian irregu-
lar plurals in -a (see Acquaviva 2008 and references therein) or collective plu-
rals, as opposed to regular distributive plurals (see Corbett 2000 and references
therein).24 The morpho-syntax and semantics of such forms have been a subject
of intense investigations both within traditional Italo-Romance linguistics (Hall
1956; Brunet 1978: pp. 30–90) as well as formally oriented approaches (Ojeda
1995; Acquaviva 2008; Kučerová 2015). Historically, the class arose as a result
of the disappearance of Latin neuters in Italo-Romance (see Löfstedt 1956: pp.
46–51; Lausberg 1963; Rohlfs 1968), and thus all the nouns that belong to it are
inanimates usually referring to body parts, series of events, measurement units,
and mass concepts.25 In contemporary Italian it is restricted to approximately
twenty nouns, but the pattern used to involve many more lexemes in the past
24Kučerová (2015) uses the terms relational pattern and atomic pattern.
25I will not discuss irregular measure nouns and mass terms here. Though I acknowledge that
they might constitute a challenge for a unified semantic interpretation of the class (cf. Ojeda
1995; Acquaviva 2008), this fact does not affect the core observation to be presented in this
section.
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(Santangelo 1981). Interestingly, nowhere else in the language is the marker -a
the exponent of the plural and in at least some cases it seems to be responsible
for an additional semantic effect to be discussed below.
The class of Italian irregular nouns can be divided into two groups. The first
group consists of nouns that take irregular plural forms exclusively, i.e., do not
pluralize in -i altogether. Table 2.2 lists some of the examples. Although plural
forms such as uova ‘eggs’ and centinaia ‘hundreds’ are morphologically irregu-
lar, they do not seem to display any semantic idiosyncrasy. They simply do what
regular plurals do, i.e., refer to pluralities of entities satisfying the property in-
troduced by the nominal stem. In this respect, there seems to be no difference
between irregular plurals and regular forms such as pomodoro ‘tomato’ ∼ po-
modori ‘tomatoes’ and miliardo ‘billion’ ∼ miliardi ‘billions’. In both cases, the
pluralized noun merely denotes a collection of eggs or fruits and a number of
hundreds or billions, respectively.
Table 2.2: Italian nouns with irregular plurals exclusively (based on
Acquaviva 2008: pp. 126–127)
singular regular plural irregular plural
uovo ‘egg’ *uovi uova ‘eggs’
riso ‘laughter’ *risi risa ‘pearls of laughter’
paio ‘pair’ *paii paia ‘pairs’
centinaio ‘hundred’ *centinai centinaia ‘hundreds’
miglio ‘mile’ *migli miglia ‘miles’
More interestingly, however, there are also a number of nouns with both reg-
ular and irregular plural counterparts such as those listed in Table 2.3.26 Though
at least to some extent the effect seems to depend on a particular idiolect and
register, in the cases of doublets concurrent irregular feminine -a plurals tend to
differ from run-of-the-mill masculine -i forms in meaning. As witnessed by the
translations of irregular forms given in Table 2.3, there is often a sense of collec-
tivity or cohesion in addition to the ordinary plural interpretation. For instance,
26Acquaviva (2008: pp. 124–129) introduces a more subtle classification by distinguishing also
a class which does have the regular -i alternant but it is dialectally restricted, and thus not
available for all speakers of Italian, e.g., lenzuolo ‘sheet’ ∼ %lenzuoli ‘sheets’ ∼ lenzuola ‘sheets
(bed linen)’. Moreover, he lists irregular pluralia tantum, i.e., feminine plural -a forms with
no singular nor regular plural counterparts, e.g., vestigia ‘relics’, as well as fossilized irregular
plural forms found only in idiomatic expressions. For the sake of clarity of the main argument,
I will not discuss all the nuanced morphological, semantic, and sociolinguistic intricacies here,
and I refer the reader to Acquaviva’s study for more details.
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the irregular form ossa ‘bones’ evokes an interpretation that the bones belong
together as in a skeleton, whereas regular ossi ‘bones’ simply refers to a plurality
of unrelated bones, see (62b) (Corbett 2000: p. 153). Likewise, the only way to
interpret mura ‘walls’ is by picturing a walled complex, e.g., a perimeter of city
walls, see (62a) (Acquaviva 2008: p. 150). In both cases, there is a strong intuition
that the referents of the irregular plural forms are naturally related and due to
this kind of semantic flavor Italian -a plurals have been analyzed as collectivizers
of a particular sort (Ojeda 1995) or expressions inherently encoding the cohesion
of referents (Acquaviva 2008).
Table 2.3: Italian nouns with both regular and irregular plural counter-
parts
singular regular plural irregular plural
muro ‘wall’ muri ‘walls’ mura ‘walls (in a complex)’
osso ‘bone’ ossi ‘bones’ ossa ‘bones (in a skeleton)’
filo ‘thread’ fili ‘threads’ fila ‘threads (in a fabric)’
fondamento ‘basis’ fondamenti ‘bases’ fondamenta ‘foundations’
urlo ‘shout’ urli ‘shouts’ urla ‘shouts (in a series)’
Aware of all the subtleties within the class, I will focus my attention only on
expressions following the second pattern in Table 2.4 (Acquaviva 2008). Specifi-
cally, plural forms of nouns that do not pluralize in -i at all get a regular semantic
interpretation, i.e., merely refer to pluralities of individuals. On the other hand,
the meaning of -a plural forms of nouns having doublets differ from the mean-
ing of those in -i. In such cases, regular plurals are semantically regular, whereas
irregular plurals denote pluralities of objects conceptualized as constituents of a
larger cohesive entity.27





27Acquaviva (2008: pp. 151–152) argues against separating the two classes due to the fact that
there exist irregular plurals without an -i counterpart that, unlike singulars, get a mass inter-
pretation, e.g., midolla ‘marrow’. For the sake of clarity, I will ignore such intricacies here.
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In the first formal semantic treatment of Italian irregular plurals, Ojeda (1995)
proposes an account on which expressions such as braccia ‘arms’ and ginocchia
‘knees’ do not denote mere sets of body parts but instead make reference to nat-
urally occurring sets of arms or knees, i.e., pairs of arms or knees of one body.28
The core idea of the approach is that nouns denote with a certain indeterminacy
of individuation and that the plural is the unmarked number (Ojeda 1993). Hence,
plural markers are mere identity functions which do not affect the reference of
the stem. On the other hand, the singular restricts the denotation of the stem
to the domain of atomic individuals. Within this approach, nominal stems in
regular/irregular doublets are in fact homophonous expressions having distinct
denotations and the distribution of the plural markers -i and -a is constrained in
that each of them can only combine with a semantic object of a particular type.
In other words, -a does not have a different semantic value than -i but they differ
in their input requirements. Specifically, the regular marker -i selects for stems
denoting sets of all sets of singular referents including singletons, e.g., the set of
all sets of individual arms. On the other hand, the irregular ending -a combines
with stems that attribute a collective meaning associated with the plurality the
whole noun refers to. In particular, -a selects for a homophonous stem denoting
the set of natural aggregates of objects within the universe of discourse, e.g., the
set of pairs of knees of each individual and pluralities formed by such pairs rather
than arbitrary sums of knees.
However, Acquaviva (2008) rejects the view that the collectivizing effect is the
characteristic for the whole class. Instead, he proposes that the common denom-
inator of irregular plurals is that they denote entities conceptualized as weakly
individual undifferentiated objects and argues for a lexicalist approach. In fact,
Ojeda (1995) himself admits that the proper analysis of irregular plurals refer-
ring to mass concepts such as cervello ‘brain’ ∼ cervelli ‘brains’ ∼ cervella ‘brains
(mass)’ is challenging for his account. Furthermore, as pointed out by Acquaviva
a straightforward compositional analysis of the relationship between -a and the
stem is problematic. One reason is that irregular plurals that lack regular -i al-
ternants do not show any semantic peculiarity and a mechanism explaining a
different selectional requirement would have to be postulated.
In order to avoid controversy I will focus on examples that indisputably invoke
the sense of collectivity, specifically I will test the behavior of the irregular forms
mura ‘walls (in a complex)’ and ossa ‘bones (in a skeleton)’, as demonstrated in
the series of alternations in (62).29
28In a sense, irregular plurals somewhat resemble duals in that they both tend to denote natural
aggregates (see also Acquaviva 2008: p. 152 for discussion).
29In (62), I use morpho-syntactic glosses. However, in the following part of the text I will gloss
irregular plurals following the pattern as coll.
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‘bone ∼ bones ∼ bones (in a skeleton)’
In this book, I refrain from taking a stand regarding the issue of the internal syn-
tactic and semantic structure of Italian irregular plurals and I remain agnostic
with respect to the exact compositional contribution of the irregular marker -a,
if any. However, I would like to suggest another perspective on reflecting the
meaning of irregular forms falling into the pattern when they compete with reg-
ular -i plurals. In the next section, I will discuss data suggesting that at least a
subset of irregular plurals is conceptualized as aggregates of entities related to
each other by means of spatial connectedness.
2.3.1 Aggregate meaning
Given the discussed semantic evidence and previous accounts by Ojeda (1995)
and Acquaviva (2008), it is plausible to posit that when an Italian plural in -a
alternates with a regular -i form, its extension does not simply comprise arbi-
trary sums of individuals but rather a more complex type of entities. Specifically,
I propose that the topological notion of connectedness or stable proximity of
parts making up a plurality denoted by the irregular plural is involved in the
way in which the referents of such an expression are conceptualized. As already
indicated in the previous section, at least in some cases there is a good reason to
assume that the reported collective flavor is due to the fact that Italian irregular
plurals encode integrated plural individuals, i.e., pluralities that unlike referents
of regular plurals involve particular spatial relations holding between individual
parts, and thus have the potential to form cohesive aggregates and even individ-
uated wholes.
For instance, Kučerová (2015) gives an example of the alternation between dito
‘finger’ ∼ diti ‘fingers’ ∼ dita ‘fingers (of a hand)’.30 If one refers to a plurality
of fingers attached to a hand, then the irregular form dita would be used. On
the other hand, when talking about detached fingers, e.g., in an anatomy class
setting, the regular plural diti is the appropriate form to use. It seems that in
30In some varieties of Italian, the regular plural diti ‘fingers’ is either unavailable or available
only marginally as a stigmatized form (Acquaviva 2008: p. 126).
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patterns such as dito ∼ diti ∼ dita the irregular form indicates a particular type
of relation holding between individual singular objects referred to by the noun,
namely a topological relation giving rise to a cluster consisting of fingers.
To illustrate that, let us imagine a military context where a siege is led by the
famous general Garibaldi who attempts to destroy the defensive fortification of
the attacked city. Now, consider the sentences in (63).

































‘Garibaldi has dismantled the walled complex.’
If (63a) is true, then there is no wall any more, just a pile of stones. Similarly,
uttering (63b) implies that there are no walls any more, just a number of piles
of stones. However, (63c) can also mean something else, namely that the walls
are not completely dismantled and though they probably received some damage
during the siege, they are still recognizable as such, but importantly they are no
longer connected. In other words, there is no complex of walls anymore andwhat
is left is only a discontiguous collection of dissociated objects, i.e., independent
walls.
The predicate smantellare ‘dismantle’ is what I call a verb of separation, i.e., a
transitive expression sensitive to the part-whole structure of its first argument.
When applied to a DP, it implies that the spatial connection between the parts
of its referents has been undone or, in other words, the denoted individual has
been disintegrated. Since referents of count singular nouns are arguably concep-
tualized as clusters, i.e., pluralities of interrelated objects, if the complement of
smantellare in a true sentence is a singular count DP, it follows that the entity de-
noted by that noun has ceased to exist as an integrated whole. To put it another
way, the connections holding between its parts have been unbound and what
is left is merely an arbitrary collection of pieces which do not form an individu-
ated object anymore. On the other hand, regular plural nouns refer to arbitrary
sums of objects, i.e., there is no sense in which parts of a plurality are related
to each other other than by being members of a certain set. Denotations of reg-
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ular plurals are constituted by scattered collections of singular individuals, and
in that sense plural individuals constitute a very different type of entity than
referents of count singulars. Therefore, a verb of separation such as smantellare
cannot disintegrate a plurality simply because there are no topological relations
involved in the first place, and instead it operates on the part-whole structures
of particular singular individuals making up a plurality. As a result, what is ob-
tained is a number of dismantled singular objects. However, irregular plurals
such as mura denote cohesive aggregates, and thus arguably involve the notion
of spatial connection on top of the plurality meaning. In other words, entities
denoted by such expressions are pluralities but at the same time they are sim-
ilar to singular objects in that their parts, i.e., members of a collection such as
individual walls, constitute a cohesive entity. Consequently, verbs of separation
can dissolve the topological structure connecting parts of a plurality, and as a
result another meaning arises, as witnessed by the possible interpretations of a
sentence such as (63c).
Contrasts such as those in (63) show that the difference between muri and
mura lies in that the former denotes a plurality of unrelated walls, whereas the
latter makes reference to a cohesive aggregate of walls, i.e., walls making up
a particular architectonic unit. In other words, the irregular plural encodes the
cohesion of elements and often invokes the meaning of an integrated whole with
a complex inner structure of associated parts connected to each other, while the
regular -i form does not, and thus simply refers to an arbitrary sum of individuals
of a particular kind.
This claim seems to be further strengthened by the fact that a significant num-
ber of nouns taking the irregular plural are words referring to body parts, i.e.,
entities naturally occurring in cohesive aggregates and typically situated in great
proximity, involving simultaneous movement, whose collections are often con-
ceptualized as functional units. Another conspicuous subset includes nouns de-
noting objects typically consisting of multiple elements spatially associated with
each other, e.g., city walls, foundations, and fabrics of threads, as well as a gen-
uine group noun paio ‘pair’. Yet another subclass involves nominals referring to
series of events such as grida or urla ‘shouts (in a series)’. Such expressions de-
note pluralities of events associated with each other, and thus making up a single
complex eventuality. For instance, urla would be true of a series of cries by a sin-
gle agent or a plural individual, e.g., audience, which are perceptually contiguous
in time and/or space (Acquaviva 2008: pp. 149–150). Though the meaning of this
subclass seems to be intuitively closely related to the semantic effect of connect-
edness discussed here, I will refrain from speculating how exactly the proposed
interpretation could be extended to eventualities and simply note the analogy.
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Before we move on to the discussion of the interaction between cardinals and
partitives in Italian, let us conclude that a subset of irregular plurals refers to co-
hesive aggregates of objects associated with each other. The evidence concerning
verbs of separation suggests that this association could be understood by means
of a particular spatial configuration.
2.3.2 Interaction with cardinals in partitives
The core observation to be discussed in this section concerns the contrast be-
tween explicit partitives with regular plurals and explicit partitives with irreg-
ular plurals displaying the cohesive effect discussed above, e.g., muri ∼ mura
and ossi ∼ ossa. As already discussed in §2.2.2, Italian is similar to many other
languages in that it allows for both singulars and plurals in explicit partitives.
Moreover, Italian displays the same pattern as, e.g., German with respect to the
quantificational properties of partitive words in explicit and proportional parti-
tives. Specifically, just like count explicit entity partitives, see (64a), partitives in-
volving plural DPs embedded under pluralized partemodified by a numeral, as in
(64b), always quantify over material parts of objects and not over sets of wholes
although unmodified set partitives get a part-of-a-plurality reading. Intriguingly,
everything changes in count explicit partitives involving -a forms following the
discussed alternating pattern, as in (62). When an irregular doublet is swapped
for a regular one, the range of possible interpretations significantly extends.









































‘Two parts of the walled complex are red.’
(i) part-of-a-singularity reading
(ii) part-of-a-plurality reading
For instance, imagine a scenario of awalled citywhose fortifications consist of six
walls 𝑤1, … , 𝑤6 connected to each other in such a way that they form a hexagon,
as depicted in Figure 2.1.
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Figure 2.1: Sections of city walls
Given the scenario described above, as one could expect, the sentence in (64c)
would be true if two parts of two distinct walls making up the complex were red,
e.g., a part of 𝑤1 and a part of 𝑤3. But surprisingly, unlike (64b), it would also be
true if two distinct individual walls making up the complex were red, e.g., the
wall 𝑤1 and the wall 𝑤3, or if two continuous sections of the walls making up
the complex were red, e.g., the subsets {𝑤1, 𝑤2} and {𝑤4, 𝑤5}. In other words, the
meanings that are impossible in explicit set partitives with regular plurals, are
easily available with irregular plurals. However, as already mentioned, there is
a crucial constraint on possible interpretations of (64c). Namely, one can count
parts of the plurality consisting of the walls in question as one as long as they
form a contiguous section of the whole structure, i.e., (64c) would not be true of
two arbitrary pluralities constituted by walls that are not in a tangential relation-
ship with each other. In particular, it would be false if, say, the wall 𝑤1 as well as
the walls {𝑤3, 𝑤5} were red.31
Likewise, assume a slightly morbid scenario involving a decaying human bone
or skeleton and consider the contrasts between the examples in (65).


























‘Three parts of the bones are decayed.’
(i) part-of-a-singularity reading
(ii) #part-of-a-plurality reading
31I assume here the ‘exact 𝑛’ interpretation of numerals (e.g., Horn 1992; Geurts 1998; Breheny
2005; see also Geurts 2006 for an overview). Notice that the judgments do not change if the
numeral is modified by overt exactly.
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‘Three parts of the skeleton are decayed.’
(i) part-of-a-singularity reading
(ii) part-of-a-plurality reading
Given that there is one relevant bone, the entity partitive in (65a) gets a part-of-
a-singularity reading as usual, and thus the sentence would be true if there were
three decayed spots on, e.g., a femur. This is not surprising and, similar to the in-
terpretation of (65b), fits the discussed semantic shift regarding modified explicit
set partitives. However, the partitive involving the irregular plural ossa in (65c)
behaves differently. Seemingly, the most readily available interpretation of the
example concerns three groups of connected bones making up the skeleton, e.g.,
it would be true of a decayed femur and knee, a decayed ulna and radius, and the
decayed neck and skull. The sentence would be felicitous if three separate bones
decayed though, e.g., a femur, ulna, and the skull. Furthermore, analogously to
(65b) it would be judged true if there were decayed parts on three distinct bones,
e.g., a part of the femur, a part of the ulna, and a part of the skull. But again, the
reading that (65c) cannot get involves three collections of disconnected bones.
For instance, it would be infelicitous in a scenario where, say, a femur and the
skull, a radius and a knee, and a rib and an ankle bone are decayed. That is
because these pairs of bones do not form cohesive wholes, i.e., topologically con-
tinuous entities of a particular sort, and consequently cannot be conceptualized
as units one could quantify over.
Table 2.5 summarizes the patterns we have observed so far. Specifically, the
quantificational behavior of the Italian part-word parte depends on certain deno-
tational properties of expressions it combines with. The labels ‘bare’ and ‘count’
in the table stand for bare explicit partitives and count explicit partitives, respec-
tively, each of which can include a singular, a regular plural, or an irregular plural
DP.
Table 2.5: Properties of Italian parte ‘part’ in explicit partitives
singulars regular pl irregular pl
bare count bare count bare count
subatomic quantification   *   
quantification over wholes * *  *  
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The investigation into the interaction between cardinal numerals and parti-
tives involving Italian irregular plurals leads to a somewhat surprising conclu-
sion. It turns out that the cross-linguistic observation concerning different prop-
erties of partitive words in entity and set partitives as discussed in §2.2.3 actu-
ally does not provide evidence for distinct part-whole structures for singulars
and plurals, as suggested by Schwarzschild (1996). That is not to say that there is
no difference in how constitution of objects as opposed to sums thereof is con-
ceptualized. That is to say that the Italian data suggest that the difference does
not regard the relation between parts and a whole, but rather that it regards the
relation governing how parts are organized in space with respect to each other.
In particular, regular plurals encode no topological relations between entities
making up pluralities or, in other words, simply denote arbitrary sums of indi-
viduals. Consequently, parts of a plurality do not form an integrated entity that
could be considered as a unit one could assign a number to, which seems to be a
prerequisite for numerical quantification. On the other hand, despite the plural-
ity inference, Italian irregular forms in -a differ significantly from regular plurals
and somewhat resemble singulars in that they do encode how parts are organized
with respect to each other. Specifically, their extensions consist of cohesive ag-
gregates, i.e., pluralities arranged in a particular spatial configurations such that
individual objects making up a plurality are either connected or at least stay in
a relatively stable proximity. Given that the domain of quantification consists
of entities conceptualized as such clusters, counting parts consisting of several
singularities is possible as long as they form integrated fragments or continu-
ous sections of the whole. Therefore, I posit that the explanation of the patterns
summarized in Table 2.1 and 2.5 should be contingent on the manner how we
conceptualize topological relations holding between parts of different types of
entities as well as on the sensitivity of quantificational operations employed in
natural language to such relations.
2.4 Parts vs. subsets
The Italian data provide intriguing evidence but let us hold on for a minute and
reconsider the claim that being countable is a property of only those entities that
are integrated wholes. One could wonder to what extent the fact that count ex-
plicit partitives involving regular plural DPs cannot quantify over sums and can
only refer to parts of singular objects tells us anything about the nature of count-
ability. After all, to the extent they are pragmatically admissible, sentences in
which the cardinal modifies an expression such as subset instead of a part-word
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are definitely compatible with an interpretation where the domain of quantifica-
tion consists of collections of individuals, i.e., felicitous when counting subsets
of a larger set. For instance, unlike (66b) the sentence in (66a) would be true in a
situation where there are, say, ten relevant apples {𝑎1, … , 𝑎10} and three arbitrary
subsets of the apples got spoiled, e.g., {𝑎1, 𝑎2}, {𝑎3, 𝑎4, 𝑎5} and {𝑎6, 𝑎7}.32 In other
words, is it really the case that counting requires units that are integrated ob-
jects? Or maybe there is simply something weird about partitive words and we




















‘Three parts of the apples got spoiled.’
(i) part-of-a-singularity reading
(ii) #part-of-a-plurality reading
At first blush, this seems to be a justified objection and I think it should be taken
seriously. However, there are a number of empirical facts suggesting that what
happens in (66a) is very different from what happens in (66b). First of all, it is
crucial to emphasize that natural language expressions such as set or subset are
not merely linguistic reflections of set-theoretic concepts involving notions such
as {… } or relations ⊆ and ⊂. On the contrary, such expressions have a number
of properties that classify them on a par with group nouns such as committee,
band, or pile.33 On the other hand, similarly to bare plurals set partitives refer
to pluralities but part-words are not collectives, as attested by a number of tests
involving predicate non-sharing.
It has been proposed in the literature that group nouns and plural NPs do not
co-refer since one can find multiple contrasts concerning (in)compatibility with
certain predicates (Barker 1992; Schwarzschild 1996). For instance, the sentence
32This reading is different from a type of reading discussed in §3.3 where reference to three-
fourths of the total volume of the apples would be involved. What is crucial for the discussion
of (66b) is that the quantified subsets of individuals cannot be arbitrary.
33In the following text, I will ignore the evidence for distinguishing between different classes of
group nouns (see Pearson 2011; Henderson 2017; Dočekal & Wągiel 2018a) and assume that for
our purposes there are no relevant differences between nouns such as band and pile.
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with a collective DP as a subject is perfectly fine with the predicate have five
members, see (67a), but its altered version involving a plural DP as in (67b) is not.
(67) English (Lønning 1987: p. 153)
a. The committee has five members.
b. #The men have five members.
Now, let us test the behavior of the Polish part-word część ‘part’ with respect
to plurals, regular collective nouns, and the expression podzbiór ‘subset’.34 The
contrasts in (68) show that bare plurals and bare explicit set partitives differ from
the typical group noun stos ‘pile’ as well as podzbiór in that they are not compat-




























































‘The subset of apples consists of ten items.’
The same pattern can be observed when the examined expressions appear as first
arguments of the two-place predicate należy do ‘belongs to’ which arguably des-
ignates assignment of objects to some abstract entity representing a collection.
Though both (69c) and (69d) are felicitous, the sentences including plurals and
explicit set partitives in (69a) and (69b), respectively, cannot saturate the predi-
cate.
34It needs to be admitted that due to the restricted distribution of the noun podzbiór (often lim-
ited to mathematical and computational contexts) the following sentences involving this ex-
pression is not how people usually talk. Rather, these examples sound nerdy or somewhat like
clumsily worded math exercises rather than something a regular person would say. Neverthe-
less, despite the slight lexical oddity the judgments concerning compatibility with different
predicates, interactions in co-variational contexts and with overt distributive operators seem
to be rather clear.
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‘This white transparent apple belongs to the subset of apples.’
Another contrast between plurals and collective nouns concerns distribution
with reciprocals, as demonstrated in (70).
(70) English (Schwarzschild 1996: p. 168)
a. The rocks in that pile are touching each other.
b. #That pile is touching each other.
Polish examples such as those in (71) show that there is a contrast between bare
plurals and bare explicit set partitives, on the one hand, and typical collectives











































Intended: ‘The subset of the apples touches each other.’
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Plurals and explicit set partitives combine felicitously with reciprocal expres-
sions, whereas collectives do not. In particular, (71a) and (71b) indicate either
strong or intermediate reciprocity (Fiengo & Lasnik 1973; Dalrymple et al. 1998;
Beck 2001), i.e., either each of the apples in question is touching all the other ap-
ples or any two of the apples are connected by a chain of apples that stand in the
reciprocal relation. Nevertheless, it is impossible to define such truth conditions
for (71c) and (71d).
A similar distribution is attested in contexts where the reciprocal is covert, see
(72), including co-variational environments such as (73). Specifically, plurals do
combine with predicates triggering covariation, whereas group nouns do not.
(72) English (Dougherty 1970)
#The trio collided.
(73) English (Schwarzschild 1996: p. 168)
a. The members of group A live in different cities.
b. #Group A lives in different cities.
Let us then consider Polish examples involving plurals, explicit partitives, group
nouns, and phrases headed by podzbiór in subject position, as provided in (74)
and (75). In (74a), the sentence-internal different expression w różnych miastach
‘in different cities’ is bound within a clause to express covariation with a plu-
ral argument due to a built-in distributive operator (Carlson 1987; Beck 2000;
Brasoveanu 2008; Dotlačil 2010). As a result, the sentence would be true if for
each of the musicians it were the case that they lived in a city that is different
from the cities other musicians live in. Due to this kind of meaning, sentence-

















































Intended: ‘A subset of the musicians lives in different cities.’
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The sentences in (75) include the distributive preposition po which is a marker
for distant distributivity in Polish (e.g., Przepiórkowski 2008; 2010; 2014; Prze-
piórkowski & Patejuk 2013).35 As such, similarly to binominal each (e.g., Safir
& Stowell 1988; Zimmermann 2002; Dotlačil 2012; Champollion 2012a) and dis-
tributive numerals (e.g., Gil 2002; Oh 2005; Cable 2014; Hofherr & Etxeberria
2017) po marks the distributive share and distributes it over the distributive key
denoted by a different phrase, here the subject DP. As a result, the possibility of
a collective reading is ruled out and a sentence in which po occurs is obligatorily
interpreted distributively, e.g., in (75a) each of the musicians played a song. This
conflicts with the semantics of group nouns which in general do not allow for
the access to individual members of a collection, hence (75c) is an awkward sen-
tence. As witnessed by the contrast between (75b) and (75d), explicit set partitives









































Intended: ‘A subset of the musicians played a song each.’
Yet another diagnostic involves the VP disjunction test proposed by de Vries
(2015: pp. 30–31). When the test is applied, część does not exhibit the kind of
behavior associated with group nouns. To illustrate this, let us consider the sen-
tences in (76a).
(76) English (de Vries 2015: p. 31; adapted)
a. The children are singing or dancing.
(i) collective reading
(ii) distributive reading
35For detailed studies on distant distributivity and distributive po in Slavic see also, e.g., Franks
(1994; 1995), Harves (2003), and Knežević (2015).
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b. The team is singing or dancing.
(i) collective reading
(ii) #distributive reading
In (76a), the definite plural DP the children serves as a subject of the disjunctive
sentence. There are two possible interpretations of (76a). On the collective inter-
pretation, see (76a-i), the disjunction singing or dancing holds of the plurality as
a whole. In other words, it is either the case that all the relevant children are
singing or that all the relevant children are dancing. However, there is yet an-
other reading of (76a), namely the distributive interpretation, see (76a-ii), accord-
ing to which the disjoined VPs hold not of the plurality of children as a whole but
rather of each individual child. Thus, some of the childrenmight be singing while
others might be dancing. Crucially, when the definite plural is replaced with a
group noun such as team as in (76b), the distributive interpretation is no longer
available. The only reading such a sentence can get is that the whole plurality
was either involved in singing or in dancing.
Now, let us examine the behavior of Polish nouns część and podzbiór compared




















































‘A subset of children is dancing or dancing.’
(i) collective reading
(ii) #distributive reading
The example (77a) can have either a collective or a distributive reading, i.e., it
would be true either when all the children are dancing or singing or when some
are dancing whereas others are singing. On the other hand, a sentence with a
group noun as a subject like (77b) can only be interpreted collectively. That is
also the case in (77d), i.e., all the children in the relevant subset need to be either
dancing or singing. However, (77c) is felicitous in both collective and distribu-
tive scenarios. Once again, the part word część patterns with plurals rather than
collectives, which definitely proves that it differs from expressions such as subset.
Notice that whatever theory of the relationship between agreement and col-
lectivity/distributivity one might have (e.g., de Vries 2015; see also Schwarzschild
1996 and Pearson 2011 for the discussion of group nouns in British English as well
as Bosnić 2016 for experimental data concerning distributivity and agreement
mismatches in BCS), it cannot explain the semantic difference between part ex-
pressions and group nouns. In Polish, część just like zespół (and any other group
noun) triggers singular agreement on the verb. As witnessed by the glosses in
the examples provided above, in sentenceswith both explicit partitives and group
nouns, see (74b)–(74c) and (77b)–(77c), the verbs agree in number with the sub-
jects. Furthermore, both in (75b) and (75c) the past participles agree with część
and zespół in gender by taking the feminine and masculine form, respectively.
Therefore, it is not the agreement pattern but rather lexical properties of część
that are accountable for the semantic difference.
Finally, despite being distinct syntactic categories partitive words pattern with
cardinal numerals in that in general they allow formodification by class A/Bmod-
ifiers such as more than and at least (Nouwen 2010; 2016; Brasoveanu 2012), see













‘At least some of the walls are red.’
36Since there are some restrictions in this respect which I believe result from the indefinite nature
of some partitive words, I present here only parallel examples with class B modifiers.
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‘At most five of the walls are red.’
The results of a battery of tests applied to the Polish nouns część ‘part’ and
podzbiór ‘subset’ unequivocally indicate that podzbiór is a group noun,37 and
thus triggers obligatory collective interpretations of sentences in which it oc-
curs, whereas część patterns with plurals including being ambiguous between
collective and distributive readings. This is a significant contrast between the
expressions in question suggesting that their extensions differ in a significant
way. In particular, it has been commonly advocated in the literature that group
nouns do not refer to pluralities but rather to atomic individuals, i.e., somewhat
abstract singularities that might be associated with their members (e.g., Barker
1992; Schwarzschild 1996; Winter 2001; Champollion 2017).38 Whatever extraor-
dinary properties such atoms have, it is plausible to assume that they are concep-
tualized as something distinct from mere sums of objects.
Therefore, I conclude that explicit partitives refer to genuine pluralities where-
as group nouns including expressions such as set and subset denote abstract en-
tities that are associated with pluralities of their members but are ontologically
distinct from them. Having this in mind, there is nothing surprising about the
fact that count explicit set partitives do not quantify over sums of individuals,
and in fact, it turns out that part-words actually pattern with regular nominals,
as will be shown below.
37Schwarzschild (1996: p. 168) actually lists set among group nouns.
38But see, e.g., Link (1984; 1998), Landman (1989a,b; 2000), and de Vries (2015) for an alternative
view on which a group noun denotes a special type of plurality shifted to an impure atom or
group-atom depending on a particular approach. Pearson (2011), on the other hand, proposes
that group nouns are predicates of individual concepts.
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It has been observed for a long time that the semantics of numeral phrases in
languages such as English poses a compositional puzzle. On the one hand, cardi-
nal numerals higher than one combine only with plural nominals, on the other,
plural NPs modified by cardinals are interpreted as singular expressions. Specif-
ically, although plurals denote sums of entities, the domain of quantification is
always a set of atomic individuals (Kratzer 1989; Chierchia 1998b; Landman 2000;
see also Kobuchi-Philip 2006). Contrary to what one would expect if numerals
simply counted elements in a given set (e.g., Barwise & Cooper 1981) and com-
bined with plural nouns in a straightforward manner, cardinals seem to be sen-
sitive only to singular individuals in the sense that they do not assign numbers
to sums of objects. Actually, this fact has already been realized in the system of
Link (1983) where the extension of a phrase such as three children is supposed to
contain only special types of elements, namely exactly three atoms. To illustrate
why such a restriction is necessary, let us consider the sentence in (79a).
(79) a. Three children slept.
b. JchildrenK = {𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑑, 𝑎𝑏, 𝑎𝑐, 𝑎𝑑, 𝑏𝑐, 𝑏𝑑, 𝑐𝑑, 𝑎𝑏𝑐, 𝑎𝑏𝑑, 𝑎𝑐𝑑, 𝑏𝑐𝑑, 𝑎𝑏𝑐𝑑}
c. Jthree childrenK ∩ JsleptK = {𝑎, 𝑎𝑏, 𝑎𝑏𝑐𝑑}
d. Jthree childrenK ∩ JsleptK = {𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑎𝑏}
Let us assume that there are four relevant children in the universe of discourse,
say, Anne, Betty, Carl, and Danny, i.e., 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, and 𝑑 respectively. Then the mean-
ing of the plural noun children is the set involving both atomic children and all
the sums generated by joining the atoms, see (79b). If three simply counted the
elements in the set denoted by the modified noun, among the possible verifica-
tions of the sentence in (79a) would be (79c) and (79d) since in both cases the set
of children that slept consists of three elements.
The truth conditions in (79c) and (79d) predict (79a) to be true both in a sce-
nario where there were four individual children sleeping and in a scenario where
only two individual children slept. However, this not how the sentence is under-
stood. It seems that what cardinals in a language such as English do is that they
restrict possible verifications of sentences including numeral phrases in such a
way that sums of individuals are excluded from the domain of quantification.39
With this in mind, let us return to count explicit partitives such as the Italian
examples in (48), repeated here as (80). Similarly to regular plural DPs, unmod-
ified explicit set partitives denote pluralities or, more precisely, sub-pluralities.
However, when combined with a numeral they do not allow for quantification
39Alternatively, one might assume that there is a null classifier responsible for this restriction
(e.g., Selkirk 1977; Kobuchi-Philip 2006).
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over sub-pluralities but only over material parts of individuals making up plural-
ities.


















‘three parts of the walls’
(i) part-of-a-singularity reading
(ii) #part-of-a-plurality reading
At first blush, it seems surprising but actually in languages such as English the
same effect can be found in numeral phrases. Specifically, the numeral combines
with the plural noun which denotes a set of pluralities; however, the domain of
quantification does not consist of pluralities but rather atomic individuals. Hence,
as demonstrated in (81) the phrase three walls does not mean three pluralities of
walls but rather a plurality of three walls. Likewise, the Italian partitive phrase in
(80b) cannot be interpreted as three pluralities of sub-pluralities of walls. Instead,
it would be felicitously paraphrased as a plurality of three parts of walls.
(81) Pluralities of wholes and parts
a. three walls
(i) #three pluralities of walls
(ii) plurality of three walls
b. tre parti dei muri
(i) #three pluralities of parts-of-a-plurality of walls
(ii) plurality of three parts of walls
In this section, I argued that set partitives differ from collectives and discussed a
number of issues regarding the domain of quantification in count explicit parti-
tives as well as group nouns and plurals modified by cardinal numerals. An im-
portant question that arises after examining the evidence explored in this chapter
is why natural language does not allow for counting a sum of entities as one thing
unless it satisfies certain topological (or other) criteria.
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2.5 Summary
The data discussed in this chapter provide compelling evidence that cross-linguis-
tically it is common for the same partitive word including proportional quanti-
fiers such as half-words to appear both in entity and set partitives. This fact sug-
gests that such expressions can operate both at the superatomic and subatomic
level depending onwhat structure is provided by the embedded DP. Furthermore,
on the basis of the zeugma test involving German partitives with conjoined sin-
gular and plural DPs I showed that it is empirically inadequate to account for the
parallelism between explicit and proportional entity and set partitives in terms
of semantic ambiguity.
However, at the same time explicit partitives modified by a cardinal numeral
can only quantify over material parts of singular individuals irrespective of
whether the complement DP is singular or plural. At first sight, this fact seems
to be at variance with the claim that there is unified parthood utilized by parti-
tive words in both entity and set partitives. Nonetheless, an important empirical
finding concerning Italian irregular plurals showed that if a plural expression en-
codes a certain topological configuration, i.e., denotes entities conceptualized as
cohesive pluralities, count explicit partitives can get a part-of-a-plurality reading
in such a case. This fact demonstrates that the uncountability of explicit partitives
with plurals does not indicate per se different part-whole structures for singular-
ities and pluralities. Rather, countability results from the interplay between the
meaning of a partitive word and the extension of a singular or plural DP it com-
bines with, and topological constraints play a crucial role in this interaction.
Given the cross-linguistic and intra-linguistic evidence explored in this chap-
ter, the two remaining possibilities are the following. It is either the case that
singulars and plurals employ a unified part-whole structure or that their mere-
ologies do differ but at the same time partitive words involve a derived indeter-
minate notion of parthood which allows them to quantify over elements of what-
ever part-whole structure they are applied to. I argue for the first option. How-
ever, by advocating this claim I do not advance a view that singulars and plurals
employ the same structures. What I claim is that it is not the part-whole relation
that differs but rather that there is another notion involved which is responsible
for how parts are topologically arranged with respect to each other. Intuitively,
this seems correct since we conceptually distinguish between integrated wholes
and arbitrary sums of parts, and quantification in natural language is sensitive
to the distinction. Specifically, only things conceptualized as integrated parts of
integrated wholes can be assigned numbers when counting. On the other hand,
scattered entities such as pluralities are prohibited from the domain of quantifica-
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tion cardinal numerals establish unless certain individuation criteria are satisfied.
In addition, Italian irregular plurals provide evidence that there are natural lan-
guage expressions involving yet another type of structure. In particular, such
nominals designate entities that are similar to plurals in that they consist of mul-
tiple integrated objects, but at the same time the sum thereof is arranged in a
particular way, i.e., it constitutes a cluster.
So far, I have argued that explicit and proportional partitives provide evidence
that countability is restricted to entities that form an integrated whole as typi-
cally denoted by concrete singular count nouns, while the arbitrary sums of parts
regular plural nouns refer to cannot be counted. Furthermore, the data concern-
ing subatomic quantification suggests that this constraint is also applicable at
the level of material parts of individuals. If that is correct, one would expect that
there are natural language expressions dedicated exclusively to quantification
over integrated parts similar to cardinal numerals that count integrated wholes.
In the next section, I will introduce novel data concerning distinct types of half-
words in Polish as well as other partitive expressions.
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In the previous chapter, I discussed data concerning quantification over parts
in explicit entity and set partitives. Specifically, I presented evidence suggesting
that only integrated parts of integrated wholes can be subject to counting. As I
have already indicated in the introduction, in English the difference can be cap-
tured by the contrast between bare part and a part. I argued that expressions
corresponding to the former refer to arbitrary parts of a whole including discon-
tinuous portions of a substance making up a whole, and thus are uncountable.
On the other hand, expressions corresponding to the latter refer to continuous
integrated parts of a whole and as such can pluralize and combine with cardi-
nals. In this chapter, I explore to what extent natural language is sensitive to this
distinction. To this end, I will provide novel evidence from different types of Pol-
ish partitive words that encode the contrast formally. It will turn out that this
phenomenon is not something idiosyncratic, but rather cross-linguistic evidence
suggests that it is relatively widespread with different languages using different
means to express it. Moreover, based on the data concerning whole-adjectives I
will demonstrate the linguistic relevance of two aspects of being whole, namely
maximality and integrity.1
3.1 Continuous and discontinuous parts
Given the meaning of the plural in languages such as English, it follows that
expressions such as a part are incompatible with predicates denoting pluralities.
Intuitively, the reason is that the extension of a phrase headed by a part com-
prises integrated portions, i.e., parts that come in one piece, whereas plurals de-
note arbitrary sums, i.e., scattered entities consisting of discontinuous elements.
1The scope of this chapter would be much narrower if it were not for my informants with
whom I tested the interpretation of expressions in languages other than Polish. In particular, I
am very grateful to Jonathan Bobaljik, Jeffrey Parrott, and Guy Tabachnick for their judgments
and discussion concerning English, to Berit Gehrke, Nina Haslinger, and Maximilian Prüller
for German, Erlinde Meertens and Izabela Jordanoska for Dutch, Muriel Assmann for Brazilian
Portuguese, and Chang Liu for Mandarin. I would also like to thank Adam Przepiórkowski for
sharing his observations regarding Polish with me.
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However, if the plural were augmented with an additional semantic feature guar-
anteeing that a plurality of integrated objects is itself an integrated object, as is
arguably the case in at least some Italian irregular plurals, then an expression
corresponding to English a part is able to combine with such a plural expression.
In such a case, it would yield a part of a plurality whose constituents are in a
particular topological relation, namely they are connected to each other.
But is there any additional reason to assume that natural language expressions
are sensitive to topological relations operating alongside part-whole structures?
And if so, to what extent do the discussed phenomena really tell us something
important about countability? The claim advanced here is that what counts as
one needs to be an integrated part (proper or improper) of an integrated whole.
Though this might seem intuitively correct, a question arises where the prop-
erty of ‘coming in one piece’ comes from. After all, countability is the ability of
an expression to appear in morpho-syntactic environments related to counting,
but counting is a semantic operation of assigning numbers to units of a particular
type. Hence, one could wonder whether there is evidence that there is something
in an expression’s meaning that corresponds to the notion of being an integrated
entity, and thus being countable. One prominent view holds that countability is
not a property of a particular class of nouns but rather of full DPs (e.g., Borer
2005a, see also Allan 1980 and Pelletier & Schubert 1989 and the following work
by Pelletier), and thus arises within a complex nominal syntactic structure. On
the other hand, other approaches posit that it is lexical meaning that determines
countability patterns (e.g., Wierzbicka 1988; Wisniewski et al. 2003). However,
the evidence discussed in the literature is mainly restricted to cases of quantifi-
cation over wholes and almost totally ignores constructions in which what is
counted are bits of objects rather than whole individuals.
In this section, I will provide additional evidence for the significance of the role
of spatial integrity, i.e., compactness, of parts in subatomic quantification. The
core data come from the distribution and semantic properties of distinct classes
of Polish half-words.
3.1.1 Polish half-words
Polish distinguishes lexically between three distinct half-words, as presented in
(1). They are morphologically derived from one another with pół being morpho-
logically the least marked form with no derivational affixes. As presented in (1a),
pół consists only of a root and null inflectional marker. On the other hand, połowa
and połówka are derived forms involving in addition the morpheme -ow-/-ów- as
well as the diminutive suffix -k- in the latter case, see (1b)–(1c).
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In terms of 𝜙-features, pół shows neuter agreement whereas połowa and połówka
are feminine, as demonstrated in (2). Furthermore, similarly to vague quantifiers
such as dużo ‘many/much’, pół is defective in that it has only the nominative/ac-


































‘This red half of the apple got spoiled.’
At first blush, the Polish half-words in (2) are mere synonyms making the same
contribution to the interpretation of the discussed sentences. However, closer in-
2Based on examples from the National Corpus of Polish (NCP) like (i), Przepiórkowski (2006)
argues that pół ‘half’ is inherently plural because it can bemodified by the plural demonstrative
te ‘these’. Notice, however, that though there are definitely varieties of Polish in which (i) is
well-formed, there are also many speakers (including myself) for whom it is ungrammatical.
Furthermore, in modern Polish the neuter singular demonstrative to ‘this’ is being gradually
replaced by the colloquial form te ‘this’ which is homophonous to the plural te ‘these’. It is
























‘Field work will start soon, so it is necessary (to finish) this half kilometer (road).’
73
3 Exploring topological sensitivity
vestigation reveals intriguing differences in their distribution and meaning. Let
us first consider the most frequent and semantically least marked half expres-
sion, i.e., połowa. As witnessed in (3), there are no constraints on its distribution
and it can felicitously combine with all types of entity-denoting predicates in-























‘half of the juice’
On the other hand, pół has a more restricted distribution since it is incompatible
with cumulative predicates such as plurals and mass nouns, see (4). Thus, it can























Intended: ‘half of the juice’
3In this section, I provide the examples with collective nouns only for the sake of completeness,
i.e., in order to show the distributional difference between pół and połówka. In the remaining
part of this chapter (except of §3.2.1), I will not investigate the interaction between partitives
and collectives.
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Notice that the constraint on the distribution of pół is not morpho-syntactic. The
phrases in (5) show that it can felicitously combine with pluralia tantum. How-
ever, in such a case the whole partitive phrase gets a part-of-a-singularity inter-
pretation. Specifically, (5a) cannot refer to 50% of the relevant utensils but only
to a half of one pair of scissors. In a similar vein, (5b) involves the noun bakalie
‘dried fruit’ which is a plurale tantum expression in Polish and as such it can
either denote one piece of dried fruit or a plurality thereof. The half-word pół
can combine with bakalie as long as it quantifies over material parts of a single
foodstuff. For instance, it would be true of a half of a raisin but not of, say, five











‘half of the dried fruit’
Furthermore, the claim that pół is incompatible with mass nouns is somewhat im-
precise and requires elaboration. In fact, when it can combine with mass terms,
it enforces a mass-count shift via the Universal Packager (see, e.g., Bach 1986b;
Jackendoff 1991; Landman 1991).4 In other words, the phrases in (6) are only felic-
itous on the portion reading, i.e., (6a) would only be true of half a glass of juice
whereas (6b) refers to half a pint of beer or some other standardized or contextu-
ally salient measure of volume. This shows that pół is sensitive to the semantics
of embedded DPs in partitive construtions. In particular, cumulative predicates







‘half of the juice’
(i) #substance reading
(ii) portion reading
4Actually, this interpretation is also possible for some pluralia tantum. For instance, (5b) can
refer to a half of a package of dried fruit.
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‘half of the beer’
(i) #substance reading
(ii) portion reading
Finally, the distribution of the third Polish half-word, i.e., połówka, is even further
constrained since it is compatible only with regular concrete singular nouns, as
witnessed by the contrasts in (7). Prototypically, it takes nominals denoting solid
objects one could easily cut or divide into separate parts such as food terms or
building materials like bricks. Similarly to pół, it is distinctively odd with plurals























Intended: ‘half of the juice’
The distributional facts concerning particular Polish half-words are summarized
in Table 3.1. While the distribution of połowa is unconstrained, i.e., it can appear
in all types of proportional partitives including entity, set, and mass partitives,
the distributional potential of pół and połówka is significantly restricted in that
neither of them canmodify cumulative predicates such as plurals andmass terms,
and thus they can only occur in entity partitives. The different distribution of par-
ticular expressions with respect to different types of nominals suggests distinct
semantic properties of those lexical items. Given that the only type of nominals
that is compatible with all the Polish half-words is singular count nouns, let us
discuss in detail intuitions about the meanings of entity partitive phrases such
as those in (3a), (4a), and (7a).
In order to do so, consider two different subdivisions of an entity, as depicted
in Figure 3.1 and 3.2. In both cases, the dashed lines mark an area designating a
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Table 3.1: Distribution of Polish half-words
singulars collectives plurals mass nouns
połowa    
pół   * *
połówka  * * *
portion of the apple that constitutes approximately 50% of the whole. However,
there is a crucial difference between the two depicted situations in terms of the
topological configuration of the stuff making up the halves. The part represented
in Figure 3.1 constitutes a continuous half of the apple and as such it can be con-
ceived of as a solid object in its own right within the whole, whereas Figure 3.2
illustrates just an arbitrary portion that is not contiguous, i.e., the apple stuff does
not form an integrated part of the apple. In other words, the marked quantity in
Figure 3.1 is an integrated part, whereas the portion in Figure 3.2 is not.
Figure 3.1: Continuous half Figure 3.2: Discontinuous half
Let us now discuss possible extensions of proportional entity partitives involv-
ing pół, połowa, and połówka. The phrases in (3a) (with połowa) and (4a) (with pół)
are true of both the object depicted in Figure 3.1 and the entity in Figure 3.2. Out
of the blue, the continuous half reading is definitely the dominant one, however
the discontinuous half interpretation can become salient in multiple contexts.5
For instance, it gets extremely relevant in a cooking scenario where pragmati-
cally halves might be considered in terms of volume rather than individuated
parts. Crucially, the ambiguity is systematic in entity partitives involving both
połowa and pół and the sentences in (8a) and (8b) are true both in a situation
where the marked half in Figure 3.1 is red and when the designated portion in
5Formost of the speakers I consulted the preferred reading of (3a) (with połowa) is as in Figure 3.1
though Figure 3.2 is also possible. This preference seems to be much weaker in the case of (4a)
(with pół).
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Figure 3.2 is red. Now, it is quite intriguing that the partitive construction in
(7a) (with połówka) does not denote entities such as the one illustrated in Fig-
ure 3.2. Therefore, entity partitives with połówka refer only to continuous in-
tegrated halves of an object denoted by the downstairs DP. Consequently, the
sentence in (8c) would be judged true if the part indicated in Figure 3.1 were red




























‘A half of the apple is red.’
A similar phenomenon can be observed in object position. In the sentences in (9),
the partitives appear as arguments of a verb of consumption and as such denote
an incremental theme (see, e.g., Dowty 1991; Krifka 1998; Filip 1999; Rothstein
2003). Again, there is a contrast between (9a) and (9b), on the one hand, and (9c),
on the other, in terms of truth conditions. The first two sentences denote weaker
propositions since for them to be judged true it would be enough for Marysia to
eat a quantity of the apple in question corresponding approximately to 50% of the
apple’s total volume. However, in many scenarios in which (9a) and (9b) would
be true the sentence in (9c) would not. This is because the proportional partitive
headed by połówka denotes a contiguous half, i.e., an integrated object within the
whole as opposed to arbitrary portions of the apple mass. This stronger meaning
results in that (9c) is true of a scenario such as the one illustrated in Figure 3.1



















‘Marysia ate half the apple.’
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‘Marysia ate a half of the apple.’
Furthermore, analogously to pół proportional partitives involving połówka and
pluralia tantum get a part-of-a-singularity reading. The phrases in (10a) and (10b)
refer to halves of one object.6 In addition, similarly to the previously discussed
examples a part yielded as a result of subatomic quantification has to be inte-
grated. Thus, (10a) and (10b) would be true of one scissor blade and, say, one











‘a half of a dried fruit’
Given the non-trivial truth conditions of the sentence in (8c), let us consider
several naturally occurring examples involving entity partitives headed by the
half-word połówka from the National Corpus of Polish (NCP) (Przepiórkowski
et al. 2012), as given in (11).
(11) Polish (NCP)





















‘[…] would you like […] a cocktail in a coconut half?’
6Some speakers report that (10a) is somewhat odd. I suspect that the reason is that scissors are
not a kind of thing one normally divides into separate parts. My own intuition, however, is
that though the phrase is certainly unusual, it is definitely interpretable and sounds absolutely












‘The victim was stabbed with a half of scissors.’
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‘He opened his wallet and took […] a half of a card out of it.’
The first three examples in the sample, see (11a)–(11c), involve reference to food-
stuffs. The sentence in (11a) would be true if the man in question consumed one
half of a dried cod. Importantly, however, it would not be true in a situation
where he ate, say, the tail and took some bites of the front left side and middle
right side of the fish even if the total amount consumed equaled 50% of the whole
issue. The man had to eat either the left side or the right side of the cod or alterna-
tively the half starting from the head or the half starting from the tail. Likewise,
the question in (11b) makes reference to a half of a coconut coming in one piece,
i.e., one would feel deceived if after answering “yes” they got several pieces of a
coconut shell filled with portions of a cocktail they ordered. On the other hand,
the use of połówka in (11c) is somewhat metaphorical. The inference here is that
the speaker asserts that they and the addressee are like two individuated halves
of an egg that fit well together. Again, the halves need to be continuous parts one
receives after a clear horizontal or vertical cut. Yet another example is provided
in (11d). Here, however, the downstairs DP in the partitive does not refer to food
but to a solid object of another type, i.e., a window consisting of two casements.
The partitive phrase clearly implies that the halves in question are individuated
and easily distinguishable parts, hence the casement window interpretation. Fi-
nally, the sentence in (11e) would be judged true only if the man in question took
out a half of a card in one piece, i.e., it would necessarily be false if he took out
several torn scraps of a card.
The discussion of (8c) as well as the attested examples from the National Cor-
pus of Polish in (11) leave no doubt that połówka requires the referents of a parti-
tive it occurs in to constitute an integrated part. Such a finding is quite remark-
able and forces us to abandon the initial intuition that Polish half-words are se-
mantically synonymous. The recapitulation of referential properties of explicit
partitives involving the expressions in question is given in Table 3.2. The main
contrast between less marked połowa and pół, on the one hand, and more marked
połówka, on the other, lies in that the first two can designate discontinuous por-
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tions of stuff making up a whole, whereas the latter denotes only such divisions
that constitute continuous, i.e., integrated, halves of an object.7
Table 3.2: Denotations of Polish half-words




The novelty of the data introduced here is twofold. First of all, Polish half-
words provide strong evidence that natural language is sensitive to the topolog-
ical arrangement of parts of an entity. Second, the data imply that individuation
is also possible at the subatomic level, i.e., quantification over parts in natural
language reflects the fact that some parts might be assigned the status of an indi-
vidual in its own right. In general, the distinction between different half-words
in Polish can be described as follows. The least semantically marked expression
połowa is topologically neutral, i.e., the spatial make-up of an entity denoted by
the downstairs DP in a partitive is irrelevant as long as it constitutes approxi-
mately 50% of a whole. That is why połowa does not discriminate between count
singulars, plurals, and mass terms, and can felicitously appear in entity, set, and
mass partitives. It simply separates out a half of whatever entity it is applied
to. Furthermore, in this case subatomic quantification does not encode any con-
straints on what kind of entity is yielded. Hence, the result might be either a
scattered entity such as a plurality or a discontinuous portion of matter. On the
other hand, pół and połówka are topologically sensitive. They both require a DP
they combine with to denote an integrated object, i.e., a cohesive whole. That
explains why they cannot co-occur with expressions referring to scattered enti-
ties such as arbitrary sums of individuals or portions of a substance as typically
denoted by plurals and mass nouns. The difference between the two is that pół
is similar to połowa in that it does not impose any topological constraints on the
resulting entity, whereas połówka does. In other words, while pół selects for an
7According to many speakers, the semantics of połówka is even stronger and indicates a half
that is both integrated and symmetrical (or maybe at least comparable with the other half
in terms of shape), i.e., the result of splitting is an object roughly along a line (or plane) of
symmetry. However, since intuitions seem to be very subtle and not all speakers I consulted
agree with the strong symmetrical requirement, I leave this issue for careful psycholinguistic
experimentation to be pursued in the future.
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integrated object and returns either its continuous or discontinuous half, połówka
yields an integrated half of an integrated whole.
3.1.2 Inherent vagueness
Similarly to other proportional quantifiers, expressions such as English half ap-
pear to be inherently vague. Though disregarded by prescriptive grammars as an
oxymoron, the concept of a bigger and smaller half is present in lexicons of many
languages, as attested in the English, German, and Polish examples in (12)–(14).
Interestingly, such phrases cannot be explained as bleached expressions mean-
ing simply something like part. For instance, for Polish speakers who would use
or at least accept the NP in (14a), i.e., speakers who have not internalized the lin-
guistic prescription in question, it would be definitely true of a part constituting
55% of a whole. However, it is unlikely that it would be judged true of 75% of a


























Given the possible interpretations discussed above, it seems plausible to assume
that in natural language proportional quantifiers such as English half denote
a relation of constituting approximately 50% share of a whole. In other words,
their meaning is fuzzy in the sense that it allows for unequal parts as long as the
disproportion falls within a particular range defined contextually.
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3.2 More topology-sensitive partitive words
The observations made in §3.1 provide interesting evidence for certain semantic
properties of natural language expressions that have not been recognized so far
in the formal study of meaning. Nevertheless, a question might arise whether
topological sensitivity is a marginal issue or whether it constitutes a broader
phenomenon associated with a number of expressions in a language. Interest-
ingly, it appears that half-words are not the sole category in Polish that displays
the distinction between topological neutrality and topological sensitivity. In this
section, I will examine more data from Polish partitive words indicating that the
pattern is robust.
3.2.1 Quarter-words
Let us first consider the contrasts between two other proportional partitives in-
volving what I will refer to as quarter-words ćwierć and ćwiartka ‘quarter’, as
provided in (15). Analogously to połówka, see (1c), ćwiartka is a morphologically








In terms of agreement, similarly to the distinction between pół and połówka, see
(2), ćwierć is neuter, whereas ćwiartka triggers feminine agreement on adjectives























‘This red quarter of the apple got spoiled.’
8Similarly to pół, some Polish speakers allow ćwierć to combine with the demonstrative te ‘the-
se/this’ (see fn. 2 and Przepiórkowski 2006).
83
3 Exploring topological sensitivity
The distribution of ćwierć and ćwiartka mimics the pattern observed in the pół
and połówka alternation, i.e., both quarter-words appear to be sensitive to the
type of nominal they combine with, see (17) and (18), respectively. In particular,
as witnessed by the infelicity of the phrases in (17c)–(17d) as well as (18c)–(18d)
neither of them occurs in set and mass partitives and only ćwierć combines with
collective nouns. Like połówka, ćwiartka typically combines with food terms or














































Intended: ‘quarter of the juice’
This kind of behavior can be contrasted with a regular fraction expression such
as jedna czwarta ‘one-fourth’, see (19). Unlike quarter-words or the half-words pół
and połówka, fractions show no distributional constraints and can freely combine
both with quantized predicates involving count singulars and with collectives
and cumulative predicates such as plural nouns and mass terms.
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‘one-fourth of the juice’
Based on the distributional evidence, I posit that similarly to pół and połówka
the quarter-words ćwierć and ćwiartka are topology-sensitive. Specifically, they
quantify only over parts of integrated wholes. To put it differently, expressions
having scattered entities such as arbitrary portions of matter or sums of individ-
uals are disallowed as their input. On the other hand, fractions do not show such
requirements and can yield a proportion of an entity of any kind. Table 3.3 sum-
marizes the observations, namely the possibility of fraction entity, set, and mass
partitives as opposed to the non-existence of proportional set andmass partitives
headed by the quarter-words in Polish.
Table 3.3: Distribution of Polish quarter-words
singulars collectives plurals mass nouns
jedna czwarta    
ćwierć   * *
ćwiartka  * * *
Moreover, the pattern is further corroborated by the differences in truth
conditions of sentences involving fraction partitives and proportional parti-
tives headed by ćwierć, on the one hand, and proportional partitives headed by
ćwiartka, on the other. Analogously to the distinction discussed with respect to
half-words, see (8) and (9), there is a contrast in terms of possible verifications of
(20a) and (20b), on the one hand, and (20c), on the other. The first two sentences
are true if any proportion of the apple constituting approximately 25% of the
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whole apple is red regardless of whether it forms a discontinuous or continuous
part. On the other hand, (20c) would only be true if an integrated quarter of the
surface of the apple were red, i.e., similarly to sentences involving połówka the




























‘A quarter of the apple is red.’
Again, the same effect appears in object position. The incremental themes ex-
pressed by fraction partitives and proportional partitives with ćwierć can refer
either to continuous or discontinuous entities. Hence, the sentences (21a) and
(21b) would be true in a scenario where Marysia ate one piece of the apple as
well as in a scenario where she took several unconnected bites constituting ap-
proximately 25% of the total volume. In contrast, (21c) requires the theme of the





























‘Marysia ate a quarter of the apple.’
Furthermore, examples naturally occurring in the NCP seem to corroborate the
intuitions described above. The sentences in (22a) and (22b) involve reference to
foodstuffs. The first does not report that the best meal in the place in question
consisted of, say, fried chicken strips, but rather that the portion of meat was
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processed in one piece. In a similar vein, (22b) means that there was a continuous
part of a baguette in a bag and not, e.g., several slices. Finally, (22c) would be









































‘A quarter of a paper sheet slided out from inside.’
The comparison of extensional properties of partitives involving fractions, ćwierć,
and ćwiartkawith regard to topological relations is given in Table 3.4. The results
show the very same pattern as discussed with regard to Polish half-words, see
Table 3.2.
Table 3.4: Denotations of Polish quarter-words
continuous part discontinous part
jedna czwarta  
ćwierć  
ćwiartka  *
The comparison of Polish quarter-words with fractions mirrors the pattern
observed for the distinction between topology-neutral and topology-sensitive
half-words summarized in Table 3.2. In the next section, I will discuss further
evidence from partitive words.
3.2.2 Piece-words
Another class of expressions displaying topological sensitivity consists of piece-
words. Polish distinguishes between two such expressions, namely cząstka and
kawałek ‘piece’. The first is derived from the partitive word część ‘part’ by the suf-
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fix -k-, compare (23a) and (23b), whereas the second appears to be a basic form.9
Similarly to English piece, in many contexts kawałek and cząstka can be used
interchangeably with the part-word część though the former is a more frequent
expression than the latter.10 Nonetheless, like in other Polish partitive words also











The distribution of the two expressions in question shows that they both resist
combining with plural DPs, see (24b) and (25b). Furthermore, the infelicity of
phrases such as (24c) and (25c) suggests that both kawałek and cząstka impose
the same topological restrictions onDPs they combinewith as the partitivewords

















Intended: ‘piece of juice’
9In fact, kawałek is also morphologically complex and from a diachronic point of view it has
been formed from kawał ‘large share’. However, from the perspective of contemporary Polish,
the relationship between the two is rather obscure and since the latter is semantically marked,
it appears as if it were actually derived by means of the deletion of -ek- from the first. This
seems to be further corroborated by the fact that it is only possible to derive verbs from kawałek
and not from kawał, e.g., kawałkować ‘to portion’ ∼ *kawałować.
10Another meaning of the noun cząstka is ‘physical particle, corpuscule’. This meaning, however,
will not be discussed here.
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Intended: ‘piece of juice’
Nevertheless, under closer inspection it turns out that in fact the piece-word
kawałek is not incompatible with all mass nouns but rather only with one par-
ticular class of such expressions. As witnessed in (26), mass partitives headed by
kawałek are possible as long as the downstairs DP does not involve a liquid term,
see (26a).11 In particular, kawałek can felicitously combine with mass expressions





















‘piece of an item of footwear’
Interestingly, the partitive in (26b) does not simply refer to any portion of gold
but rather to to an integrated (though most probably amorphous) lump, i.e., to a
nugget. Likewise, the phrases in (26c) and (26d) have contiguous entities in their
11Gas terms are also infelicitous.
12Although examples such as (26c) and (26d) are not frequent and seem quite unusual, they are
definitely interpretable and the intuitions regarding their meaning are clear. Notice also that
a similar pattern is observed with respect to German Stück ‘piece’ as well as the diminutive
forms such as Stückchen and Stückerl (Nina Haslinger, p.c.).
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extension. Granular mass terms denote aggregates of objects such as grains of
rice or granules of gravel that seem too small or not significant enough to be
perceived as individuals in their own right (Grimm 2012b; Sutton & Filip 2016b).
Instead, they are conceptualized as clusters of elements. As is well-known, those
elements cannot be accessed by regular quantificational expressions such as dis-
tributive quantifiers or cardinal numerals, hence the possibility for granular con-
cepts to be lexicalized as mass. However, the piece-word kawałek in (26c) can
access the part-whole structure of the granular and designate a single granule,
i.e., a piece of gravel.
Similarly, object mass nouns refer to stable discrete entities such as pieces
of furniture or items of tableware (Gillon 1992; Chierchia 1998a; 2010; Barner &
Snedeker 2005; Bale & Barner 2009; Rothstein 2010; Landman 2011). Despite their
denotations, object mass nouns are uncountable, i.e., do not allow for quantifica-
tion over individual objects they refer to. However, kawałek yet again can reach
the part-whole structure of an aggregate. Even more interestingly, it can quan-
tify over parts of such discrete objects and trigger subatomic quantification, i.e.,
quantification over parts of a single item. As a result, (26d) can be interpreted
as referring to a piece of a shoe. Admittedly, this effect appears to be marginal.
However, it can be observed, e.g., in the attested fragment of discourse in (27),
where the phrase kawałek obuwia ‘piece of an item of footwear’ refers back to the








































‘“But first, giveme back the heel.” He reached out for it. The blonde gulped
silently and pulled out the piece of an item of footwear from her sleeve
[…]’
The findings concerning the distribution of Polish piece-words in comparison
to the part-word część are summarized in Table 3.5. Both cząstka and kawałek
have a selectional restriction prohibiting them from combining with expressions
13Source (accessed on 10th November 2020): https://www.wattpad.com/525823126-troubles-up-
your-sleeve-bellamy-blake-2-rozdzia%C5%82-2.
90
3.2 More topology-sensitive partitive words
denoting arbitrary sums of individuals, i.e., plurals. However, the main differ-
ence concerns the distribution with uncountable nouns. Unlike cząstka which is
generally incompatible with mass terms, kawałek is sensitive to the properties
of referents of a particular uncountable noun. In particular, it seems to require
a certain stability of form so that parts singled out from a whole can sustain
a fixed constant shape. In other words, kawałek accepts entities displaying any
kind of topological arrangement as long as it guarantees that the spatial form of
pieces is relatively stable. This way it rejects liquid terms but can combine with
expressions denoting solid substances, granular aggregates as well as artifacts,
i.e., discrete entities related in terms of similar origin and functionality.




część    
cząstka  * * *
kawałek  * * 
Another issue concerns the internal structure of objects denoted by partitives
headed by piece-words. As provided in Table 3.6, analogously to the partitive
words połówka and ćwiartka, both cząstka and kawałek yield parts that can be
recognized as contiguous integrated entities within a whole. This contrasts with
the standard part-word część which just like, e.g., the half-word połowa, can de-
liver both continuous and scattered parts. What is especially interesting about
kawałek is that unlike połówka and ćwiartka it does not require the whole to be
an integrated object. As long as it is not an arbitrary sum of individuals or a con-
stantly deforming substance, kawałek yields a portion of the whole that is one
piece.
Table 3.6: Denotations of Polish piece-words





3 Exploring topological sensitivity
The properties of the piece-word kawałek seem to relate to the scale of individ-
uation proposed by Grimm (2012b). However, there seems to be an interesting
discrepancy. In Grimm’s original proposal, see (28), liquids and solid substances
are grouped together with no ordering relation between them, i.e., water falls
into the same category as gold.
(28) Fragment of the scale of individuation (Grimm 2012b: p. 80; adapted)
liquid/solid substance < granular aggregate < artifactual aggregate…
Yet the data concerning the distribution of the Polish piece-word kawałek seem to
suggest that an evenmore fine-grained distinctionmight be necessary to account
for some grammatical phenomena in natural language. Since partitive phrases
headed by kawałek can only denote stable objects that come in one piece and
are able to sustain their shape, they cannot combine with liquid terms such as
water simply because fluids continually deform, i.e., lack a given shape. Thus, it
is possible that distinguishing between liquids and solid substances in terms of
ordering on the scale of individuation, as proposed in (29), might appear to be
required.14
(29) Modified fragment of the scale of individuation
liquid < solid substance < granular aggregate < artifactual aggregate…
Before we move on to discussing how the interplay of quantification and topol-
ogy looks like from a cross-linguistic perspective and whether other languages
can shed new light on the issues related to this phenomenon, let us briefly dis-
cuss the somewhat surprising fact that mass partitives are countable. In the next
section, I will consider the relationship between substances and portions thereof.
3.3 Mass, parts, quantities, and pieces
One of the very few attempts to link the issue of countability with partitivity
and pseudo-partitivity (see, e.g., Selkirk 1977; Koptjevskaja-Tamm 2001) has been
pursued in Chierchia (2010), who raises an interesting question concerning how
it can be that one cannot count mass, whereas portions of mass are countable.15
14It would be an interesting enterprise to explore whether there are more natural language
expressions sensitive to the distinction between liquid and solid substance terms and if so
whether that fact provides any interesting insights into the semantics of mass nouns. How-
ever, such a research project lies far beyond the scope of this study (for a discussion of related
psychological evidence that infants can discriminate between solid objects and amorphous
substances, see §5.1.1).
15See also Khrizman et al. (2015) and Landman (2016) for related considerations.
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Specifically, how come expressions such as (30a) and (30b) can have a different
status with respect to the mass/count distinction and yet refer to the very same
entity.
(30) English (Chierchia 2010; adapted)
a. That water is contaminated.
b. Those three quantities of water are contaminated.
Chierchia examines English relational expressions such as quantity, part, and
piece in partitive and pseudo-partitive constructions such as those in (31)–(33)
and observes a number of differences in their distribution.16
(31) English (Chierchia 2010; adapted)
a. (?)a quantity of that person
b. a quantity of apples
c. two quantities of gold
(32) English (Chierchia 2010; adapted)
a. a part of that person
b. #a part of apples
c. #a part of gold
(33) English (Chierchia 2010; adapted)
a. a piece of that pizza
b. #a piece of apples
c. a piece of gold
Though quantity is slightly degraded with singular count nouns in entity parti-
tives such as (31a), it combines felicitously with bare plurals and mass terms, see
(31b) and (31c), respectively. On the other hand, as we have already seen in §2.2.2,
the English expression a part of is incompatible with bare plurals, illustrated here
by (32b). Moreover, it fails to take bare mass nouns as its complements, see (32c).
Finally, piece seems to fall somewhere in between the two categories since it can
head partitives involving singular definite DPs like (33a) and bare mass nouns,
as in (33c), but cannot combine with bare plurals, see (33b).
Chierchia analyzes quantity, part, and piece in terms of partitions imposing
relative atomicity and non-overlap of members and attributes their selectional
16A pseudo-partitive (sometimes called a quantitative), e.g.,a piece of cake, differs from a partitive,
e.g., a piece of that cake, in that it does not indicate a part or a subset of an entity or a set, but
rather it simply denotes either an amount of something or the number of members in a set.
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restrictions to the input requirements of the functions denoted by these expres-
sions. Specifically, while quantity is defined over properties of sums of entities,
part is defined over singular individuals and piece displays a hybrid behavior.17
Although this approach is definitely thought-provoking, it seems that it misses
an important point regarding the contrast between the expressions in question
for at least two reasons. First, it neglects the role of topological sensitivity, as dis-
cussed above. But it also seems to ignore the distinction between counting and
measuring (see, e.g., Rothstein 2009; 2010; 2011; 2017; Partee & Borschev 2012;
Khrizman et al. 2015; Landman 2016). Intuitively, the difference between the two
operations is that while counting is about specifying how many discrete objects
of a certain kind there are, measuring determines some quantity in relevant units.
To foreshadow, I will argue that counting is sensitive to topological characteris-
tics such as being conceptualized as an integrated object, whereas measuring is
not.18
For a start, let us consider the count partitives in (34a) and (34b).19
(34) English (Chierchia 2010; adapted)
a. two quantities of that pizza
b. two parts of that rice
It seems that what happens in both cases is that at a certain level of the semantic
derivation some sort of quantification in terms of volume is involved. The result-
ing measure is then subject to a shift that returns a count interpretation. In the
literature, a number of operations that relate mass and count denotations have
been proposed. For instance, one possibility is that the singular count noun pizza
in (34a) is shifted to the mass interpretation via the Universal Grinder (Pelletier
1975) or a similar operation and then the partitive word designates some amount
of the mass before the entire phrase is shifted to a count denotation. Alterna-
tively, the portion interpretation is derived via the measure interpretation by a
special operator applied to the meaning of the partitive word (Khrizman et al.
2015). Likewise, the part-word in (34b) could be paraphrased as portion or propor-
tion and it essentially designates a particular volume of the rice in question.
Why is the distinction between counting and measuring of any significance
here? Intuitively, quantities are about volume, pieces involve some form of in-
dividuation, i.e., are conceived of as independent objects, and parts can shift
17I will return to Chierchia’s proposal in §7.1.
18I will discuss the distinction between the two operations in detail in §5.2.2.
19Notice that a reviewer finds (34b) a bit awkward to interpret. Here, I ignore possible inter-
speaker variation and simply discuss the data, as reported by Chierchia.
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between these two aspects of quantification. However, to address this question
more properly, let us consider the difference between the Polish part-word część
and piece-word kawałek. Similarly to multiple other languages, Polish does not












Interestingly, though, as witnessed in (36), mass partitives headed by część are
countable. In this case, the part-word gets a proportion interpretation, i.e., it mea-
sures the extension of the mass noun in terms of volume and indicates that the
total volume is perceived as consisting of disjoint roughly equal sized quantities.
For instance, the phrase in (36a) designates two out of some number of more
or less equally large amounts the total quantity of gold was divided into, irre-
spective of the size and shape of individual pieces of gold. Analogously, (36b)















‘two parts of the gravel’
On the other hand, the minimal pair examples involving the piece-word kawałek
in (37) lack the proportion reading, which suggests that the meaning of this ex-
pression does not merely concern quantification in terms of volume but rather it
serves as a basis for counting individuated solid objects. Neither (37a) nor (37b)
can get the volume interpretations available for (36a) and (36b), respectively.
They can only denote pluralities of pieces, i.e., solid integrated parts, of gold
and gravel, respectively.
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‘two pieces of gold’
(i) quantification in terms of objects







‘two pieces of gravel’
(i) quantification in terms of objects
(ii) #quantification in terms of volume
To better illustrate the contrast, let us consider several natural sentences. Pro-
portion uses of part-words are especially frequent in recipes and other cooking-
related contexts. For instance, consider the examples in (38), which are con-
structed based on typical recipes. Both in (38a) and (38b), the count explicit par-






















































‘Mix the porridge in the 2:1 ratio, which means two parts of rice for
one part of millet.’
A similar effect can be observed in count partitives with plural nouns. For in-




























‘Put two thirds of the apples evenly on the baking tray and blend the
remaining part.’
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‘Put two apple pieces evenly on the baking tray and blend the re-
maining piece.’
(i) quantification in terms of objects
(ii) #quantification in terms of volume
The count plural jabłka ‘apples’ in (39a) is shifted to the mass denotation and the
part-word część quantifies over proportions of the apple mass making up the rel-
evant apples and not over the apples as separate individuated objects. Whether
the ingredients in question are stored as wholes or are cut into pieces plays no
role for the truth conditions of the sentences in question. Consequently, if in re-
sponse to (39a) one apple was put on the baking tray and one half of an apple
was blended or, alternatively, four apples were put on the baking tray and two
apples were blended, the instruction would be followed correctly. Crucially, how-
ever, if we swap the part-word część in (39a) for the piece-word kawałek, we get
a significant contrast. Specifically, the sentence in (39b) cannot get a proportion
reading, i.e., it cannot be understood as instructing one to put four apples on the
baking tray and to blend the remaining two. Instead, it says you should put two
integrated parts of different apples on the baking tray as well as blend one such
part. Therefore, while the proportion interpretation of explicit partitives such as
(36) involves quantification in terms of volume along with the similarity in size
restriction, piece-words do not trigger such a constraint.
In fact, English also allows for a proportion use of part in numeral noun con-
structions when describing ratios, as in (40).20 This use is most natural with mass
nouns, see (40a), but it seems to work with plural count nouns too, as attested in
(40b).
(40) English (Peter Sutton, p.c.)
a. The ideal G&T is four parts tonic to one part gin.
b. Potatoes constituted the core of the recipe, which required two parts
of potatoes for every one of barley with dried peas.
20The example in (40b) comes from a book by Rebecca Earle Feeding the people: The politics
of the potato (p. 93) accessed via Google. Source (accessed on 10th November 2020): https:
//books.google.cz/books?id=WxzhDwAAQBAJ.
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At this point, a preliminary conclusion can be drawn. The structure of parts can
be such that it is merely a scattered entity, an unconnected configuration of bits
related merely by virtue of belonging to the same whole. However, some parts
are arranged in such a manner that they form a spatially contiguous entity that
can be conceptualized as an individual in its own right. It appears that natural
language is sensitive to this contrast and the Polish data show that this semantic
distinction can be encoded formally in the lexicon. Although not every parti-
tive word imposes topological restrictions regarding the spatial form of a por-
tion of an entity the whole partitive construction denotes, there are some that
do. Furthermore, it appears that counting and measuring differ with respect to
topological properties of quantified entities. While the former operation requires
integrated objects, the latter does not.
The facts discussed above suggest that accounts that neglect the distinction in
question most probably miss something crucial about how we humans conceptu-
alize part-whole structures and how it relates to the phenomenon of countability
in grammar. In the next section, I will inspect cross-linguistic evidence that fur-
ther corroborates this claim.
3.4 Cross-linguistic parallels
Polish gives important insight into the role of topological notions in quantifi-
cation over wholes and parts. However, one could wonder to what extent the
semantic behavior of proportional partitives discussed above is a Polish idiosyn-
crasy. In this section, I will discuss cross-linguistic evidence suggesting that topo-
logy-sensitive expressions are a relatively widespread phenomenon in partitive
constructions though not necessarily expressed by distinct lexical items. For in-
stance, my informants report that the English sentences in (41a) and (41b) have
different truth conditions. While the former is simply true in a scenario where
50% of an apple was eaten by Mary, the meaning of the latter is stronger since it
is true only if Mary ate a continuous half of an apple such as the one depicted in
Figure 3.1.
(41) English (Guy Tabachnick, p.c.)
a. Mary ate half an apple.
b. Mary ate a half of an apple.
However, the semantic difference between (41a) and (41b) is very slight and in
multiple contexts it might be extremely hard to detect. Therefore, before we dis-
cuss data from English, German, Dutch, Brazilian Portuguese, and Mandarin, let
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us briefly elaborate on the method developed to tell an integrated-part and a
scattered-part reading apart. For the sake of clarity, I will limit the discussion of
subatomic topological sensitivity to proportional partitives involving half-words.
Since topological aspects of partitivity can be very subtle and intuitions in
this respect tend to be somewhat obscure, in order to develop a proper diagnos-
tic to detect topology-sensitive partitive expressions it seems necessary to come
up with plain test objects readily divisible into comparable continuous and dis-
continuous parts differentiated by easily distinguishable properties. For instance,
consider the flag test, as represented in Figure 3.3 and 3.4. TheMaltese-like flag in
Figure 3.3 consists of two continuous areas each constituting 50% of the flag’s sur-
face. It is easy to distinguish between the halves since the left one is red whereas
the right one is white. Therefore, the spatial arrangement of the parts fit what I
will call an AB pattern. On the other hand, the red area in the Canadian-like flag
illustrated in Figure 3.4 is discontinuous, i.e., it does not constitute an integrated
half. I will call such an arrangement an ABA pattern.
Figure 3.3: Flag AB Figure 3.4: Flag ABA
As we saw in the previous sections, Polish encodes topological sensitivity lex-
ically by differentiating between distinct partitive words. As in Polish, Brazilian
Portuguese distinguishes between distinct half-words, namely metade and meio
‘half’. The former has nominal features and takes the partitive da-phrase, whereas
the latter is an adjectival expression agreeing with a modified noun in number
and gender. Interestingly, similarly to Polish half-words metade and meio differ
with respect to both their distributional and referential properties.
Let us first consider the difference in the distribution of the two Brazilian Por-
tuguese partitive expressions. While metade patterns with połowa in not being
picky about the type of predicate within the da-phrase it can combine with, see
(42), meio appears to correspond to pół and połówka.







‘half of the apple’
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‘half of the juice’
As demonstrated in (43c), meio cannot form a partitive with a mass term. More-
over, when combined with a plural noun it lacks a half-of-a-plurality reading,
i.e., it cannot be interpreted as a quantifier over individuals making up the de-
noted plurality. Instead it can only operate on the subatomic level of particular
members of the plurality denoted by a modified noun, i.e., it gets a half-of-a-
singularity interpretation exclusively. In other words, meio can only occur in an
entity partitive and not in a set partitive. For instance, (43b) cannot refer to a
half of the total number of apples. The only interpretation available regards a
plurality of apple halves.

















Intended: ‘half of the juice’
It seems plausible to posit that the contrasts between the phrases in (42) and (43)
follow from topological restrictions imposed by meio and metade on what they
select, analogously to the distinction between Polish pół and połówka, on the one
hand, and połowa, on the other. In other words, the nominal half-word metade
is topology-neutral, and thus can combine with DPs that denote integrated ob-
jects as well as those that have scattered entities in their extensions. On the other
hand, adjectival meio appears to be sensitive to the type of topological relations
holding between parts of the referents of NPs it modifies. In particular, it requires
integrated wholes. From a syntactic perspective, meio as a nominal modifier sits
lower in the structure thanmetade which takes the whole DP as its complement.
In other words, meio is an adjective that is merged with the NP. Assuming that
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the NumP is higher than the AP (e.g., Ritter 1991; 1992), this might explain sco-
pal properties ofmeio when it comes to subatomic quantification with respect to
regular plurals, i.e., why (43b) denotes a plurality of halves rather than half of a
plurality. However, meio can also combine with lexical plurals such as pluralia
tantum, see (44), and it has been argued that the plural in lexical plurals is signif-
icantly lower, i.e., inside the nP (see, e.g., Acquaviva 2008; Alexiadou 2011; Smith
2015; 2017).









Notice that (44) gets a similar interpretation as the phrase in (43b), i.e., denotes a
plurality of halves or rather, due to the number-neutrality of óculos ‘eye-glasses’,
either a plurality of halves or one half of an object. I argue that this fact alongside
the infelicity of phrases wheremeio modifies mass terms, see (43c), supports the
semantic explanation of the observed behavior in terms of topological sensitivity.
Even more interestingly, the results of the flag test show that meio in fact
patterns with Polish połówka. As reported by my informant, the sentence with
the proportional partitivewithmetade in (45a) is true both in the flagAB scenario,
see Figure 3.3, and in the flag ABA scenario, see Figure 3.4. However, the sentence
involving (45b) is judged true only in the former case and false in the latter. This
means that metade does not impose any topological restrictions on the portion
of an entity denoted by the downstairs DP, wheres meio yields only integrated
parts.


























3 Exploring topological sensitivity
A similar pattern is attested in Dutch where the distinction between the nominal
expression helft ‘half’, on the one hand, see (46a), and adjectival half ‘half’, on
the other, see (46b), is used in order to indicate the discussed contrast.




























‘A half of the flag is red.’
(i) AB
(ii) #ABA
The half-word helft forms a standard proportional entity partitive by combining
with the prepositional van-phrase which takes a singular DP as its complement
(de Hoop 1997; 2003; see also Cleven 2013: pp. 16–18). On the other hand, Dutch
half resembles meio in that it shows agreement with the modified NP. The suf-
fix -e on half shows up when the noun is either definite or common gender, or
both, as in the case of (46b), where it is spelled as halve. As in the Brazilian Por-
tuguese example, the flag test shows that helft licenses both a continuous-half
and a discontinuous-half interpretation, whereas adjectival half/halve disallows
the latter reading. In other words, while the sentence in (46a) is reported to be
true of both Figure 3.3 and 3.4, (46b) is judged false in the ABA flag scenario. This
fact strongly suggests that Dutch lexicalized the distinction between topologi-
cally neutral and topologically sensitive partitive words. While helft is similar to
Polish połowa or Brazilian Portuguese metade in that it simply returns an entity
constituting 50% of a whole, truth conditions imposed by half/halve are stronger,
i.e., the partitive yields a half that needs to be integrated.
It turns out that, as in Polish, Brazilian Portuguese and Dutch distinguish be-
tween topology-neutral and topology-sensitive half-words lexically. However, it
is not the only way the distinction can be encoded in natural language. Thus, let
us now consider a few strategies languages use to differentiate between the two
partitive meanings in question that I identified in this chapter. Interestingly, dif-
ferent structures give rise to similar semantic effects concerning topological rela-
tions in subatomic quantification. The sample discussed here is relatively small,
but the discussed data suggest that the observed semantic phenomenon is sys-
tematic and cross-linguistically valid.
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Let us start with the syntactic distinction occurring in English, as already men-
tioned in (41). From a morphological point of view there is no contrast between
the partitive word half in (47a) and (47b). Nevertheless, the syntactic structures
inwhich it appears in each of the two sentences significantly differ (see Vannestål
2004 for discussion).
(47) English (Jonathan Bobaljik, Jeffrey Parrott, p.c.)
a. Half the flag is red.
(i) AB
(ii) ABA
b. A half of the flag is red.
(i) AB
(ii) #ABA
In (47a), half is a predeterminer since it can occur before regular determiners
such as articles and demonstratives (Quirk et al. 1985: pp. 257–258). On the other
hand, in (47b) half forms a standard proportional entity partitive by taking the
of -phrase with a singular DP as its complement. In this environment it seems to
have nominal properties since it can be preceded by a determiner and it allows
for numeral and adjectival modification (Huddleston & Pullum 2002: p. 434). The
syntactic distinction translates into a semantic difference. Specifically, the sen-
tence in (47a) is considered appropriate with respect to both the AB and ABA flag
in Figure 3.3 and 3.4, respectively, whereas (47b) would be judged true only in the
first scenario.21 The contrast shows the relevance of topology in subatomic quan-
tification even in the absence of distinct lexical items differentiating between a
continuous-part and a discontinuous-part interpretation. In other words, it ap-
pears that natural language can employ purely syntactic means in order to in-
dicate the notion of topological integrity of parts. Notice that the half-word in
(47b) is preceded by the article. Superficially, the distinction between half and a
half of resembles to some extent the contrast between the part-expressions part
of and a part of. The appearance of the indefinite article suggests that the latter
should be treated on a par with count nominals and countability seems to imply
spatial integrity.
Another strategy is employed in German. At first blush, it might appear to
pattern with Brazilian Portuguese and Dutch since it also distinguishes between
the nominal half-word Hälfte ‘half’ and adjectival halb ‘half’. However, German
half-words display non-trivial interactions with determiners. While Hälfte with
21A reviewer comments that they prefer one half of the flag over a half of the flag in this context.
Though this raises an interesting question concerning interspeaker and/or dialectal variation,
I ignore this issue here and simply report on my informants’ judgments.
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the definite article die shows similar behavior with respect to count singulars,
plurals, and mass terms as Brazilian Portuguesemetade, see (48), it is infelicitous
with mass nouns when preceded by indefinite eine, see (49).



























‘half of the juice’



























Intended: ‘half of the juice’
On the other hand, definite DPs with adjectival halb differ from Brazilian Por-
tuguese phrases withmeio in that they can combine felicitously with all the types
of expressions in question including mass nouns, see (50). However, when pre-
ceded by the definite article, halb is odd with mass nouns, and thus patterns with
meio, see (51).

























‘half of the juice’



















Intended: ‘half of the juice’
In addition, the examples with the definite article in (50) seem to also have an
additional expressive intensifier reading of the sort ‘all those apples’. For instance,
it would be appropriate when half of the apples were splattered across the street
and the speaker were expressive about this situation (somewhat like totally).22
The facts discussed above suggest that whether Hälfte and halb are sensitive
to the spatial constitution of referents of the NP they attach to depends on the de-
terminer. In particular, their selectional restrictions suggest that German definite
DPs with half-words are topology-neutral, whereas their indefinite counterparts
are topology-sensitive. The results of the flag test seem to support that idea. As
witnessed in (52a) and (52b), sentences with definite DPs involving Hälfte and
halb are judged true in both the AB and the ABA flag scenario. Unlike in the
case of Brazilian Portuguese meio, there is no contrast between Hälfte and the
expressive reading of halb with respect to the the spatial make up of the partial
entity they yield here.23













‘Half the flag is red.’
(i) AB
(ii) ABA
22I would like to thank Berit Gehrke for sharing this observation with me.
23Note, however, that (52b) has also a strongly individuating reading that there is one piece of
cloth, which is half a flag (the other half is ripped off), and that half-flag is red.
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‘Half the flag is red.’
(i) AB
(ii) ABA
Now, consider the indefinite counterparts of (52) in (53). Both (53a) and (53b)
display the kind of semantic behavior observed in typologically sensitive expres-
sions such as Polish połówka, Brazilian Portuguesemeio, and Dutch half, i.e., they
would be true only if a continuous part of the flag were red.24 This shows that
the source of topological sensitivity is the interaction between the half-word and
the determiner rather than that it is encoded lexically.


























‘One piece, which is half a flag, is red.’
(i) AB
(ii) #ABA
Furthermore, there is yet another topology-sensitive construction in German. In
particular, consider the subject of the sentence in (54a) involving the half-word
Hälfte preceded by both what at first blush appears to be an indefinite article and
the definite article die. Notice, however, that eine in this environment is not an
indefinite article, but rather the numeral ‘one’. The mere fact that it can combine
with the definite article die suggests that it is an expression of a different type.
Furthermore, unlike regular indefinite articles, it is always stressed. As shown
by the ungrammaticality of (54b), in this construction one cannot put stress on
the half-word.















‘The half of the flag is red.’
24Again, the non-expressive reading of (53b) is that there is a half of the flag that is cut off or

















Intended: ‘The half of the flag is red.’
The truth conditions of sentences with the die eine Hälfte partitive expression
contrast with the truth conditions of the sentences involving definite propor-
tional partitives examined so far. For instance, consider (55).






























‘One half of the flag is red.’
(i) AB
(ii) #ABA
As we have already discussed, (55a) is true of both relevant scenarios, i.e., Fig-
ure 3.3 and 3.4. However, (55b) is consistently judged false in the flag ABA sit-
uation. This shows that German developed a rather complex system in which
the semantic distinction between different proportional partitive expressions, i.e.,
topologically neutral partitives, on the one hand, and topology-sensitive expres-
sions, on the other, results from the interaction between the half-word, definite-
ness, and the numeral. The expressions are distinguished from each other both
lexically and structurally with the most marked form being at the same time
semantically most complex.
Finally, the examined contrast involving yet another two types of construc-
tions is found in Mandarin. The two structures are provided in (56).
































‘A half of the national flag is red.’
(i) AB
(ii) #ABA
In (56a), the partitive meaning is conveyed by the phrase involving the propor-
tional expression yí-bàn ‘half’ related by the associativemarker de to the nominal
guó qí ‘national flag’ (Jing-Schmidt 2005: p. 294; Jin 2018). In this construction,
the half-word bàn does not follow a classifier and combines directly with the pre-
ceding cardinal numeral yí ‘one’ forming a constituent. It is possible that yí in
yí-bàn is in fact a grammaticalized expression interpreted as an indefinite rather
than a numeral (see Hsieh 2008: p. 127; Jin 2018).25 In any case, this structure is
topologically neutral and yields both integrated and discontinuous halves of en-
tities since sentences such as (56a) are reported to be true of the flag in Figure 3.3
as well as the one in Figure 3.4. In (56b), however, the partitive morpheme bàn
behaves more like a quantifier since it needs to combine with the classifiermiàn
dedicated to counting flat and smooth objects such asmirrors in order to quantify
over parts of the national flag denoted by the nominal. Therefore, it appears that
in this case the syntactic status of the half-word is on a par with cardinals. And
again, a different structure corresponds to a different semantics. Unlike (56a), the
sentence in (56b) can only mean that an integrated half of the national flag is red,
i.e., it would be judged false in the scenario represented in Figure 3.2.
The Mandarin example discussed above concludes this brief exploration of
cross-linguistic strategies of encoding sensitivity to topological notions in parti-
tive expressions. Though the sample of languages examined here was relatively
small and most probably more strategies await to be discovered within a future
thorough cross-linguistic investigation, the presented evidence proves that nat-
ural language encodes subtle topological distinctions in the domain of partitiv-
ity. The contrasts examined here are often very slight but a careful examination
suggests that the topology-related phenomena in question are not something
idiosyncratic but rather occur systematically across languages.
In the next section, I will discuss yet another class of expressions that might
shed new light on the issues related to the interplay of quantification and topol-
ogy. In particular, I will consider some similarities and contrasts concerning two
whole-adjectives in Polish, namely cały ‘whole’ and kompletny ‘complete’. To
25See also Hsieh (2008: p. 46) and Zhang (2011) for the discussion of issues regarding constituency
and other types of environments bàn appears in.
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this end, I will explore two different respects of being entire as well as the inter-
action between whole-adjectives and different types of nominals from the per-
spective of subatomic quantification and topological sensitivity.
3.5 Whole-adjectives
Due to contrasts parallel to the one illustrated in (57), adjectives such as whole
and entire have been analyzed as universal quantifiers over parts (Moltmann
1997) or maximizing modifiers, i.e., expressions restricting exception tolerance
(Morzycki 2002).26 There is a strong intuition that compared to (57a) the sen-
tence in (57b) implies that no part of the entity in question is exempt from having
to satisfy the main predicate. In particular, (57a) would be true if a sufficiently
significant proportion of the ferret were under the water, i.e., if part of a paw
or a tail were not submerged, under most circumstances the sentence would not
be considered false. However, the proposition expressed by (57b) is stronger. It
states that all the parts of the ferret are submerged.
(57) English (Morzycki 2002; adapted)
a. The ferret is submerged.
b. The {whole/entire} ferret is submerged.
In Polish, alongside the standard whole-adjective cały ‘whole’, there is yet an-
other expression that shares some of its semantic properties yet differs in an
interesting respect, namely the adjective kompletny ‘complete’. Though there is
a partial overlap between the two expressions in question in terms of their dis-
tribution, they show quite different patterns.
Let us first consider the distributional potential of the whole-adjective cały.
What is interesting about this expression is that it can be used for universal
quantification over parts of stuff denoted both by singular count nouns and mass
terms. Specifically, (58a) refers to all the material parts making up a particular
apple, whereas (58b) is true of an entity comprising all the quantities of juice in
a relevant context, i.e., the total amount of juice. Interestingly, when modifying
a plural expression such as (58c), in some contexts cały can scope over the plural.
In other words, (58c) is true of a plurality of whole apples but it can also be true
of a whole plurality of not necessarily whole apples.
26Morzycki (2002) builds on Brisson’s (1998) analysis of all in terms of maximizing modification.
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‘all (of) the apples’
(i) plural > whole
(ii) whole > plural
Admittedly, the cases in which cały can outscope the plural are restricted and
in many environments such a reading is either unavailable or marked. However,
there are contexts in which it is definitely possible. One such example is illus-
trated by the sentence in (59).



























‘Rats ate all of the apples, although most of them were already nibbled off
by mice.’
Compared to cały, the distribution of kompletny is significantly restricted. Intu-
itively, this is due to the fact that it seems to presuppose a certain complexity
in terms of a part-whole structure. In particular, it can only modify nominals re-
ferring to objects consisting of multiple easily recognizable and distinguishable
parts such as utensils and clothes.27
In addition to this restriction, the whole-adjective kompletny differs from cały
in that it can never scope over the plural. For instance, due to the fact that comput-
ers consist of many detachable elements, (60a) is a meaningful phrase in Polish.
27There is yet another meaning of kompletny that could be glossed as ‘total’ which does not
impose such a constraint. This use is especially frequent in colloquial Polish; however, it will
not be considered here.
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Similarly, when combined with an object mass term it implies that all discrete
objects comprising the extension of the noun are in place. For example, (60b)
would be true of a collection of equipment where there is no item missing. More-
over, kompletny frequently appears with collective nouns such as zestaw ‘set’
and kolekcja ‘collection’, which denote groups of artifacts. On the other hand,
when modifying a plural expression, as in (60c), kompletny cannot assert the de-
noted property of a plurality as such, but rather of singular individuals. In other


















(i) plural > complete
(ii) #complete > plural
Notice also that both cały and kompletny can combine with pluralia tantum, see
(61a)–(61b). The plurale tantum nominal nożyczki laparaskopowe ‘laparoscopic
graspers’ denotes a specialized object consisting of multiple detachable and re-
placeable elements, which makes it a proper expression to be modified by kom-
pletny. In both cases, the whole phrase is ambiguous between a singular and a
plural reading, i.e., it either refers to one whole or complete object, respectively,








‘whole laparoscopic graspers’ or









3 Exploring topological sensitivity
The reading on which the whole-adjective would impose a semantic restriction
on a plurality can be available only for (61a), i.e., only this phrase can mean some-
thing like a whole plurality of laparoscopic graspers. This can be observed in a
shopping context, where a sentence such as (62) means that the owners of the
store ran out of laparoscopic gaspers. Given the fact that the plural in plurale tan-
tum nouns was argued to be inside the nP (see, e.g., Acquaviva 2008; Alexiadou
2011; Smith 2015; 2017), data like (62) suggest that cały can enter into a scopal
























‘Today there were so many orders from hospitals that we sold out all
laparoscopic graspers.’
Table 3.7 gives an overview of the distribution of the Polish whole-adjectives
cały and kompletny as discussed above. While both can co-occur with singular
count nouns and mass terms, the latter requires the modified noun to refer to
complex entities consisting of multiple easily individuated parts. On the other
hand, when combinedwith regular plurals, only cały can scope over the plural. In
other words, what is targeted by kompletny is always the part-whole structure of
a particular singular individual, whereas cały in some cases can trigger universal
quantification over singular objects making up a plural entity.
Table 3.7: Distribution of Polish whole adjectives
singulars mass nouns plurals
cały   
kompletny   #
The evidence regarding the distribution of the Polish whole-adjectives in ques-
tion suggests the distinction between integrated objects as prototypically de-
noted by singular count nouns and scattered entities designated by mass terms,
on the one hand, and arbitrary sums of individuals referred to plural expressions,
on the other. To some extent this contrast resembles what was observed with re-
spect to the distribution of the piece-word kawałek in §3.2.2 and §3.3. Before I
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move on to discussing some semantic differences between cały and kompletny,
let us briefly examine a cross-linguistic context which might shed more light on
the pattern observed in Polish. In the next section, I will consider data concerning
a German whole-adjective modifying plural nouns.
3.5.1 German ganz and plurals
As in Polish, in German the whole-adjective ganz ‘whole’ can be used as a uni-
versal quantifier over parts of matter making up referents of both singular count
nouns as well as mass terms, as demonstrated in (63a)–(63b) (see also Moltmann
1997: pp. 123–127).







‘the whole apple’ or







‘all (of) the juice’
In addition, it has also been reported that at least in some German dialects the ad-
jective ganz ‘whole’ gives rise to a universal quantification interpretation when
modifying plural DPs (Moltmann 1997: pp. 123–127; see also Igel to appear). This
is claimed to be possible with plurals referring to sums constituting natural
wholes, i.e., sums whose members are considered as having less individuality,
and thus do not appear to be prominent with respect to the whole (Moltmann
1997: p. 125). For instance, consider (64).
























‘All the bees have stung Maria.’
In the sentence in (64a), children are part of a more or less anonymous group,
whereas in (64b) bees are perceived as constituents of a swarm. In both cases,
themodifier ganz seemingly quantifies over individualsmaking up the pluralities
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and thewholeDP yields the total number of children and bees involved in coming
and stinging, respectively.
However, under more rigorous investigation it appears that at least in one Aus-
trian dialect showing the discussed behavior there is an important distinction
between ganz and the universal quantifier alle ‘all’. Whatever the exact seman-
tic contribution of ganz, it seems that unlike alle it allows for exceptions. For
instance, consider the contrast given in (65). While the sentence in (65a) can be
supplemented with another clause stating that not all of the children have come,
(65b) obviously excludes such a continuation.28
(65) Viennese German (Maximilian Prüller, p.c.)






































‘Then the neighbors have come with their children. Two of them





































Intended: ‘Then the neighbors have come with all their children.
Two of them were ill and stayed home, but there were still eight!’
Although definitely more systematic research is required to establish what ex-
actly the properties of ganz are, I take the data in (64) as evidence suggesting
that German ganz patterns in the relevant respect with Polish cały. In the next
section, I will return to the alternation between cały and kompletny and examine
two different aspects of wholeness.




3.5.2 Integrity vs. maximality
There is yet another difference between the Polish whole-adjectives cały and
kompletny, which also intuitively appears to be the most significant one. The
difference relates to the distinction between two aspects of wholeness, which
I will call an integrity component and a maximality component. The former is
topological in nature and indicates that the parts of a whole are connected in such
a way that they form an intact integrated object.29 The latter, on the other hand,
simply employs universal quantification over parts or mereological exhaustivity,
and thus indicates that no part of a whole is missing.30
Under ordinary circumstances these two aspects of wholeness are interrelated.
Hence, the contrast between the twomeanings might seem somewhat subtle and
in many contexts it is probably difficult to detect. However, it is relatively easy
to come up with examples where it becomes significant. For instance, consider
the scenario described in (66).
(66) Polish
Scenario: Jan bought his daughter Marysia a model aircraft. After Marysia



























‘No, it needs to be assembled.’
29See also (Moltmann 1997: p. 127) for a remark on the integrity reading of German ganz in
predicate position as, e.g., in (i).











‘The glass is still intact.’
30However, see Morzycki (2002) for arguments against treating whole-adjectives as universal
quantifiers over parts based on the anaphoric and scope properties they give rise to. Instead,
he proposes to treat them as maximizing modifiers. Since the main point here concerns the
distinction between quantification over wholes and subatomic quantification, I only signal the
problem here and leave it unaddressed.
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Notice that there are two kinds of model aircraft Jan might have bought for Ma-
rysia, namely either a pre-built model that has already been put together or a
construction kit with a collection of separate parts that require gluing. Then, de-
pending on whether Marysia got the former or the latter, her brother Piotruś’s
question in (66a) can be understood along the lines of topological integrity or
mereological exhaustivity. In particular, (66b) provides an answer to a question
implying amaximality reading, i.e., whether no part is missing, whereas (66c) is a
reply in terms of an integrity interpretation, i.e., whether the parts are connected.
This shows that though the two ways in which being a whole can be understood
are frequently related, they are in fact separate semantic phenomena and in some
contexts only one of them can become prominent if not the only relevant aspect.
Now, let us compare what was observed in (66) with what happens in the
same context when the question in (67a) is slightly modified. Specifically, instead
of cały what appears in predicate position is the whole-adjective kompletny.
(67) Polish
Scenario: Jan bought his daughter Marysia a model aircraft. After Marysia



























‘No, it needs to be assembled.’
Here, the only meaningful answer is the one in (67b). The reply in (67c) is just re-
markably odd. That is because kompletny, unlike cały, lacks the semantic compo-
nent invoking integrity and implies exclusively the maximality aspect of whole-
ness. Therefore, the question in (67a) can only be interpreted as whether the box
includes all the relevant parts of the model aircraft.
The contrast between the number of possible answers in (66) and (67) shows
that cały has two meaning components which correspond to maximality, on the
one hand, and integrity, on the other. In contrast, kompletny can be interpreted
exclusively in terms of maximality. Importantly, however, it is not the case that
cały is ambiguous between two different readings. Rather, both aspects of whole-
ness need to be present. The reason is that in the context of (68) neither of the
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answers to the question in (68a) makes much sense. If cały were ambiguous, both
(68b) and (68c) would be legitimate.
(68) Polish (Adam Przepiórkowski, p.c.)
Scenario: Jan bought his daughter Marysia a model aircraft. After Marysia









































‘Yes, it is whole, it only lacks the propeller.’
Though the distinction discussed in this section is subtle, it is systematic and
can be detected in multiple environments. Even out of the blue the intuitions
regarding the contrast between the sentence in (69a) and (69b) are very clear.
The former states that all the relevant parts of the toy are in place or that the
parts are connected, or most probably both, whereas the latter implies only that





















‘This toy is complete.’
(i) maximality meaning
(ii) #integrity meaning
31It is possible that the semantics of cały is even stronger. As suggested by Adam Przepiórkow-
ski (p.c.), in some contexts it seems to require that the object in question is not only maximal
in the mereological sense and integrated in the topological sense, but also undamaged. Such
a requirement seems to invoke a stronger topological notion, perhaps the notion of homeo-
morphism in the sense that, e.g., a broken sphere is not homeomorphic with an unbroken
sphere. Though this is definitely a very interesting idea, I will leave careful investigation of its
implications for future research.
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Table 3.8 recapitulates the findings. Distinguishing between the maximality and
the integrity meaning component of wholeness allows us to conclude that while
the Polish whole-adjective kompletny is topology-neutral, cały is not.




The contrast concerning possible interpretations of the Polish whole-adjec-
tives discussed in this section provides yet another piece of evidence that some
natural language expressions are sensitive to topological relations holding be-
tween particular entities. Specifically, the whole-adjective cały can be used to
imply that all the parts of an object remain in such a spatial configuration that
the object in question constitutes an integrated whole. In the next section, I will
focus on the maximality aspect of wholeness. In particular, assuming that the
semantics of cały involves universal quantification over entities of some sort I
will examine what exactly can constitute the domain of such quantification.
3.5.3 Universal quantification over parts and wholes
Though the Polish whole-adjective cały can combinewith a wide range of expres-
sions including singular count nouns, prototypical mass terms, granulars, object
mass nouns, and plurals, in each case the interpretation of the whole NP depends
on the structure of the denotation of the modified noun. The difference becomes
apparent when we distinguish between subatomic quantification, i.e., quantifica-
tion over material parts making up building blocks of the denotation of a certain
noun, and what, for the lack of a better term, I will call non-subatomic quantifi-
cation, i.e., quantification above the subatomic level. Specifically, non-subatomic
quantification covers both atomic quantification, i.e., quantification over singular
individuals constituting pluralities of objects, as well as quantification over por-
tions of substances as long as it does not target the internal structure of minimal
building blocks of mass denotations, assuming there are any.32
32Though for a long time it was commonly assumed that there are no minimal building blocks
in the denotations of mass nouns (e.g., ter Meulen 1980; Link 1983; Bunt 1985; Landman 1991),
some theories postulate that the denotations of mass nouns do in fact consist of minimal build-
ing blocks but these building blocks are in some way inaccessible for counting (e.g., Chierchia
1998a; 2010). For an overview, see Landman (2011).
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To illustrate the distinction, let us first consider the interpretative contrast
between singular count nouns and liquid terms. For instance, the phrase in (70a)














‘all (of) the water’
(i) #subatomic quantification
(ii) non-subatomic quantification
The whole-adjective cały in (70a) quantifies universally over material parts of a
single apple rather than, e.g., over individual apples making up a collection of
apples. In other words, (70a) does not mean something like ‘all apples’ when the
set of relevant apples consists of one object. On the other hand, in (70b) cały trig-
gers universal quantification over entities in the extension of the modified mass
noun, but it is impossible to interpret the phrase as meaning that some quantity
of individual drops or molecules of water are whole. Rather, (70b) designates the
entire amount of the water in question. In addition, unlike (70a), the phrase in
(70b) does not imply the sense of integrity. The translations of the sentences in










‘Marysia ate the whole apple.’ or









‘Marysia drank all the water.’
The distinction between subatomic and non-subatomic quantification becomes
more evident in the case of plurals as well as granular and object mass nouns
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since these expressions allow for both types of quantification in question. Let us
start the discussion of these classes of expressions with the examples in (72). In
particular, the NP in (72a) can either refer to the total amount of rice in question
irrespective of the structure of individual grains constituting that amount or to
an unspecified amount of rice involving whole grains, as opposed to milled rice.
Similarly, (72b) is either true of an unspecified number of whole shoes or of the















‘all (of) the footwear’
(i) subatomic quantification
(ii) non-subatomic quantification
The contrast can be clearly demonstrated by considering non-trivial truth-con-
ditional differences between (73a) and (74a), on the one hand, and between (73b)
and (74b), on the other. The most prominent interpretation of (73a) is that there is
no rice left. On the other hand, the sentence in (73b) does not infer that Marysia




























‘Marysia bought whole rice, whereas Jan bought rice flour.’
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Likewise, (74a) is true only if therewere no shoe left in the shop last year, whereas
the context rules out this interpretation in (74b). Instead, the available reading





































‘Our factory produces whole footwear, whereas our competitors pro-
duce only soles.’
Moreover, as already discussed in §3.5, in some environments cały can scope
over the plural, recall (59) and (62). Consequently, a phrase such as (75a) denotes
a plurality of whole objects but in some contexts it can also designate a whole plu-
rality of objects. This behavior is irrespective of whether the modified nominal















‘all (of) the scissors’
(i) subatomic quantification
(ii) non-subatomic quantification
The quantificational behavior of cały modifying plurals is well illustrated by the
interpretative contrast between the two sentences in (76), where (76b) repeats
the example already provided in (59).
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‘Rats ate all of the apples, although most of them were already nib-
bled off by mice.’
While (76a) makes it clear that in this case the whole-adjective indicates that
no part of each relevant apple is exempt from being consumed, (76b) is most
naturally interpreted in terms of universal quantification over individual apples.
The quantificational properties of the Polish whole-adjective cały ‘whole’ are
summarized in Table 3.9. The crucial observation is that the domain of quantifica-
tion depends in a non-trivial manner on the extension of the modified nominal.
Specifically, cały can quantify either over material parts or individual parts of
an entity denoted by the nominal it combines with. Expressions that indicate
objects conceptualized as integrated wholes allow for subatomic quantification,
whereas substance mass nouns do not. On the other hand, cały can also trigger
non-subatomic universal quantification over entities making up a plurality or a
substance.
Table 3.9: Quantificational properties of Polish cały ‘whole’
mass
singulars plurals object mess
subatomic quantification    *
non-subatomic quantification *   
This concludes the investigations into the relevance of topological sensitivity




In this chapter, I provided additional evidence for the relevance of the notion
of spatial integrity for subatomic quantification. In particular, novel evidence
shows that the distinction between topology-neutral and topology-sensitive par-
titive words is lexicalized in Polish. Specifically, Polish has three morphologically
distinct half-words, i.e., połowa, pół, and połówka. What they share is that when
applied to an entity they return a part constituting approximately 50% of a whole.
They differ, however, regarding the type of entity they select for, as well as the
type of part they yield. Given different distributional and referential properties
the data could be explained as follows. The half-word połowa is topology-neutral,
i.e., it measures halves of any type of entity, be it a solid individual, mass sub-
stance, aggregate, or an arbitrary plurality of individuals. The outcome of quan-
tification is a portion of a whole which is topologically indeterminate. In other
words, połowa can either designate an integrated entity within the part-whole
structure of an individual or merely an arbitrary discontinuous sum of pieces
making up the whole. Unlike połowa, pół is sensitive to the type of entity de-
noted by its complement. Specifically, it selects only for integrated individuals,
i.e., individuated objects that come in one piece.33 Nonetheless, analogously to
połowa the resulting partitive phrase can refer either to a continuous or discon-
tinuous half but in this case it has to be part of an integrated whole. Finally,
the meaning of połówka is the most constrained. It shares selectional restrictions
with pół, i.e., it excludes scattered entities such as substances and granular aggre-
gates as denoted typically by mass terms as well as pluralities of individuals, but
in addition it imposes topological constraints on the extension of the resulting
partitive construction. To put it in a different way, połówka cuts out an integrated
part constituting approximately 50% of the volume of a continuous individuated
object.
In a similar vein, the alternation between fractions and the quarter-words
ćwierć and ćwiartka ‘quarter’ corresponds to the pattern observed in half-words.
In particular, fractions are topology-neutral, whereas ćwierć patterns with pół
and ćwiartka mirrors the behavior of połówka in that it requires a portion of an
object to form a contiguous entity. Polish further distinguishes between distinct
piece-words, one of which, i.e., kawałek, yields an integrated object within a part-
whole structure as long as the whole does not denote an arbitrary sum of individ-
uals. Furthermore, the contrast between two types of Polishwhole-adjectives, i.e.,
cały and kompletny, makes it easier to determine two distinct aspects of whole-
ness, namely maximality and integrity.
33This is a slight simplification since pół can also combine with collective nouns. However, as
explained above, I will ignore this issue here.
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The cross-linguistic investigation revealed that the phenomenon observed in
Polish partitives is not a peculiarity of one language but rather appears in at
least several other languages. The distinction is not always expressed lexically
and sometimes it manifests itself in different interpretations assigned to different
syntactic structures. It turns out that Brazilian Portuguese and Dutch distinguish
between the topology-neutral half-wordsmetade and helft, on the one hand, and
the topology-sensitive adjectives meio and half semantically resembling Polish
połówka, on the other. In contrast, English does not differentiate between distinct
lexical items but rather distinguishes two constructions, i.e., the topology-neutral
half DP phrase as opposed to the a half of DP structure, which again shows a
semantic behavior similar to połówka. The same contrast is reported to hold be-
tween the yí-bàn and bàn-clf constructions in Mandarin. Finally, the German
data suggest an interaction between half-words and (in)definiteness. While defi-
nite DPs involving half-words are topology-neutral, their indefinite counterparts
behave analogously to what is attested in Polish. Furthermore, there is an addi-
tional construction involving the nominal half-word, the definite article, and the
numeral ‘one’, namely die eine Hälfte, which is also topology-sensitive.
The significance of the data discussed here lies primarily in revealing the rel-
evance of topological relations holding between parts of individuals forcing us
to recognize that natural language semantics is sensitive to whether parts come
in one piece or constitute discontinuous entities. In the following section, I will
introduce yet another set of evidence concerning subatomic quantification. In
particular, I will show that similarly to cardinal numerals, which are dedicated
to counting wholes, there are numerical expressions in natural language dedi-
cated to counting parts.
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In the previous chapters, I provided robust linguistic evidence for the relevance
of subatomic quantification in natural language as well as for the significant role
the topological notion of integrity plays with respect to that phenomenon. I ex-
amined multiple types of partitive constructions including count explicit parti-
tives and topology-sensitive proportional partitives. What these two types of
expressions have in common is that they impose a certain constraint on how the
denoted parts of objects are conceptualized. Specifically, they require the parts
to constitute integrated continuous elements. On the other hand, we saw that
subatomic quantification is not restricted to partitive constructions and is also at-
tested in the adjectival domain, e.g., German and Romance adjectival half-words
as well as different types of whole-adjectives. At this point, one could expect
that given the amount of evidence for the relevance of part-whole structures in
different types of constructions there should be quantificational expressions in
natural language that are specialized for counting parts of entities. It turns out
that in fact in many languages there are such expressions.
In this chapter, I will present novel data concerning subatomic quantification
in the adjectival domain. In particular, I will examine semantic properties of nu-
merical expressions such as English double and triple which I will refer to as
multipliers (following Quirk et al. 1985; Huddleston & Pullum 2002). In par-
ticular, I will focus mostly on Slavic multipliers exemplified by Polish podwójny,
Czech dvojitý, Russian dvojnoj, and Bosnian-Croatian-Serbian (BCS) dvostruki, all
‘double’, which all seem to have identical properties. Unlike cardinal numerals,
multipliers do not count entities, but rather their particular parts. I have chosen
Slavicmultipliers due to theirmorphological complexitywhich suggests a rich se-
mantic structure that is not expressed formally in a language such as English. To
foreshadow, I will argue that since multipliers in Slavic are derivationally com-
plex, they are in fact compositional. Though the distribution of multipliers is
relatively broad, I will mainly concentrate on a subset of environments in which
they can occur, which allows us for novel insights with respect to the phenomena
discussed in this study.1
1Most of the data discussed in this chapter come from linguistic corpora. However, I would like
to sincerely thank Mojmír Dočekal, Pavel Caha, and Markéta Ziková, Tetiana Kamyshanova,
Boban Arsenijević, Kurt Erbach and Guy Tabachnick, and Viola Schmitt for confirming my
intuitions concerning some of the Czech, Russian, BCS, English, and German phrases, respec-
tively.
4 Multipliers
4.1 Significance of multipliers
Since the early days of formal semantics (starting with Montague 1973) the mean-
ing of quantificational expressions such as numerals has been constantly receiv-
ing a lot of attention. Over the last several decades, extensive and extremely
important work has been done in this area leading to a number of influential the-
ories of cardinals (e.g., Barwise & Cooper 1981; Scha 1981; Landman 2004; Ionin
& Matushansky 2006). Nevertheless, it seems that there is still a vast territory
left unchartered since natural languages exhibit multiple classes of numerical ex-
pressions that did not receive nearly asmuch recognition as cardinal numerals. In
this chapter, I will contribute to the study of such somewhat neglected classes of
quantifiers by providing evidence considering multipliers. Though such expres-
sions are cross-linguistically common, see (1), as for now their semantic proper-
ties are surprisingly understudied and I am not aware of any formal attempt to















The fact that multipliers have been somewhat overlooked is even more striking
given that they exhibit non-trivial quantificational behavior that differs signifi-
cantly from the one observed in cardinal numerals. For instance, consider exam-





2An exception is Wągiel (2020a) on which the whole chapter is loosely based.
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The noun phrase in (2a) simply denotes a set of singular entities having the prop-
erty of being a crown. Interestingly, although the phrase in (2b) is true of a plu-
rality of two entities, (2c) can only be interpreted as referring to a single indi-
vidual, similarly to (2a). There is, however, a crucial difference between the two
expressions since (2c) seems to involve subatomic quantification. In particular,
the multiplier appears to quantify over elements within the inner structure of a
denoted entity. In other words, double in (2c) restricts the denotation of the noun
to only those crowns that have a particular complex form.
In the following parts of this chapter, I will discuss the distribution and seman-
tic properties of Slavic multipliers with a special focus on Polish. I will argue that
such expressions are compositional and involve quantification over objects that
are conceptualized as integrated parts of integrated wholes. Furthermore, I will
suggest a generalization concerning the meaning of a representative subset of
the data, i.e., multiplier phrases involving concrete singular nouns, and point
out some non-trivial consequences as well as discuss other types of nominals
multipliers that combine with and how it relates to subatomic quantification.
4.1.1 Morphological complexity of Slavic multipliers
Since it is widely recognized that derivational morphology in Slavic languages is
particularly rich, in recent years increasing attention has been drawn to the se-
mantics of Slavic morphologically complex numerical expressions. The research
has led to a number of insightful investigations concerning such constructions in
Czech (e.g., Dočekal 2012; 2013; Dočekal &Wągiel 2018b; Grimm&Dočekal 2021),
Polish (e.g., Wągiel 2014; 2015b; 2020a,b; to appear), and Russian (e.g., Khriz-
man 2020). However, while previous research focused mainly on the impact of
numeral morphology on the collective/distributive alternation with respect to
different types of numerals, in this study I will examine the adjectival domain
and present evidence of the significance of multipliers for subatomic quantifi-
cation, i.e., quantification over cognitively salient parts of entities. In §3.1 and
§3.2, we saw how formal complexity correlates with topology-sensitive seman-
tics in partitive words in Polish. In this section, I will focus on the morphology of
Polish, Czech, Russian, and BCS multipliers which unlike their English counter-
parts exhibit a complex derivational structure. I believe this choice of data will
be instructive since it will allow us to confront multipliers with cardinals in a
straightforward manner that will reveal intriguing similarities as well as differ-
ences between the two classes.
The examined lexical items in question will be exemplified in the following
sections by expressions derived from the numeral root √dw / √dv corresponding
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to the number 2. Let us assume the morphological make-up of the basic cardinals





























3For convenience, I provide only unmarked forms for cardinals in (3a)–(6a). In a similar vein,
in (3b)–(6b) masculine forms represent whole declensional paradigms. For BCS in (6b), the
derivationally complex adjective dvostruki ‘double’ has been chosen for sake of exposition
despite the fact that there is also another BCS multiplier, namely dupli ‘double’. Although it
seems that there is a difference in the distribution of the two forms, I assume that there is no
relevant semantic distinction between them with respect to the phenomena discussed here.
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As can bewitnessed in themorpheme orderings in (3b)–(6b), all themultipliers in
question consist of numeral roots shared with corresponding cardinals and some
additional morphology including the affixes po⟩…⟨n-/-it-/-n-/-struk- and the mor-
phemes -ój-/-oj-/-o-, whichmark a non-cardinal stem as well as inflectional mark-
ers. Notice that the morphemes -ój-/-oj-/-o- appear in multipliers derived from
numeral roots referring to the numbers 2–3. In multipliers derived from roots
referring to the number 4, the suffix -ór-/-er-/-oro- occurs instead, e.g., Polish
po⟩czw-ór⟨n-y, Czech čtv-er-n-ý, Russian četv-er-n-oj, and BCS četv-oro-stuk-i, all
meaning ‘quadruple’.
In general, Slavic multipliers exhibit adjectival morphology and agree with












‘This double glazing broke.’
I will refer to the derivational circumfix po⟩…⟨n- in Polish and the suffixes -it-,
-n-, and -struk- in Czech, Russian, and BCS, respectively, as multiplicative mor-
phemes. Moreover, I will assume here that inflectional markers and morphemes
constituting non-cardinal stems have no contribution to the semantics of mul-
tipliers. Therefore, in the analysis to come I will focus only on the interaction
between numeral roots and multiplicative morphemes.
An approach neglecting the semantic role of some of the examinedmorphemes
in composition might seem in fact a considerable simplification since affixes
marking non-cardinal stems are attested not only in multipliers, but also in a
variety of other numerical expressions. For instance, consider Polish denumeral
group nouns such as dwójka ‘(group of) two’, derived numerals presupposing that
a plurality is heterogeneous with respect to the natural gender of referents such
as dwoje ‘two (one male and one female)’, taxonomic numerals like dwojaki or
dwoisty, both ‘twofold’, as well as denumeral verbs such as podwoić ‘to double’.4
At first blush, it seems appealing to assume that the appearance of non-cardinal
stem markers in all the above cases is non-coincidental from a semantic point of
view. Therefore, an alternative approach could assign, e.g., Polish -ój-/-oj-/-oi- a
meaning general enough to cover the whole variety of considered expressions,
i.e., an underspecified operation on numbers that is different from the one em-
ployed in cardinals. Nevertheless, in this study Iwill remain agnostic with respect
4See Wągiel (2014; 2015b) for a discussion and possible analysis of expressions such as dwójka
and dwoje. Notice also that -ój-, -oj-, and -oi- are allomorphs.
129
4 Multipliers
to that possibility. Instead, I will assume that the discussed markers are seman-
tically vacuous and that their sole function is purely structural, specifically they
simply form stems. For the sake of simplicity I will also ignore all the intricacies
related to the semantics of gender as well as its relationship with quantification
(see, e.g., Arsenijević 2017; Fassi Fehri 2016; 2018; Wągiel to appear) and the role
of inflectional markers in coding such an interaction.
4.1.2 Subatomic quantifiers
In the previous section, we saw that in Slavic the morphological make-up of
multipliers resembles that of cardinals with the crucial difference that the former
consistently involve more structure. Let us now consider the meaning of phrases
in which multipliers modify a noun. I will start with the set of examples in (8)–


























The examples provided above will be considered as illustrative since they are all
attested in representative Slavic text corpora such as the National Corpus of Pol-
ish (NCP) (Przepiórkowski et al. 2012), the Czech National Corpus (CNC) (Křen
et al. 2012), the Russian National Corpus (RNC) (Apresjan et al. 2006), and the
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Croatian National Corpus (CrNC) (Tadić 2009).5 Furthermore, the Polish noun
korona ‘crown’ ranks at the 13th place on the list of collocation candidates within
two-words collocations for the form podwójna ‘double’ in the balanced sample
of the National Corpus of Polish whereas the Czech noun koruna ‘crown’ ranks
at the 7th place for the form dvojitá ‘double’ in a corresponding Czech sample
in the Czech National Corpus. Moreover, the example is of historical relevance
since it resembles the famous case of the complex papal crown discussed in the
philosophical literature (seeWiggins 1980: p. 70), which I will also briefly address
below.
As alreadymentioned, noun phrases such as those in (8)–(11) denote sets of sin-
gular (and not plural) entities despite the fact that in the morphological make-up
of multipliers modifying a noun there are numeral roots which involve reference
to the number 2. Given the classical perspective on the meaning of numerals, at
first sight this fact might appear somewhat puzzling. Nevertheless, it seems clear
that in all the multiplier examples discussed in this chapter quantification is in-
volved albeit it is not quantification over wholes. To illustrate this claim, let us























‘The Pschent consists of two parts.’
The sentence in (12a) indicates a complex inner structure of the Pschent, and thus
entails the sentence in (12b). If it is true of an object that it is a double crown, it
has to be a crown and it has to consist of (at least) two elements.
However, it is not sufficient that the object referred to by the noun Pszent con-
sists of any two elements since it is not the case that every crown consisting
of two parts is a double crown. Rather, the two relevant elements need to have
a particular property, i.e., a property comparable to the property of the whole.
In other words, a double crown consists of two parts which can be considered
5NCP: http://nkjp.pl/, CNC: https://www.korpus.cz/, RNC: https://ruscorpora.ru/new/, CrnC:
http://filip.ffzg.hr/cgi-bin/run.cgi/first_form.
6In the following part of this section, the phenomena will be discussed mainly on the basis




crowns themselves. For instance, a reader familiar with ancient history will rec-
ognize the Pschent as a crown worn by rulers of Ancient Egypt. Historically, as
demonstrated in Figure 4.1 the Pschent combined two parts, i.e., the Red Deshret
Crown of Lower Egypt, see Figure 4.2, and the White Hedjet Crown of Upper
Egypt, see Figure 4.3.7 Its design represented the pharaoh’s power over all of
the unified kingdom. Due to the discussed features of the relevant parts of the
Pschent, one could say it is a two-in-one crown.
Figure 4.1: Pschent Figure 4.2: Deshret Figure 4.3: Hedjet
Note that there is only one cut that divides the Pschent into the Deshret and
Hedjet and this characteristic can be generalized to any hypothetical double
crown. In other words, not every part of a double crown is a crown itself. On
the contrary, in this and similar cases within the set of all the parts of a whole
there are exactly two parts of which a property comparable to the property of the
whole holds. Therefore, the semantics of Slavic predicates such as those in (8)–
(11) and others corresponding to the English phrase double crown does not involve
the property of divisive reference which is sometimes assumed to hold for mass
nouns (e.g., Cheng 1973).8 Notice also that the referents of multiplier phrases
differ from things designated by nouns like twig, rock, and fence. Though such
entities also involve parts that have the property of a whole, e.g., parts of a twig
are also twigs and parts of a rock are also rocks (Zucchi & White 2001; Rothstein
2010: e.g.,), the crucial distinction lies in the level of the arbitrariness of subdivi-
sions. While objects in the extensions of twig-like expressions can be partitioned
in an arbitrary manner and the resulting parts will still have the property of
a whole (assuming some level of granularity) as long as they form continuous
segments, complex individuals denoted by multiplier phrases typically require
7The pictures in Figure 4.1–4.3 are based on the work by fi:Käyttäjä:kompak shared on
Wikimedia Commons under the CC-BY-SA 2.5 license. Sources: https://commons.wikimedia.
org/wiki/File:Pschent2.svg, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Deshret.svg, and https:
//commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Hedjet.svg.
8I do not share this view. For an overview of the problems related to treating divisive reference
as the hallmark of mass terms see, e.g., Grimm (2012b: pp. 111–119).
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a very specific subdivision in order to identify the salient parts. This property
makes them on a par with the already mentioned example of the papal tiara (see
Wiggins 1980: p. 70) which is a complex object constituting a triple crown. What
I believe to be the signature property of such individuals is that they are simul-
taneously perceived as one integrated entity and as a configuration of parts that
could be considered independent objects in their own rights.
At this point, one might object that the double crown example is somewhat
fancy and does not really reveal the meaning of multipliers. However, the char-
acteristic described above is also valid for many other examples including nouns













As for (13a), the noun drzwi ‘door’ ranks at the 23rd place on the NCP colloca-
tion list for the non-virile/neuter form podwójne.9 An object referred to by the
phrase is a door made of two independently moving leafs, i.e., entities that could
be perceived as self-sufficient doors. Likewise, a double garage denoted by the ex-
pression in (13b) can be a buildingwith two entrances leading to separate parking
spaces.10 Again, it appears that the structure of the entity in question involves
parts that can be considered as having a property similar to the property of the
whole.
The same way of thinking about multiplier phrases also applies to examples
that at first blush appear to be less obvious than those discussed above. For in-








9Notice that in Polish the noun drzwi ‘door’ is a plurale tantum.
10Notice, however, that similarly to the English phrase double garage (13b) can also mean simply








The intuitions about frequencies are corroborated by the fact that, e.g., the noun
warstwa ‘layer’ ranks at the 7th place on the NCP collocation list for the feminine
form podwójna. At first sight, it seems that expressions such as (14a) and (14b)
refer to homogeneous entities and as such do not designate objects involving
a complex structure. However, under closer inspection it turns out that even
in these cases division into parts is not arbitrary. Specifically, a double layer is
normally taken to be a layer consisting of two layers merged together. Since
layers are flat entities spread over some surface, only a cut alongside a certain
plane can divide the two parts constituting an entity denoted by the phrase in
(14a). Similarly, the expression in (14b) designates an entity whose structure can
be partitioned only in a particular manner in order to separate the salient parts.
Intuitively, a double coating consists of two parts that themselves are coverings
applied to the surface of some object.
Certainly, examples such as those in (8)–(11) and (13)–(14) do not exhaust the
combinatorial potential of Slavic multipliers and some more problematic cases
will be discussed subsequently in §4.2. Nevertheless, the data discussed above in-
dicate that at least a subset of constructions involving multipliers indicates clear
cases of subatomic quantification. Noun phrases such as those in (8)–(11) and
(13)–(14) denote sets of things conceptualized as singular objects with a complex
inner structure. The role of multipliers in the discussed constructions is to quan-
tify over particular parts of such structures, i.e., parts that have a property compa-
rable to the property of the whole. I will refer to such elements as self-sufficient
parts. However, before we turn our attention to some less obvious examples and
see how far the generalization proposed above can get us, let us briefly examine
towhat extent the described semantic properties are representative formultiplier
phrases in general.
4.1.3 Cross-linguistic similarities
In this section, I will discuss corpus-based evidence suggesting that the semantic
behavior of multipliers discussed in the previous section is not a Slavic idiosyn-
crasy but it is actually widespread in languages such as English and German. In
particular, I will inspect a number of phrases mostly involving some of the most
frequent collocates of double as specified by the Corpus of Contemporary Amer-
ican English (COCA) (Davies 2009) and supplement them with German equiva-
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lents found in the German Reference Corpus (GRC) (Kupietz & Keibel 2009).11
This brief investigation will both provide a slightly broader cross-linguistic per-
spective and prepare the ground for a discussion of more problematic cases in
§4.2.






The expression in (15a) is a somewhat metalinguistic example. Specifically, the
symbol J…K used to indicate the semantic evaluation function every formal se-
manticist knows sowell, is referred to by the pluralized phrase in (15a), i.e., double
brackets. The structure of the entity is such that each of the two parts of the, say,
opening bracket can be considered a bracket itself. However, since they are spa-
tially arranged in such a way that they form an integrated object perceived as
one, under ordinary circumstances it would be rather awkward to refer to a dou-
ble bracket as two brackets. An analogous effect can be observed with respect
to the meaning of the phrase in (15b) which refers to a basin designed in such
a way that it includes two parts each of which is a sink itself. Similarly, (15c) is
true of a cooking device that consists of two merged ovens, i.e., two parts that
have a property comparable with the property of the whole. The expression (15d)
refers to a knot wound twice which typically results in an object consisting of
two recognizable parts that are knots themselves.
Other examples of the discussed sort involve relatively frequent multiplier












Each of the expressions provided above refers to an entity perceived as a complex
object involving two salient parts with a property comparable to the one of the
whole. Specifically, (16a) and (16b) denote a staircase consisting of two connected
staircases and a tomb built in such a way that it comprises two tombs in one
structure, respectively. Analogously, the phrases in (16c)–(16e) designate entities
conceptualized as one object consisting of two merged individuals in their own
right. Finally, the frequent expression in (16f) refers to a body part that due to
the excessive amount of fat or skin looks as if it were a two-layered chin.
In parallel to phrases such as (14), the COCA provides examples of homoge-
neous entities involving self-sufficient parts, see (17). The same observations I






Sometimes, parts of an individual denoted by a multiplier phrase are not actu-
ally connected but remain in such proximity that they are perceived as forming
one complex entity. For instance, the phrases in (18a) and (18b) refer to close-set
pairs of meteorological and astronomical objects, respectively. In such cases, the
perceived distance between individual rainbows and stars is considered so small
that a pair is conceptualized as a complex entity consisting of two parts each
of which has a property comparable to the one of the whole. Similar examples
include, e.g., double nebula and double cluster which also refer to astronomical




The results of several quick searches in the German Reference Corpus (GRC)
consulted with native speakers demonstrate that the reported effects are also
attested in German. The phrases in (19) exemplify different types of referents
of multiplier phrases including homogeneous entities, see (19b), and phenomena
perceived as wholes consisting of similar objects remaining in relative proximity,
see (19c).12
12In fact, German distinguishes between two distinct, thoughmorphologically related, multiplier
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The quick overview of some of the frequent contexts multipliers appear in shows
that the double crown example discussed in §4.1.2 is not some extravagant case.
Rather, it represents common semantic behavior of multipliers. I conclude that
the English and German evidence based on the collocation list from the COCA
and searches in the GRC suggests that the pattern is robust.
4.1.4 Multipliers as degree modifiers
Briefly, I will return to the data both from Slavic and English to examine some-
what more problematic examples. Nonetheless, before I move on to the discus-
sion of cases where at least at first sight intuitions concerning the subatomic
structure of entities denoted by multiplier phrases are not that clear, let us dis-
cuss yet another use of the expressions in question. In English, multipliers can
be used as predeterminer modifiers, i.e., external modifiers of the whole DP oc-
curring before the central determiner such as the definite article (see, e.g., Quirk
et al. 1985: pp. 257–258; Huddleston & Pullum 2002: pp. 433–436).13 Examples of
such uses are given in (20).
(20) English (Quirk et al. 1985: p. 257; Huddleston & Pullum 2002: p. 434;
adapted)
a. double the amount
b. triple the size
c. quadruple the fun
expressions, e.g., adjectival doppelt and prefixal Doppel-. Though it seems that their distribu-
tion differs, for the sake of brevity I will not examine the alternation here and leave such an
investigation for future research.
13Actually, the term predeterminer modifier is used only by Huddleston & Pullum. Quirk et al.
use the term predeterminer instead.
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The nominals provided in (20) appear to be degree-related (see Morzycki 2009).
For instance, the meaning of the noun size in (20b) could be thought of as corre-
sponding to some degree of volume. Likewise, the noun fun is clearly gradable
since it allows for degree modification as witnessed by the well-formedness of
the comparative phrasemore fun. Consequently, I conclude that multipliers used
as predeterminer modifiers involve degree modification and as such are expres-
sions of a different type.
At some abstract level it might seem appealing to try to associate the use of
multipliers as degree modifiers with the use related to subatomic quantification
we are interested in here. However, in this book I will not pursue such an attempt
for two reasons. First, the phrases in (20) have a different structure than, e.g.,
those in (15). In the former, multipliers combine with NPs whereas in the latter
theymodifywhole DPs. I argue that this fact indicates that there are good reasons
to believe that in each case they introduce a semantic operation of a different type.
The second reason has to do with the cross-linguistic distribution of multipliers.
For instance, Czech distinguishes lexically between subatomic multipliers such
as dvojitý ‘double, consisting of two parts’ and dvojnásobný ‘double, twice as
large’ (see Dočekal & Wągiel 2018b for a related discussion). This fact further
suggests that the semantics of Englishmultipliers used as degreemodifiers differs
from what is the main interest of this study.
4.2 Less obvious cases
In the previous section, I discussed model examples of multiplier phrases denot-
ing complex entities with self-sufficient parts. I signaled that the distribution of
multipliers in the examined Slavic languages as well as in English and German is
richer. In this section, I will discuss other types of nominals that can be modified
by numerical expressions such as double and show how the perspective posited
above allows us to capture the meaning of less obvious cases.
4.2.1 Essential parts
So far, I have discussed examples of multiplier phrases denoting objects involv-
ing self-sufficient parts, i.e., elements that have a property comparable to the
property of the whole. However, it is possible to come across phrases in which
the multiplier does quantify over parts of an individual, but crucially those parts
are not self-sufficient. Examples of such expressions are frequent in the fast food
culture and involve, e.g., Slavic phrases such as those in (21)–(24).
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In each of these phrases given above, it is not the case that its referent consists
of two parts that are hamburgers themselves, but rather that it consists of two
patties in a bun. This seems to differ significantly from the cases discussed so
far. However, the fact that the parts that multipliers quantify over are not self-
sufficient does not mean that they are arbitrary. In fact, they appear to be the
most salient parts of the whole thing since in the fast food context it is commonly
assumed that the essential element of a hamburger is a patty whereas other parts
of a sandwich are considered to be merely a garnish.
The fact that a certain part of an entity is perceived as more salient than others
corresponds to what is sometimes called structured parthood (Champollion &
Krifka 2016). As mentioned in Chapter 1, the term has been postulated to account
for the fact that some parts appear to have a more significant status than others
or, in other words, are perceptibly distinguished within a whole.14 The difference
between structured and unstructured elements is that the former are cognitively
salient parts of a whole whereas the latter are not. Table 4.1 gives some examples
of structured part relations.
For some time, it has been recognized that structured parthood plays an im-
portant role in organizing lexicons of natural languages, specifically via semantic
relations such as meronymy and hyponymy (see, e.g., Cruse 1986). However, in




Table 4.1: Examples of structured parthood (Simons 1987: p. 10)
whole part
a (certain) man his head
a (certain) tree its trunk
a house its roof
a mountain its summit
a battle its opening shot
an insect’s life its larval stage
a novel its first chapter
contemporary research on natural language, the impact of structured part rela-
tions on compositional semantics seems to be somewhat neglected (e.g., Cham-
pollion 2012b; Champollion & Krifka 2016). Yet, it appears that multipliers pro-
vide evidence that cognitively salient parts are relevant from a quantificational
perspective. In particular, I would like to suggest that counting self-sufficient
parts is a particular instance of a more general subatomic quantification over
particular elements within a make-up of an entity. Consequently, I posit that the
inner structure of objects such as hamburgers is in fact linguistically encoded in
some way and that multipliers are sensitive to its most cognitively salient parts.
In particular, they select for such essential elements within the part-whole struc-
ture of a certainwhole and quantify over them.Within such a view, self-sufficient
parts constitute a particular case within a class of structured parts, specifically a
subclass of cognitively most salient elements, i.e., essential parts.
However, what counts as an essential part is somewhat vague and can be sub-
ject to different conceptualizations under different circumstances. To illustrate
this claim, let us consider another sample from the COCA collocate list for the






For instance, consider the term in (25a) one can stumble across in the context of
typography. Though in the Unicode standard the expression refers to the symbol
⇒, it is commonly used to designate also the symbols ↔ and ≫. In the Unicode
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terminology, what appears to be considered the most salient, and thus multiplied,
part is the horizontal line. However, in the more common and lax use of the
expression, it seems that it is the arrowhead that is taken to be the essential part.
In typography, the phrase in (25b) refers to the symbol ‡. Its design indicates that
the parts worth quantification over are the handles. Nonetheless, in a military,
martial arts, or gaming context the very same expression or a similar phrase such
as (25c) is muchmore likely to denote thrusting weapons with two blades. On the
other hand, there are some examples that display a stable meaning. For instance,
the phrase in (25d) refers to a gun with two joint barrels. From a ballistic point
of view, the barrel ensures functionality of a gun, whereas in terms of size it
also constitutes its most significant portion. Consequently, it is perceived as the
essential part of aweapon andwhen the noun shotgun combineswith amultiplier,
the resulting phrase designates objects consisting of two merged barrels.
Some other examples of the sort discussed above are the expressions in (26),






For instance, the phrases in (26a) and (26b) can refer to objects that have two com-
ponents installed on a single set of wheels. The former can denote a pushchair
with two baby seats arranged one over the other, whereas the latter would be
true of a cart with two trays or two columns for trays. Likewise, the expression
in (26c) describes a condition known also as tooth gemination when a person has
a single dental root with a single crown that has a cleft in it. As a result, the tooth
looks like consisting of two smaller teeth. Finally, the phrase in (26d) is not true
of a figure skating element in which a skater jumps, spins in the air, lands and
jumps, spins in the air, and lands again.15 Rather, it refers to a single jump with
two spins.
At this point, it is clear that the generalization concerning multipliers as quan-
tifiers over self-sufficient parts requires an adjustment. In fact, multipliers count
essential, i.e., cognitivelymost salient, elements within the subatomic part-whole
structure encoded by the modified noun. Self-sufficient parts constitute only a
subset of such entities. In the next section, I will discuss the case of mass nouns
where at first blush talking about essential parts does not make any sense.




In the previous sections, I discussed examples involving count nouns. Neverthe-
less, just like equivalent expressions in other languages Slavic multipliers co-
occur also with mass terms. At first sight, it might appear to be problematic for
the proposed perspective since it is somewhat odd to think about referents of
prototypical mass nouns in terms of consisting of essential parts. For instance,

























Prima facie, it may seem that there is no straightforward correlation between the
semantic behavior of multipliers we have observed so far and the examples intro-
duced above since none of the expressions refers to some cognitively salient parts
of coffee, e.g., coffee grounds. However, a more careful examination reveals some
non-trivial facts about such examples. More specifically, the contrast appears to
fade when we realize that multiplier phrases involving mass terms in fact are not
mass. Notice that the expressions in (27)–(30) neither denote a scattered entity,
i.e., a substance in general, nor do they refer to some arbitrary quantity thereof.
Instead, they designate a standard amount, i.e., a big cup of coffee, which con-
sists of two standard amounts of coffee or, in other words, it is equivalent to two
regular cups of coffee.
Let us consider the relationship between bare mass nouns and mass nouns
modified by multipliers more closely on the basis of Polish data. As already men-
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tioned in §3.3, Polish mass terms are generally incompatible with cardinal nu-
merals unless they are coerced into a count reading via some sort of packaging
or portioning.16 Consequently, a phrase such as (31a) lacks a substance interpre-
tation and can only refer to a standard or contextually determined portion of
coffee. As I have already stated, the same is true of a multiplier phrase such as
that in (27). In this respect, multipliers pattern with cardinals in that they co-
erce the meaning of the modified mass noun. Furthermore, as can be witnessed
by the felicity of (31b), multiplier phrases involving mass terms are countable.
When combined with a cardinal, they denote a plurality of portions that consist
















Given the portion interpretation of examples such as (27)–(30), describing their
meaning in terms of an interaction between quantification over self-sufficient
parts and some sort of a mass-count shift appears as a plausible possibility. For
this purpose, one can adopt the standard Universal Packager operation which
yields quantized portions or packages of a substance for a given mass entity.17
Assuming that the mass noun kawa ‘coffee’ is shifted by the Universal Packager
or some other equivalent operation (see, e.g., Rothstein 2011; Khrizman et al. 2015;
Landman 2016) before it is modified by the multiplier, the resulting count noun
refers to a standard or contextually determined portion of coffee, specifically a
cup of coffee.18 The multiplier then asserts that within the package there are
two standard or contextually determined measures, i.e., two cups of coffee. As
16Another possible coercion involves a taxonomic interpretation where the cardinal quantifies
over subkinds of a particular kind. For the sake of brevity, I ignore this phenomenon here.
17An alternative approach to be taken is to enrich the structure with a classifier. As suggested
by Selkirk (1977) and subsequent work, it is plausible to assume that possibly every natural
language uses classifiers which are often null.
18There are good reasons to presume that the denotation of the mass noun is in fact coerced




a result, we obtain a double coffee, i.e., a standard quantity consisting of two
smaller parts that have a property of being a standard quantity of coffee as well
or, in other words, a cup of coffee to the measure of two cups-worth. This is
actually quite similar to the cases provided in (8)–(11). Furthermore, note that
in the discussed coffee scenario the portion of beverage is defined pragmatically
and is at least to some extend fixed. In other words, there are exactly two parts
of the amount of coffee constituting double coffee that are standard measures.
Smaller or bigger amounts are simply not standard with respect to coffee. Yet of
course the standard can differ with respect to other beverages or food-stuffs. For





c. double ice cream
Interestingly, it seems that there is a deep relationship between multipliers and
packaging. One could easily imagine that multipliers would also interact with an-
other mass-count shift, specifically with Universal Sorter (see Bunt 1985), which
coerces the mass noun denotation into a count denotation referring to quantized
subkinds. However, it seems that at least in Slavic there is no such interaction
since phrases such as those in (27)–(30) lack the relevant interpretation. In partic-
ular, (27) is not true of a substance consisting of two kinds of coffee, say a drink
brewed from a mixture of Coffea arabica and Coffea canephora beans. This fact
seems to suggest that multipliers operate only on mereologies involving object-
level entities, i.e., tokens, and cannot count parts of kind-level individuals, i.e.,
types.19
Up to this point, I have focused onmultiplier phrases involving concrete nouns
since they are the subject of this study. However, as can be witnessed by the
collocation lists in the examined corpora many of such constructions comprise
also nominals of different sorts. For the sake of completeness, in the next two
sections I will briefly discuss how the observations collected so far can inform
us about the meaning of two other types of multipliers phrases.
19I leave aside the question what a part of a kind could be.
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4.2.3 Events
I believe that the discussion of the data examined so far gives some intriguing
insights into issues concerning subatomic quantification in the adjectival domain.
The proposed generalization seems to cover a significant subset of constructions
in which multipliers appear, including examples such as those in (8)–(11) and
many others provided in this chapter. Nonetheless, as attested in the examined
corpora, multipliers can co-occur also with nouns that at first sight might appear
to be problematic since they do not refer to concrete entities such as crowns,
hamburgers, or portions of coffee. For instance, as indicated by examples such
as those in (33) Polish multipliers can also combine with deverbal nouns which
do not involve reference to entities, but rather to some abstract objects. Neither













It is usually assumed that deverbal nominalizations with the exception of par-
ticipant and result nominals denote properties of events (e.g., Grimshaw 2011),
i.e., spatiotemporal particulars with a location and time (Davidson 1967). A stan-
dard test reveals that a noun such as Polish morderstwo ‘murder’ refers to an
event since it can be felicitously modified by event-modifying predicates such as
mieć miejsce ‘take place’ and być świadkiem ‘witness’ (e.g., Grimshaw 1990), as





















‘Jan witnessed the murder.’
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If multipliers can count essential parts of not only entities but also events, the pro-
posed view naturally extends to examples such as those in (33). An intuitive way
to understand subatomic quantification within the structure of an event involves
temporal characteristics. Within this view, a self-sufficient part of an event is a
subevent of which the same property as the one of the whole event holds. For
instance, in a murder scenario in which a maniac stabbed to death two victims
with a knife one after another there would be two relevant parts of the whole
murdering event, i.e., stabbing victim 1 and stabbing victim 2, and each of those
subevents can be considered a murder as well, see Figure 4.4. In such a case
the multiplier in, e.g., (33a) quantifies over self-sufficient parts of the murdering
event, i.e., subevents that are murders themselves. Since there is no murder with-
out a victim, the phrase infers that there were two individuals murdered during
the complex murdering event which seems to be the expected result.
Figure 4.4: Parts of a double murder event in a knife-stabbing scenario
Nonetheless, one could object that such an approach cannot account for sit-
uations such as a bomb scenario in which an intended explosion affected two
victims leading to a double homicide. In such a case, quantification over tempo-
rally subsequent subevents is not possible since the explosion had an immediate
effect and there was virtually no running time of the event. However, I believe
there is no reason to assume that temporal chunks are the only possible parts
that can constitute an event. Since events are complex peculiarities involving
not only times, but also locations, in a bomb scenario described above it is still
possible to differentiate between parts of an event in spatial terms. Consider the
situation depicted in Figure 4.5.
Even with no temporally defined subevents it is quite straightforward that one
could specify two areas within the space in which the explosion took place, as
indicated by the dashed line. As a result, we obtain two parts of the murdering
event each of which turns out to have the property of the whole and since in-
dividuals are in general assumed to occupy space, it should be possible to draw
divisions like that with respect to any event.
Another way of explaining scenarios such as the one depicted in Figure 4.5
would be to assume the uniqueness of roles condition on the individuation of
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Figure 4.5: Parts of a double murder event in a bomb scenario
events (see Parsons 1990). In such a case, the bomb explosion event can be de-
scribed as consisting of two murdering subevents by distributing to different
victims.
All things considered, it seems that the way of thinking about the meaning of
multipliers I argue for can be easily extended to phrases involving reference to
abstract peculiarities such as eventualities. Adopting a typal distinction between
entities and events as typically assumed in standard Neo-Davidsonian frame-
works (e.g., Carlson 1984; Dowty 1989; Parsons 1990), along with the proposal
that pluralities of events are obtained similarly to pluralities of entities (Bach
1986b), would simply require to ensure that the semantics of multipliers is gen-
eral enough to cover both types of objects. In the next section, I will inspect yet
another type of expression that is often modified by multipliers and does not
necessarily denote concrete things.
4.2.4 Social roles
The final piece of data that appears to be problematic for the claim that mul-
tipliers are in fact subatomic quantifiers is constituted by phrases with nouns














Under ordinary circumstances, the phrase in (35a) does not refer to an individual
who consists of two parts, e.g., Siamese twins working as spies, but rather they
seem to involve a relationship between an individual and two other entities. To
be an agent means to be an agent for some intelligence agency, i.e., one cannot
be an agent without an employer for whom they spy. Likewise, (35b) refers to
one person who is a champion in two disciplines. In both cases, the multiplier
seems to quantify over entities denoted by the argument of the noun which at
first blush is not expected given the previously discussed semantic behavior.
At this stage, it is not entirely clear how to integrate the ideas developed in
this chapter with the treatment of examples such as those in (35). However, a
possible extension of the proposed view is to assume that nouns such as agent
involve some kind of an abstract association to entities related to denoted indi-
viduals, e.g., an association between agents and intelligence agencies, and that
such an association is subject to part-whole relations. A promising perspective
to pursue involves adopting the notion of roles into semantic theory (see Sowa
1984; Steimann 2000; Zobel 2017; Wągiel 2021). Intuitively, roles are functions
or capacities of individuals, i.e., social constructs independent of the individuals
that bear them. Crucially for our purposes, for an individual to bear a particu-
lar role, it must stand in a certain relationship to other individuals. Following
Zobel (2017), one could distinguish between class nouns such as man, i.e., prop-
erties of individuals of type ⟨𝑒, 𝑡⟩, and role nouns such as agent by adding a new
type 𝑟 referring to roles and a shifting mechanism relating roles and individuals.
Role nouns would then essentially denote properties of roles at type ⟨𝑟 , 𝑡⟩, but
they could be shifted to refer to properties of entities as well. Within this view,
multipliers would quantify over essential parts of roles rather than individuals
and the whole phrase could then be shifted to refer to entities if required. This
would account for the fact that expressions such as those in (35) denote individu-
als performing a complex role, i.e., individuals involved in activities and bearing
responsibilities related to two distinct intelligence agencies. However, exploring
the interaction between subatomic quantification and roles is rather challenging
and goes beyond the scope of this study. Instead, in the next section I will return
to the relationship between multipliers and cardinals.
4.3 Multipliers vs. cardinals
As we saw in §4.1.1, Slavic multipliers display morphological complexity, which
suggests semantic compositionality. For instance, the Polish multiplier podwójny
‘double’ consists of the numeral root √dw corresponding to the number 2 present
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also in other types of numerical expressions, e.g., the cardinal dwa ‘two’, as well
as additional morphemes including a special multiplicative circumfix po⟩… ⟨n-.
This fact indicates that what multipliers and cardinals have in common is some
sort of reference to integers. Though they both indicate that the number of quan-
tified things equals 2, they differ in that they are devised to count entities of a
distinct type. In particular, cardinals are semantically dedicated to count wholes.
It is true that in Chapter 2 and 3 we saw that they can be used in count explicit
partitives in order to quantify over parts of objects, but notice that it is only pos-
sible when they modify a partitive word. In such a case, entities denoted by the
whole partitive are treated as objects in their own right. Hence, the source of
subatomic quantification is in fact the partitive, and the cardinal simply counts
provided entities in their relative entirety. Bare cardinals can never access ele-
ments within a part-whole structure of a given entity. Rather, they always count
entire objects in the denotation of a modified noun. On the other hand, multipli-
ers are essentially subatomic quantifiers. They count parts of objects referred to
by a modified nominal.
To better illustrate the claim introduced above, let us closely consider the con-
trasts between the truth conditions of the sentences involving numerical expres-
sions in (36).
(36) English (Guy Tabachnick, p.c.)
a. There are two crowns in the vault.
b. There are two parts of the crown in the vault.
c. There is a double crown in the vault.
d. There are three double crowns in the vault.
Under normal circumstances, there is no way the statement in (36a) could be
judged true if there were only two parts of a crown or crowns, e.g., an orb and a
jewel, in the vault. The numeral phrase simply cannot be understood as referring
to two parts instead of two entire objects.20 In other words, cardinals are seman-
tically devised to counting wholes. This is not in contradiction with the fact that
in a sentence including a count explicit partitive construction as in (36b) the car-
dinal does count parts of a whole object. Consequently, (36b) would be true if
there were only, say, an orb and a cross in the vault. Notice, however, that it is
the partitive word that employs subatomic quantification. The cardinal here sim-
ply counts parts provided by the partitive construction as if they were considered
20Of course, what portion of an entity counts as an entire object is rather vague and might differ




objects in their own right. In other words, it does not operate on the part-whole
structure of a given part. This contrasts with the meaning of (36c) which would
be true in a scenario where there were just one object in the vault. Crucially,
however, that object would have to have two essential parts or, to put it differ-
ently, two parts having a property of being sort of a crown. Finally, the felicity of
the sentence in (36d) shows that both types of quantification can co-occur within
one phrase. Here, the multiplier triggers subatomic quantification constrained as
discussed above, whereas the cardinal quantifies over wholes having the inner
structure imposed by the multiplier. Consequently, the sentence would be true
in a situation where in the vault there were three crowns such that each of them
consisted of two self-sufficient parts. Notice that the relative order of the cardinal
and multiplier as well as adjectival properties of the latter further suggest that
subatomic quantification takes place first and only after the resulting wholes are
counted.
The discussed contrast between cardinals and multipliers becomes even more
salient if we consider what happenswhen the latter modify partitive words. Com-















‘double part of the adapter’
We have already examined in detail count explicit partitives such as (37a), but
let us now contemplate the meaning of an equivalent multiplier phrase such as
(37b). Crucially, the multiplier quantifies over parts of a part of the adapter. The
whole expressionwould be true of an entity that is an adapter part and consists of
two comparable parts. Yet again, themultiplier employs quantificationwithin the
part-whole structure of a thing denoted by the nominal nomatter what that thing
is. Though such a use is for sure very rare, the phrase is definitely interpretable.21
A natural example of a sentence with the discussed construction attested in
the NCP is provided in (38).
21The example was actually found on a website of a producer of adapters with a pic-



























‘The horizontal box can be opened similar to the double part of the front
wall […]’
I conclude that the purpose of cardinals is essentially to count whole entities in
the extension of a modified nominal. If they modify a regular noun, they simply
quantify over objects in its denotation. Similarly, if they appear in a count explicit
partitive, they count provided parts in their entirety as if theywerewholes. At the
same time, natural language developed a special type of expression dedicated to
numerical subatomic quantification, namely multipliers. Multipliers differ from
cardinals in that they always count essential parts of objects denoted by a modi-
fied nominal be it a whole or a part. In other words, they are equipped to count
parts within a whole. On the other hand, the two categories are similar in that
although they typically count, sometimes they seem to measure. The quantifica-
tional properties of the two numerical expressions in question are summarized
in Table 4.2.
Table 4.2: Properties of cardinals and multipliers
cardinals multipliers
subatomic quantification * 
quantification over wholes  *
This concludes the examination of some non-trivial properties of the neglected
class of multipliers with respect to the issues concerning subatomic quantifica-
tion.
4.4 Summary
In this chapter, I focused on a key topic concerning subatomic quantification.
Specifically, I presented novel evidence demonstrating that in natural language
there are numerical expressions devised for the purpose of quantification over
parts, namely multipliers such as English double. The fact that such lexical items
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are cross-linguistically widespread indicates the relevance of part-whole struc-
tures of singular objects for the interaction between parthood and quantification
in natural language semantics. The morphological evidence from Slavic demon-
strates that Polish, Czech, Russian, and Bosnian-Croatian-Serbian multipliers are
formally complex expressions derived from numeral roots of corresponding car-
dinals. I argued that the morphological complexity of Slavic multipliers suggests
semantic compositionality.
Multipliers are sensitive to the internal part-whole structure of objects denoted
by nouns they modify and involve quantification over cognitively most salient el-
ements of those objects. Often, such elements are self-sufficient parts, i.e., entities
that have a property comparable with the property of the whole. Sometimes, they
are not self-sufficient but rather they are considered the most significant parts
within the inner structure of an object. I generalized that multipliers count essen-
tial parts, i.e., parts perceived as crucial for an entity to be considered as having a
particular property, with self-sufficient parts constituting a subset thereof. More-
over, I examined multiplier phrases involving mass terms. Interestingly, such ex-
pressions receive a portion interpretation and as such are countable. This fact
indicates that multipliers either perform or require a mass-count shift in terms
of packaging. Furthermore, I proposed how the view argued for here could be ex-
tended to cover cases of multiplier phrases involving other types of NPs, namely
event nominals and role nouns. Incorporating abstract objects such as eventu-
alities and roles into the ontology would allow us to capture the meaning of
virtually all multiplier phrases in terms of one unified mechanism. Finally, I dis-
cussed how multipliers differ from cardinals. The crucial distinction between
the two boils down to what type of entity they count in terms of part-whole
structure. In particular, while cardinals always quantify over wholes, multipliers
always count parts of a singular object which, similarly to complex entities or
events they constitute, have themselves a property considered essential for an
entity to fall in the denotation of a modified noun.
This chapter concludes the empirical part of this book. The most important
insights could be summarized as follows. First, singulars and plurals share a uni-
fied part-whole structure. Second, natural language is sensitive to topological
relations holding between parts of entities in the denotations of nominal expres-
sions and allows for quantification at the subatomic level. Third, only entities that
are perceived as constituting integrated wholes are conceptualized as countable.
Finally, though different types of numerical expressions specialize in quantifica-
tion either over wholes or over parts, the underlying mechanism is the same. In
the next chapter, I will introduce the conceptual background that will serve as
an informal notional basis for a formal account for subatomic quantification.
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In the previous three chapters, I discussed novel data concerning the interaction
between partitivity and countability. In particular, I presented linguistic evidence
suggesting that singulars and plurals do not differ with respect to the part-whole
relation they employ but rather that parts of singularities remain in a particular
topological configuration ensuring that the whole constitutes an integrated ob-
ject, whereas parts of pluralities do not, and thus form a scattered entity. This
claim is motivated by two linguistic facts. First, cross-linguistically the same par-
titive words can appear both in entity and set partitives. Second, the contrast
between regular plurals and Italian irregular plurals reveals a crucial topological
distinction between the two. Furthermore, I showed that natural language does
not allow for counting arbitrary sums of topologically unrelated parts. Only enti-
ties that are conceptualized as constituting continuous objects can be subject to
counting. This restriction appears to hold both on the level of wholes and on the
subatomic level, as the evidence concerning topology-sensitive partitive words
as well as the semantic behavior of multipliers indicate. In other words, quantifi-
cation in natural language is sensitive to topological relations between parts of
entities it operates on.
In this chapter, I will discuss the conceptual background concerning count-
ability and subatomic quantification I assume here. In particular I will present
three claims regarding the relevance of topological notions in nominal seman-
tics, general counting principles, and their significance for subatomic quantifi-
cation. This informal conceptual framework will motivate the formal account
for the core phenomena explored in this study, which I will develop in Chapters
6 and 7. However, before I present in detail the notional core of this study, let
us cgonsider a more general cognitive context. Though the linguistic evidence
presented so far is compelling and entirely motivates the claims, I believe it is




In this section, I will review psychological evidence that demonstrates several
factors concerning human cognition that correlate with the linguistic evidence
introduced in Chapters 2, 3, and 4. First, I will discuss the relevance of how spatial
categories such as solidity, shape, and most importantly integrity of entities are
conceptualized with respect to the mass/count distinction in grammar. Further-
more, I will consider the significance of the part/whole distinction for language
acquisition and review the evidence that humans have simultaneous perception
of an object as a whole and as a collection of parts. Finally, I will discuss what
cognitive studies tell us on number sense in humans, especially on the relation
between integrity and counting in young children. The literature on each topic
is abundant. For the sake of brevity, in each case I will only refer to a few repre-
sentative studies.
5.1.1 Object/substance distinction
I will start with a brief overview of the research in cognitive psychology relating
individuation with the difference in perception of solid objects and amorphous
substances, which suggests that this distinction is relevant to the phenomenon
of countability in natural language. In the past 30 years, convincing evidence has
been presented that indicates that the distinction between objects and substances
is not merely an alternation based on grammar. Contrary to Quine’s (1960) influ-
ential claim that it is language what provides the means for individuation of
objects (see also Pelletier & Schubert 1989), it appears that count and mass syn-
tax reflect on how we see entities in the world rather than the other way round.
In other words, the research to be discussed here shows that the distinction be-
tween objects and substances is not something conventional, formal, or arbitrary
imposed by the way a particular language is devised, i.e., a way of speaking so to
say. To the contrary, it appears to be a deeply embedded component of human
cognition manifesting itself in non-verbal infants at a few months of age and
shared with non-human species.
Multiple experiments demonstrate that children associate count nouns with
solid discrete objects at an early age (see, e.g., Landau et al. 1988; Soja et al. 1991;
Imai & Gentner 1997). The evidence comes from the results of the so-called word
extension task, which concerns learning new words by subjects. The procedure
is as follows. First, a child is presented with a novel entity and instructed on
what it is called. That entity can be either a solid object or a shapeless portion
of a substance. Next, two other entities resembling the initial one with respect
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to different perceptual features are introduced. One would match the already
introduced entity in shape, whereas the other would be of the same material.
Interestingly, extensive research shows that children extend the name of a novel
item to items of the same shape only if the initial entity was a solid discrete object.
On the other hand, if they were first presented an amorphous portion of a novel
substance, they do not extend its name to items of a similar shape, but rather to
objects made out of the same material.
Based on such evidence, Soja et al. (1991) argue that certain ontological com-
mitments are prior to the linguistic mass/count distinction, contrary to Quine’s
claim. Additional support for such a conclusion comes from the fact that the re-
sults were replicated in populations using languages with syntax significantly
different from English. For instance, Imai & Gentner (1997) demonstrate parallel
evidence based on the same experimental paradigm using the word extension
task in the Japanese speaking environment. Though Japanese lacks a straight-
forward morpho-syntactic equivalent of the distinction between mass and count
nouns present in languages such as English, Japanese speaking children distin-
guish between objects and substances just as well as their English speaking peers.
A number of studies provide varied and carefully controlled evidence that pre-
verbal children are endowed with certain assumptions concerning the nature of
objects (e.g., Carey 1985; Spelke 1990; Soja et al. 1991; Carey & Spelke 1996). For
instance, they expect objects to be bounded and cohesive. The former assump-
tion reflects on an entity having natural boundaries, whereas the latter translates
into an anticipation that objects have parts that stick together. Furthermore, ob-
jects are expected to move across space as wholes along continuous paths and to
retain identity upon collisions with other entities. On the other hand, substances
lack any of those properties. An exemplary experimental paradigm is as follows.
An infant is introduced either to a solid object, e.g., a teddy bear, or a portion of
substance, e.g., clay, displayed in front of them. Next, the entity is covered by a
screen and the child sees that a second item is placed behind the screen. Finally,
depending on an experimental condition after the screen was removed either
there were two items revealed or due to the manipulation by an experimenter
only one item could be seen. Interestingly, if the initially introduced entity was
a discrete solid object, children reacted with great surprise if after removing the
screen they could find only one item. On the other hand, no such reaction was
recorded if they were introduced to a portion of a substance at the beginning.
The conclusion is that preverbal children appear to know the difference between
objects, pluralities thereof, and substances. They expect that if one adds a teddy
bear to a teddy bear, the result should be two teddy bears, whereas if one com-
bines clay with clay, one does not get a plurality of clay. Since similar results
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were also found in non-human primates (see, e.g., Hauser & Carey 2003; Hauser
& Spaulding 2006 on rhesus monkeys), it seems plausible to assume that this
property of human cognition has some evolutionary history. I will come back to
the issue of number in §5.1.4.
However, though the difference between discrete solid objects and amorphous
substances has a significant status in the cognitive and linguistic development of
children, it turns out that the correlation between this distinction and mass/-
count syntax is imperfect. A corpus study on toddler vocabulary pursued by
Samuelson & Smith (1999) shows a significant asymmetry between particular
syntactic categories. Specifically, while the large majority of nouns that English
speaking children learn early are count nouns (74% of the vocabulary), only a
small portion involves mass nouns (10% of the vocabulary). There is also a third
class of expressions that is considered ambiguous between count and mass (16%
of the vocabulary). The results of the examination in order to find out whether
the object/substance distinction correlates with the mass/count distinction are
somewhat surprising. In general, a correspondence between solid objects and
count nouns, on the one hand, and non-solid entities, on the other, was in fact
observed. However, it was imperfect and Samuelson & Smith recognized a num-
ber of interesting mismatches. Surprisingly, while solidity and shape turn out to
be good predictors of count nouns, mass nouns appear to be less correlated with
non-solidity and shapelessness.1
Yet another strand of research provides support for the findings discussed
above. In particular, Prasada et al. (2002) demonstrate that categorization of a
noun as countable or uncountable does not reduce to establishing an immutable
ontological distinction between an object and a substance. Rather, it seems that
speakers of languages such as English categorize nouns in terms of countability
based on whether they construe entities they refer to as objects or as substances.
A series of experiments utilizing novel vocabulary tasks show that a novel item
that has an irregular shape is less probable to be referred to by a novel count
noun when contrasted with entities of a regular shape. However, the same item
is significantly more probable to be considered countable when displayed among
other similar entities having such an irregular shape. This means that it is not
the case that some objective properties of things influence the way grammar is
directly. Instead, the mass/count distinction appears to reflect how humans con-
ceptualize entities in the world.
To conclude, the psychological research reviewed in this section indicates that
contrary to Quine’s claim, human beings apparently do have certain ontological
1Notice that probably the main reason explaining this result is the existence of the category of
object mass nouns such as furniture and kitchenware.
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commitments prior to acquiring the syntax of a particular language. Specifically,
the way children are biased towards perceiving objects as opposed to substances
correlates with the mass/count distinction in grammar. However, this correspon-
dence is not of a one-to-one type and there are well-known cases of mismatches.
Yet, it is crucial that the distinction in grammar is not due to different ontolog-
ical categories in some objective sense, but rather it reflects on how entities in
the world are conceptualized. In the next section, I will discuss the relevance of
part-whole structures in the process of language acquisition. In particular, I will
briefly review how a certain bias concerning what it means to be a whole guides
children in how they learn lexical meanings of nouns.
5.1.2 Whole object assumption
Since at least the early 1990’s, language acquisition studies have shown that vo-
cabulary development is constrained by certain mechanisms that govern it in
order to ensure its effectiveness. In particular, children are guided by a number
of word learning biases i.e., endowed assumptions that allow us to eliminate un-
likely alternatives in order to efficiently process and learn new lexical meanings
(see, e.g., Markman 1990; Hollich et al. 2007; Hansen & Markman 2009). Such as-
sumptions begin to manifest around the age of 18 months when rapid expansion
of a child’s vocabulary starts. They are crucial in deciding what the reference of
a new noun is, e.g., what aspect of an object it designates, as well as in solving
the problem of indeterminacy. One of the word learning biases that will be of
special interest to us here is the so-called whole object assumption (Markman
1990).
The whole object assumption allows children to constrain the meaning of
novel words by guaranteeing that a child relates a new noun with an object in its
entirety rather than with some arbitrary part or property of that object (Mark-
man 1990). For instance, if an adult points to an item and labels it, e.g., by uttering
a doll, a child assumes that the noun doll is meant to refer to the whole object
and not to its part or its certain characteristic. Though in principle the adult’s
verbal behavior might have been interpreted as referring to the doll’s head, leg,
dress, color, or size, children intuitively rule out such possibilities and associate
the label with the whole item.2 This bias holds even in situations where an ob-
ject’s color or a certain dynamic activity are made salient to a child (Hansen &
Markman 2009).
Though the original research regarded 18-month-year old children and older,
later studies have demonstrated that in fact infants can associate nouns with
2See Quine (1960) for a related problem of the inscrutability of reference.
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whole objects already at the age of 12 months (Hollich et al. 2007). Crucially,
the effect was attested despite the fact that test items could be viewed as two
separate objects and even when a certain part of an item was made salient. Inter-
estingly, similar results were obtained in experiments where participants were
adult. Hence, the mechanism appears to be deeply embedded. Its relevance lies
in that it enables children to determine which of the numerous logically possible
meanings a word could have is actually the correct one.
In this section, we saw that children distinguish intuitively between parts and
wholes. In the process of language acquisition, when exposed to a novel noun,
they do not attribute its meaning to a part of an object it refers to but rather
immediately assume it is true of a whole thing. The whole object assumption
has often been related to the findings concerning infants’ perception of objects
discussed in the previous section. It has been hypothesized that the constraint
in question reflects the non-linguistic status of objects (Hollich et al. 2007). This
might suggest that from the perspective of a child the fact that wholes involve
parts is somewhat discriminated. However, the evidence is much more complex.
In the next section, I will provide a brief overview of the study of part-whole
perception in children.
5.1.3 Part-whole perception
It is a cognitive fact that we often conceive of entities as being made up of
smaller entities related to each other in a particular manner. Experimental ev-
idence shows that humans have two simultaneous perceptions concerning part-
whole structures of entities (e.g., Witkin 1950; Meili-Dworetzki 1956). On the
one hand, we possess the ability to discriminate parts from a whole, i.e., decom-
pose an entire object into distinct elements making it up. On the other hand,
we are able to integrate the total sum of the parts into a complete whole. This
phenomenon is usually referred to as part-whole perception and it is standardly
attributed to the ability of an individual to decenter, i.e., to shift attention from
parts to the whole or vice versa (see Piaget & Morf 1958).
Though adults in general show part-whole perception, it has been subject to
controversy in the psychological literature at what age it emerges. In the early
Piagetian studies, the experimental results suggested that this ability is absent in
young children (Elkind et al. 1964). In a typical experiment, a child was presented
a drawing of a whole consisting of parts that were independent objects in their
own right, e.g., a person made out of fruits as in Figure 5.1, and was instructed
verbally to report what they see.
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Figure 5.1: Part-whole perception (Elkind et al. 1964)
According to Elkind et al., children report that they perceive simultaneously a
whole and parts attributed to the same form, e.g. both a man and fruits, only at
the age of 8. Before that age, subjects failed in complete decentration with 5-to-
6-year-olds showing complete centration, i.e., they reported that they saw only
parts, e.g., fruits but not a person, and older children gradually improved. How-
ever, later studies suggest that part-whole perception develops much earlier. For
instance, Kimchi (1993) provides evidence that 5-year-old children show sensitiv-
ity to parts and to part-whole relations and that this sensitivity improves with
age. Even more interestingly, Boisvert et al. (1999) show that 3-year-olds demon-
strate good performance in part-whole perception tasks using multiple-choice
tests instead of Piagetian verbal tasks used in earlier studies. Finally, Quinn et
al.’s (1993) results indicate that 3-month-old infants can group elements of visual
pattern information into larger perceptual units based on lightness similarity in
a way that suggests at least some component of part-whole perception.
I interpret the experimental results presented above as suggesting that hu-
man cognition is devised to be sensitive to part-whole structures since even very
young individuals can decompose a whole into pieces by discriminating its parts
as well as represent individual elements as making up an integrated collection
that is a whole. Since these two perceptions are simultaneous, one could expect
that we intuitively categorize entities as certain configurations of smaller things
that despite their often complex inner structure are singular objects. At the same
time, parts of such objects remain cognitively salient and if required, can be eas-
ily accessed. If the conclusions from the experiments reported above are on the
right track, this property of the human mind appears to be either innate or at




The final piece of cognitive evidence to be discussed here concerns human num-
ber sense, i.e., an intuitive understanding of what numbers mean and how they
can be affected by various operations (see, e.g., Dehaene 1997 for an overview).
This mental mechanism allows for a special type of sensory perception through
which the cardinality of a given set of entities can be perceived with similar ease
as their size, color, shape, or position and as such provides the basis for various
forms of calculation. In humans, number sense is based on two different cogni-
tive systems, specifically the approximate number system (ANS) and the object
tracking system (OTS) (see, e.g., Hyde 2011). The ANS is a cognitive system sup-
porting the imprecise estimation of the numerical magnitude of a collection of
objects without relying on symbolic representations (see, e.g., Feigenson et al.
2004; Nieder & Dehaene 2009 for an overview). It manifests already in infants
and gets more developed with age (Cantlon et al. 2006). In contrast, the OTS
is the mental ability to independently track up to 4 entities without counting
by means of parallel individuation (see, e.g., Carey 1998; 2009 for an overview).
Though the acquisition of abstract number concepts, even for low numbers, ap-
pears to require more than only the ANS and the OTS, both capacities seem to
support this process (e.g., Hyde 2011; but see Piazza 2010 for arguments for the
crucial role of the ANS rather than the OTS).
It appears that there is evidence indicating that humans are at least to some
extent predisposed to develop certain numerical abilities such as the concept of
exact number and simple arithmetic based on their number sense. For instance,
Gelman & Gallistel (1978) argue that children are endowed with innate principles
of counting and have intuitive understanding of the cardinality of a set of entities
and its conservation under changes that do not affect quantity. It seems that a
lot of knowledge concerning how to put objects in a one-to-one correspondence
with numbers is intuitively understood by children though it is never taught or
formulated in an explicit way. In particular, when learning to count children are
not taught that each entity must be counted once and only once, or that one num-
ber cannot be associated with more than one entity, but this principle is taken for
granted. Moreover, children know intuitively that number words are supposed
to be recited in a fixed order and that the last numeral represents the cardinality
of the whole enumerated set. According to this view, innate knowledge regard-
ing counting principles precedes and facilitates the acquisition of that part of
the lexicon that includes number words and guides its application in a particular
situation of counting.3
3However, see Fuson (1988) for an opposing view claiming that children learn counting by imi-
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The above introduced hypothesis seems to be corroborated by further exper-
imental evidence that suggests that at the age of 2.5 years children understand
that counting is an abstract procedure that can be applied to different kinds of
objects including concrete entities as well as events (Wynn 1990). 3.5-year-olds
know that the order in which they recite numerals is crucial, whereas the order
of pointing at counted items is irrelevant as long as each item is counted and
no one item is counted twice. Furthermore, children are able to indicate and cor-
rect subtle errors that result from violations of basic counting principles such as
reciting numerals out of order, counting the same object twice, or omitting an
item while counting (Gelman & Meck 1983; Gelman et al. 1986). By the age of 4
years, children show that they have already mastered the basics of counting and
that they can generalize the procedure to novel situations. Older children often
spontaneously reinvent arithmetic developing new strategies for calculating that
best fit for a particular problem (Dehaene 1997: p. 119).
However, probably the most intriguing finding from the perspective of the
interest of this study is a tight link between spatial integrity and numerical in-
formation observed in young children. Specifically, Shipley & Shepperson (1990)
provide a particularly striking demonstration of the relevance of objects under-
stood as integrated discrete physical entities for the cognition of 3-to-4-year-olds.
In the experiment, children were presented sets of items and instructed specifi-
cally what they were supposed to count. For instance, an array of forks with one
item broken in two pieces as illustrated in Figure 5.2 was displayed in front of a
child who was then asked to count the forks.
Figure 5.2: Relevance of integrity in counting (Dehaene 1997: p. 60;
adapted from Shipley & Shepperson 1990)
tation. For instance, Fuson argues that children recite strings such as onetwothreefourfive… as
uninterrupted sequences and only later on they segment them in order to delimitate numerals,
learn to extend them to larger values and to apply them to particular situations.
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Unlike adults and older children, children between 3 and 4 years of age did
not answer that there are five forks, but rather that there six of them, i.e., they
counted each detached part of a fork as a separate entity. Similarly, when in-
structed to count kinds, e.g., different kinds of animals, or properties, e.g. differ-
ent colors, in a setup where each kind or property was exemplified by a number
of distinct discrete items, children included each separate object in their count.
The results demonstrate that the canonical countable entity for a young child is
a discrete physical object that comes in a single piece. The role of spatial integrity
is crucial in determining what counts as one and this bias precedes the process
of learning how to count. In other words, at an early stage of development of
arithmetic abilities young children simply cannot avoid counting each discrete
integral object as one unit. It is very likely that the assumption that number is
a property of sets consisting of discrete spatially contiguous objects is a deeply
embedded principle that facilitates mastery of counting.
The findings of Shipley & Shepperson were further confirmed for other forms
of linguistic quantification in experiments based on quantity judgment tasks in-
volving comparative constructions and pluralization (Melgoza et al. 2008). In par-
ticular, when presented an object divided into three parts, e.g., a broken fork, on
the one hand, and twowhole objects, e.g., two integral forks, on the other, 4-year-
old children judged the former to be more objects than the latter. Furthermore,
in an elicitation task children often labeled broken objects using plural morphol-
ogy. For instance, a phrase some forks was used to refer to three separated pieces
of a broken fork. The results presented by Melgoza et al. not only confirm the
findings of Shipley & Shepperson but also indicate the existence of a spatial bias
for many forms of quantification in natural language. In all tested cases, the spa-
tial criterion of integrity was preferred over other factors in order to establish
what counts as one. In other words, when children quantify sets, they seem to
define individual set members in terms of spatial contiguity in the first place. I
take these results to be evidence suggesting that countability as a property of
sets of discrete separate entities is a deeply embedded principle. Though as we
know from every-day life experience adults can develop a mechanism to retrieve
the original part-whole structure of counted entities, e.g., reconstruct a whole
fork by combining separate pieces in thought, I hypothesize that the underlying
quantificational procedure is based on a principle relating numbers with things
that are conceptualized as coming in one piece.4 However, before I conclude, I
4Admittedly, one can also count concrete entities such as functional units that do not seem to
be integrated in a topological sense. For instance, a pestle and mortar can count as a single
piece of kitchenware (Sutton & Filip 2016a). Nevertheless, I argue that in such cases the notion
of integrity still applies, though it is not physical integrity but rather functional units are con-
ceptually integrated in the sense that they are united under some functional role (see Grimm
& Levin 2017). I will come back to this issue in §7.2.2.
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will briefly discuss how human quantification differs from number sense in other
animals.
Massive evidence indicates that number sense is not exclusive to human mind.
Well-established research in etiology shows that apprehension, comparison, and
even approximate addition of quantities is also present in animals (see, e.g., Davis
& Pérusse 1988; Gallistel 1989; Dehaene 1997: pp. 13–40 for overview). The most
well-known evidence concerns the ability to represent and discriminate quan-
tities of relative sizes in primates (e.g., Woodruff & Premack 1981; Matsuzawa
1985; Rumbaugh et al. 1987; Washburn & Rumbaugh 1991; Boysen et al. 1996), but
it is also found in other mammals such as dolphins (Mitchell et al. 1985), cats
(Thompson et al. 1970), and rats (Capaldi & Miller 1988), as well as birds (Pep-
perberg 1987) and even fish (Agrillo et al. 2012). Furthermore, recent studies in
botanics suggest that there are reasons to also assume plant arithmetic (Böhm et
al. 2016). The evidence indicates either that number sense is an evolutionary an-
cient part of cognition or that there were multiple convergent evolution events.
In any case, it is a widespread phenomenon shared by a wide range of species.
However, despite the large body of evidence indicating that many non-human
animals have the approximate number system, their number sense seems to differ
significantly from that of humans. Though there are well-documented cases of
approximate quantification in animals, no case of symbolic addition is known
in any species other than the chimpanzee, and there only after long training
dedicated to learning a small set of digits andwith frequent errors in computation
(Dehaene 1997: p. 39). On the other hand, young children spontaneously count
on their fingers, often up to 10 before the age of three and acquire the syntax of
complex numerals with ease. Thus, the more lax concept of numerosity is often
used with respect to animal quantification in order to distinguish it from the
symbolic and verbal representation of number in humans. To conclude, though
some forms of quantification appear to be frequent in the animal kingdom, they
seem to differ significantly from what humans do when they count. While non-
human animals estimate quantities on a regular basis, it seems that the ability to
establish a one-to-one correspondence between an object and a discrete symbol
which allows for computation of the exact number of entities in a given set is an
extremely rare property among species.
It seems that counting as performed by humans is a quite unique ability which
associates discrete entities with abstract representations of number. I hypothe-
size that the core mechanism underlying all counting manifests in early child-
hood and concerns establishing a one-to-one correspondence between integral
physical objects that come in one piece and integers. In other words, I assume
that the topological notion of spatial integrity is the basis for what counts as one,
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and only later humans develop ways of abstracting away from this principle, e.g.,
by extending it to quantification over abstract entities such as kinds and proper-
ties, or by being able to retrieve the original connection between detached parts.
In the following sections, I will attempt to relate the linguistic evidence presented
in Chapters 2, 3, and 4 with the conclusions of cognitive psychology in order to
develop the three main claims of this study that will serve as a conceptual back-
ground for the formal account for subatomic quantification in natural language,
to be developed in Chapters 6 and 7.
5.2 The three claims
I have already presented a broad range of data demonstrating both the relevance
of subatomic structures in natural language and the important role that the way
entities including parts of a whole are spatially related to each other plays with
respect to quantification. Furthermore, in the previous section I reviewed addi-
tional psychological evidence suggesting that these issues are deeply embedded
in human cognition. Now is the time to discuss in detail what I believe to be the
conceptual core of this study, namely the three claims I make with respect to the
interaction between parthood, topology, and quantification in natural language.
I will start with postulating that natural language semantics is sensitive to topo-
logical relations holding between elements within part-whole structures desig-
nated by nominal expressions. Next, I will posit a set of general counting princi-
ples, including constraints concerning non-overlap, maximality, and integrity of
counted things. Finally, I will postulate that the very same universal mechanism
applies irrespective of whether one quantifies over entire entities or over parts
of a whole.
5.2.1 Relevance of topological notions with respect to part-whole
structures
It is well-known that topological notions play an important role in natural lan-
guage. The existence of locative expressions involving prepositions such as in-
side, near, under, between, and far shows that relations concerning how we con-
ceptualize position and space are deeply rooted in grammar. Arguably, they con-
stitute universal components of human cognition and natural language seman-
tics. Though the research on locative PPs is well-established and contributed to
our understanding what means language uses to encode information regarding
location of objects with respect to each other (e.g., Clark 1973; Herskovits 1985;
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Zwarts & Winter 1997; Kracht 2002), the question concerning spatial constitu-
tion of entities remained somewhat elusive in the study of meaning. One line of
argumentation justifying why those kinds of issues should remain unaddressed
is that they simply stem from every-day world knowledge, and thus, as extra-
linguistic factors, are not supposed to be incorporated into semantic theory. For
instance, Schwarzschild (1996) famously argues that the fact that (1a) entails (1b)
has nothing to do with referential properties of the subject DPs in both sentences.
Rather, the inference simply results from facts concerning what we know about
where brains are located.
(1) English (Schwarzschild 1996: p. 187)
a. Bill is in Texas.
b. Bill’s brain is in Texas.
Schwarzschild might seem right for examples such as (1). However, in previous
chapters of this study we saw that there are a number of natural language ex-
pressions that are sensitive to topological properties of part-whole structures
corresponding to their referents. My view is that if we want to account for the
meaning of nouns in its entire complexity, topology-related phenomena deserve
serious consideration.
It has been acknowledged for a long time that nominal semantics differenti-
ates between count singulars referring to integrated objects, on the one hand,
and mass terms and plurals denoting scattered entities and arbitrary sums of in-
dividuals, respectively, on the other. As we saw in §5.1.1, there are good reasons
to assume that this contrast correlates with some fundamental properties of hu-
man cognition. Soon, we will see that the distinction can be captured in terms
of how parts constituting a whole are spatially arranged. However, before I even
start considering how to develop a proper account, it is crucial to realize that the
extent to which topology plays a role in part-whole structures associated with
referents of nominals is highly underestimated, if not neglected, in the contempo-
rary mainstream research on pluralities and countability. One of the important
empirical contributions of this study is about compensating this deficit.
The data presented in Chapter 2 and 3 show that certain classes of nouns en-
code certain types of spatial configurations of entities making up a whole. In par-
ticular, at least some Italian irregular plurals discussed in §2.3 denote integrated
pluralities, i.e., sums of individuals that form cohesive wholes. On the other hand,
different types of topology-sensitive partitive words explored in §3.1 and §3.2 in-
volve reference to continuous parts whereas extensions of their topology-neutral
counterparts comprise also discontinuous portions of a whole. Though the evi-
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dence explored in this study emphasizes specifically the role of integrity in sub-
atomic quantification, recent research on different types of collective nouns and
mass terms points to a similar conclusion regarding the relevance of topology
in nominal semantics on independent grounds. In particular, Grimm (2012b) pro-
poses that a subset of mass nouns that denote aggregates of granular objects,
hence granular mass terms like rice and gravel, involve reference to clustered in-
dividuals, i.e., bundled entities transitively connected to each other. In a similar
vein, Henderson (2017) argues that swarm nouns such as grove, horde, and swarm
denote large pluralities whose constituents remain in proximity within a certain
spatial configuration. Moreover, Grimm & Dočekal (2021) and Wągiel (2021) dis-
cuss a particular class of Slavic derivedmass nouns, such as Czech list ‘leaf’∼ listí
‘foliage’, that refer to collections of singular entities that are easily distinguish-
able yet conceptualized as aggregates.5 Finally, as proposed by Grimm (2012b),
referents of concrete count nouns can be viewed as entities whose part-whole
structure is constrained in such a way that it forms an integrated object in its
own right.
The psychological evidence discussed in §5.1 emphasizes the role of spatial in-
tegrity of objects, on the one hand, and our ability to simultaneously perceive
individual parts of such cohesive wholes as entities in their own right, on the
other. Given the amount of linguistic evidence supplemented with findings con-
cerning human cognition, I argue that semantic theory needs to accommodate
those facts. In other words, my first claim is as follows. There is more to themean-
ing of common nouns than usually assumed, and without a proper approach in-
corporating the insights concerning the role of topological notions in part-whole
structures many phenomena will be left unexplained or even unnoticed. I posit
that a good starting point is to try to capture the difference between count singu-
lars, regular plurals, and mass nouns in terms of different topological relations
encoded within corresponding part-whole structures. Specifically, count singu-
lars refer to entities that constitute integrated wholes whose parts stick together,
rather than mere collections of spatially unrelated portions of matter. On the
other hand, plural nouns denote arbitrary sums of such individuals, i.e., they re-
quire their parts to be constrained by spatial integrity but impose no topological
restrictions on configurations in which they appear. Finally, a proper treatment
of mass terms should account for the fact that their prototypical referents are
scattered unbounded entities. An additional advantage of such a novel perspec-
tive is that it suggests that different part-whole structures do not emerge due to
5For experimental investigation into the meaning of such expressions in Czech and Polish, see
Dočekal & Wągiel (2018a).
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distinct parthood relations. Instead, it seems that different part-whole structures
arise as a result of the interaction between one unified parthood relation with
distinct topological notions. In the next section, I will posit that the postulated
view on what it means to be a whole can shed new light on countability.
5.2.2 General counting principles
In general, I follow awell-established linguistic tradition assuming that the mass/
count distinction corresponds to a contrast concerning how different types of
entities are conceptualized (e.g., Wierzbicka 1988; Chierchia 1998a,b; 2010; 2015;
Grimm 2012b). As we saw in §5.1, a substantive body of research in cognitive psy-
chology provides evidence that human beings categorize stable bounded things
that preserve shape differently than amorphous substances. The former are con-
sidered delimited objects whose spatial identity can be tracked easily through-
out time, whereas the latter are perceived merely as unindividuated portions of
matter. On the other hand, there appears to be rich intuitive knowledge concern-
ing what counting is, which seems to be part of human cognitive endowment.
The exact nature of how cognitive facts relate to natural language semantics
and grammar, i.e., the structure and meaning of certain syntactic constructions,
might not be straightforward. Therefore, the view that I propose here is most
probably a simplified account. Nevertheless, I believe that it reveals what I argue
is an advantageous perspective on what it means to be countable.
Usually in the study of countability, at some point when it comes to defining
what counting is something like ‘counting is quantification over what counts as
one’ is stated. Often, ‘what counts as one’ is understood in terms of atomicity.
In particular, an atom in a technical sense is an object that has no proper parts.
Though at first blush this notion seems rather counterintuitive (see Champol-
lion 2010; 2017 for discussion), it has been very influential in the research on
countability.6 To the extent that counting is often implicitly assumed to be sim-
ply quantification over atoms, spelling out the exact nature of the mechanism is
rarely provided. In this section, I will attempt to elaborate a bit more on what
counting is and how it differs from other forms of quantification. For this pur-
pose, I will consider three conditions entities need to satisfy in order to be able
to be put in a one-to-one correspondence with natural numbers based on what
we know what humans do when they count. In particular, I will propose three
general counting principles that will allow us to better understand countability
in a more general manner. Though the proposed mechanism, as described below,
6I will come back to this issue in §7.1.
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is intended to apply only to concrete entities and will require certain additional
assumptions with respect to (at least some) artifacts and functional units, I be-
lieve that in principle it can be generalized to cover also more abstract domains.
As we will soon see, this novel perspective will also prove of great significance
with respect to subatomic quantification.
Counting is usually understood as establishing a one-to-one correspondence
between what is being counted and natural numbers. This kind of association
is necessary to determine the cardinality of a particular set of entities. Though
there are a number of aspects of counting, as well as many morphologically dis-
tinct numerical expressions dedicated to particular quantificational purposes, in-
cluding cardinal numerals, ordinals, fractions, percentage expressions, nominals
such as dozen, approximators like hundreds, and numerical adverbials, e.g., twice,
it is usually assumed that at the end their interpretation is based on number (see
Rothstein 2017).7 In particular, different types of numerical expressions appear to
represent enumerations of different types of sets, e.g., sets of entities as opposed
to sets of events.
However, though the definition introduced above involves a significant compo-
nent of counting, it is incomplete, and thus fails to capture what counting really
is and how it differs from other quantificational operations such asmeasuring. As
we will soon see, there are a number of situations where despite successfully es-
tablishing a one-to-one correspondence between entities and numbers we would
intuitively reject a particular enumeration as counting. Therefore, amore specific
characterization is required. In particular, I take counting to be a quantificational
operation that is governed by three general principles restricting what kind of
object can be assigned a number. I will refer to those constraints as the princi-
ple of non-overlap, maximality, and integrity. It is not unlikely that their
knowledge is inherent, and thus when talking about counting, their existence is
taken for granted. That is precisely why I believe it might be useful to formu-
late them explicitly in order to get a better understanding of the phenomenon of
countability.
The principle of non-overlap ensures that things that count as one must not
overlap, i.e., do not share a part (see Landman 2011; 2016). Guaranteeing disjoint-
ness of units of counting is necessary to avoid the possibility of an entity being
counted twice. For instance, assume portions of matter 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, and 𝑑 arranged in
such a way that 𝑐 overlaps with both 𝑎 and 𝑏, specifically 𝑐 = 𝑎⊔𝑏. Now, one could
7Notice also that both complex numerical expressions are necessary if a language is to be able to
enumerate the infinite series of numbers since in order to do so it requires a recursive system
(Rothstein 2017: pp. 12–13).
168
5.2 The three claims
imagine an operation that would assign numbers to all 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, and 𝑑 . Summing
them up would yield number 4 but this result is incorrect if one wanted to count
how many portions of matter there are. The reason is that 𝑐 is not disjoint from
𝑎 and 𝑏, and thus should not be associated with a number.8 To put it differently,
when counting it is disallowed to count a thing two times.
Though prototypical count nouns such as cat and apple denote sets ofmutually
disjoint entities, i.e., individual apples have no part in common and the same
applies to individual cats, mass overlap, i.e., overlap between material parts of
different entities is not inconceivable. For instance, it is possible to imagine three
entities conceptualized as distinct objects 𝑎, 𝑏, and 𝑐 such that 𝑎 consists of three
parts 𝑑 , 𝑒 and 𝑓 (𝑎 = 𝑑 ⊔ 𝑒 ⊔ 𝑓 ), 𝑏 consists and of 𝑓 , 𝑔, and ℎ (𝑏 = 𝑓 ⊔ 𝑔 ⊔ ℎ), and 𝑐
consists of ℎ, 𝑖, and 𝑗 (𝑐 = ℎ⊔𝑖⊔𝑗). Or to use Landman’s (2011) example, two hands
of a certain person and their ten fingers are countable objects despite the fact
that each hand shares material parts with its five fingers. Nonetheless, it seems
that the way counting operates is that if we can count entities simultaneously as
one, in that very counting situation we perceive them as disjoint objects, and any
potential mass overlap is ignored. In otherwords, entities in the count domain are
conceptualized as if they do not overlap, irrespective of what the exact structure
of the corresponding things in the external world looks like. Given the human
part-whole perception discussed in §5.1.3, I suggest that an ability to perceive
objects this way is likely.
Furthermore, Rothstein (2010) shows that though a non-prototypical count
noun such as fence might denote overlapping entities, in a particular situation
its denotation is restricted to eliminate overlap. For instance, consider rectangu-
lar fence structure 𝑎 consisting of four fences 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑑 , and 𝑒 constructed by four
different persons; thus, 𝑎 = 𝑏 ⊔ 𝑐 ⊔ 𝑑 ⊔ 𝑒. Depending on the context, we could
count it as one fence (𝑎) or as four fences (𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑑 , and 𝑒), but never as five fences
in a single counting situation. In addition, Krifka (2009) discusses cases in which
one counts configurations such as outfits, e.g., outfits 𝑎 and 𝑏 may both consist
of pants 𝑐 and shirts 𝑑 and 𝑒, respectively. Such configurations can be concep-
tualized as distinct things despite the overlap. Crucially, however, such entities
cannot exist simultaneously in one and the same situation. Rather, each of the
possible combinations can come into being only if the other one is not chosen.
Therefore, I conclude that counting typically requires non-overlap while in some
non-typical cases it makes overlap irrelevant for how objects are conceptualized.
8Notice that this effect can also be captured by ensuring that the counted set is quantized (Krifka
1989), which is a weaker notion than non-overlap. However, I prefer the notion of non-overlap




The second principle concerns maximality understood in terms of mereolog-
ical exhaustivity. It states that counting requires that what is associated with a
number needs to be a maximal entity of which a certain property holds in a given
counting situation. In other words, objects need to be counted in their entirety,
i.e., all relevant parts of a thing need to be put in correspondence with a particu-
lar number and it is disallowed to leave some of them out. To illustrate this, let
us consider a situation where there are three distinct cuboid entities 𝑎, 𝑏, and 𝑐




Figure 5.3: Counting and maximality
Now, let us assume that we are counting cuboids and that that is all what the
context specifies. We can then imagine a quantificational operation that satisfies
the non-overlap constraint but is not restricted by the principle of maximality. In
this particular counting situation, when applied to the set of things in question,
it might very well yield 4 since 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑑 , and 𝑒 are disjoint cuboid entities, whereas
𝑐 shares a part with both 𝑑 and 𝑒. However, such an operation would not be
of great help if one wanted to know how many cuboids there are since it fails
to differentiate between wholes and their parts. Likewise, if one asked for two
cuboids and got object 𝑐 as a result of the request, they surely would not be
satisfied.
Of course, situations such as the one described above are rare. Typically, the
combination of the predicate and the context provide enough information to
specify a counting situation unambiguously, so that there is little doubt regarding
what counts as one. For instance, let us suppose that the rectangles in Figure 5.3
represent buildings such that 𝑎 and 𝑏 are each a detached house, whereas 𝑐 is a
building consisting of two semi-detached houses 𝑑 and 𝑒. If one wanted to know
the number of houses, the answer would be four (𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑑 , and 𝑒; assuming that 𝑐 is
not in the extension of the predicate house). If, on the other hand, we were count-
ing buildings, then the answer would be three (𝑎, 𝑏, and 𝑐). Therefore, it might
seem that in this particular case the principle of maximality is not playing a role.
However, it is possible to find examples which demonstrate that the principle of
maximality does apply after the enforcement of contextual disjointness.
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In order to show the relevance of the interaction between maximality and
context, let us consider the configuration in Figure 5.4, depicting a scenario in







Figure 5.4: Counting, maximality and context
In Figure 5.4, lines 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, and 𝑑 represent straight fences that form a fencing
structure (𝑎 ⊔ 𝑏 ⊔ 𝑐 ⊔ 𝑑) around the owner’s house represented by the dashed
square such that each side separates that house from a different house (repre-
sented by white squares). Importantly, 𝑑 consists of two parts 𝑒 and 𝑓 each of
which also separates the owner’s house from a neighboring house. Suppose that
𝑑 is homogeneous in the sense that there is no visible separation between 𝑒 and
𝑓 such as a gate or some difference in the color or shape of the two parts, but
both 𝑒 and 𝑓 completely cover the view of a corresponding smaller house to the
right. Now, depending on the situation one could count 𝑎 ⊔ 𝑏 ⊔ 𝑐 ⊔ 𝑑 either as one
fence, e.g., if one were supposed to pay a special tax for each fence, or as four
fences, e.g., if one were to get a subsidy for each fence they had to build in order
to separate their house from their neighbours. However, even though the prop-
erty of separating the owner’s house from other houses is contextually salient,
it would be strange to say that there are five fences in Figure 5.4. I argue that
that is because the principle of maximality operates on top of what the predicate
along with the context specify. It is simply very hard to conceptualize 𝑒 and 𝑓 as
separate objects in their own right. Rather, they are merely parts of 𝑑 .
Based on the examples discussed above, I conclude that counting is about rec-
ognizing that though what counts as one might be constituted of smaller ele-
ments, for the purpose of quantification the maximal sum of those elements is
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considered a whole unit relative to the relevant predicate and counting situation.
Again, counting ensures that an entity is not assigned two numbers. Notice also
that this constraint accounts for how we count homogeneous entities such as
twigs and rocks. Given a particular counting situation, what counts as one is al-
ways the thing perceived as the maximal entity relative to what is relevant and
irrespective of how its part-whole structure is construed in that situation.
Finally, the principle of integrity requires what counts as one to be conceptu-
alized as an integrated whole. It is crucial that for an individual to be assigned
a number it is not enough to be mereologically maximal and disjoint from other
entities. In addition, its parts need to be in a particular spatial configuration, i.e.,
they need to be connected. This means that scattered entities such as substances
and arbitrary sums of individuals normally are not assumed to count as one. In
the next chapter, I will introduce a theory of wholes spelling out those concepts
in a formal way. Notice, however, that the words ‘integrated’ and ‘connected’
are used in a somewhat liberal sense here and should be rather understood as
‘conceptualized as integrated/connected’. If the connection between parts is eas-
ily retrievable, e.g., parts are physically dissected but remain in proximity to the
original place of attachment, thenwith great probability the principle of integrity
would be satisfied. Thus, individuation in terms of integrity is about how human
beings categorize objects in the world rather than about objective properties of
mind-external entities. Aswewill see in the next section, this property is also use-
ful for distinguishing counting from another quantificational operation, namely
measuring. However, before I discuss the difference between the two in detail,
let us consider examples of proper counting as opposed to what I call illegal
counting.9
Given the counting principles of non-overlap, maximality, and integrity dis-
cussed above, we expect that counting works as illustrated schematically below.
In an apple counting situation, each of the apples in Figure 5.5 can be associated
with integers since they all satisfy the requirements in question. First, the apples
are disjoint from each other, i.e., they do not share parts. Second, in each case
what is assigned a number is a whole apple, i.e., a maximal sum of parts making
up an object. This means that counting is complete. In other words, after the pro-
cedure is finished, there are no entities left that have not been associated with an
9Notice that in accordance with the focus of this study the proposed principles are intended
to account for quantification over concrete physical objects. In fact, they might be more ab-
stract in order to be extendable to quantification over abstract entities such two ideas and three
proposals (e.g., Grimm 2014; Sutton & Filip 2020), as well as imaginary individuals like four
monsters (e.g., Haslinger & Schmitt 2021). Though I will not pursue this possibility here, I will
return to the issue of artifacts in §7.2.2.
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integer. Finally, individual apples constitute objects that are conceptualized as
integrated wholes, i.e., configurations of parts that are connected to each other.
This fact guarantees that each apple can be tracked in space and time, and thus is
easily recognizable as an object distinct from other entities. The interplay of the
three factors in question results in that the procedure illustrated in Figure 5.5 sat-
isfies conditions on counting. Given the depicted set of apples, after performing
it we would get an integer corresponding to the total number of apples.
Figure 5.5: Counting
According to the general counting principles, counting is devised to be what
we see in Figure 5.5. However, one could easily imagine an operation where, e.g.,
assigning a number to less than a whole entity or summing up complementary
parts of corresponding entities to make up what counts as one is not prohib-
ited. For instance, consider a quantificational operation that satisfies the general
counting principle of non-overlap, but violates the principle of integrity. To illus-
trate this, let us assume illegal counting as depicted in Figure 5.6.
Figure 5.6: Illegal counting
In contrast to Figure 5.5, in this case numbers are associated with arbitrary
sums of parts of distinct entities. Notice that those sums can be guaranteed to
cover the total volume of all the relevant apples. If this were somehow ensured,
in the discussed scenario we could obtain the same number as in Figure 5.5. How-
ever, intuitively this operation is very different from counting. It is simply not
what we do when we count.
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Though the procedure illustrated in Figure 5.6 is not counting, it does not
mean that it does not represent another quantificational operation human beings
utilize for different purposes. In the next paragraphs, I will discuss what I believe
to be the crucial difference between counting and measuring.
5.2.3 Counting vs. measuring
Intuitively, the difference between counting and measuring relies essentially on
the fact that the former is about specifying how many objects of a certain kind
there are in a particular context, whereas the latter concerns determining the
quantity of a particular substance in relevant measure units. In principle, there
are three possible views on the relationship between the two operations in ques-
tion. The first one reduces measuring to a particular type of counting (e.g., Gil
2013). The intuition behind such an approach is that measure words individu-
ate in terms of quantity (Lyons 1977). Consequently, instead of quantification
over objects measuring is about counting units determined by measure words.
An opposing approach is to view counting as a form of measuring. In particu-
lar, counting can be understood as measuring a quantity of an object in terms
of natural units (Krifka 1989; 1995). Finally, the third option is to postulate that
counting andmeasuring are two independent operations (Rothstein 2017). In this
study, I adopt the third perspective and present novel evidence in its favor. In par-
ticular, I propose that the distinction between counting and measuring can be
reformulated in terms of quantificational principles introduced in the previous
section. Though both counting and measuring obey the principle of non-overlap
and maximality, only the former satisfies the principle of integrity. Measured
quantities of a substance cannot overlap in order to ensure that things are not
measured twice. Furthermore, a unit of measurement needs to correspond to the
maximal quantity of matter to guarantee that measuring is exhaustive. However,
only counting is sensitive to the topological make-up of entities it applies to.
To better understand the essence of the distinction, let us consider the follow-
ing two scenarios. In the first scenario, illustrated in Figure 5.7, someone has
spilled some liquid on the table in such a way that there are two separate blobs 𝑎
and 𝑏 whose volume is one and a half milliliters each. In the second scenario, see
Figure 5.8, someone has simply put two cubes 𝑐 and 𝑑 on the table. Let us also
assume that apart from the liquid and the cubes there is nothing else on the table
in each of the cases, respectively.
Now, let us examine the sentences in (2a) and (2b) describing the situations
depicted in Figures 5.7 and 5.8, respectively. The statement in (2a) is true despite
the fact that one of the three milliliters must be split between a portion of 𝑎 and
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𝑎 𝑏
Figure 5.7: Measuring and integrity
𝑐 𝑑
Figure 5.8: Counting and integrity
a portion of 𝑏 since each of the blobs consists of one and a half milliliters of
liquid. On the other hand, (2b) is simply false. This contrast shows that units of
measurement such as milliliters are not objects. In other words, unlike counting
measuring does not care about individuation in terms of integrity and it indeed
appears to be a distinct operation.
(2) English (Guy Tabachnick, p.c.)
a. There are three milliliters of liquid on the table.
b. #There are three objects on the table.
I argue that this is because counting is topology-sensitive whereas measuring
is not. In other words, in measuring, units of measurement are not required to
be assigned only to contiguous entities. There are multiple ways in which one
could assign particular milliliters 𝑢1, 𝑢2, and 𝑢3 to particular portions of 𝑎 and 𝑏,
and Figure 5.9 illustrates one possible distribution, with 𝑢2 corresponding to the
volume of liquid of a sum of one-third of 𝑎 and one-third of 𝑏. As long as the total
volume of 𝑎 and 𝑏 equals three milliliters, (2a) is true with respect to Figure 5.7.
𝑢1 𝑢2 𝑢3
Figure 5.9: Measuring in units
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Unlike measuring, counting is sensitive to what kind of topological structure
entities in its domain have. In parallel to Figure 5.9, one could imagine that two-
thirds of 𝑐 correspond to an object 𝑜1, one-third of 𝑐 plus one-third of 𝑑 make up
𝑜2, and the remaining two-thirds of 𝑑 correspond to 𝑜3, as depicted in Figure 5.10.
However, this is not how counting typically works. The statement in (2b) is false
with respect to Figure 5.8 because counting assigns numbers to integrated indi-
viduated entities rather than arbitrary portions thereof.
𝑜1 𝑜2 𝑜3
Figure 5.10: Counting objects
I argue that what the contrast between truth-conditions of (2a) and (2b) dis-
cussed above shows is that counting and measuring are in fact two distinct se-
mantic operations, as proposed by Rothstein (2017). The core difference between
the two boils down to the fact that counting is topology-sensitive, whereas mea-
suring is not. In other words, it is misleading to think of measuring in terms
of counting measure units (pace Gil 2013). If it were, similarly to Figure 5.8, we
would expect (2a) to be false with respect to Figure 5.7, contrary to fact.
The distinction gets evenmore salient if we realize that many numeral phrases
can get a measure interpretation.10 For instance, consider the contrast between
the scenarios described in (3) and (4). In (3a), the numeral phrase three apples
denotes a plurality of integrated wholes, i.e., distinct individuated objects, and
thus it can be felicitously continued by (3b). In other words, since the referents
of the phrase satisfy conditions specified by the general counting principles, they
can be put in a one-to-one correspondence with numbers.
(3) English (Guy Tabachnick, p.c.)
Scenario: John is cooking with his child. They put three whole apples on a
table. John says:
a. There are three apples on the table…
b. Let’s count them together: one, two, three.
10See Rothstein (2017: p. 3) for extensive discussion of ambiguities of another sort, namely the
alternation between individuating and content readings of container words such as glass of
water.
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On the other hand, the same phrase in the context of (4) gets a measure reading.
Given that the slices in the bowl are placed in such a way that it is impossible
to retrieve the original part-whole structures of individual apples, three apples
does not refer to distinct objects but rather to the volume corresponding to three
apples. Consequently, it is distinctively odd to continue the sentence in (4a) with
(4b). All things considered, (3a) presumes an operation depicted in Figure 5.5,
whereas (4a) does not.
(4) English (Guy Tabachnick, p.c.)
Scenario: John is cooking with his child. They sliced three apples and put
the slices into a bowl. John says:
a. There are three apples in the bowl…
b. #Let’s count them together: one, two, three.
The contrasts discussed above prove that counting indicates integrity or at least
easily retrievable traces of integrity of entities it applies to, whereas measuring
ignores this factor. Thoughmonotonic systems of measurement track part-whole
relations (Schwarzschild 2002), they do not seem to be sensitive to topological
notions. On the other hand, counting does care about the spatial arrangement of
parts making up wholes. This strongly suggests that the two operations in ques-
tion are distinct from each other. Perhaps, one could argue that despite syntactic
as well as semantic differences between numeral phrases and measure phrases
(see Rothstein 2017) counting is a very special case of measuring (see Krifka 1989;
1995). In particular, measuring could be thought of as a more general quantifi-
cational procedure. However, for the sake of what this study is about I will as-
sume that measuring and counting are two distinct semantic operations. In the
next section, I will propose how general counting principles extend to subatomic
quantification.
5.2.4 Subatomic quantification
In Chapters 2, 3, and 4, we saw that there is substantial evidence showing that nat-
ural language semantics is sensitive to the fact that entities we refer to by means
of nominal constructions consist of parts and that there are linguistic means to
quantify over such parts. On the other hand, in the previous section I postulated
the general counting principles of non-overlap, maximality, and integrity. So far,
we have seen that there are good reasons to believe that these quantificational
constraints capture what humans do when they count objects. In this section, I
argue that the proposed set of rules constitutes a universal mechanism that can
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be applied not only to whole individuals but also when counting parts of objects.
In other words, I posit that subatomic quantification is subject to the very same
constraints as quantification over wholes.
Analogously to what we saw in Figure 5.5, counting at the subatomic level
presumes mereological maximality and topological integrity of entities subject
to quantification. Typically, counting is sensitive to the fact that some parts are
cognitively more salient within the part-whole structure of an object than others.
This seems to correspond to what Champollion & Krifka (2016) call structured
parthood as well as to the distinction between specific and arbitrary subdivisions
of a whole into parts introduced in philosophical considerations, as already men-
tioned in Chapter 1 (e.g., Krecz 1986; Markosian 1998; Jennings 2010). Notice that
what counts as a cognitively salient part can vary with respect to the context.
For instance, consider the two sentences in (5).
(5) English (Guy Tabachnick, p.c.)
a. Both parts of the teddy bear are painted.
b. Two parts of the teddy bear are painted.
Assume John’s daughter has a teddy bear called Fuzzy Wuzzy. In a situation
where she has covered Fuzzy Wuzzy’s entire left half with red paint and its en-
tire right half with black paint, John might want to say (5a). In such a case, the
total volume of matter making up the teddy bear is partitioned in such a way
that the cognitively salient parts are its left half and its right half.11 On the other
hand, in a scenario where John’s daughter painted Fuzzy Wuzzy’s left paw red
and its right paw black, the count explicit partitive in (5b) refers to the teddy
bear’s body parts. Nevertheless, what cognitively salient parts have in common
is that given a particular context they are disjoint. This brings us to the relevance
of the principle of non-overlap in subatomic quantification.
Since there are numerous ways in which one could divide an object into parts,
there are multiple portions of matter of which the property of being part of that
object holds. For instance, Figure 5.11 illustrates a number of entities the phrase
part of the apple could refer to. Notice that none of them is disjoint from the
others, i.e., all of them share a part with at least one other part. However, the
principle of non-overlap states that such entities cannot be counted. Similarly to
arbitrary portions of mass, e.g., juice, arbitrary parts of an apple avert individua-
tion since they are not well-defined bounded integrated objects and it is virtually
impossible to distinguish them from other parts. This means that not all parts are
11The sentence in (5a) appears to be slightly degraded due to the fact that instead of part a more
accurate partitive word, i.e., half, could have been used. Many thanks to Guy Tabachnick for
discussing the English examples with me.
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equal with respect to countability. Some of them are countable, whereas others
are not. Crucially, only those divisions of a whole into parts can be enumerated
that are perceived as involving only non-overlapping parts.
Figure 5.11: Overlapping parts
Another issue concerns the principle of maximality. What counts as part of an
object can also consist of smaller parts. Notice that such parts of parts also satisfy
the property of being part of that object. However, the general counting princi-
ples require that only entities in their mereological entirety can be associated
with a number. This means that once a particular division of an individual into
parts has been executed in a given counting context, those parts are immutable
and are treated as objects in their own right. Consequently, the principle of max-
imality applies as it would in a situation when one counts whole individuals. In
other words, given a partition, non-overlapping parts are assumed to be maximal
with respect to how the whole has been divided.
Finally, as we saw in the previous section, countability is also governed by the
principle of integrity. However, as we saw in Chapter 3, extensions of expressions
referring to parts of objects do not necessarily involve topological commitments,
i.e., parts need not be continuous. For instance, let us consider explicit entity
partitives. There is definitely a sense in which two or more separated portions
of matter within an object are part of that object, and thus a topology-neutral
explicit entity partitive construction would be true of such a configuration. Nev-
ertheless, as any arbitrary sum such entity is not countable since associating it
with a number would clearly violate the principle of integrity. Therefore, only
sets including parts that are mereologically maximal integrated entities that do
not overlap can be enumerated. In other words, only a subset of possible divisions
of an object is fit for counting.
Having this in mind, let us see how the general counting principles apply in
the context of subatomic quantification. For this purpose, let us assume John’s
daughter wants to count parts of her teddy bear Fuzzy Wuzzy. Figure 5.12 repre-
sents an exemplary situation that intuitively fits what we expect from counting.
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Figure 5.12: Counting of parts
The operation illustrated above assigns numbers to cognitively salient non-
overlapping parts of Fuzzy Wuzzy, namely its ear, leg, and paw. Those parts
constitute mereologically maximal and integrated entities, i.e., though they are
elements of a larger whole, when counted they are treated as objects in their own
right. This means that, e.g., number 1 is associated with FuzzyWuzzy’s whole ear
and there is no part of that ear that is left out. Also, an ear is a continuous part
that comes in one piece. To sum up, since the depicted division of the teddy bear
consists of elements that are disjoint, maximal, and integrated, all the counting
principles are satisfied and the set of parts can be enumerated.
On the other hand, one could imagine another operation, e.g., one such as that
illustrated in Figure 5.13. Though it is definitely logically possible, it seems weird
and would intuitively be rejected as counting. There are two reasons why this is
so. The first reason is that the indicated ear and leg do not constitute a continuous
integrated part that would be cognitively salient. Therefore, assigning them the
number 1 violates the principle of integrity. In other words, there is a sense in
which an ear and a leg are part of the teddy bear, but they are not a part of it and
only entities that can be considered as such can satisfy the countability condition.
The second reason is that the marked paw is not disjoint with the right half of
the teddy bear which of course violates the principle of non-overlap. Given the
division in Figure 5.13, the paw in question would be counted twice and since
counting requires that an entity can be associated with a number once and once
only, the depicted operation fails to satisfy the general counting principles and
represents what I call illegal counting at the subatomic level, recall Figure 5.6.
All things considered, counting at the subatomic level presumes assigning
numbers to salient parts of a whole constituting disjoint integrated entities that
are maximal with respect to a given partition. In other words, once it is decided
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Figure 5.13: Illegal counting of parts
what counts as a part, it is treated as an individuated object in its own right
and all discussed constraints concerning counting apply. The key conclusion is
that there is one universal mechanism governing quantification over wholes as
well as subatomic quantification, and exploring the latter can reveal some funda-
mental properties of countability in general that otherwise might be difficult to
recognize.
5.3 Summary
In this chapter, I provided a general conceptual framework that will serve as
a basis for developing a formal account for subatomic quantification in natu-
ral language. I suggested how the linguistic evidence presented in Chapters 2,
3, and 4 correlates with findings in cognitive psychology. In particular, in the
first part of the chapter I reviewed several representative studies in the research
indicating the following. First, there is compelling evidence that humans pos-
sess an innate ability to perceptually distinguish between objects, i.e., bounded
integrated entities, and substances, i.e., shapeless scattered portions of matter,
and that this contrast correlates with the mass/count distinction in grammar,
though the correspondence is imperfect. Specifically, integrated solid things are
predictably referred to by count nouns, but there is a class of mass terms that also
refer to objects. Importantly, the object/mass distinction is not based on ontolog-
ical properties of entities in some objective sense but rather it is construed by hu-
man cognition. Second, the ability to simultaneously perceive parts as elements
of a whole and a whole as a collection of parts manifests itself in early child-
hood. The capacity to intuitively distinguish between parts and wholes guides
vocabulary acquisition. Finally, human number sense appears to be sensitive to
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whether counted items are conceptualized as integrated objects. Experimental
evidence shows that young children always count each separate physical entity
as one. Even if they are instructed to do otherwise or given clues that two ele-
ments might be considered one broken thing, they ignore them and simply can-
not avoid counting contiguous entities. This suggests that further development
of quantification in older humans rests on a mechanism individuating singular
objects in terms of spatial integrity.
In the second part of this chapter, I presented the three claims that constitute
the conceptual core of this study. I postulated that natural language is sensitive
to how the spatial relationship holding between parts of a particular entity is con-
ceptualized. The relevance of the topological notion of integrity manifests itself
primarily in how the nominal lexicon is classified into different grammatical cat-
egories. In particular, count singular nouns prototypically designate integrated
wholes, i.e., encode information concerning a particular spatial configuration of
parts their referents consist of, whereas plurals denote arbitrary sums thereof,
i.e., presuppose integrated wholes as parts but impose no topological constraints
on them.
The second claim regards what I call the general counting principles. I posit
that counting is a special kind of quantificational operation that presumes certain
properties of entities that are put in a one-to-one correspondence with numbers.
Specifically, the principle of non-overlap guarantees that enumerated entities are
disjoint, and thus no thing is counted twice. On the other hand, the principle of
maximality requires that numbers are associated with entities in their mereolog-
ical entirety, i.e., no part is left out. Finally, the principle of integrity ensures that
what can be counted needs to be conceptualized as something that comes in one
piece. This constraint excludes arbitrary sums of individuals as well as scattered
entities such as substances. Altogether, the general counting principles guaran-
tee that sets that can be enumerated consist only of elements that are discrete
object.
The final claim extends the general counting principles to subatomic quan-
tification. In other words, I postulate the quantificational mechanism described
above is a universal mechanism that can apply both at the level of wholes and at
the level of parts. In the next chapter, I will introduce a theory of wholes called
mereotopology in which the formal account for subatomic quantification will be
grounded. In particular, it will enable us to capture various subtle topological
distinctions including the intuitive notion of an integrated whole as opposed to
an arbitrary sum of parts. This will provide means to model not only the fact that
some entity is part of something else but also how individual parts are spatially
arranged within a whole configuration.
182
6 Theory of parts and wholes
Given the conceptual background described in the previous chapter, an account
for subatomic quantification is supposed to capture the intuitive notions of part-
hood and integrity. In this chapter, I will introduce a theory of parts and wholes
that provides the formal apparatus devised to model both concepts. This theory
is usually referred to as mereotopology and as suggested by the name it involves
two interrelated components. In the following sections, I will first introduce stan-
dard mereology, its axioms, and advantages. Next, I will turn to its limitations
and discuss how it can be extended with topological notions such as connected-
ness. As a result, the sophisticated mereotopological framework to be presented
will allow us to model integrated wholes as opposed to other types of entities.
The mereotopological distinctions to be developed will play a crucial role in the
formal account for subatomic quantification in natural language that I will pro-
pose in the next chapter.
6.1 Mereology
mereology (from the Greek 𝜇𝜖𝜌𝑜𝜁 ‘part’) is the study of parthood, i.e., relations
between part and whole as well as between parts within a whole. It was proposed
by Leśniewski (1916) and further developed by Leonard & Goodman (1940) and
Goodman (1951) as an alternative to set theory. In particular, since set theory is
founded on the notion of set membership ∈, i.e., the relation between an element
and a set, it distinguishes between a singleton set and its member, i.e. {𝑎} ≠ 𝑎.
For this reason, the nominalist tradition fromwhich mereology stems has consid-
ered set theory as ontologically suspect. In order to avoid potentially problematic
ontological assumptions, mereology does not postulate abstract entities such as
sets. Instead, the meronomic relation of parthood is postulated as the primitive
notion of the theory. Therefore, in mereology there is no need to draw the dis-
tinction between a singleton set and its member. Though historically mereology
was viewed as equivalent to a rejection of set theory, since at least Eberle (1970) it
has been gradually recognized that employing mereological concepts is possible
irrespective of one’s ontological position concerning sets.
6 Theory of parts and wholes
The part-whole relation can hold between portions of masses, parts of indi-
viduals, members of groups, locations, events, times, and even abstract entities,
as depicted in Table 6.1 (see Simons 1987; Winston et al. 1987). It is a prominent
notion in how the world appears to be structured, how human beings perceive
things and talk about things. Therefore, mereology plays an important role in
ontology, cognitive psychology, and natural-language semantics. Since Quine’s
(1960) discussion of mass nouns as scattered objects (a clearly mereological con-
cept), considering countability in mereological terms became standard in philos-
ophy (see especially Sharvy 1980 for a treatment of mass definite descriptions
in this spirit). However, it was Link (1983) who introduced formal mereology to
linguistics in his lattice-theoretic approach to pluralities.
Table 6.1: Examples of wholes and parts (Champollion 2017: p. 12)
whole part
some horses a subset of them
a quantity of water a portion of it
John, Mary, and Bill John
some jumping events a subset of them
a running event from A to B its part from A halfway towards B
a temporal interval its initial half
a spatial interval its northern half
There are different ways in which one could spell out mereological intuitions
and axiomatize the parthood relation (see, e.g., Simons 1987; Casati & Varzi 1999;
Varzi 2016 for thorough surveys of the field). However, in this chapter I will dis-
cuss only a system that gives rise to algebraic structures, i.e., sets with binary
operations defined on them, which is often referred to as classical extensional
mereology. For brevity, however, I will simply call it standard mereology since
it is considered to be a standard in mereology (though see, e.g., Rescher 1955 for
an alternative proposal) and is most commonly used in formal semantics for nat-
ural language (e.g., Link 1983; Krifka 1989; Landman 2000; Champollion 2017, to
name just a few prominent approaches). The axiomatization of standard mereol-
ogy presented here largely follows the extensive discussions provided by Simons
(1987) and Casati & Varzi (1999) as well as the encyclopedic entry on linguistic
applications of mereology by Champollion & Krifka (2016). To avoid termino-
logical confusion I will follow Grimm (2012b) in distinguishing between indi-
viduals, i.e., a pre-theoretic notion regarding well-defined physical entities, and
m-individuals, i.e., objects in the mereological sense.
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The most common view on the axiomatization of mereology takes the concept
of part (⊑) to be the basic notion. The part-of relationship ⊑ is the primitive
relation which is reflexive, transitive, and antisymmetric.1 The axioms given in
(1)–(3) constrain ⊑ to be a partial order.
(1) Reflexivity (Champollion & Krifka 2016: p. 515; adapted)
∀𝑥[𝑥 ⊑ 𝑥]
(Every thing is part of itself.)
(2) Transitivity (Champollion & Krifka 2016: p. 516; adapted)
∀𝑥∀𝑦∀𝑧[(𝑥 ⊑ 𝑦 ∧ 𝑦 ⊑ 𝑧) → 𝑥 ⊑ 𝑧]
(Any part of any part of a thing is itself part of that thing.)
(3) Antisymmetry (Champollion & Krifka 2016: p. 516; adapted)
∀𝑥∀𝑦[(𝑥 ⊑ 𝑦 ∧ 𝑦 ⊑ 𝑥) → 𝑥 = 𝑦]
(Two distinct things cannot both be part of each other.)
Given that the primitive ⊑ relation is defined in such a way that an m-individual
is part of itself, it might be useful to introduce an auxiliary notion of parthood
which is not reflexive. The formula in (4) provides the definition of proper part
(⊏).
(4) Proper part (Casati & Varzi 1999: p. 36)
𝑥 ⊏ 𝑦 ≝ 𝑥 ⊑ 𝑦 ∧ ¬(𝑦 ⊑ 𝑥)
(A proper part of a thing is a part of a thing that is distinct from it.)
Furthermore, one might also want to account for the fact that entities can share
parts. For this reason, an ancillary relation overlap (O) can be defined, as in (5).2
From a mereological point of view, identity can be understood as a special case
of overlap.
(5) Overlap (Champollion & Krifka 2016: p. 516; adapted)
O(𝑥, 𝑦) ≝ ∃𝑧[𝑧 ⊑ 𝑥 ∧ 𝑧 ⊑ 𝑦]
(Two things overlap if and only if they share a part.)
The parthood relation together with the derived notions of proper part and over-
lap constitute the core of standard mereology. However, without any further
1I use the symbol ⊑ following Landman (1989a,b; 2000). Other authors use ≤ instead. The main
motivation behind this notational decision is to avoid potential confusion with the ‘less than
or equal to’ relation between numbers.
2I use the O(𝑥, 𝑦) notation following Casati & Varzi (1999), Varzi (2007), and Grimm (2012b).
Other authors use 𝑥 ∘ 𝑦 instead.
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constraints the system developed so far gives rise to structures which have been
traditionally dismissed as objects that a theory of part-whole relations should
represent. For instance, Figure 6.1 illustrates a mereological relation between the




Figure 6.1: Object with a solitary proper part
Similarly, Figure 6.2 depicts a model in which two distinct m-individuals 𝑎
and 𝑐 both share all parts. Though such models are allowed within the system,
intuitively they are not what a theory of parts and wholes should account for. To





Figure 6.2: Objects sharing all parts
Standard mereology can be devised in order to restrict how an m-individual
can be decomposed into parts. In particular, an additional axiom can be added
that constrains mereological objects in such a way that every proper part must
be supplemented by another disjoint part. In other words, there is always a mere-
ological difference between a whole and its proper parts. An extension known as
remainder principle or supplementation, see (6), guarantees that m-individ-
uals cannot consist of a single proper part, and thus models such as that in Fig-
ure 6.1 are ruled out.
(6) Supplementation (Casati & Varzi 1999: p. 36)
𝑥 ⊏ 𝑦 → ∃𝑧[𝑧 ⊑ 𝑦 ∧ ¬O(𝑧, 𝑥)]
(Whenever a thing has a proper part, it has more than one.)
3The line represents ⊑with the m-individual corresponding to the lower node being part of the
m-individual corresponding to the higher node.
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However, supplementation is insufficient to exclude structures like the one in
Figure 6.2, and thus another extension needs to be implemented in order to ban
them. Given ⊑, the notion of SUM can be defined. Sums are devised to capture a
pretheoretical concept of collections, i.e., the result of grouping several entities
together. In natural language, conjoined terms and definite descriptions like the
water have been analyzed in terms of sums. In particular, in his influential paper
Link (1983) treats expressions such as John and Mary as referring to the sum of
two individuals, namely John andMary. In a similar vein, Sharvy (1980) proposes
that a definite expression such as the water denotes the sum of all water. Here I
will follow the classical definition of sum due to Tarski (1929), as presented in (7)
(for alternative definitions, see Simons 1987; Casati & Varzi 1999).
(7) Sum (Champollion & Krifka 2016: p. 517; adapted)
SUM(𝑥, 𝑃) ≝ ∀𝑦[𝑃(𝑦) → 𝑦 ⊑ 𝑥] ∧ ∀𝑧[𝑧 ⊑ 𝑥 → ∃𝑧′[𝑃(𝑧′) ∧ O(𝑧, 𝑧′)]]
In prose, a sum of (the things in) a set 𝑃 is a thing that consists of everything in
𝑃 and whose parts each overlap with something in 𝑃 . Since the part structures
in standard mereology are closed under sum formation, for any two individu-
als there is also a sum of those two individuals. This is ensured by uniqueness
of sums, which requires two things composed of the same parts to be identical,
see (8). This principle excludes structures such as the one in Figure 6.2. Since 𝑏
and 𝑑 form two different sums, namely 𝑎 and 𝑐, uniqueness of sums is violated
and the model is ruled out, as desired. Notice also that introducing uniqueness
of sums makes the axioms of reflexivity and antisymmetry redundant since any
transitive relation that satisfies uniqueness of sums is provably reflexive and anti-
symmetric (see Hovda 2009; Champollion 2017). The axioms have been discussed
for completeness though.
(8) Uniqueness of sums (Champollion & Krifka 2016: p. 517; adapted)
∀𝑃[𝑃 ≠ ∅ → ∃!𝑧 SUM(𝑧, 𝑃)]
(Every non-empty set has a unique sum.)
Finally, the additional notions binary sum and generalized sum can be derived,
as given in (9) and (10), respectively.4 The former operation allows us to refer
explicitly to the sum of two m-individuals, whereas the latter to the sum of an
arbitrary set.
4Again, I follow Landman (1989a,b; 2000) in the use of the symbols ⊔ and⨆, respectively, which
correspond to the symbols ⊕ and ⨁ one can often find in the literature.
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(9) Binary sum (Champollion & Krifka 2016: p. 518; adapted)
𝑥 ⊔ 𝑦 ≝ 𝜄𝑧 SUM(𝑧, {𝑥, 𝑦})
(10) Generalized sum (Champollion & Krifka 2016: p. 518; adapted)
⨆𝑋 ≝ 𝜄𝑧 SUM(𝑧, 𝑋), where 𝑋 is any non-empty set
Consequently, the meaning of the coordinate phrase John and Mary can be rep-
resented as 𝑗 ⊔ 𝑚, whereas the semantics of the definite description the water is
represented as ⨆water.
Alongside philosophical arguments for standard mereology, a significant ad-
vantage of this framework is that it involves a well-understood algebraic struc-
ture. In particular, as demonstrated by Tarski (1935) models delivered by mere-
ology are essentially isomorphic to Boolean algebras with their bottom element
removed, or equivalently complete semi-lattices without the null element (see
also Pontow & Schubert 2006).5 Figure 6.3 gives an example of a mereological
structure licensed by standard mereology. Note that it is isomorphic to the pow-
erset of the set {𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐} with the bottom element removed.
𝑎 ⊔ 𝑏 ⊔ 𝑐
𝑎 ⊔ 𝑐𝑎 ⊔ 𝑏 𝑏 ⊔ 𝑐
𝑎 𝑏 𝑐
Figure 6.3: Semi-lattice
I will follow the well-established tradition in the semantic literature and refer
to such models as complete semi-lattices. However, as pointed out by Cham-
pollion (2017) due to the lack of the null element the use of the term complete is
rather inadequate since it deviates from standard mathematical practice (see also
Landman 1989a). The definition of such a structure is given in (11).
5The reason is that standard mereology does not allow for an object that is part of everything
and since the empty set is a subset of every other set, it must be eliminated.
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(11) Semi-lattice (Champollion 2017: p. 17; adapted)
Let 𝑆 be a set and ⊑ be a relation from 𝑆 to 𝑆. A pair ⟨𝑆, ⊑⟩ is called a com-
plete semi-lattice iff ⊑ satisfies the axioms of transitivity and uniqueness
of sums.
Before we move on to the discussion of the limits of standard mereology that
seem to have posed some serious problems in the study of natural language se-
mantics adopting lattice-theoretic approaches, let us briefly contemplate some
correspondences between mereology and set theory.
6.1.1 Mereology vs. set theory
It can be easily noted that the notion of parthood in standard mereology has basi-
cally the same properties as the subset relation in standard set theory. Therefore,
since ⊑ and ⊆ are very much alike, there are a number of deep correspondences
between the two axiom systems, some of which are illustrated in Table 6.2. Con-
sequently, in many contexts it might be convenient to regard sums as sets, and
a question arises on why mereology is preferable over set theory in modeling
pluralities in natural language semantics.
Table 6.2: Correspondences between mereology and set theory (Cham-
pollion & Krifka 2016: p. 519; adapted)
property mereology set theory
reflexivity 𝑥 ⊑ 𝑥 𝑥 ⊆ 𝑥
transitivity 𝑥 ⊑ 𝑦 ∧ 𝑦 ⊑ 𝑧 → 𝑥 ⊑ 𝑧 𝑥 ⊆ 𝑦 ∧ 𝑦 ⊆ 𝑧 → 𝑥 ⊆ 𝑧
antisymmetry 𝑥 ⊑ 𝑦 ∧ 𝑦 ⊑ 𝑥 → 𝑥 = 𝑦 𝑥 ⊆ 𝑦 ∧ 𝑦 ⊆ 𝑥 → 𝑥 = 𝑦
interdefinability 𝑥 ⊑ 𝑦 ⇔ 𝑥 ⊔ 𝑦 = 𝑦 𝑥 ⊆ 𝑦 ⇔ 𝑥 ∪ 𝑦 = 𝑦
unique sum/union 𝑃 ≠ ∅ → ∃!𝑧[SUM(𝑧, 𝑃)] ∃!𝑧[𝑧 = ∪𝑃]
associativity 𝑥 ⊔ (𝑦 ⊔ 𝑧) = (𝑥 ⊔ 𝑦) ⊔ 𝑧 𝑥 ∪ (𝑦 ∪ 𝑧) = (𝑥 ∪ 𝑦) ∪ 𝑧
commutativity 𝑥 ⊔ 𝑦 = 𝑦 ⊔ 𝑥 𝑥 ∪ 𝑦 = 𝑦 ∪ 𝑥
idempotence 𝑥 ⊔ 𝑥 = 𝑥 𝑥 ∪ 𝑥 = 𝑥
unique separation 𝑥 ⊏ 𝑦 → ∃!𝑧[𝑥 ⊔ 𝑧 = 𝑦 ∧ ¬O(𝑥, 𝑧)] 𝑥 ⊂ 𝑦 → ∃!𝑧[𝑧 = 𝑦 − 𝑥]
Though early approaches to the semantics of plural expressions were
grounded in set theory (Bennet 1974; Hausser 1974), a substantive body of con-
temporary research embraces systems based on the notion of parthood. The origi-
nal motivation behind preferring mereology over set theory in the logic of plural-
ity developed by Link (1983; 1998) was formulated on philosophical grounds. In
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particular, Link argues that the traditional set-up of semantics taking the domain
of individuals to be simply a non-empty set fails to represent various relations
between objects. In other words, it is devised to capture only flat domains and
cannot account for structured domains, as inmodeling natural language. In terms
of ontology, Link describes his position as “relative nominalism” and argues that
a set-theoretic approach is not desirable because by treating pluralities as sets,
it commits us to assuming additional abstract objects. On the other hand, since
in a mereological framework pluralities are treated on par with singularities as
individuals, such an approach bears no additional ontological commitments, and
thus is to be preferred.6
Another arguable advantage of using mereology rather than set theory in plu-
ral semantics is that it conveniently allows us to distinguish type-theoretically
between the denotations of common nouns, i.e., set-denoting expressions of type
⟨𝑒, 𝑡⟩, and plural individuals, i.e., individual-denoting expressions of type 𝑒 (see
also Vaillette 2001; Champollion 2017). Due to the lack of sums set-theoretic ap-
proaches to pluralities conflate the meanings of these two types of expressions
which can be considered an undesired result.
A prominent linguistic application of standard mereology is the theory de-
veloped by Champollion (2017), who adopts the order-theoretic perspective and
treats ⊑ as primitive. On the other hand, Krifka (1998) derives ⊑ from ⊔. Other
influential theories that were intended to characterize standard mereology were
developed by Link (1983; 1998) and Landman (1989a; 1991; 2000).7
6.1.2 Limits of mereology
As has been pointed out by many authors, there is independent motivation for
extending standard mereology with auxiliary notions. One factor concerns the
criticism mereology faced with respect to its inadequacy in modeling objects in
the real world. In particular, mereology is committed to unrestricted sum forma-
tion and as such it is insufficient to capture what it means to be a whole. This
results in diametrical discrepancies between intuitions regarding the nature of
entities in the world and objects mereology actually delivers. To use Casati &
Varzi’s (1999) example, imagine a cup and broken glass. Intuitively, the former
constitutes an object, i.e., an individuated whole, something that counts as one,
whereas the latter is just a collection of shards. However, this distinction cannot
be captured by describing entities purely in terms of parthood. This is because in
6But see Landman (1989a) for a discussion challenging such a view.
7But see a scrupulous review by Hovda (2009) who demonstrates in detail that these systems
contain certain flaws, which result in them failing to describe standard mereology, as intended.
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mereology for every whole there is a set of parts and to every arbitrary collection
of parts there is their sum, i.e., a complete whole. As a result, a cup and broken
glass have the very same mereological status. In other words, the allowance of
scattered entities makes it impossible to differentiate between them and individu-
als constituting integrated wholes. Consequently, mereology has faced criticism
that in principle it fails as a theory of individuals.
As suggested by Grimm (2012b), it is very likely that at least some of the short-
comings of mereological approaches to pluralities and countability in natural
language may be due to the general flaws of standard mereology in attempting
to capture what it means to be a whole. Arguably, extending standard mereolog-
ical frameworks with additional notions in order to develop a better theory of
objects, as proposed, e.g., by Casati & Varzi (1999), may provide superior tools for
semantic treatments of quantification in natural language. As already signaled,
a challenging problem concerns the requirement of unrestricted sum formation
which states that for every two elements in the domain, there is a plural individ-
ual corresponding to the sum of those two elements. Specifically, the ontological
status of such a plural entity has often been disputed. As wittily put by Landman
(1989a), if three children messed up the living room, the correct answer to the
question “How many individuals were involved in messing up the living room?”
is “three”, whereas “seven” clearly seems incorrect.8 However, if pluralities were
conceptualized as having the same ontological status as singular individuals, we
would expect this answer to be adequate since that number includes all distinct
sums of the children in question. In other words, if the children were Anne, Betty,
and Carl, i.e., 𝑎, 𝑏, and 𝑐 respectively, then 7 is the number of the elements of the
set consisting of all entities that are part of the total sum of the children, i.e.,
{𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑎 ⊔ 𝑏, 𝑎 ⊔ 𝑐, 𝑏 ⊔ 𝑐, 𝑎 ⊔𝑏 ⊔ 𝑐}. The fact that natural language does not allow for
quantification over arbitrary sums suggests that the way individual objects are
conceptualized differs from how we see pluralities of objects. However, standard
mereology lacks notions fine-grained enough to distinguish between objects that
come in one piece and entities that do not.
The next section will introduce an extension of standard mereology within
which more fine-grained notions can be defined. These notions will enhance
mereology in that in addition to parthood they will allow us to capture also the
topological configuration of entities making up a particular sum, i.e., their spatial
arrangement. In other words, the topological extension will make it possible to
discriminate between scattered entities and wholes that come in one piece.
8See also Cresswell (1985).
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6.2 Mereotopology
topology (from the Greek 𝜏𝑜𝜋𝑜𝜁 ‘place’) is the study of those properties of space
that are unaffected by continuous deformations of shape or size of figures such as
stretching or bending, as opposed to tearing or gluing. Two of the crucial notions
studied in the field are connectedness and compactness. Important contributions
to the early development of topology were made by Fréchet (1906), Hausdorff
(1914), and Kuratowski (1922).
Theories that extend standardmereologywith topological relations are known
as mereotopology. Though early attempts to formalize such a system trace back
toWhitehead (1920; 1929), for many decades there was no continuation in the sys-
tematic study of mereotopological issues until relatively recent work in artificial
intelligence began to investigate the interaction between mereological and topo-
logical notions in order to develop formal representations of spatial relations
such as near or inside. Consequently, new developments in philosophy and
ontological modeling (e.g., Clarke 1981; Smith 1996; Roeper 1997) motivated the
extension of standard mereology with topological relations in order to advance
an improved theory of objects.
Though topological notions have been widely used within the study of loca-
tives (e.g., Clark 1973; Herskovits 1985; Zwarts & Winter 1997; Kracht 2002), it
was not until Grimm (2012a,b) that mereotopology was introduced to natural
language semantics.9 In this chapter, I will define basic topological concepts and
review how they interact with mereological notions as discussed by Casati &
Varzi (1999) and adopted for the semantic treatment of countability by Grimm
(2012a,b).
There are two main approaches with respect to relating mereology and topol-
ogy: (i) choosing mereology as a basic level and augmenting it with topological
notions, or (ii) choosing topology as a basic level and adding mereological rela-
tions. I will follow Grimm (2012b), who employs a technique of simply extending
mereology with topological notions. In particular, he adopts the approach devel-
oped in Casati & Varzi (1999), which I will describe in the following paragraphs.
The crucial topological notion for the purpose of this study is connected-
ness (C). This relation is introduced in such a way that it interacts with other
definitions and axioms of standard mereology. Connectedness is reflexive and
symmetric, as defined in the axioms in (12) and (13).
9Mereotopology has been further applied to particular topics concerning countability in Lima
(2014) and Grimm & Dočekal (2021). The theory has also inspired approaches that do not de-
velop full-fledged mereotopological accounts but employ some spatial relations in order to
capture certain issues relating to individuation such as Scontras (2014; 2017), Sutton & Filip
(2017a,b), Henderson (2017), and Krifka (2021).
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(12) Reflexivity (Casati & Varzi 1999: p. 52; adapted)
∀𝑥[C(𝑥, 𝑥)]
(Every thing is connected to itself.)
(13) Symmetry (Casati & Varzi 1999: p. 52; adapted)
∀𝑥∀𝑦[C(𝑥, 𝑦) → C(𝑦 , 𝑥)]
(If 𝑥 is connected to 𝑦 , then 𝑦 is also connected to 𝑥 .)
Notice, however, that unlike the parthood relation ⊑, as defined in standard mere-
ology, recall (1)–(3), the connectedness relation C does not need to be transitive.
For instance, consider the configuration depicted in Figure 6.4. Although 𝑎 and
𝑏 are connected to each other and 𝑏 and 𝑐 are connected to each other, it is not
the case that 𝑎 and 𝑐 are connected to each other.
𝑎 𝑏 𝑐
Figure 6.4: Connectedness and transitivity
As discussed by Casati & Varzi (1999), there are a number of intuitive inter-
actions between the topological notion C and the mereological relations ⊑ and
O. These intuitive interactions can be formalized as the so-called bridging prin-
ciples which interrelate the mereological and the topological component of the
theory (Varzi 2007). The main aim of the bridging principles is to secure that,
irrespective of their full characterization, ⊑ and C are related in such a manner
that a whole and its parts are firmly connected. In particular, the principle of
integrity ensures that connectedness is implied by parthood, see (14), and con-
sequently mereological overlap is in fact a form of connection, as guaranteed
by the principle of unity, see (15). Finally, the principle defined in (16) secures
monotonicity.10
(14) Integrity (Varzi 2007: p. 981; adapted)
∀𝑥∀𝑦[𝑥 ⊑ 𝑦 → C(𝑥, 𝑦)]
(If an m-individual is part of another m-individual, then they are con-
nected.)
10In fact, (16) implies both (14) and (15) (Varzi 2007: pp. 981–982). However, I provide all the
bridging principles for the sake of completeness.
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(15) Unity (Varzi 2007: p. 981; adapted)
∀𝑥∀𝑦[O(𝑥, 𝑦) → C(𝑥, 𝑦)]
(If two m-individuals overlap, then they are connected.)
(16) Monotonicity (Varzi 2007: p. 981; adapted)
∀𝑥∀𝑦[𝑥 ⊑ 𝑦 → ∀𝑧[C(𝑧, 𝑥) → C(𝑧, 𝑦)]]
(If an m-individual is part of another m-individual, then whatever is con-
nected to the former, is also connected to the latter.)
Given these extensions, a number of mereotopological properties like internal
part (IP), internal overlap (IO), and tangential overlap (TO) can be defined.
Such notions enable us to draw subtle topological distinctions in order to account
for different spatial configurations that entities may be in. For instance, the in-
dividual 𝑏 in Figure 6.5 is an internal part of the individual 𝑎 since every entity
that is connected to 𝑏 overlaps with 𝑎 or, in other words, 𝑎 includes 𝑏. On the
other hand, though part of 𝑏 is an internal part of 𝑎 in Figure 6.6, there is also a
part of 𝑏 which is not included in 𝑎. Finally, Figure 6.7 illustrates a configuration
where there is overlap between 𝑎 and 𝑏 but there is no internal overlap, i.e., the










The relevant definitions are given in (17)–(19).
(17) Internal part (Casati & Varzi 1999: p. 55; adapted)
IP(𝑥, 𝑦) ≝ 𝑥 ⊑ 𝑦 ∧ ∀𝑧[C(𝑧, 𝑥) → O(𝑧, 𝑦)]
(18) Internal overlap (Casati & Varzi 1999: p. 55; adapted)
IO(𝑥, 𝑦) ≝ ∃𝑧[IP(𝑧, 𝑥) ∧ IP(𝑧, 𝑦)]
(19) Tangential overlap (Casati & Varzi 1999: p. 55; adapted)
TO(𝑥, 𝑦) ≝ O(𝑥, 𝑦) ∧ ¬IO(𝑥, 𝑦)
In addition, within the mereotopological framework standard topological no-
tions can be defined. Assuming mereological complement (∼), as provided in
(20), (21)–(24) give definitions for interior (INT), exterior (EXT), closure (CLO),
and boundary (B), respectively.
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(20) Mereological complement (Casati & Varzi 1999: p. 45; adapted)
∼(𝑥) ≝ 𝜄𝑦∀𝑧[𝑧 ⊑ 𝑦 ↔ ¬O(𝑧, 𝑥)]
(21) Interior (Casati & Varzi 1999: p. 58; adapted)
INT(𝑥) ≝ ⊔𝑋 where 𝑋 = {𝑦 ∶ IP(𝑦 , 𝑥) = TRUE}
(22) Exterior (Casati & Varzi 1999: p. 58; adapted)
EXT(𝑥) ≝ INT(∼(𝑥))
(23) Closure (Casati & Varzi 1999: p. 58; adapted)
CLO(𝑥) ≝ ∼(EXT(𝑥))
(24) Boundary (Casati & Varzi 1999: p. 58; adapted)
B(𝑥) ≝ ∼(INT(𝑥) ⊔ EXT(𝑥))







The shaded area in Figure 6.8 represents the interior of an object, which is
taken to be the sum of an m-individual’s internal parts. The dashed line marks
the boundary of the object, i.e., the part that is not included in its interior. On the
other hand, Figure 6.9 represents the exterior of an object, which again does not
comprise the boundary, whereas the solid line in Figure 6.10 indicates that both
the interior and boundary make up the closure of an entity.
The framework described so far extends standard mereology with the prim-
itive topological relation of connectedness and several derived notions, which
allow us to talk about different configurations that entities can be in. Such a sys-
tem provides means to distinguish between arbitrary and non-arbitrary sums,
and consequently to define individuals as integrated wholes, i.e., objects charac-
terized in terms of different degrees of connectedness. The following section will
discuss a mereotopological approach to such individuals.
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6.2.1 Integrated wholes
A great advantage of the mereotopological approach to natural language seman-
tics is that by means of the topological relations defined so far it is possible to
capture what it means to be an individual understood as an integrated whole. In
particular, a distinction can be drawn between entities which come in one piece,
as opposed to pluralities, i.e., scattered entities, which bear no topological com-
mitments. To distinguish the former from the latter, it is essential to introduce
the property self-connected (SC). Unlike arbitrary sums, SC entities cannot be
divided into separated parts. The definition of SC is provided in (25).
(25) Self-connected (Casati & Varzi 1999: p. 57; adapted)
SC(𝑥) ≝ ∀𝑦∀𝑧[∀𝑤(O(𝑤, 𝑥) ↔ (O(𝑤, 𝑦) ∨ O(𝑤, 𝑧))) → C(𝑦 , 𝑧)]
(An entity is self-connected if and only if any two parts that form the
whole of that entity are connected to each other.)
Given the definition in (25), it is possible to differentiate inseparable individuals
from separable ones including arbitrary sums of entities, i.e., disconnected con-
figurations of objects. To illustrate this let us assume a model containing four
entities. Specifically, suppose 𝑎 and 𝑏 are two halves of a cube, whereas 𝑐 and 𝑑
are a pyramid and a sphere, respectively, see Figure 6.11. Intuitively, there is a
difference between the sum 𝑠1 = 𝑎 ⊔ 𝑏 and the sum 𝑠2 = 𝑐 ⊔ 𝑑 . While 𝑠1 forms an
integrated whole, the plurality 𝑠2 is just an arbitrary collection of disconnected
objects, and thus it does not make up a solid whole. In other words, SC(𝑠1) is true,
whereas SC(𝑠2) is false.
𝑎 𝑏 𝑐 𝑑
Figure 6.11: Wholes vs. sums
Self-connectedness is a great improvement in the theory of wholeness. How-
ever, this notion is still insufficient to capture what it means to be conceptual-
ized as an integrated object since it allows for configurations involving only an
external connection holding between individuals. In other words, cases when
the closure of one object overlaps the other or vice versa are not ruled out. For
instance, Figure 6.12 depicts two spheres 𝑎 and 𝑏 which only touch each other,
i.e., their boundaries are connected at a single point. Given the definition of SC
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in (25), 𝑎 and 𝑏 are self-connected but intuitively such a spatial configuration is
not sufficient to count as an integrated whole.
𝑎 𝑏
Figure 6.12: External connection
In order to rule out cases such as the one illustrated in Figure 6.12, a stronger
relation is required. Ostensibly, what is necessary is that not only boundaries of
parts of a whole are connected to each other, but also that their internal parts
are shared. To solve this problem one needs to define an additional restriction on
the concept of interior given in (21). Accordingly, Casati & Varzi (1999) postulate
the property of being strongly self-connected (SSC), as defined in (26).11 This
refinement will get us much closer to the type of entities we would like to single
out, i.e., integrated wholes.
(26) Strongly self-connected (Casati & Varzi 1999: p. 60; adapted)
SSC(𝑥) ≝ SC(𝑥) ∧ SC(INT(𝑥))
(An m-individual is strongly self-connected if it is self-connected and its
interior is self-connected.)
The restriction introduced in (26) guarantees that not only boundaries of parts
are shared but also that the interior of an entity is self-connected. Therefore, the
property of SSC rules out objects that merely touch each other, e.g., the spheres in
Figure 6.12. However, the fact that an entity is strongly self-connected still does
not ensure that such an entity is an integrated whole in the sense a theory of
wholeness is supposed to capture. For instance, consider the entity 𝑎, i.e., the left
half of the cuboid represented in Figure 6.13. Although 𝑎 qualifies as a strongly
self-connected object since any two parts that form its interior are connected,
intuitively it cannot be characterized as a whole. Obviously, the reason is that
there is yet another half of the cuboid and only the two together make up the
entire individual. Consequently, SSC is insufficient for our purposes and an even
stronger notion is required to capture what is perceived as an integral whole.
11Notice that on some plausible assumptions concerning boundaries the first conjunct in (26)
is superfluous (for a discussion of various views on boundaries, see Casati & Varzi 1999: pp.
61–62, 71–98).
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𝑎
Figure 6.13: Strongly self-connected part
Describing wholes is about capturing an intuitive notion of unity. This means
that a proper definition should accommodate both topological integrity andmere-
ological exhaustivity. For this purpose, Casati & Varzi (1999) introduce the prop-
erty of being maximally strongly self-connected (MSSC), as defined in (27).
(27) Maximally-strongly-self-connected (Casati & Varzi 1999: p. 60; adapted)
MSSC(𝑥) ≝ SSC(𝑥) ∧ ∀𝑦[SSC(𝑦) ∧ O(𝑦 , 𝑥) → 𝑦 ⊑ 𝑥]
(An m-individual is maximally strongly self-connected if (i) every part of
the individual is connected to (overlaps) the whole (strongly self-connect-
ed) and (ii) anything else which overlaps it and is strongly self-connected
is once again part of it (maximality).)
More generally one could single out entities that are maximally strongly self-
connected relative to a particular property. The relativized MSSC property can be
characterized as in (28), which provides the final mereotopological definition of
what an integrated whole is.
(28) Maximally strongly self-connected relative to a property (Casati & Varzi
1999: p. 60; adapted)
MSSC(𝑃)(𝑥) ≝ 𝑃(𝑥) ∧ SSC(𝑥) ∧ ∀𝑦[𝑃(𝑦) ∧ SSC(𝑦) ∧ O(𝑦 , 𝑥) → 𝑦 ⊑ 𝑥]
(An m-individual is maximally strongly self-connected relative to a prop-
erty if (i) every part of the individual is connected to (overlaps) the whole
(strongly self-connected) and (ii) anything else which has the same prop-
erty, is strongly self-connected, and overlaps it is once again part of it
(maximality).)
If an entity satisfies MSSC, then it is the largest entity satisfying that property
which is self-connected. For instance, if 𝑃 is the property of being a cuboid, then
the definition in (28) will select the largest such entities among those that come
in one piece. In particular, it will single out the whole cuboid in Figure 6.13 as
opposed to, e.g., its left half 𝑎 though 𝑎 itself also satisfies the property of being
a cuboid. That is because 𝑎 is part of the cuboid whereas the whole cuboid is not
part of any other strongly self-connected object.
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Though the structure of the mereotopological framework of Casati & Varzi
(1999) discussed above is relatively simple, the distinctions developed within it
are fine-grained enough for the representation of spatial objects. As standard
mereology, mereotopology gives rise to algebraic structures isomorphic to
Boolean algebras with their bottom element removed. However, such lattice rep-
resentations are further endowed with regions indicating which elements are
associated with the connectedness relation C. For instance, consider Figure 6.14.
𝑎 ⊔ 𝑏 ⊔ 𝑐







Figure 6.14: Parthood and connectedness (based on Grimm 2012b: p.
136)
Given a model with 3 entities, namely two halves of a cube 𝑎 and 𝑏 and a pyra-
mid 𝑐, the semi-lattice represents all the possible sums generated by the set of cor-
respondingm-individuals. The vertical axis illustrates the parthood relation with
individual lines between particular nodes symbolizing ⊑, whereas the horizontal
axis represents connectedness. The shaded area then covers those entities in the
structure which are connected. In other words, the mereological component of
the theory defines part-whole relations between 𝑎, 𝑏, and 𝑐 and all the possible
sums thereof, whereas the topological component singles out those parts that
form self-connected wholes. In particular, while 𝑎 in the model is part of 𝑎 ⊔ 𝑏
(as well as of itself due to the axiom of reflexivity), it is not part of 𝑏. However,
it is connected to 𝑏 (as well as to 𝑎 ⊔ 𝑏 due the axiom of integrity and to itself –
again reflexivity).
Moreover, as discussed by Grimm (2012b), the subtle niceties between different
types of connectedness provide means to capture differences between distinct
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types of nominals, such as object, substance, and aggregate nouns, as well as elim-
inate old problems concerning cumulative singular count nouns such as fence or
twig (see, e.g., Zucchi & White 2001; Rothstein 2010). Specifically, among multi-
ple parts that have a property of being, say, a rock only the maximal (improper)
part counts as a whole object. Hence, I conclude that compared to standard mere-
ology, mereotopology proves to be a superior theory of parts and wholes and its
application in natural language semantics should be considered advantageous.
In the next section I will discuss several other kinds of connection.
6.2.2 Other types of connection
In the previous section, we saw that given the primitive relation C it is possible
to derive a notion that can capture what it means to be an integrated whole as
opposed to an arbitrary sum, namely the MSSC property. This, however, does not
deplete the potential of mereotopology in modeling different types of objects
and spatial configurations. Based on C, many other types of topological relations
representing distinct varieties of connectedness may be defined. In this section,
I will discuss some of them.
The first auxiliary mode of connection to be discussed is the property of
firmly connected (FC), as defined in (29).12
(29) Firmly connected (Varzi 2007: p. 1003; adapted)
FC(𝑥, 𝑦) ≝ ∃𝑤∃𝑧[𝑤 ⊑ 𝑥 ∧ 𝑧 ⊑ 𝑦 ∧ SSC(𝑤 ⊔ 𝑧)]
(Twom-individuals are firmly connected if a sum of their parts is strongly
self-connected.)
This property holds between two entities when they overlap in a substantive
sense. In other words, two m-individuals are firmly connected if their sum is
strongly self-connected. Such a definition excludes cases of tangential overlap,
i.e., configurations where entities only touch each other, since the SSC property
implies that not only the boundaries but also the interiors of m-individuals are
connected.
With an additional restriction regarding the local scope of connectedness, the
notion of FC seems to be suitable to capture what it means to be conceptual-
ized as a substance, as opposed to an integrated individual that we count as one.
Specifically, substances can be represented as comprising of m-individuals that
12I use the term following Varzi (2007), whereas Casati & Varzi (1999) and Grimm (2012a,b) talk
about strong connection. My motivation is mainly to avoid potential confusion with the SSC
property which plays a crucial role in defining FC but is distinct from it.
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are locally firmly connected, i.e., at a given location an instance of a substance
is always firmly connected to another instance of the same substance (Grimm
2012a,b: pp. 140–142). For instance, a section of mud in a puddle overlaps with
other sections of the puddle of mud, which are again mud.
In contrast to FC, the property externally connected (EC), as defined in
(30), concerns entities that are merely tangentially connected, i.e., it is only their
boundaries that are connected, whereas their interiors do not overlap. This no-
tion enables us to model configurations of entities that are not merged but simply
touch each other.
(30) Externally connected (Grimm 2012b: p. 134; adapted)
EC(𝑥, 𝑦) ≝ C(𝑥, 𝑦) ∧ ¬C(INT(𝑥), INT(𝑦))
(Two m-individuals are externally connected if they are connected but it
is not the case that their interiors are connected.)
Another topological notion it might be useful to derive is one describing a config-
uration of objects touching each other in such a way that they form, say, a row.
This variety of connectedness can be captured by the property by-connected
(BC), as provided by Varzi (2007). It holds between entities that are not connected
to each other but are associated by virtue of being connected to another mediat-
ing entity. The definition in (31) describes BC as a three-place relation establishing
indirect connectedness between the outermost entities within a configuration.
(31) By-connected (Varzi 2007: p. 979; adapted)
BC(𝑥, 𝑦 , 𝑧) ≝ C(𝑥, 𝑧) ∧ C(𝑧, 𝑦)
(Three m-individuals 𝑥 , 𝑦 , and 𝑧 are by-connected if 𝑥 is connected to 𝑧
and 𝑧 is connected to 𝑦 .)
A related notion is called mediately connected (MC). This is a binary relation
that holds between entities that are not necessarily connected to each other, but
are part of a by-connected configuration, e.g, a row of individuals. In other words,
there is an object that mediates the connection between two such entities. The
formal definition of MC is given in (32).
(32) Mediately connected (Varzi 2007: p. 979; adapted)
MC(𝑥, 𝑦) ≝ ∃𝑧[BC(𝑥, 𝑦 , 𝑧)]
(Two m-individuals are mediately connected if they are by-connected
through a third m-individual.)
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To illustrate the BC and MC relations, consider the configuration of two spheres 𝑎
and 𝑐 and a cube 𝑏, as depicted in Figure 6.15. The three entities are by-connected
since 𝑎 is externally connected to 𝑏 and 𝑏 is externally connected to 𝑐. At the same
time, the spheres are mediately connected since both 𝑎 and 𝑐 are connected to
the cube 𝑏, i.e., 𝑏 in a way mediates the connection between 𝑎 and 𝑐.
𝑎 𝑏 𝑐
Figure 6.15: By-connected and mediately connected
As pointed out by Grimm (2012b: pp. 134–135), the notion of MC may prove
useful in modeling natural language expressions denoting entities such as eyes
or fingers. Such objects seem to be conceptualized in a particular way which is
further reflected in grammar. Specifically, in some languages they belong to a
category of inherently plural or dual expressions.
Furthermore, the BC relation can be generalized to hold for any number of en-
tities. This gives rise to the property transitively connected (TC). As defined
in (33) (see Grimm 2012a,b: p. 144), it is intended to determine whether two in-
dividuals are connected through a series of mediating entities. For instance, it
would hold of two opposite entities in a scenario similar to the one illustrated in
Figure 6.15 with the exception that between the spheres 𝑎 and 𝑐 there is not only
the cube 𝑏, but also a pyramid 𝑑 such that it touches both 𝑏 an 𝑐.
(33) Transitively connected (Grimm 2012a: p. 15; adapted)
TC(𝑥, 𝑦 , 𝑃 , 𝐶, 𝑍) ≝ ∀𝑧 ∈ 𝑍[𝑃(𝑧) ∧ (𝑥 = 𝑧1 ∧ 𝑦 = 𝑧𝑛) ∧ 𝐶𝑧1𝑧2 ∧ 𝐶𝑧2𝑧3⋯ ∧
𝐶𝑧𝑛−1𝑧𝑛]
where 𝑍 = {𝑧1, 𝑧2, … 𝑧𝑛}
(Entities 𝑥 and 𝑦 are transitively connected relative to a property 𝑃 , a
connection relation 𝐶 , and a set of entities 𝑍 , when all members of 𝑍
satisfy 𝑃 and 𝑥 and 𝑦 are connected through the sequence of 𝑧𝑖s in 𝑍 .)
The property TC allows for defining the concept of cluster (CLSTR) (see Grimm
2012a,b: p. 144). According to (34), a cluster is a special type of entity that is
conceptualized as a plurality of m-individuals that are transitively connected, i.e.,
they compose a connected sequence. For instance, the sum 𝑎⊔𝑏 ⊔𝑐 in Figure 6.15




(34) Cluster (Grimm 2012b: p. 144; adapted)
CLSTR(𝑥, 𝑃 , 𝐶) ≝ ∃𝑍[𝑥 = ⨆𝑍 ∧ ∀𝑧∀𝑧′ ∈ 𝑍∃𝑌 [TC(𝑧, 𝑧′, 𝑃 , 𝐶, 𝑌 )]]
(An entity 𝑥 is a cluster relative to a property 𝑃 and a connection relation
𝐶 iff 𝑥 is a sum of entities falling under the same property which are all
transitively connected relative to some set 𝑌 under the same property and
connection relation.)
Though the notions of TC and CLSTR are intriguing and important mereotopo-
logical concepts, the definitions in (33) and (34) seem to give rise to certain un-
intended consequences.13 In (33), the argument 𝑍 being a set does not have an
inherent ordering. However, the indexed variables 𝑧1, 𝑧2, … 𝑧𝑛 make reference to
some ordering of this set. Since there is no quantifier over these variables in (33),
the particular indexing assumed for a given case in fact determines whether the
relation TC(𝑥, 𝑦 , 𝑃 , 𝐶, 𝑍) holds or not. For instance, if 𝑍 = {𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐} such that 𝑎 and
𝑏 are connected, 𝑏 and 𝑐 are connected and no other connections hold, the con-
dition in (33) is met for 𝑧1 = 𝑎, 𝑧2 = 𝑏, 𝑧3 = 𝑐 but not for 𝑧1 = 𝑎, 𝑧2 = 𝑐, 𝑧3 = 𝑏.
This seems counterintuitive since, given the context of Grimm (2012a,b), the in-
tention behind (33) must be that it is valid whenever there is some finite sequence
⟨𝑧1, … , 𝑧𝑛⟩ such that 𝑍 = {𝑧1, … , 𝑧𝑛}, 𝑥 = 𝑧1, 𝑦 = 𝑧𝑛 and for every index 𝑖, such
that 1 ≤ 𝑖 < 𝑛, the connection relation 𝐶(𝑧𝑖, 𝑧𝑖+1) holds. And yet, based on (33),
it seems like some particular such sequence must be always contextually given,
which means it is unclear how to apply (33) in the context of (34).
Another problem is that the definition of a cluster in (34) has the follow-
ing counterintuitive consequence. Let 𝑃 = {𝑧1, 𝑧2, 𝑧3} and 𝑍 = {𝑧1, 𝑧3} and as-
sume that 𝑧1 and 𝑧2 are connected, 𝑧2 and 𝑧3 are connected and nothing else
is connected. In such a case, 𝑧1 and 𝑧3 are transitively connected via the set
𝑌 = {𝑧1, 𝑧2, 𝑧3}, which is a subset of 𝑃 , so the sum 𝑧1 ⊔ 𝑧3 should form a clus-
ter relative to 𝑃 and 𝐶 , even though it is not a connected entity.
In order to avoid the problems discussed above, I propose the revised defini-
tions for TC and CLSTR in (35) and (36), respectively. The main difference between
(33) and (35) is that in the revised version the quantification over possible order-
ings of 𝑍 is made explicit, i.e., the parameter 𝑍 ranges over sequences rather than
unordered sets.
(35) Transitively connected (revised)
TC(𝑥, 𝑦 , 𝑃 , 𝐶, 𝑍) ≝ 𝑧1 = 𝑥 ∧ 𝑧𝑛 = 𝑦 ∧ ∀𝑖[1 ≤ 𝑖 < 𝑛 → 𝐶(𝑧𝑖, 𝑧𝑖+1)]
∧ ∀𝑖[1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛 → 𝑃(𝑧𝑖)], where 𝑍 = ⟨𝑧1, … , 𝑧𝑛⟩
(Entities 𝑥 and 𝑦 are transitively connected relative to a property 𝑃 , a con-
nection relation 𝐶 , and a finite sequence of entities 𝑍 , when all members
13I would like to sincerely thank Nina Haslinger for pointing this out as well as suggesting a
solution.
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of 𝑍 satisfy 𝑃 and 𝑥 and 𝑦 are connected through the sequence of 𝑧𝑖s in
𝑍 .)
Furthermore, the key modification in (36), as compared to (34), is that in (36) the
variable 𝑌 is restricted to the subsets of 𝑍 . This excludes configurations such as
the unconnected sum 𝑧1 ⊔ 𝑧3 in the scenario discussed above.
(36) Cluster (revised)
CLSTR(𝑥, 𝑃 , 𝐶) ≝ ∃𝑍[𝑥 = ⨆𝑍 ∧ ∀𝑧∀𝑧′ ∈ 𝑍∃𝑌 ⊆ 𝑍[TC(𝑧, 𝑧′, 𝑃 , 𝐶, 𝑌 )]]
(An entity 𝑥 is a cluster relative to a property 𝑃 and a connection relation
𝐶 iff 𝑥 is a sum of entities falling under the same property which are all
transitively connected relative to 𝑌 which is a subset of a sequence 𝑍
under the same property and connection relation.)
Finally, the weakest variety of connectedness can be captured by the notion of
proximately connected (PC).14 This relation concerns entities that are neither
contiguous, nor do they touch each other, but rather they are “very close”. The
formula in (37) defines PC in terms of the distance function D which yields the
distance between two entities it is applied to. For instance, if a sphere 𝑎 is 1 meter
away from a cube 𝑏, the distance function D would yield 1 meter. The value 𝑛 is
determined with respect to the predicate in question so that entities that satisfy
it are conceptualized as being sufficiently near each other relative to the relevant
property.
(37) Proximately connected (Grimm 2012b: p. 135; adapted)
PC(𝑥, 𝑦 , 𝑃) ≝ D(𝑥, 𝑦) ≤ 𝑛(𝑃)
(Two m-individuals are proximately connected if the distance between
them is lesser than or equal to the value determined for a given predicate.)
The overview provided here does not by any means exhaust possible configura-
tions of objects and different types of connectedness. Nonetheless, for our pur-
poses the notions introduced in this section will be absolutely sufficient. The
introduced distinctions allow us to differentiate between several types of enti-
ties. First, due to the MSSC relation it is possible to distinguish between arbitrary
sums and solid integrated wholes. On the other hand, the FC property might be
useful in capturing the nature of substances, i.e., entities that come in multiple
instances which overlap each other. Furthermore, the TC relation enables us to
single out entities consisting of connected objects arranged in configurations
14In order to refer to a similar concept, Casati & Varzi (1999) use the term quasi-connected. How-
ever, I will follow Grimm’s (2012b) terminology and formalism here.
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such as rows and piles, whereas PC provides means to describe entities involv-
ing multiple parts remaining in a proximate distance from each other such as
complex mechanical devices as well as swarms (see, e.g., Henderson 2017).
6.3 Summary
In this chapter, I presented a theory of parts and wholes called mereotopology.
The described system involves a mereological core devised to capture the intu-
itive notion of parthood. This allows us to relate elements that are part of certain
larger entities with those entities. However, what standard mereology cannot
account for are certain relations between parts that result in different spatial
configurations. This is where the topological component introduces the notion
of connectedness. Based on this primitive concept more sophisticated properties
can be derived. From the perspective of this study, the most prominent is the
property of being a maximally strongly self-connected individual. This notion
enables us to capture integrated wholes, i.e., objects that are conceptualized as
coming in one piece. In the next chapter, I will demonstrate how the mereotopo-
logical framework introduced here can be used to model individuals in term of
integrated wholes as well as continuous fragments of such wholes as integrated
parts. Such treatment will allow us to better understand countability and to de-
velop a novel account for subatomic quantification.
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subatomic quantification
Given the mereotopological framework introduced in the previous chapter, let us
now attempt to account for some of the relevant expressions employing quantifi-
cation over parts such as partitives andmultiplier phrases as discussed in Chapter
2, 3, and 4. The conceptual basis of the general mechanism of subatomic quantifi-
cation outlined in Chapter 5 can now be spelled out formally with the notions of
parthood and connectedness playing the central role in modeling the meaning
of expressions that provide objects to be counted as well as of those that do the
counting.
In this chapter, I will propose an analysis of different types of partitives and
multiplier phrases. I will start with the general discussion of the implausibility of
atomicity-based approaches to subatomic quantification. Next, I will turn to my
own proposal spelled out in terms of mereotopology, supplemented with addi-
tional components such as measure functions, partitions, and the individuation
operation. First, I will address the mass/count distinction by distinguishing be-
tween different types of nominals, as well as give the meaning of the plural in
the spirit of Grimm (2012b). Subsequently, I will turn to defining other seman-
tic objects I assume in the structure of different types of partitives and multiplier
phrases including themeanings of different types of partitive words as well as nu-
merical expressions, which I treat as complex constituents comprising a classifier
component. Finally, I will propose a compositional analysis of the expressions in
question by showing how the pieces fit together.
7.1 Doing without atoms
In standard theories of pluralities and countability the mass/count distinction
is often formulated in terms of atomicity (e.g., Link 1983; Landman 1991; 2000;
Chierchia 1998a; 2010). Though particular theories differ significantly with re-
spect to the exact character of the alternation, the contrast between count and
mass nouns usually boils down to the existence or lack of minimal building
blocks in their denotation or, alternatively, to a distinct nature of those building
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blocks. The approach developed here rejects the view that what counts as one
is best represented as an atomic entity. Instead, I build on the mereotopological
notion of MSSC introduced in §6.2.1 to capture what can be an object of counting.
There are three main motivations behind this decision. The first one is the lin-
guistic relevance of topological relations holding between parts of a whole object
as empirically attested in multiple constructions in various languages discussed
in Chapters 2 and 3. The second stems from the general counting principles de-
scribed in §5.2.2, which I believe constitute a deeply rooted part of human cog-
nition and as such interact with that part of the language faculty that generates
the grammar of countability. Finally, the last reason for abandoning atomicity
is simply that it does not seem helpful with respect to subatomic quantification.
Before we move on to the proper proposal, let us briefly consider why that is.
Things that count as one are typically defined as atomic individuals, i.e., enti-
ties that have no proper parts, see (1) for the definition of the notion atom and (2)
for an optional mereological axiom of atomicity that delivers atomic domains,
i.e., domains consisting of atoms.
(1) Atom
ATOM(𝑥) ↔ ¬∃𝑦[𝑦 ⊏ 𝑥]
(An atom is an entity which has no proper parts.)
(2) Atomicity
∀𝑥∃𝑦[𝑦 ⊑ 𝑥 ∧ ¬∃𝑧[𝑧 ⊏ 𝑦]]
(For any element, there is a part for which there does not exist a proper
part.)
At first blush, such an approach to what it means to count as one seems counter-
intuitive since we know from our everyday life experience that things we count
as one very often do have multiple parts. However, one should not confuse intu-
itive concepts with formal notions devised to represent the semantics of natural
language expressions, e.g., the meaning of the English partitive word part with
⊑. Thus, my view is that there is nothing wrong in dissociating intuitive entities
from their intuitive parts in terms of mereological modeling as long as it serves a
certain purpose. For instance, Champollion (2010; 2017) assumes that the relation
between, say, a teddy bear named Fuzzy Wuzzy and its paw is not mereological
parthood. In other words, despite the fact that Fuzzy Wuzzy consists of a num-
ber of material parts it is considered a mereological atom, i.e., an inseparable unit
in the domain of entities. This might seem plausible since it corresponds to yet
another intuition, namely that though we know that things have parts, we seem
to ignore this fact when we count those things. However, a significant problem
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for such an account arises when we decide to quantify not over whole things but
over parts of those things. Thus, I will argue for two claims. First, having a notion
of atomicity is not enough for a full analysis of quantification of parts. Second,
atomicity is actually not needed to analyze quantification over parts since it can
be reduced to topological notions which are required independently.
To illustrate this, let us consider the following case involving subatomic quan-
tification. Assume we wanted to count parts of Fuzzy Wuzzy, e.g., its paws. Of
course, natural language allows for that since we can say (3).
(3) English (Peter Sutton, p.c.)
Exactly two parts of Fuzzy Wuzzy are brown.
The sentence in (3) would be true if, say, FuzzyWuzzy’s paws were brownwhere-
as all of its other parts were of a different color. However, if referents of proper
names are mereological atoms, there are no parts to be counted since the entity
designated by the expression Fuzzy Wuzzy cannot be split. Without saying any-
thing else, this is untenable if wewant to account for (3). Consequently, one could
follow Link (1983) and propose to distinguish between a domain of entities and
a domain of portions of matter over which a different parthood relation would
be defined, i.e., the material parthood relation ⊑𝑚 as opposed to the individual
parthood relation ⊑𝑖. Assuming the domains are related by a function from enti-
ties to portions of matter, one could argue that subatomic quantification is about
triggering this mapping and operating on portions of matter corresponding to
the mereological atom in the domain of entities. However, such a proposal raises
questions. If the domain of portions of matter is atomless, which at first blush
might seem intuitive, then how is it possible to count entities of such a domain?
Since atomicity is a necessary condition for countability,1 we need to ensure that
at least some portions of matter are atomic. However, this is problematic.
Let us now imagine that for some reason we wanted to count parts of a part
of an individual. Again, natural language does allow for that. The sentence in
(4) is perhaps not something one would frequently say but it sounds completely
natural and it is definitely interpretable.
(4) English (Peter Sutton, p.c.)
Exactly two parts of this part of Fuzzy Wuzzy are brown.
1Notice that it is not a sufficient condition due to the existence of object mass nouns which are
also assumed to have atomic reference yet are uncountable (see, e.g., Chierchia 1998a; Barner
& Snedeker 2005).
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It would be true if, say, exactly two digits of Fuzzy Wuzzy’s left paw were brown
and the remaining part of the paw were not. Notice that truth-conditionally (4)
is not equivalent to (3). Consider, for instance, a scenario where the brown parts
of FuzzyWuzzy included only its head, right leg, and two digits of its left paw. In
such a scenario, (4) would be true but (3) would not. Now, if countable portions
of matter are atomic, then the same problem as discussed with respect to atoms
in the domain of entities arises. Specifically, if a portion of matter corresponding
to Fuzzy Wuzzy’s left paw is modeled as having no proper parts, then how can
we quantify over its parts? To account for that we would be forced to postulate
another domain and relate it with the domain in which the material part corre-
sponding to FuzzyWuzzy’s paw is an atom. However, this seems weird and even
if we did it, the same problem would arise again if we wanted to count parts of a
digit of Fuzzy Wuzzy’s paw. Consequently, distinguishing between just two dis-
tinct parthood relations is not enough. In fact, since there are multiple possible
divisions of matter, we might end up establishing numerous or even potentially
infinitely many domains in order to be able to define parts as atomic objects in a
particular domain. This, of course, is far from desirable and it seems to me that
the discussed example strongly suggests that sorting domains does not offer a
tenable solution to the issues concerning subatomic quantification and atomic-
ity.
Yet another argument against the two domain view can be put forward based
on examples such as (5).
(5) English (Peter Sutton, p.c.)
Exactly two parts of Fuzzy Wuzzy are brown: his (two) paws.
If one said that exactly two parts of Fuzzy Wuzzy are brown and this was true
because of his paws, then (5) would not be straightforwardly true since the paws
would be interpreted realtive to a different domain than the two parts. This fur-
ther suggests that a Linkean approach is not a good path to follow.
Since sorted domains proved unsatisfactory for our purpose, one might think
of another idea. As discussed in §3.3, one of the very few attempts to propose a
solution to the problem of countability of portions of matter (as opposed to un-
countability of matter) preserving atomicity was developed in Chierchia (2010).2
In this system, an expression such as English part is modeled as a variable over
partitions of an entity, i.e., an expression of type ⟨𝑒, ⟨𝑒, 𝑡⟩⟩ that selects an entity
and returns a set of relative atoms that are ‘spatio-temporally included’ in that
2Another account worth mentioning was proposed by Landman (2016) but this theory also
abandons atomicity.
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entity. Since in principle such partitioning can be applied recursively, we can ob-
tain parts of parts of entities etc. This seems to be a significant improvement com-
pared to an attempt to account for subatomic quantification in terms of sorted
domains and distinct parthood relations. However, there are still several issues
with this approach.
First, as already discussed, an analysis along the lines of Chierchia’s proposal
fails to account for the fact that parts can be either continuous or discontinu-
ous, and, crucially, natural language turns out to be sensitive to this distinction.
Second, the notion “spatio-temporally included” introduced above is very loose.
Compared to the fine-grained concepts discussed in the previous chapter, it ap-
pears to be very unsatisfactory. In general, I agree with Chierchia’s “mereotopo-
logical” intuition; however, its formulation leaves a lot to be desired. For instance,
imagine that Fuzzy Wuzzy was left in a car. Does it mean that for linguistic pur-
poses it is now part of that car? Or if an elephant accidentally swallowed Fuzzy
Wuzzy in a zoo only to throw it up after some time, would the poor teddy bear be
considered part of that elephant in the period between swallowing and throwing
up? Intuitively, that does not seem to be the case. Finally, from my point of view
postulating partitions of entities is an attempt to compensate deficits of atomicity
rather than a genuine development. On the one hand, it seems like circumvent-
ing the ban on having proper parts by singular individuals, which are building
blocks of denotations of count nouns. On the other, though it seems to point
in a desirable direction, it somewhat stops halfway. As we will see, given the
potential of a mereotopological account, the vague concept of a partition of enti-
ties does not make a tenable alternative. In particular, if maintaining one unified
parthood relation proved successful, then partitions of entities could be reformu-
lated in terms of such unified ⊑, as we will see in §7.5.5. Though I will return
to partitioning as a useful tool in modeling partitive words denoting continuous
parts, I do not find Chierchia’s proposal an overall satisfactory analysis.
I believe that at this point it is plausible to conclude that in order to account
for subatomic quantification it is desirable to find a substitute for atomicity. One
might think that a plausible alternative would be to adopt frameworks that model
building blocks of denotations in terms of natural or object units, as proposed by
Krifka (1989; 1995). At first blush, this might seem attractive because what counts
as one, i.e., an entity to which we can assign the number 1, is not defined in
terms of not having proper parts. Thus, in principle accounting for quantification
over parts of such an object would not have to face the issues described above.
Nonetheless, such an approach would run into a nagging conceptual problem.
Intuitively, it is quite straightforward what a natural unit of, say, entities that
have the property of being an apple is. Alternatively, it is clear what kind of con-
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cept such entities realize as object units. But what is a natural unit of a part? Or
what kind of concept does a part instantiate as an object unit? Given the systems
mentioned above, these notions would have to refer in some way to the deno-
tations of partitive words. But it seems to me that this is a very strange way of
thinking about parts. However, even if one accepts the existence of natural units
or concepts of this sort, other questions arise. Since there are numerous ways
how to divide portions of matter making up an entity, does it mean there are
numerous natural units or concepts corresponding to such portions, e.g., a natu-
ral unit/concept of a tiny part, half, great part, and not-that-small-but-not-that-
big part? Can both continuous and discontinuous parts be considered as natural
units? Are they realizations of the same concept or two different concepts? Is
there a difference between natural units or concepts corresponding to parts of a
singularity and those corresponding to parts of a plurality? If yes, then how do
quantificational operations know that one is to be selected over the other? If no,
then how can we distinguish between the semantic subtleties that the meaning
of partitive words are associated with? It feels like all of these questions are quite
odd questions but they would need to be addressed seriously in order to account
for the data presented in Chapter 3. Therefore, it appears to me that trading in
atomicity for natural or object units does not make a satisfactory alternative with
respect to subatomic quantification.
Given the problems considered above, I conclude that an approach based on
mereotopology proves more advantageous for accounting for subatomic quan-
tification. Not only does it provide means to better capture what it means to be
a whole but also, as we will see, it turns out to be extremely useful in model-
ing those entities that can be counted. In the following sections, I will introduce
a minimal set of tools necessary to model two different types of constructions
concerning quantification over parts, namely multiplier phrases and partitives. I
treat this repertoire of means alongside the standard principle of Function Ap-
plication as the first attempt to develop a compositional analysis of the syntactic
structures in question that could shed new light on the somewhat neglected phe-
nomenon of subatomic quantification as well as on countability in general. At
the same time I believe the real journey begins afterwards.
7.2 Common nouns
I will start my proposal with a brief discussion of the semantics for different
types of concrete nouns, i.e., expressions denoting sets of individuals such as ap-
ples and teddy bears as well as scattered entities such as juice and rice. Though
everything I have to say about the semantics of nouns extends naturally to NPs,
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for the sake of brevity I will focus only on nouns. In general, I assume that all com-
mon nouns of the sort discussed in this study as well as nominals derived from
them, e.g., by adjectival modification, are standard ⟨𝑒, 𝑡⟩ predicates, i.e., functions
from entities to truth values. Among such expressions there are some that are
countable and some that are not. Though countability is, of course, a grammati-
cal category, I assume that the mass/count distinction correlates with cognitive
factors determining how human beings conceptualize things in the world, as dis-
cussed in Chapter 5. In particular, I take the counting principles of non-overlap,
integrity, and maximality as the benchmark for deciding what is countable and
what is not. In other words, I postulate that only nouns whose referents satisfy all
three criteria are countable. In the next section, I will propose how the meaning
of such predicates can be captured.
7.2.1 Count nouns
Building on Grimm (2012b), I model the distinction between count and mass
nouns in terms of mereotopological distinctions developed in the previous chap-
ter. In particular, I propose that defining countable predicates is about ensur-
ing that their extensions include only entities conceptualized as objects, i.e., dis-
crete integrated wholes that are perceived as being disjoint from each other. In-
tuitively, the core distinction between count nouns, on the one hand, and mass
nouns including substance terms, granulars, and object mass nouns, on the other,
can be reduced to the fact that the former denote only individuated objects,
whereas the latter either do not have integrated wholes in their extension at all,
or they do but in addition they also refer to other types of entities. For instance,
the noun apple simply denotes a set of individuals, i.e., distinct apples. On the
other hand, the referents of juice do not have properties that integrated wholes
have, i.e., they are not constrained as bounded non-overlapping discrete objects.
The case of granular terms such as rice is somewhat more complicated. Arguably,
those predicates do denote integratedwholes since one can point at a single grain
of rice and truthfully call it rice. Intuitively, grains of rice have similar properties
as apples, i.e., they are disjoint, integrated, and mereologically maximal, how-
ever rice does not refer exclusively to individual grains of rice. In addition, it can
also denote arbitrary sums as well as clusters of rice which lack those properties.
Likewise, object mass nouns such as footwear have both integrated wholes, i.e.,
individual shoes, as well as groups of such individuals, i.e., pluralities of shoes,
in their extensions. Thus, though there are important differences between par-
ticular types of mass nouns, they all contrast with count nouns with respect to
what kinds of entities fall into a denoted set.
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Since mereotopology provides powerful means to distinguish formally be-
tween objects conceptualized as integrated wholes and other types of entities,
I will use the notion of MSSC defined in (27) in order to capture the main intu-
ition behind the contrast discussed above. Specifically, I will employ the variant
of MSSC relativized to a property as provided in (28) in §6.2.1 and repeated here
as (6). As discussed in §6.2.1, this allows us to distinguish between integrated ob-
jects such as individual apples and scattered entities like juice, on the one hand,
and arbitrary sums such as pluralities of apples, on the other.
(6) Maximally strongly self-connected relative to a property
MSSC(𝑃)(𝑥) ≝ 𝑃(𝑥) ∧ SSC(𝑥) ∧ ∀𝑦[𝑃(𝑦) ∧ SSC(𝑦) ∧ O(𝑦 , 𝑥) → 𝑦 ⊑ 𝑥]
(An m-individual is maximally strongly self-connected relative to a prop-
erty if (i) every part of the individual is connected to (overlaps) the whole
(strongly self-connected) and (ii) anything else which has the same prop-
erty, is strongly self-connected, and overlaps it is once again part of it
(maximality).)
Given the mereotopological notion of MSSC, we can now characterize the subset
of predicates that refer exclusively to integrated wholes. In the following text, I
use the symbol PMSSC to refer to a higher order predicate of which such predi-
cates are true. As stated in (7), there is nothing in the denotation of a predicate
satisfying PMSSC that is not an MSSC entity.3 This means that, e.g., apple does sat-
isfy PMSSC, whereas juice, rice, and furniture do not since either they do not refer
to MSSC individuals at all or they also denote entities that are not MSSC.
(7) Predicate of MSSC individuals
PMSSC(𝑃) ≝ ∀𝑥[𝑃(𝑥) → MSSC(𝑃)(𝑥)]
(Any m-individual of which a predicate satisfying PMSSC is true is an MSSC
m-individual relative to the relevant property.)
Let us now consider the semantics of the English count noun apple, as provided
in (8).
(8) Count nounJappleK = 𝜆𝑥[MSSC(apple)(𝑥)]
What the semantics in (8) says is that apple is an expression of type ⟨𝑒, 𝑡⟩ which
yields the truth value True for entities that are MSSC with respect to the property
3For convenience, I use the term MSSC entity/individual to refer to objects that are maximally
strongly-self connected relative to a relevant property.
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apple. Given the definition in (6), MSSC(apple)(x) entails apple(x) which means
that the discussed predicate denotes a set of apples that are integrated wholes.
Therefore, the proposed semantics captures the intuition that referents of count
nouns constitute discrete objects without any reference to the notion of atomic-
ity.
Since the main topic of this study concerns subatomic quantification, I will
refrain from discussing the exact semantics for different types of mass nouns.
Nonetheless, the meaning of all of the expressions mentioned above can be cap-
tured in terms of mereotopological distinctions. In particular, substance terms
such as juice can be modeled in terms of m-individuals having a certain prop-
erty that are firmly connected to distinct m-individuals with the same property,
formally involving the FC relation introduced in (29) (see Grimm 2012b: pp. 140–
142). On the other hand, granular mass nouns such as rice can be accounted for
by treating them as aggregates, i.e., expressions that can denote MSSC individ-
uals, their sums as well as clusters thereof, i.e., configurations of MSSC entities
transitively connected via the TC relation defined in (35) (see Grimm 2012b: pp.
142–148).4 Finally, object mass nouns such as footwear can be thought of as de-
noting both MSSC entities and sums thereof though definitely more work needs
to be done with respect to this category.
The mereological approach to nominal semantics allows us to distinguish
countable nouns without postulating atomicity. As we will see, this will prove
crucial in accounting for subatomic quantification. However, before I move to
the discussion of the machinery behind measuring and counting, the issue of
number morphology on nouns needs to be addressed. In the next section, I will
take up the meaning of the plural.
7.2.2 Artifacts and functional units
Before I move on to the discussion of plurals, cardinal numerals and multipliers,
and partitive words, I would like to address a class of apparent counterexamples
to the proposed account. Grimm (2012b: p. 21) explicitly restricts his meretopo-
logical approach to natural concrete entities, i.e., referents of expressions such
as cat and apple. Aside from the reasons of simplicity stated by Grimm for why
artifact nouns, e.g., clock and pen, are excluded from the analysis, there are also
other reasons for doing this. In particular, it might seem that lots of artifacts that
we count as one do not seem to be MSSC individuals. For instance, a clock is a
system of connected gears, hands, a spring, and a clock face. For some clocks,
4Clusters can be further relativized to different types of connections, such as external connec-
tion, see ET in (30), and proximate connection, see PC in (37) (Grimm 2012b).
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these parts may be merely touching, like interlaced cogs. Similarly, a pen can
be the main part of the pen and its lid, which can merely touch. Other potential
counterexamples include chain, which designates a string of interlinked MSSC in-
dividuals, nouns such as fence and wall, which might overlap at edges, and count
counterparts of object mass nouns, e.g., a pestle and mortar can count as one
piece of kitchenware (see Sutton & Filip 2016a).
Admittedly, the examples provided above seem to pose a problem for the se-
mantics of count nouns proposed in (8) and for the principle of integrity in gen-
eral since, strictly speaking, they are not MSSC individuals. One possible reply is
that, given the cognitive view of meaning adopted in this book, see §1.2.1, what
matters for grammar is how referents of artifact nouns are conceptualized rather
than what objects, which we use language to talk about, exactly look like in
the mind-external world. This means that there might be mismatches between
mereotopological structures in the part of the human mind that is relevant for
natural language semantics, on the one hand, and the internal make-up of (at
least some) physical entities we use linguistic expressions to refer to, on the
other.
Another possibility is to loosen the relationship between the notion of in-
tegrity and the mssc relation. In particular, it is possible that the referents of nat-
ural concrete entities exemplified by (8) are only one particular subtype of things
conceived of as integrated objects. Although artifactual entities are not inte-
grated in the sense of MSSC (in the physical space), there are still othermereotopo-
logical notions that might be relevant for the way such entities are conceptu-
alized as integrated wholes. For instance, one could model artifacts as various
types of clusters, i.e., collections of parts that (typically) either touch each other
or remain in close proximity, see §6.2.2. This solution would require some slight
amending of the principle of integrity, and consequently the semantics of car-
dinal numerals and multipliers. However, it would definitely preserve the core
idea and the general spirit of the approach.
Finally, I would like to suggest that it is also possible to have a unified account
on which both natural entities and artifacts are modelled in terms of the MSSC
relation by extending mereotopology to abstract domains. Though this requires
several non-standard assumptions, some of whichmight at first sight seem rather
controversial, I believe that it is worth considering since it offers a very promising
and advantageous perspective.
First of all, notice that artifacts are usually characterized by their intended
function, e.g., measuring and indicating time for the clock andwriting for the pen.
This makes them conceptually different from natural concrete entities, which
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seem to lack any functional component. Grimm & Levin (2017) argue that the se-
mantics of an artifact noun includes an associated event, which often represents
the intended function of the corresponding object. This is a very interesting idea
and one could extend the framework proposed here with this kind of approach.
However, there is yet another account I would like to suggest.
As already mentioned in §4.2.4, there are reasons to assume that natural lan-
guage is sensitive to the distinction between individuals and roles, which are cer-
tain functions or capacities of entities. Zobel (2017) provides a number of linguis-
tic phenomena involving, e.g., English and German as-phrases, which demon-
strate the relevance of this distinction, and proposes to model roles as indepen-
dent ontological objects of the primitive type 𝑟 that can be also associated with
individuals that perform them. Though previous research has focused on roles
of human individuals, e.g., judge (Zobel 2017) and clergy (Wągiel 2021), it is con-
ceptually conceivable that there might also be “inanimate” roles, which would
represent functions or capacities of inanimate objects. For instance, consider the
contrast in (9).
(9) English (Katie Fraser, p.c.)
a. Jenny used that thing as a pen.
b. #Jenny used that thing as an apple.
The sentence in (9a) is perfectly natural since it is easy to imagine that one could
use various items forwriting, e.g., a stick. On the other hand, (9b) is weird because
apples have no intended function unless the context makes it clear that in this
particular situation apples are used in a very special way, e.g., as some kind of
offering in a religious ritual.5
An important result in the last four decades of the study of part-wholes struc-
tures is that mereological relations hold not only between concrete physical ob-
jects but also between abstract entities such as events (Bach 1986b), informa-
tion states (Krifka 1996), times (Artstein & Francez 2003), and degrees (Dotlačil
& Nouwen 2016) as well as propositions (Lahiri 2002) and functions (Schmitt
2013; 2019). Therefore, I see no a priori reason to assume that this cannot be true
also for mereotopological notions. Of course, such an approach would require
abstracting from the connectedness relation C as a relation between physical ob-
jects. Rather, it would need to be viewed as a purely abstract notion that can
5Of course, there are also nominals that can get coerced to an artifact meaning in a particular
situation, e.g. a stone or a stick can have a function if they are used as a skipping stone or
a walking stick, respectively (see also Asher 2011: pp. 256–259). Importantly, however, the
function seems to stem from the human intention to use an object in a particular way rather
from some intrinsic property of that object.
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hold between entities of any type (similarly to the parthood relation ⊑). The core
intuition behind such an idea is that the manner in which parts of a whole are
arranged can be equally relevant for any type of entity including abstract objects.
Importantly, there is evidence that mereological structures apply also in the
domain of roles, see (10) (Wągiel 2021).
(10) English (Wągiel 2021)
a. Paul gave 4,000 euros to Tom and Amy.
b. Paul earns 4,000 euros as a judge and a lecturer.
It is well known that conjunction in examples such as (10a) gives rise to the
distributive and the non-distributive reading. Specifically, the sentence can ei-
ther mean that Tom and Amy got 4,000 euros each or that they got 4,000 euros
between them. Interestingly, (10b) displays the same type of ambiguity. On the
distributive interpretation, Paul earns 4,000 euros working as a judge and 4,000
euros working as a lecturer, i.e., 8,000 euros in total. In addition, the sentence
has the non-distributive reading on which Paul earns a total of 4,000 euros for
both of those two professional roles.
The existence of mereological structures in the domain of roles opens up the
possibility for a topological extension. For the sake of presentation, let us assume
that both individuals and roles are conceptualized as occupying positions within
regions of space, the former as concrete things located in physical space whereas
the latter as abstract entities inhabiting abstract functional space. We could then
postulate connected roles if, e.g., two roles involved overlap. Such an extension of
the model would allow for developing more complex mereotopological notions
including mssc. As a result, an artifact could be modelled as an mssc inanimate
role, i.e., abstract integrated functional unit, that can be in turn mapped onto
entities that perform that function. This would allow us to talk about functional
integrity as a notion that is at the same time independent and closely related to
physical integrity.
Since the main focus of this book concerns subatomic quantification, I will
not pursue a detailed implementation of the idea of functional integrity here,
but instead leave it for future research.6 Nonetheless, I conclude that, given the
analytical possibilities discussed above, the proposed approach can be extended
to account also for potentially problematic artifact nouns without sacrificing its
core components.
6But see Wągiel (2021) for a mereotopological attempt to model social collective nouns as prop-




Following Grimm (2012b), I assume that number morphology is sensitive to the
mereotopological structure of referents of the basic, i.e., unmarked, form of a
noun.7 Specifically, as we saw in the previous section in a language such as En-
glish only a subset of nouns can be characterized as denoting single objects con-
ceptualized as MSSC individuals. For the purpose of this study, I assume that in
general this property corresponds to countability and thus the compatibility of
such nouns with the plural morpheme.8 In particular, the plural marker attaches
only to predicates that have exclusively MSSC entities in their extensions.9
Keeping this in mind, the plural can be analyzed as an operation which selects
a set of MSSC individuals and applies the strict pluralization operation, see (11)–
(13).
(11) Algebraic closure (see Link 1983)
*𝑃 ≝ {𝑥|∃𝑃 ′ ⊆ 𝑃[𝑥 = ⨆𝑃 ′]}
(12) Strict pluralization
+𝑃 ≝ *𝑃 − 𝑃
(13) PluralJPLK = 𝜆𝑃 ∶ PMSSC(𝑃)[+𝑃]
The semantics in (13) involves the + operator whose definition is provided in
(12). As one can see, + employs the classical * operator introduced by Link (1983),
which is defined as a closure under sum formation, see (11). Specifically, what +
does is that it selects a predicate, applies * to it and then removes all the MSSC indi-
viduals from the pluralized set. The selectional requirement of the plural marker
is introduced by what I refer to as the individuation presupposition repre-
sented by PMSSC(𝑃) introduced after a colon following immediately the relevant
7Alternatively, one could argue that this kind of information is already encoded in the semantics
of the stem (pace, e.g., Pelletier & Schubert 1989; Borer 2005a). However, for the sake of brevity
I will not explore this hypothesis here.
8This is, of course, a simplification. As mentioned before, for the sake of simplicity I ignore
here collective nouns as well as count abstract nouns. However, I assume that in principle it
is possible to extend the core mereotopological concepts to develop a framework based on
notions derived from or inspired by MSSC that would account for phrases such as two ideas and
three committees (see also Grimm 2014).
9Without any additional assumptions, this approach fails to account for inherently plural mass
nouns such as leftovers (Acquaviva 2008) as well as pluralized mass nouns as observed, e.g.,
in Greek (Tsoulas 2009). However, since the general topic of the meaning of the plural lies
beyond the scope of this study, I leave it for future research.
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𝜆.10 The individuation presupposition requires an argument of the 𝜆 operator to
be a predicate denoting only MSSC individuals as defined in (7).
As indicated by (13), I adopt here the so-called exclusive analysis of the plural.
Within this view, plurals are assumed to refer only within the domain of sums,
i.e., singularities are excluded from the denotation, and thus the plural is treated
as designatingmore than one (cf. Hoeksema 1983; Chierchia 1998a,b; Grimm 2013;
see also Wągiel 2017).11 Hence, what the plural does is that it selects a set includ-
ing only MSSC individuals and yields a new set consisting of all the sums formed
by joining the members of the input set. For instance, let us consider the seman-
tics of the bare plural apples, see (14).
(14) Plural NPJapplesK = JPLK(JappleK) = 𝜆𝑥[+(𝜆𝑦[MSSC(apple)(𝑦)])(𝑥)]
In this case, the plural morpheme -s combines successfully with the noun since
the individuation presupposition is satisfied, i.e., apple is a predicate of MSSC en-
tities. As a result, the set denoted by apple is first closed under sum and then all
the MSSC individuals are removed. Hence, we obtain a new predicate which is
true only of entities that are pluralities of apples.
To see how this works, consider the following example. Let us assume a model
with three individual apples 𝑎, 𝑏, and 𝑐. Given such a model, the common noun
apple denotes the set of singular apples as in (15a). On the other hand, its plural
counterpart apples in (15b) denotes the set comprising all the sums obtained from
the singular individuals, i.e., pluralities of apples. In both cases, the semantic type
of the expression in question is ⟨𝑒, 𝑡⟩.
(15) Plural NP
a. JappleK = {𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐}
b. JapplesK = {𝑎 ⊔ 𝑏, 𝑎 ⊔ 𝑐, 𝑏 ⊔ 𝑐, 𝑎 ⊔ 𝑏 ⊔ 𝑐}
An important advantage of such treatment of the plural is that it explainswhy the
plural marker does not occur on mass nouns without triggering any additional
10For notational conventions used in this book see §1.3.2.
11This decision is mainly motivated by independent reasons and as far as I can see for the most
part nothing hinges on this from the perspective of the phenomena I attempt to account for
here. However, the exclusive analysis will prove advantageous in the context of set partitives.
Notice also that many arguments have been proposed in favor of the inclusive view on which
singularities are included in the meaning of the plural mainly based on the data concerning
downward-entailing environments (see, e.g., Link 1983; Schwarzschild 1991; Landman 2000;
Sauerland et al. 2005; Spector 2007; Zweig 2009). However, see Grimm (2013) for an analysis
of such contexts maintaining the exclusive view.
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semantic effect such as a portion interpretation. Or, alternatively, it is not the
plural marking that triggers that effect but rather, the application of the Universal
Packager is a prerequisite for the plural morpheme to be able to attach to a mass
noun.12 Since packaging restricts the extension of a mass term in such a way that
the resulting portion has properties similar to integrated objects, it is plausible to
postulate that it does so by applying an MSSC constraint or at least some related
restriction. In any case, non-coerced mass nouns fail to satisfy the individuation
presupposition simply because either they do not refer to MSSC individuals at
all as in the case of substance terms, or though their denotations include MSSC
individuals, they also include other entities such as sums (object mass nouns) and
clusters (granulars).
Apart from the individuation presupposition, the approach to the meaning of
the plural provided here is essentially one of the two standard analyses. How-
ever, there is an important comment to be made concerning the morpho-syntax/
semantics interface. Namely, I assume that not all morphological plurals get the
interpretation in (13). Leaving aside pluralia tantum which would require much
unrelated consideration, I posit that only bare plurals are semantic plurals, i.e.,
expressions on which the plural marker is interpreted. To foreshadow, I will
claim that plural morphology in quantificational constructions such as numeral
phrases in languages such as Englishmakes by contrast no semantic contribution
and is merely triggered syntactically by agreement (see, e.g., Krifka 1989; 2007;
Ionin & Matushansky 2004; Deal 2017).
7.2.4 Consequences
Adopting the mereological account for nominal semantics has some interesting
consequences. First, as we saw in §7.2.1 the notion of MSSC allows us tomodel indi-
viduals denoted by singular count nouns without reference to atomicity. There-
fore, there is no need to postulate a special category of entities that have no
proper parts. To the contrary, unlike atoms MSSC objects are viewed as certain
configurations of parts, specifically configurations forming integrated wholes.
This is a radically different approach from purely mereological theories. In my
opinion, its great advantage is that it succeeds in capturing two ontological intu-
itions concerning individuals at the same time. As we saw in Chapter 5, there are
good reasons to believe that cognitive structures underlying conceptualization of
12I refrain here, from the discussion of the role of the Universal Sorter since it is unclear whether
kind-level entities can be considered subject to topological relations. Potentially, subkind read-
ings constitute a problem for the described approach. For sure, more research is required on
this topic.
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solid objects differ from those corresponding to scattered entities. On the other
hand, human beings are able to perceive wholes simultaneously as discrete units
and as configurations of parts. Unlike atomicity-based theories, a mereotopolog-
ical account enables us to model natural language expressions in such a way that
the former cognitive aspect can be captured without sacrificing the latter. From
my point of view, this is an important advantage.
The second favorable consequence of mereotopology is that it provides a very
simple and intuitive way to distinguish between integrated sums of parts, i.e.,
singular individuals, and arbitrary sums, i.e., plural entities. The distinction sim-
ply boils down to whether topological notions are involved in the part-whole
structure of an entity or not. As MSSC individuals, referents of singular count
nouns consist of connected elements, whereas pluralities encode no topological
relations holding between their parts. Intuitively, the sum of two apples 𝑎 and 𝑏
remains the same entity 𝑎 ⊔ 𝑏 irrespective of whether 𝑎 and 𝑏 touch each other,
stay in proximity, or are situated in distant locations. On the other hand, 𝑎 would
cease to exist if its halves were separated from each other by some contextually
significant distance.13 In other words, while plural entities can be modeled in
purely mereological terms, singular individuals require an additional topological
layer. It seems that such a distinction accounts for the intuition that, contrary to
what standard mereology posits, singularities and pluralities are very different
types of creatures. However, this approach does not exclude yet another onto-
logical possibility, namely the existence of sums of solid entities that are topo-
logically arranged in a particular way. This fact is of considerable significance
since there is linguistic evidence indicating that introducing such type of entities
might be necessary for the meaning of certain expressions in natural language.
As we saw in §2.3, referents of Italian irregular plurals make a good candidate
for such a class.14
There is another welcome result. The theory adopted here allows for distin-
guishing between different types of entities in terms of the distinction between
mereotopological and purely mereological configurations. This fact in turn en-
ables us to reduce the number of domains. In particular, there is no need to dis-
tinguish between the domain of entities and the domain of portions of matter as
postulated by Link (1983). Since referents of count nouns are not consideredmere-
13Often, when parts remain in proximity it is still possible to retrieve the original part-whole
structure from the context. Though the constraints on such a ‘reconstruction’ operation are
potentially an interesting topic in cognitive science, I refrain here from any speculations on
this issue and focus only on clear cases.
14Another kind of expressions that are arguably of this sort are certain types of Slavic derived
collectives (see Dočekal & Wągiel 2018a; Grimm & Dočekal 2021).
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ological atoms, i.e., entities without proper parts, but rather mereotopologically
constrained sums of parts they have additional properties compared to arbitrary
collections of portions of matter. Those properties are formulated in terms of
connection, specifically MSSC. Therefore, it is sufficient to assume only one do-
main of concrete things, namely the domain of entities, and different types of
objects populating this domain can be distinguished in terms of different types
of either mereological or mereotopological part-whole structures.
I believe that at this point it is useful to readdress the classical paradox in (16)
which led Link to distinguish between the domain of entities and the domain of
portions of matter.
(16) English (Link 1983: adapted)
a. This is a gold ring.
b. The ring is new but the gold is old.
Assume that (16a) points at a ring which was recently forged from some old
Egyptian gold. If the ring is nothing more than a sum of portions of gold, it
is surprising that (16b) is not contradictory. To the contrary, in the described
scenario it is true. In other words, the problem concerns the fact that an object
appears to have different properties than the sum of its parts, but in mereological
terms the two are identical (see also Rothstein 2010; 2017 for discussion).
Mereotopology offers a new explanation for the paradox. What is crucial here
is that the ring is not just the sum of portions of gold it is made of. Rather, to be
perceived as a ring an entity needs to remain in a particular spatial configuration,
i.e., its parts need to be related by a topological relation. Therefore, the reason
why (16b) is not contradictory is that it says that while the parts are old, the
configuration is new. For instance, this intuition could be captured by attributing
different topological properties to the definite descriptions the ring and the gold.
As a result, even if the extensions of these two expressions involved absolute
material overlap, e.g., imagine that at a certain point in time the ring consisted of
all of the gold, the two entities could still be differentiated since only the referent
of the ring would be conceptualized as an integrated whole.15
To sum up, the view developed here offers a radically different perspective
on nominal semantics compared to standard approaches which utilize the no-
tion of atomicity. Given the above discussion, I conclude that it turns out to be
advantageous both from the conceptual and practical point of view because it
better captures intuitions concerning the nature of individuals as well as allows
for simpler models with less domains. Soon we will see that since it is free from
15Of course, it would be a topic for another study to work out what these properties are.
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the deficits of atomicity-based approaches discussed in §7.1, it also proves signifi-
cantly favorable in modeling subatomic quantification. In the following section, I
will make a first step towards developing an analysis along those lines. In particu-
lar, I will introduce the theoretical background for a unified analysis of numerical
expressions.
7.3 Measure functions
Following Krifka (1989; 1995), I model quantification over both parts and wholes
in numeral and measure constructions in terms of extensive measure functions,
i.e., operations that directly relate entities to numbers. The core mechanics be-
hind a measure function is that when applied to a plurality of individuals or
quantity of substance it maps it onto a real number corresponding to the num-
ber of individuals or units making up the plurality or quantity in question. Such
operations need to satisfy what we expect from counting, i.e., they need to be
additive. The definition in (17) ensures that no entity will be counted twice.
(17) Additive measure function
𝜇 is an additive measure function iff it satisfies the following requirement
∀𝑥∀𝑦[¬O(𝑥, 𝑦) → [𝜇(𝑥 ⊔ 𝑦) = 𝜇(𝑥) + 𝜇(𝑦)]]
(The measure of a sum consisting of non-overlapping parts equals the
arithmetic sum of the measures of parts.)
Assuming supplementation for the join operation as defined in (6) in §6.1 and
repeated here in (18) alongside the Archimedean property of measure functions,
see (19), it can be demonstrated that an additive Archimedean measure function
is monotonic, see (20) (see Schwarzschild 2002).
(18) Supplementation
∀𝑥∀𝑦[𝑥 ⊏ 𝑦 → ∃𝑧[𝑧 ⊑ 𝑦 ∧ ¬O(𝑧, 𝑥)]]
(Whenever a thing has a proper part, it has more than one.)
(19) Archimedean property
∀𝑥∀𝑦[𝜇(𝑥) > 0 ∧ 𝑦 ⊑ 𝑥 → 𝜇(𝑦) > 0]
(If a measure of a thing is greater than zero, then a measure of its part is
also greater than zero.)
(20) Monotonicity
∀𝑥∀𝑦[𝑥 ⊏ 𝑦 → 𝜇(𝑥) < 𝜇(𝑦)]
(A measure of a whole is greater than a measure of its proper part.)
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Examples of extensive additive measure functions include liter, meter, and
calorie, whereas measure functions such as degree-celsius and carat are non-
additive.16 For instance, for an entity 𝑥 the measure function liter yields a num-
ber of liters corresponding to the volume of that entity. In other words, it mea-
sures the quantity of space occupied by its argument in units of liters. Analo-
gously, meter and calorie return the number of meters and calories of a partic-
ular entity, respectively.
7.3.1 Counting operation
With this machinery in place, we can now start developing an account for count-
ing. Let us begin with an operation to which I will refer as 𝜇#. Its formal definition
is provided in (21).17
(21) Measure function 𝜇#
𝜇# is an additive measure function standardized by the following require-
ment
∀𝑥[𝜇#(𝑥) = 1 iff MSSC(𝑥)]
In §5.2.2, I demonstrated that counting and measuring differ in that the former
is topology-sensitive, whereas the latter is not. Despite this fact, for convenience
I will talk about measure functions when referring to both operations yielding a
cardinality of objects as well as operations giving a measure in terms of, e.g., vol-
ume. Given the definitions introduced above, the counting operation 𝜇# defined
in (21) is a kind of measure function. Nevertheless, it is crucial to emphasize
that it is a special kind of measure function. Similarly to other additive mea-
sure functions, it cares about non-overlap, but in addition it is also sensitive to
the mereotopological structure of the entities that it applies to. In particular, as
specified in (21) it assigns the value 1 exclusively to MSSC individuals.18 This fact
makes it distinctively different from measure functions such as liter which ig-
nore whether their arguments refer to integrated entities that come in one piece.
To see the measure function 𝜇# at work, let us consider the example provided
in (22). Assume that there are two distinct MSSC individuals 𝑎 and 𝑏, i.e., 𝑎 ≠ 𝑏. In
16This distinction corresponds to the monotonicity/non-monotonicity distinction in Schwarz-
schild (2002). In the following part of the chapter, I will focus only on additive/monotonic
measure functions.
17The symbol # in the subscript indicates quantification in terms of number of elements.
18In the original theory of Krifka (1989) the equivalent of 𝜇# measures in terms of natural units,
hence the NU operation. On the other hand, Krifka (1995) introduces the OU and KU operations
(for ‘object unit’ and ‘kind unit’, respectively), whereas in newer versions of the theory (e.g.,
Krifka 2007) the AC measure function (for ‘atomic count’) is defined to count atoms.
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such a case, after we apply 𝜇# to the sum of 𝑎 and 𝑏, the returned value will be 2
which of course is a correct result.
(22) Counting via 𝜇#
MSSC(𝑎) ∧ MSSC(𝑏) ∧ ¬O(𝑎, 𝑏) → 𝜇#(𝑎 ⊔ 𝑏) = 2
(If both 𝑎 and 𝑏 are MSSC and they do not overlap, i.e., they are not identical,
then the measure function 𝜇# applied to the sum of 𝑎 and 𝑏 yields the
number 2.)
The measure function 𝜇# seems to do what we would expect an operation in-
tended to capture the core intuitions concerning counting to do. However, there
is yet another improvement to be implemented. As we discussed in §6.2.1, it is
desirable to relativize MSSC to a particular property in order to avoid ending up
with the single integrated whole corresponding to the entire material universe.
Therefore, a proper device intended to account for counting should also be rela-
tivized to a property so that it does not count absolutely MSSC entities but rather
objects that are MSSC with respect to a particular characteristic, e.g., apples. This
can be ensured by introducing a new operation to which I will refer as #. As can
be seen in the definition in (23), it is similar to 𝜇# in that the notion of MSSC plays
a crucial role here.
(23) Measure function #(𝑃)
#(𝑃) is an additive measure function standardized by the following re-
quirement
∀𝑃∀𝑥[#(𝑃)(𝑥) = 1 iff MSSC(𝑃)(𝑥)]
Importantly, # differs from 𝜇# in that it takes a property 𝑃 and yields a measure
function that returns a number of MSSC individuals relative to 𝑃 . For instance,
assume there are two distinct apples 𝑎 and 𝑏. Then, # can yield ameasure function
that will count entities that are MSSC with respect to the property of being an
apple. As a result, we obtain the number 2.
Before we move on to introducing another measure function that will prove
useful for modeling multiplier phrases, let us discuss the mechanism of contex-
tual conditioning which will allow us to account for proportional partitive words.
7.3.2 Contextual conditioning
The evidence presented in Chapter 2 shows that cross-linguistically partitive
words can appear both in entity andmass partitives, on the one hand, and set par-
titives, on the other. In general, in the first two cases the partitive word quantifies
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over portions of matter constituting either a particular individual or a quantity
of substance, whereas in the third situation it quantifies over integrated wholes
making up a plurality. To account for this double compatibility a procedure is
required which will determine what is to be measured or counted when. For this
purpose, I build on Bale & Barner’s (2009) proposal that assumes a generalized
context-dependent measure function 𝜇. Such an approach posits a mechanism of
contextual conditioning along the lines defined in (24). The core of the idea is
that particular measure functions are ordered and depending on a context those
that are ranked higher in the series are favored over those that are ranked lower.
(24) Contextual conditioning (Bale & Barner 2009: p. 245; adapted)
𝜇 is interpreted as one of the measure functions 𝑚𝑧 in the series
⟨𝑚1, 𝑚2, 𝑚3…𝑚𝑛⟩ such that the argument for 𝜇 is in the range of 𝑚𝑧 ;
furthermore, contextually 𝑚𝑧 is preferred to 𝑚𝑦 if 𝑧 < 𝑦
Bale & Barner use themechanism in (24) to account for various meanings ofmore
observed in comparative constructions such asX has more NP than Y. Specifically,
depending on the NP comparison may be specified in terms of cardinality, vol-
ume, intensity etc. For the purpose of this study, I will make use of the very same
mechanism for a procedure determining that partitive words can quantify over
portions of matter in entity and mass partitives and over individuals in set parti-
tives. In particular, I propose a partial ordering of measure functions, as provided
in (25).
(25) Partial ordering of measure functions
𝑚1 = #(𝑃) < 𝑚𝑛 ∈ volume
where volume is a set of measure functions measuring entities in terms
of volume including m3, liter, pint etc.
The first measure function in the series, i.e., the one ranked highest, is the mea-
sure function #(𝑃)which is devised to count integrated wholes. I remain agnostic
with respect to the exact position in the ranking other measure functions occupy,
but for our purposes establishing the ordering between #(𝑃) and measure func-
tions measuring in terms of volume is certainly sufficient.
To anticipate, the contextually conditioned generalized measure function 𝜇
can cover the meanings of partitive words in entity and mass partitives, on the
one hand, and set partitives, on the other. In particular, 𝜇 is interpreted as a mea-
sure function quantifying over units of volume when the partitive word com-
bines with a DP involving a singular count noun which refers to an individual
as well as with a DP with a mass term referring to a quantity of substance. On
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the other hand, when the partitive word combines with a DP comprising a reg-
ular plural noun, 𝜇 is interpreted an operation counting individuated integrated
wholes. This is because whenever the context allows for it, #(𝑃) is preferred over
the functions from the set volume, e.g., cm3. An additional positive consequence
of the adopted mechanism of contextual conditioning is that it allows for quan-
tification over individuals in partitives with object mass nouns in the embedded
DP (see Barner & Snedeker 2005; Bale & Barner 2009).
7.3.3 Counting essential parts
The final component of the analysis related to measure functions has to do with
modeling multipliers. As we saw in Chapter 4, multipliers quantify over cogni-
tively salient parts of individuals. In order to capture this intuition, I propose
an additional measure function for which I will use the ⊞ symbol.19 This opera-
tion takes a property and yields an additive measure function⊞(𝑃)which counts
essential parts of a whole. The formal definition of ⊞(𝑃) is provided in (26).
(26) Measure function ⊞(𝑃)
∀𝑃∀𝑥[MSSC(𝑃)(𝑥) → ⊞(𝑃)(𝑥) = #(𝜆𝑦[𝑦 ⊑ 𝑥 ∧ ESSENTIAL(𝑃)(𝑦)])]
Notice that the ⊞(𝑃) measure function quantifies only over parts of MSSC indi-
viduals as ensured by the antecedent in the requirement. Furthermore, the con-
sequent imposes that ⊞(𝑃) employs # in order to count the number of parts of 𝑥
that are essential for an ascription of 𝑃 to some entity. Then, since there are no
other 𝑃 objects overlapping with 𝑥 , these must be parts that are essential for 𝑃 to
hold of 𝑥 . The parthood relation captures the intuition that only entities within
the part-whole structure of an object are subject to quantification and the use of
improper parthood, i.e., ⊑, rather than ⊏ is to account for cases of homogeneous
entities without any distinguishable salient parts such as individuated portions
of coffee or martini. In particular, one might want to talk about a single portion
as opposed to a double portion rather than to unrelated two portions, since there
is a clear semantic contrast between single coffee ∼ double coffee ∼ two coffees.20
As witnessed by comparing (23) and (26), the main difference between #(𝑃)
and⊞(𝑃) lies in what type of objects they map onto numbers. The former simply
19There is a mnemonic here. The ⊞ symbol is a square constituted by four smaller squares each
of which is a part of the whole with comparable properties. Hence, ⊞ represents a type of
object multiplier phrases usually refer to.
20It is possible that (26) is too strong to account for examples like double coffee since it requires
conceptualizing the referents of such expressions as mssc individuals. However, I will leave
this issue for future research.
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associates any MSSC object with a number, whereas the latter counts only what
I refer to as an essential part of an entity, i.e., a cognitively salient element. The
notion ESSENTIAL in (26) is relativized to a property and can be defined as in (27).
(27) Essential parts
ESSENTIAL(𝑃) is true of an MSSC part of an entity in the extension of 𝑃 that
is essential for that entity to be considered as having a property 𝑃
I keep the definition in (27) somewhat vague on purpose since what is considered
essential for an entity to be perceived as having a certain property is often not
entirely clear and may differ with respect to a particular context. For instance, as
we discussed in Chapter 4 multiplier phrases such as double garage can denote
objects of a different internal structure as long as they can hold two vehicles.
Nevertheless, one important feature of an essential part is that it is an integrated
and recognizable entity within a whole that can be easily individuated against
other parts.
An example of an essential part would be a patty in a hamburger. Intuitively,
it makes the most important element of the whole sandwich. Out of the blue, it
seems that the crucial part of a bed is an area covered with a mattress on which
a person can sleep. Finally, in a natural context the most salient piece of, say, a
shotgun is its barrel since it guarantees functionality as well as constitutes a sig-
nificant portion of the weapon. However, notice that the broad definition in (27)
also covers self-sufficient parts, i.e., parts that have a property comparable, i.e.,
very similar or identical, to the property of a whole. I argue that a self-sufficient
part can be considered an extreme case of an essential part. If for some reason
it is considered that what is essential cannot be reduced to one particular ele-
ment, then ESSENTIAL(𝑃) yields an MSSC part that resembles the object it is a part
of. For instance, let us once again consider the case of double crown discussed in
Chapter 4. Although there can be multiple cognitively salient parts within the
make-up of a crown, e.g., jewels, orbs, crosses, or fleurs-de-lis, intuitively no such
element is essential for a thing to be considered a crown. On the other hand, an
object such as the Pschent or papal tiara counts as a double or triple crown, re-
spectively, because it comprises parts with comparable properties as the whole.
Similar cases arguably involve objects such as doors and layers, thus a double
door involves two connected door leaves and a double layer is an entity con-
sisting of two merged layers. For the reasons discussed above, I leave the issue
concerning when an essential part is a self-sufficient part vague and dependent
on how a particular artifact is conceptualized.
All things considered, given (26) and (27) the ⊞(𝑃) measure function returns
a number of essential parts in each object being a member of a given set. The
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properties of such a device might help us to account for the interpretation of
multiplier phrases. With the set-up and all the relevant ingredients necessary to
account for the numerical expressions I am interested here in place, let us now
propose the semantics for cardinals and multipliers that will allow us to account
for the observed phenomena in count explicit and proportional partitives as well
as in multiplier phrases.
7.4 Numerical expressions
In the history of formal semantics spanning over almost half a century therewere
not that many expressions that received as much attention as numerals. Though
a lot of revealing research has been done in this field (see, e.g., Horn 1972; Bar-
wise & Cooper 1981; Scha 1981; Krifka 1999; Landman 2003; 2004; Hofweber 2005;
Ionin &Matushansky 2006; Geurts 2006; Nouwen 2010; Kennedy 2013; Rothstein
2013; 2017 to name just a few influential studies), in my opinion there is a shared
misconception concerning numerals since they are commonly treated as simplex,
i.e., non-decomposable, expressions.21 On the other hand, it has been observed
that in a language such as English cardinals have multiple uses and therefore it
is misleading to search for “the” meaning of numerals but rather it is more ap-
propriate to talk about multiple meanings associated with such expressions (e.g.,
Bultinck 2005; Geurts 2006). The interplay of these two aspects results in treating
cardinal numerals either as ambiguous or postulating some shifting mechanism
to account for at least some of the uses. However, I believe there are good reasons
to claim that the assumption that numerals are simplex is incorrect.
In my opinion, the prevailing viewmost probably stems from the limited scope
of the mainstream research on numerals. In particular, most work on numeri-
cal quantification has been done on the basis of English data and since English
lacks a rich morphology, certain semantic distinctions are not marked by means
of different formal exponents. However, even in English there are complex nu-
mericals such as twice, twofold, twosome, and adjectival two-time, but this set of
expressions for the most part has been surprisingly neglected in the study of nu-
merical quantification. On the other hand, evidence from languages that have a
broader repertoire of derivational means suggests that numerals are in fact com-
positional. For instance, recent research on cardinals as well as derivationally
more complex numerical expressions in Slavic and Semitic indicates that differ-
ent numerical affixes correspond to distinct semantic operations responsible for
21A notable exception is the theory of Kennedy (2013) who proposes that numerals are general-
ized quantifiers over degrees and discusses their possible semantic decomposition.
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deriving various meanings (see, e.g., Dočekal 2012; 2013; Dočekal &Wągiel 2018b
for Czech, Wągiel 2014; 2015b; to appear for Polish, Khrizman 2020 for Russian
and Fassi Fehri 2016; 2018 for Arabic).
In the following sections, I posit a compositional account for numerical expres-
sions in natural language. I assume that a prerequisite for such an approach is
that it accounts for the three counting principles discussed in §5.2.2. In particu-
lar, it needs to be guaranteed that the numerical expression ignores overlapping,
non-integrated, and non-maximal entities. In other words, it needs to be devised
in such a way that it counts right.
7.4.1 Numeral roots
Many numerical expressions in numerous languages are morphologically com-
plex and can be sequenced into separate morphemes including numeral roots
and various additional affixes. In this study, I follow my previous work in ar-
guing that it is plausible to treat numeral roots as names of natural numbers,
i.e., expressions referring to abstract objects of type 𝑛, see (28a) (Wągiel 2015b;
2020a,b; to appear). For instance, the English root √tw as in, e.g., two and twenty,
simply names the integer 2, as specified in (28b).
(28) Numeral root
a. J√NumeralK = 𝑛
b. J√twK = 2
Furthermore, I assume that virtually all meanings numerical expressions can
have can be derived from this basic semantics by application of additional op-
erations encoded by different types of classifiers. Those classifiers can be either
introduced overtly by a particular morpheme or silent. For the sake of coherence
and in order to stay as close to the main argument as possible, in the following
sections I will focus on derivations of only two kinds of numerical expressions,
namely cardinals and multipliers.22
7.4.2 Cardinals
I propose that cardinals are born as singular terms, specifically as names of num-
bers at type 𝑛. This meaning is preserved in contexts clearly calling for numerical
arguments such as the mathematical statements in (29) (see Rothstein 2017 for
22For some preliminary proposals of how to treat compositionally other complex numerical ex-
pressions in Slavic, see Wągiel (2015b; 2020a,b).
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extensive discussion of such environments). However, the singular term seman-
tics can also serve as a basis to derive expressions that are more abstract than
number-denoting.
(29) English (Rothstein 2013)
a. Two plus two is four.
b. Two is the only even prime number.
Since this study concerns subatomic quantification, in the following part of this
section I will restrict my proposal to the use of numerals as nominal modifiers.
In particular, I posit that in attributive position the meaning associated with the
numeral root is shifted to an expression of type ⟨⟨𝑒, 𝑡⟩, ⟨𝑒, 𝑡⟩⟩, i.e., the type of a
predicate modifier (see Ionin & Matushansky 2006). I postulate that this shift is
performed by a classifier element which I will refer to as CL# (see also Sudo 2016
for a similar proposal based on Japanese data). As suggested by the abbreviation
and provided in (30), CL# is an expression of type ⟨𝑛, ⟨⟨𝑒, 𝑡⟩, ⟨𝑒, 𝑡⟩⟩⟩, i.e., a function
from numbers to predicate modifiers, that introduces the # operation.
(30) Classifier#JCL#K = 𝜆𝑛𝜆𝑃 ∶ PMSSC(𝑃) 𝜆𝑥[*𝑃(𝑥) ∧ #(𝑃)(𝑥) = 𝑛]
Notice, however, that triggering # is not the only thing CL# does. In order to
ensure that counting goes right, the classifier imposes a particular constraint
on predicates it can select, specifically via the individuation presupposition it
selects only predicates that denote exclusively MSSC individuals. Consequently,
the resulting cardinal will not be compatible with mass nouns or pluralia tantum
since they do not fulfill this requirement. Notice also that a predicate 𝑃 in the first
conjunct is pluralized by the classical * operator. Such a semantics guarantees
that an integer 𝑛 will be associated with the number of MSSC individuals making
up a plurality in the extension of 𝑃 , see (21)–(23). The use of * rather than the strict
pluralization operator + postulated for semantic plurals, see (12), is motivated by
the existence of the numeral one which requires singularities.
Given the semantics of CL# proposed above, it is straightforward how particu-
lar cardinals are derived. When the classifier combines with a numeral root, e.g.,
√tw, the number variable in (30) is saturated by a particular integer and this gives
rise to a full-fledged attributive numeral as exemplified in (31).
(31) Cardinal numeralJtwoK = JCL#K(J√twK) = 𝜆𝑃 ∶ PMSSC(𝑃) 𝜆𝑥[*𝑃(𝑥) ∧ #(𝑃)(𝑥) = 2]
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Given the formula above, two in a phrase such as two apples takes a property of
being an apple and yields a set of pairs of objects that are MSSC with respect to
that property, i.e., a set of pairs of apples. Admittedly, the way it is ensured in (31)
that cardinals do not combine with mass terms is by stipulating the individuation
presupposition PMSSC(𝑃). Notice, however, that in Chapter 5 I argued extensively
that a requirement like this stems form the general counting principles, which
in turn arguably result from the way human cognition works. Therefore, the
proposed denotation of cardinals seems to relate to more general facts regarding
human mind, which I believe provides a valuable perspective.
In general, I take (31) to be a welcome result. However, an important com-
ment is required. For the semantics in (31) to work, one needs to assume that the
morphological plural on the noun that the cardinal modifies is not interpreted
semantically since otherwise the pluralized propertywould fail to satisfy the indi-
viduation presupposition. In other words, the source of plurality is the * operator
introduced by CL#, whereas the number marker on the noun is a mere agree-
ment plural triggered syntactically with no semantic contribution (see Krifka
1989; Ionin & Matushansky 2006). At first sight this might seem implausible, but
there are well-documented cases of mismatches between the plural as a morpho-
syntactic category and the semantic notion of plurality, as in (32) (see Nouwen
2016 for an overview). Furthermore, there are examples of languages such as
Finnish, Hungarian, and Turkish that despite having plural morphology do not
employ it in numeral phrases or employ it only with numerals higher than ‘four’,
as in Russian and BCS.23
(32) English (Krifka 1989; adapted)
a. zero {cows/*cow}
b. 1.0 {cows/*cow}
However, it is important to emphasize that if it turned out that the assumption
that cardinals combine with semantically singular nouns is untenable, this would
not be a serious problem for the proposed account. An alternative would be to
rework the semantics of CL# in (30) on the assumption of defining a function
23I simplify here for the sake of brevity since, e.g., Turkish was argued to have semantically
number-neural singular count nouns (e.g., Görgülü 2012). For a general discussion on different
strategies languages use to combine cardinals with nouns and a proposal of an alternative
approach see Bale et al. (2011). One thing that should be mentioned as a potential problem for
the proposed approach concerns collective modification below the numeral, e.g., two parallel
streets and two similar objects (though see Ionin & Matushansky 2018 for a proposed solution).
However, since this study does not focus on such expressions, I leave this issue for future
research.
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that applies to sets of pluralities and returns the set of MSSC individuals relative
to that set, which would be the mereotopological equivalent of Chierchia’s (2010)
approach. Without going into details, let us call such an operation OBJ. Applying
it would give us an alternative denotation of CL#, as provided in (33), and conse-
quently, no need for the number vacuousness assumption in numeral phrases.24
(33) Classifier# (alternative)JCL#K = 𝜆𝑛𝜆𝑃 ∶ PMSSC(𝑃) 𝜆𝑥[𝑃(𝑥) ∧ #(OBJ(𝑃))(𝑥) = 𝑛]
The treatment postulated in (31) builds on a well-established way of thinking
about cardinals since the idea that numerals are in fact names of numbers dates
back to Frege (1884). An early formal semantic account for cardinals proposed
by Scha (1981) assumes a complex syntactic structure for numerical determiners
decomposing them into the bottom-most Number projectionwhich is interpreted
in terms of reference to an integer and the Numeral and Det projections above
which transform a singular term into a predicate based upon that integer and
generalized quantifier, respectively. Finally, in a recent theory of counting and
measuring by Rothstein (2012; 2013; 2017) it has been acknowledged that when
used as singular terms in examples such as (29) cardinals seem to refer to abstract
objects rather than anything else and this meaning should be accounted for by a
special shifting operation.
Apart from providing an explanation for why cardinals are incompatible with
mass terms, an important advantage of the semantics developed here is that it
also allows for a unified analysis of numerical expressions in classifier and non-
classifier languages.25 In the next section, I will extend the proposed classifier
semantics for numerals to multipliers.
7.4.3 Multipliers
As we saw in Chapter 4, multipliers are similar to cardinals in that they both
do what a counting expression does, i.e. establish a one-to-one correspondence
between entities and natural numbers. On the other hand, the two expressions
in question differ significantly in that the former do not count whole individuals
but rather quantify over certain parts thereof. Furthermore, they appear to be
merged with the modified noun before other quantifiers, and thus their scope is
significantly limited since they allow for modification by numerals and by the
universal quantifier. In other words, they do not infer a plurality of objects, in-
stead they imply that an object involves a plurality of parts having particular fea-
24I would like to thank Peter Sutton for this suggestion.




tures. These facts suggest that the analysis of multipliers should resemble that
of cardinals and at the same time differ in such a way that would capture the
relevant distinctions.
The morphological evidence from Slavic presented in Chapter 4 strongly sug-
gests that just like cardinals multipliers should be treated as complex composi-
tional expressions. Just like in the previous section, I propose that multipliers
are decomposable into two elements. In a language such as Polish, the first is the
name of a number corresponding to a numeral root present in the morphological
make-up of the multiplier, whereas the second is a special classifier introduced
by the multiplicative affix. I will refer to that classifier as CL⊞. As indicated by
the superscript, this element introduces the ⊞ operation defined in (26) in §7.3.3
above, see (34).
(34) Classifier⊞JCL⊞K = 𝜆𝑛𝜆𝑃 ∶ PMSSC(𝑃) 𝜆𝑥[𝑃(𝑥) ∧ ⊞(𝑃)(𝑥) = 𝑛]
As CL#, CL⊞ is a function from numbers to predicate modifiers, i.e., an expres-
sion of type ⟨𝑛, ⟨⟨𝑒, 𝑡⟩, ⟨𝑒, 𝑡⟩⟩⟩. It also involves the individuation presupposition
which accounts for the fact that multipliers can only modify expressions denot-
ing MSSC individuals such as count nouns and mass terms coerced by the Univer-
sal Packager. However, unlike CL# the element CL⊞ does not pluralize predicates
it applies to. This is an important difference between the two classifiers since it
explains why multiplier phrases do not denote pluralities and allow for numeral
modification.
Again, it is straightforward how to get a multiplier by combining the meaning
of a numeral root, see (28), with the semantics of CL⊞ in (34) above. For instance,
consider the denotation of the Polish multiplier podwójny ‘double’ in (35).
(35) Polish multiplierJpodwójnyK = JCL⊞K(J√dwK) = 𝜆𝑃 ∶ PMSSC(𝑃) 𝜆𝑥[𝑃(𝑥) ∧ ⊞(𝑃)(𝑥) = 2]
The number referred to by the numeral root √dw simply saturates the first ar-
gument slot in (34) and as a result an expression of type ⟨⟨𝑒, 𝑡⟩, ⟨𝑒, 𝑡⟩⟩ is obtained,
see (35). The derived predicate modifier selects for a set that has only MSSC in-
dividuals in their extensions and returns a subset of such MSSC individuals that
have two essential parts. Such a predicate can further serve as an argument for
another quantificational expression, e.g., a cardinal numeral.
The proposed semantics appears to successfully account for the subset of data I
focus on here, namely multiplier phrases involving concrete nouns. Furthermore,
as indicated in §4.2 it also offers a way of thinking about examples I do not deal
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with here. In particular, after extending the ontology with primitive semantic
types for events and roles a very similar mechanism can be proposed to account
for the meaning of NPs like double murder and double president. Such considera-
tions, however, reach far beyond the main topic of this study and I will refrain
from discussing an exact implementation of the idea. Instead, in the following
section I will present a brief overview of how the proposed semantics fits into a
bigger typological picture and how cross-linguistic data supports the treatment
of cardinals and multipliers as complex expressions.
7.4.4 Cross-linguistic support
The structure of cardinal numerals proposed above is further supported by sev-
eral empirical findings made in linguistic typology. First, it has been observed
that cross-linguistically numerals and classifiers are always adjacent (Greenberg
1972). Table 7.1 provides the four attested orderings of the numeral, the classifier,
and the noun, out of six logically possible patterns. Notice that in the missing
two the noun would separate the numeral and classifier.







Second, in classifier languages classifiers are often suffixes on numerals as wit-
nessed, e.g., in (36) and (37) (see Aikhenvald 2000 for more data).














Furthermore, intriguing data from partly classifier languages such as Mi’gmaq
and Chol show that it can be the case that in a single language some cardinals
require classifiers in order to combine with nouns whereas others do not, see (38)
(Bale & Coon 2014). This further suggests that the classifier makes a constituent
with the numeral and compensates its semantic deficits.















Finally, it has been observed that in genetically and typologically diverse lan-
guages there exists an alternation between attributive and specialized so-called
counting cardinals, i.e., referential expressions that cannot be used as modifiers,
see Table 7.2 (Hurford 1998; 2001; see also Wągiel & Caha 2020). This fact demon-
strates that in some cases an exponent of the name of a number can be formally
distinct from a related attributive expression. All things considered, I take the
data discussed here to indicate that the analysis postulated for cardinals is on
the right track.
Table 7.2: Attributive and counting numerals across languages (Hur-
ford 2001)
language number attributive counting
German 2 zwei zwo
Maltese 2 żewg tnejn
Chinese 2 liǎng èr
Hungarian 2 két kettö
Basque 2 bi biga
Moreover, the semantics postulated in (35) can be further supported by the
fact that in many languages the numeral root can be easily distinguished in the
morphological make-up of multipliers. As we saw in Chapter 4, Slavic multipliers
are morphologically complex expressions derived from numeral roots by means
of affixation which I argue encodes the classifier element CL⊞. Though many
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European languages borrowed their multipliers from Latin, the existence of mul-
tiplicative affixes is by no means a Slavic idiosyncrasy since similar patterns can
be observed in Baltic and Finnic, as witnessed by the correspondences given in
Table 7.3.
Table 7.3: Multipliers across languages
language number cardinal multiplier
Russian 2 dva dvojnoj
Lithuanian 2 du dvigubas
Finnish 2 kaksi kaksinkertainen
I conclude that the proposed account is plausible both in terms of what multi-
pliers mean, i.e., what kind of semantic effects they give rise to, and what they
often look like, i.e., their morphological complexity in some languages suggests
their semantic decomposability. The system developed here is advantageous in
that the same compositional mechanism allows for accounting for different nu-
merical expressions. Though in this study I focus only on cardinals and multi-
pliers, after extending it with additional classifiers a number of other numerals
can be derived by its means (see Dočekal 2012; 2013; Wągiel 2014; 2015b; 2020b;
Dočekal & Wągiel 2018b for a discussion of other types of complex numerals in
Slavic). This unified treatment also explains why only one ordering of cardinals
and multipliers is possible. However, before we discuss how a multiplier phrase
modified by a cardinal is composed step by step from the pieces defined here, let
us introduce additional tools to account for explicit and set partitives.
7.5 Partitives
The main data set presented in Chapter 2 concerned different types of partitives
in various languages. In this study, I do not attempt to provide a detailed anal-
ysis of the syntax-semantics interface regarding partitive constructions. Rather,
based on the cross-linguistic evidence I focus on general issues concerning the
interaction between partitivity, topological sensitivity and countability. In par-
ticular, I will postulate a minimal set of ingredients necessary for an attempt to
explain what happens in count explicit partitives and different types of propor-
tional partitives involving topology-neutral as well as topology-sensitive parti-
tive words. However, before I propose particular denotations of selected expres-




An important component of partitive constructions considers what kind of DP
can be combined with the partitive word. As already mentioned in §2.1, parti-
tives are subject to the so-called Partitive Constraint which disallows certain
expressions from the embedded DP (e.g., Jackendoff 1977; Selkirk 1977; Barwise
& Cooper 1981; Ladusaw 1982). I will follow here the semantic reanalysis of the
Partitive Constraint, as proposed by de Hoop (1997), see (39), which states that
the whole downstairs DP is an expression of type 𝑒.
(39) Partitive Constraint (de Hoop 1997; adapted)
In a partitive, the embedded DP must be entity-denoting, i.e., definite or
specific.
The formulation in (39) means that the semantics of the element combining with
the embedded DP needs to be devised in such a way that it does not take sets
as its input but rather individual things. Consequently, since Barker (1998) it is
commonly assumed that the preposition of in English partitives is a function
from entities to sets of their parts, i.e., type ⟨𝑒, ⟨𝑒, 𝑡⟩⟩, expressing partialness by
means of proper parthood.26 Specifically, the semantics of partitive of establishes
the ⊏ relation between entities stating that each member of the output set is a
proper part of the input entity.
However, as we saw in Chapter 2 and 3, there are languages that do not em-
ploy prepositions in partitive constructions. For instance, Russian, Hungarian,
and Basque make use of case marking instead, whereas Japanese and Chinese
can wield a number of strategies to express partitivity including classifier struc-
tures. Moreover, in German and Brazilian Portuguese NPs can be modified by
adjectival half-words in order to yield proportional meaning. These facts seem to
suggest that from a cross-linguistic perspective the mapping between semantics
and morphology is not that obvious. After all, given that ⊏ is introduced by some
other element, it is not clear what the exact semantic contribution of part-words
is since they seem to do precisely the same thing. Therefore, for convenience I
incorporate the general partitive semantics into the meaning of partitive words
themselves, see (40).
(40) PartitivityJPARTK = 𝜆𝑦𝜆𝑥[𝑥 ⊏ 𝑦]
26But see Ionin et al. (2006) and Marty (2017) for a treatment based on improper parthood.
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Since I will focus here on the composition of German and Polish partitives, the
reason behind this move is mainly to avoid an unnecessary detour into the se-
mantics of case.27 However, if required the distribution of particular components
to be discussed below could be rearranged so that, say, the genitive case in a
language such as German and Polish is associated with the semantics in (40),
whereas particular partitive words contribute additional meaning or are treated
as void.
Notice that since I assume only one domain, i.e., the domain of entities, with
one parthood relation ⊑ defined over it, the partitivity semantics in (40) simply
employs the basic mereological notion of proper parthood, which unlike ⊑ is not
reflexive. As a result, there is no need to distinguish between entity and set parti-
tives in terms of different parthood relations. Consequently, it is straightforward
to expect that in general partitive words are able to combine both with expres-
sions referring to singularities and with those denoting pluralities. As witnessed
in §2.2, this kind of behavior is exactly what is observed cross-linguistically.
As we saw, the semantic re-formulation of the Partitive Constraint in (39)
urges us to ensure that the downstairs DP position in partitives is occupied by
an expression of type 𝑒. Putting aside the straightforward case of proper names,
in the next sections I will discuss two mechanisms how to guarantee adequate
extensions of definites and specific indefinites, namely maximization and choice
functions, respectively.
7.5.2 Maximization
In order to account for definite DPs, I assume the standard maximization opera-
tion MAX, see (41) (cf. Sharvy 1980; Link 1983), which yields the unique maximal
entity in the denotation of a predicate.28
(41) Maximization operator
MAX(𝑃) = 𝜄𝑥[𝑃(𝑥) ∧ ∀𝑦[𝑃(𝑦) → 𝑦 ⊑ 𝑥]]
defined if there is a unique 𝑥 in 𝑃 of which all other things are a part;
otherwise undefined
(If defined, MAX(𝑃) is the element in 𝑃 which all other things in 𝑃 are part
of.)
In other words, MAX maps any set which may include singularities, pluralities, or
both onto the element that all other elements in that set are part of. In cases it
27See Kagan (2013) for a detailed discussion of some aspects of the meaning of genitive case in
Russian.
28In the literature, the symbol 𝜎 is often used instead of MAX.
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selects a pluralized predicate, it returns the supremum, i.e., the largest plurality
in the set. On the other hand, if MAX is applied to a singular predicate, it returns a
singularity, provided that that predicate denotes a singleton, i.e., there is only one
relevant entity in a given context. Maximality thus allows for a unified account
for both singular and plural definite DPs.
In article languages such as English and German, the MAX operator is intro-
duced by the definite article, e.g., the and der/die/das/die, respectively. On the
other hand, for article-less languages such as Polish I assume a DP projection
over NP headed by a silent determiner that can be interpreted as a definite ar-
ticle (e.g., Veselovská 1995; Progovac 1998; Rutkowski 2002). The semantics for
such an overt or covert definite DP head is given in (42).
(42) Definite articleJDEFK = 𝜆𝑃[MAX(𝑃)]
Let us now contemplate how the proposed semantics delivers the meaning of
definite singulars and plurals. Assuming a model for (43) with a unique apple
𝑎, the noun apple denotes a singleton set involving 𝑎, see (43a). After the NP is
merged with the determiner the resulting DP the apple in (43b) simply refers to
𝑎. On the other hand, in a model with three apples 𝑎, 𝑏, and 𝑐 the pluralized noun
apples denotes the set of all pluralities derived from 𝑎, 𝑏, and 𝑐, see (44a), whereas
the definite the apples has only the maximal sum in its extension, see (44b). This
shows that the mechanics of MAX captures the intuition that singular definites
such as the apple are true of a unique apple, whereas a definite plural DP like the
apples corresponds to a plurality consisting of all the apples.
(43) Definite singular DP
a. JappleK = {𝑎}
b. JDEF appleK = 𝑎
(44) Definite plural DP
a. JPL appleK = {𝑎 ⊔ 𝑏, 𝑎 ⊔ 𝑐, 𝑏 ⊔ 𝑐, 𝑎 ⊔ 𝑏 ⊔ 𝑐}
b. JDEF [PL apple]K = 𝑎 ⊔ 𝑏 ⊔ 𝑐
The MAX operation allows us to model the meaning of both singular and plural
definites in partitives in accordance with the Partitive Constraint. In order to
account for specific indefinites, I assume choice functions which will be briefly
described in the next section.
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7.5.3 Choice functions
A choice function is an operator selecting a member from a set (Reinhart 1997;
Kratzer 1998). On the adopted view, the choice function variable remains free at
the level of semantic composition and its value is provided by the context, i.e.,
the choice of a particular member of a given set may vary depending on extra-
linguistic circumstances. In general, choice functions can be applied to any kind
of set. As a result, they have been widely used in cross-linguistic research on
different types of specific indefinites (see, e.g., Matthewson 1998; Kratzer & Shi-
moyama 2002; Alonso-Ovalle & Menéndez-Benito 2003; Yanovich 2005; Wągiel
2020b). In this study, however, I will limit my focus to the domain of entities. In
particular, I embrace an approach that a choice function CH over entities is an
expression of type ⟨⟨𝑒, 𝑡⟩, 𝑒⟩ such that when it is applied to a non-empty set of
entities 𝑃 , it yields a specific entity from 𝑃 relative to a particular context, see
(45).
(45) Choice function
For any CH⟨⟨𝑒,𝑡⟩,𝑒⟩ and 𝑃⟨𝑒,𝑡⟩, CH is a choice function if 𝑃(CH(𝑃)) = TRUE
I assume that choice functions are introduced by a specificity element which can
either be expressed formally or be silent. For instance, in Russian it is encoded
by a special suffix on indefinite pronouns (see, e.g., Yanovich 2005) but lack any
exponent in case an indefinite DP including a common noun gets a specific inter-
pretation. Either way, the specificity element takes a predicate as its input and
applies CH on that predicate as specified in (46).
(46) Specificity elementJSPECK = 𝜆𝑃[CH(𝑃)]
Provided a model with three apples 𝑎, 𝑏, and 𝑐, the denotations of singulars and
plurals are exactly as such cases discussed above, see (47a) and (48a), whereas
the extensions of specific indefinites can be as follows. For instance, in a given
context apple can be interpreted as referring to a certain apple, say, 𝑏 in (47b).
Analogously, the plural apples can be understood to designate a specific though
indefinite plurality of apples, e.g., 𝑎 ⊔ 𝑏 in (47b).29
(47) Specific indefinite singular DP
a. JappleK = {𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐}
b. JSPEC appleK = 𝑏 (in a certain context)
29Of course, SPEC and DEF extend also to mass nouns.
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(48) Specific indefinite plural DP
a. JPL appleK = {𝑎 ⊔ 𝑏, 𝑎 ⊔ 𝑐, 𝑏 ⊔ 𝑐, 𝑎 ⊔ 𝑏 ⊔ 𝑐}
b. JSPEC [PL apple]K = 𝑎 ⊔ 𝑏 (in a certain context)
The discussed mechanism will allow us to account for specific DPs in partitives.
However, for the sake of brevity, in the following sections I will focus only on
constructions involving definite DPs downstairs. For the treatment of specific
indefinites in the embedded DP, it is sufficient to substitute the choice function
for the maximization operator.
7.5.4 Topology-sensitive transitivity
Having provided means to ensure that the complement of the partitive compo-
nent is of type 𝑒, let us return to the meaning of partitive words in different con-
structions. One of the observations discussed in Chapter 2 concerned the cross-
linguistic analogy between entity and set partitives. In particular, in languages
such as German and Polish the same partitive word can combine with both singu-
lar and plural DPs. In the first case, it gives rise to a part-of-a-singularity reading,
whereas in the latter configuration a part-of-a-plurality interpretation is inferred.
This suggests that either the meanings of partitive words are general enough to
cover both readings or such expressions are ambiguous cross-linguistically.
Furthermore, in §2.2.1 I showed that at least in German it is implausible to
postulate ambiguity since partitive words can give rise to both discussed read-
ings simultaneously in partitives with coordinated structures involving singular
and plural DPs. Therefore, the data suggest that the proper treatment should
be formulated in terms of one general meaning. Given that no sorted domains
are postulated and singular individuals are distinguished from plural entities in
terms of the distinction between mereotopological as opposed to purely mereo-
logical configurations, respectively, the partitivity semantics introduced in (40)
is exactly what we need. However, utilizing one unified parthood relation for
singularities and pluralities in both entity and set partitives turns out to be prob-
lematic in one respect.
The issue is the following. If there is only one domain with one parthood re-
lation, there is nothing that stops set partitives from referring to an arbitrary
material part of any singular entity making up a plurality. For instance, given
the plurality of apples 𝑎 ⊔ 𝑏 ⊔ 𝑐 ⊔ 𝑑 a part-word taking that plurality as an argu-
ment could return some part of, say, 𝑏. However, this is not how set partitives
are interpreted. To the contrary, under ordinary circumstances they denote a set
of individual parts of a plurality, e.g., in the above example the extension could
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include 𝑎 ⊔ 𝑏, 𝑏 ⊔ 𝑐, 𝑎 ⊔ 𝑏 ⊔ 𝑐 etc. In order to exclude material part interpretations,
I postulate a special condition, which I call topology-sensitive transitivity,
as formulated in (49), where IMSSC(𝑥) refers MSSC individuals, see (50).30
(49) Topology-sensitive transitivity
∀𝑥∀𝑦∀𝑧[[𝑥 ⊏ 𝑦 ∧ 𝑦 ⊏ 𝑧] → [𝑥 ⊏ 𝑧 ↔ ¬IMSSC(𝑦)]]
(50) MSSC individual
IMSSC(𝑥) ↔ ∃𝑃[MSSC(𝑃)(𝑥)]
The condition in (49) has the following effect. If 𝑦 is not an MSSC individual, then
transitivity works as usual. However, if 𝑦 is an mssc individual, then transitivity
is blocked. Hence, topology-sensitive transitivity ensures that an entity that is
part of a plurality is either an MSSC individual or a sum of such individuals. In
other words, (49) excludes all material parts from the denotations of set partitives.
It is worth noting that an important consequence of adopting (49) is that in
a certain sense we have abandoned the unconditioned transitivity of parthood.
Though it is definitely not a mainstream assumption, the behavior of explicit set
partitives described above suggests that it is empirically correct as far as natural
language is concerned (see alsoMoltmann 1997 for related arguments). Moreover,
given the evidence for the significance of topological notions for grammar exam-
ined in Chapter 3 it would not be surprising that topological sensitivity applies
also to some primitive notions governing linguistic part-whole structures.
I conclude that topology-sensitive transitivity guarantees the proper interpre-
tation of partitives involving plural DPs. It seems that postulating this restric-
tion is a necessary move for an analysis of partitive constructions building on
the unified parthood relation. However, I believe that it is not a big price to pay
compared to the gains such an approach can offer. In the next section, I will
readdress the issue of partitioning discussed briefly in §7.1, in order to provide a
background for the analysis of particular types of partitive words. The notion of
partition will turn out useful in modeling continuous parts.
7.5.5 Partitions
As the evidence discussed in this study indicates, quantification over both wholes
and parts can only operate on sets consisting of disjoint members, i.e., entities
that do not share a part. However, since there are numerous ways how to divide
a thing into parts, many of such divisions would yield multiple entities that do
overlap. But such divisions are undesirable since only those sets can serve as the
30I would like to thank Adam Przepiórkowski and Peter Sutton for their suggestions concerning
the formalization of the condition.
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domain of subatomic quantification that comprise separate, i.e., non-overlapping,
continuous parts. For instance, if one counted one half of a teddy bear as one, an-
other half as two, and its head and right paw as three and four, one would count
some things multiple times. By doing so they would violate one of the crucial
counting principles and, as a result, fail to establish a one-to-one correspondence
between discrete entities and numbers. In order to avoid that, a mechanism rul-
ing out undesirable divisions is required. Such a mechanism is supposed to guar-
antee that the domain of quantification does not include overlapping parts. In
other words, what we want is an operation that will be able to carve up a whole
into distinct separate entities. For this purpose, I will make use of a device well-
known in the study of pluralities, namely partitions (see, e.g, Schwarzschild 1996;
Chierchia 2010).
The partitioning operation 𝜋 is a function of type ⟨⟨𝑒, 𝑡⟩, ⟨𝑒, 𝑡⟩⟩ which selects
a set of entities, i.e., a predicate 𝑃 , and yields its subset 𝜋(𝑃), i.e., a set of those
elements in 𝑃 that do not overlap. Given the standard mereological definition
of overlap, see (5), partitioning imposes a condition that no two members of a
partition 𝜋(𝑃) share a part. The formal definition of the partitioning operation 𝜋
is provided in (51).31
(51) Partitioning function 𝜋
For all properties 𝑃 , 𝜋(𝑃) is a subset of 𝑃 such that for any 𝑥 and 𝑦 in 𝜋(𝑃)
the following requirement is satisfied
¬∃𝑧[𝑧 ⊑ 𝑥 ∧ 𝑧 ⊑ 𝑦]
(No two members of a partition overlap.)
To see how partitioning works let us consider what happens when 𝜋 is applied
to the set A in (52a). As a result, we get (52b) which includes only those members
of A that do not share a part. On the other hand, the set B in (52c) does not satisfy
the condition defined in (51) since 𝑎⊔𝑏 and 𝑎⊔𝑐 share a part, namely 𝑎. Therefore,
although B is a subset of A, it is not its partition.
(52) Partitioning in context
a. A = {𝑎 ⊔ 𝑏, 𝑎 ⊔ 𝑐, 𝑎 ⊔ 𝑑, 𝑏 ⊔ 𝑐, 𝑏 ⊔ 𝑑, 𝑐 ⊔ 𝑑, 𝑎 ⊔ 𝑏 ⊔ 𝑐, 𝑎 ⊔ 𝑏 ⊔ 𝑑, 𝑎 ⊔ 𝑐 ⊔ 𝑑,
𝑏 ⊔ 𝑐 ⊔ 𝑑, 𝑎 ⊔ 𝑏 ⊔ 𝑐 ⊔ 𝑑}
b. 𝜋(A) = {𝑎 ⊔ 𝑏, 𝑐 ⊔ 𝑑}
c. B = {𝑎 ⊔ 𝑏, 𝑎 ⊔ 𝑐}
31Notice that this definition diverges from what is usually expected from partitions, i.e., not
only non-overlap but also complete cover. In that sense, 𝜋 does not deliver proper partitions,
as defined in set theory. However, for the sake of convenience I will continue to use the term
following some other authors (e.g., Scontras 2014).
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It is important to emphasize that (52b) represents only one of numerous possible
partitions. For many sets there are multiple subsets that would satisfy the non-
overlap requirement after applying 𝜋 . Depending on the context some of those
possible partitions may be considered more natural than others since a particu-
lar arrangement of parts making up an entity may suggest a particular division.
For instance, a teddy bear consists of cognitively salient elements recognizable
as legs, paws, a head, and a body. The fact that we perceive the whole in such a
structured way may result in partitioning the set of material parts of the toy in
question accordingly. However, different partitions are not excluded, e.g., into its
left and right half or its brown and white part. Crucially, once a particular parti-
tion is established in a given context it is fixed. This seems to be a welcome result
since it satisfies the intuition that, despite multiple possible divisions of a whole
into parts, once a choice concerning a particular division has been made, it can-
not be altered. Figuratively speaking, one cannot change what is being counted
while already counting.
7.5.6 Individuation
The partitioning function 𝜋 guarantees that a reference set is free of entities
sharing a part. This is an important improvement since it accounts for the ban
of overlap in the domain of quantification. However, as discussed in Chapter 5
there are two more principles that need to be accommodated within a theory
of countability, namely the conditions of integrity and maximality. Since in this
study I am primarily concerned with subatomic quantification, I will focus on
what makes some part a part, i.e., on how to model the contrast between an arbi-
trary material portion of a whole and a stable integrated and recognizable entity
within a whole. In order to do so, we need a more fine-grained device than mere
partitioning. For this purpose, I assume an additional semantic element which I
will refer to as the individuating element (IND). This operation is a function of
type ⟨⟨𝑒, 𝑡⟩, ⟨𝑒, 𝑡⟩⟩ which selects a set of entities and returns a subset of the input
consisting of non-overlapping integrated objects. This can be achieved by incor-
porating into the semantics of IND two components, specifically the partitioning
function 𝜋 and the mereotopological MSSC relation. To be precise, I propose that
IND introduces the MSSC restriction relative to a partitioned property, as defined
in (53). Consequently, IND turns a set consisting of different types of entities into
a set including only MSSC individuals.32
32One might wonder whether the combination of contextual partitioning would suffice with
a weaker notion of SSC, recall (26) in §6.2.1. There are two reasons why I use MSSC instead.
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(53) Individuating elementJINDK = 𝜆𝑃𝜆𝑥[MSSC(𝜋(𝑃))(𝑥)]
In general, an idea of an individuating operation is by no means new. In fact,
theories postulating similar operators in order to account for the mass/count dis-
tinction date back at least to Sharvy (1979). For instance, one of the most promi-
nent and innovative systems was developed by Borer (2005a) who proposes that
count syntax involves a classifier element, which is absent in mass expressions.
It is introduced by a null head merged in the region between the NP and DP and
expresses division by partitioning the domain of reference encoded by the nom-
inal stem. In a similar vein, Bale & Barner (2009) posit a count noun functional
head interpreted as a function from unindividuated denotations to individuated
denotations. Admittedly, a closely related idea to IND was proposed by Scon-
tras (2014: p. 97) for atomizers such as grain in, e.g., grain of rice. On his view,
partitioning is defined in such a way that it applies to a kind and the result is a
set of MSSC instantiations of that kind. However, what is new about the notion
I propose is that, as we will see, it allows for the individuation of material parts
of individuals, something that Scontras’s system fails to account for, unless pos-
tulating kinds corresponding to denotations of particular partitive words, which
seems both conceptually undesirable and empirically inappropriate. Given the
linguistic relevance of subatomic quantification discussed in Chapters 2, 3, and
4 I argue that the semantics proposed in (53) proves to be more advantageous.
Despite the fact that in many cases the individuating element is silent, postu-
lating it is well motivated by the restricted meaning of partitive words in count
explicit and proportional partitives, as we saw from the contrasts provided in
Chapter 2. Though bare topology-neutral expressions of that kind can denote
both contiguous and discontiguous entities such as scattered portions of matter
and arbitrary sums of individuals, the moment they combine with the cardinal
numeral they can refer exclusively to entities perceived as integrated objects. Fur-
thermore, as discussed in Chapter 3, Polish and German provide evidence that
there are expressions that encode the individuating element formally. In partic-
ular, as witnessed by the morphological complexity of Polish topology-sensitive
partitive words such as połówka and ćwiartka as opposed to topology-neutral
First, the aim of this study is to provide a unified account for both quantification over wholes
and subatomic quantification. More importantly, however, though in fact partitioning plus SSC
yields a set of disjoint entities, i.e., non-overlapping parts of the whole, it does not guarantee
that that one cannot count SSC parts of those entities, i.e., parts of those non-overlapping parts,
as one. Arguably, in many cases it would not matter, but there are some cases where it would,
see §5.2.2.
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połowa and ćwierć there are good reasons to postulate that the suffix -k- is the
exponent of IND. Similarly, German stacked eine in proportional partitives of the
the type die eine Hälfte DP also appears to express the semantics in (53).
The next section will provide the semantics of some of the various types of
partitive words discussed in Chapters 2 and 3.
7.5.7 Partitive words
Having defined the generalized contextually conditioned measure functions 𝜇 in
(24) as well as the individuating element IND in (53), we are ready to propose
the semantics of both topology-neutral and topology-sensitive partitive words.
Let us start with German Teil. As discussed in §7.5.1, for convenience I assume
that parthood or, more precisely, proper parthood is encoded in the semantics of
partitive words. Thus, the meaning of Teil is given in (54).
(54) German topology-neutral part-word TeilJTeilK = 𝜆𝑦𝜆𝑥[𝑥 ⊏ 𝑦]
The purely mereological nature of ⊏ makes it a topology-neutral expression
which can denote a set of scattered entities, arbitrary sums, or integrated indi-
viduals. This characteristic corresponds to the compatibility of Teil with explicit
entity, set, and mass partitives reported in §2.2. On the other hand, the constraint
on set partitives postulated in (49) guarantees that when it selects a plural geni-
tive DP, it does not yield an arbitrary material part or parts of an MSSC individual
making up a plurality. However, when Teil combines with a count singular DP,
the resulting set can consist of various parts of the relevant object since the pro-
posed semantics bears no topological commitments with respect to the to spatial
arrangement of portions of matter the whole phrase denotes. In other words,
explicit entity partitives can refer to continuous as well as discontinuous parts.
However, as we saw in §2.2.3, in count explicit partitives the numeral in accor-
dance with the counting principle of integrity can quantify only over contiguous
portions of matter. This means that in such a syntactic configuration the possible
denotation of Teil is significantly restricted. In other words, the part-word that
is normally topology-neutral is shifted into a topologically sensitive expression
that yields a set of those parts of the relevant whole that are spatially integrated.
I propose that this shift is performed by a silent IND element. As specified in (53),
IND applies MSSC to a partition of the set denoted by the input predicate. As a
result, all of those parts denoted by the phrase combining with Teil that are over-
lapping as well as discontinuous are excluded from the extension of the shifted
expression. All the details concerning composition will be discussed in §7.6.
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Let us now turn to different types of Polish half-words. In general, the seman-
tics of topology-neutral połowa given in (55) is quite similar to the one of Teil.
(55) Polish topology-neutral half-word połowaJpołowaK = 𝜆𝑦𝜆𝑥[𝑥 ⊏ 𝑦 ∧ 𝜇(𝑥) ≈ 𝜇(𝑦) × 0.5]
Both Teil and połowa are expressions of type ⟨𝑒, ⟨𝑒, 𝑡⟩⟩, i.e., functions that take
an entity and yield a set of its parts. Furthermore, as in the case of Teil nothing
restricts połowa from selecting any particular type of thing, i.e., it is perfectly
compatible with individuals, scattered entities, and pluralities of objects. Finally,
the resulting set involves both continuous and discontinuous halves. The main
difference between the two is that połowa is a proportional expression which
denotes only those parts that constitute a certain portion of a whole. This is cap-
tured by the generalized measure function 𝜇. Given the mechanism of contextual
conditioning defined in (24), 𝜇 returns an integer corresponding to a number of
individuals if its argument is a plurality, whereas when applied to a singular in-
dividual or scattered entity, it yields a value corresponding to the measure of its
volume in some contextually salient units, e.g., cm3. Since as discussed in §3.1.2
half-words are inherently vague and can indicate parts that are either smaller or
greater than an exact half, the approximately equal relation ≈ is preferred over =
in the formula in (55). Overall, what połowa does is that it selects an entity of any
sort and returns a set of its continuous and discontinuous parts such that they
constitute approximately 50% of the total cardinality or volume of that entity.
Compared to połowa, its topology-sensitive counterpart pół fails to combine
with predicates denoting scattered entities and arbitrary sums of individuals.
Given the framework developed here, it is possible to account for its distribu-
tional restrictions discussed in §3.1.1 in terms of mereotopological distinctions.
In particular, I propose that the semantics of pół, see (56), is almost identical to
(55) with the exception that it involves a special selectional requirement which
I refer to as the integrated individual presupposition. Specifically, (56) pre-
supposes that the first argument, i.e., 𝑦 , is an individual that is MSSC relative to
some property, recall (50).
(56) Polish topology-sensitive half-word półJpółK = 𝜆𝑦 ∶ IMSSC(𝑦) 𝜆𝑥[𝑥 ⊏ 𝑦 ∧ 𝜇(𝑥) ≈ 𝜇(𝑦) × 0.5]
The integrated individual presupposition in (56) explains why pół does not com-
bine with plural and mass DPs, since these expressions do not refer to MSSC in-
dividuals in their extensions. Therefore, pół can only head proportional entity
partitives and after it takes an integrated object, it yields a set that consists of
various continuous as well as discontinuous halves of that object.
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Finally, it is time to account for the most formally as well as semantically com-
plex of the Polish half-words, namely połówka. As we saw in §3.1.1, it is a morpho-
logically complex expression involving a special suffix -k- shared with a number
of derived partitive words in Polish such as ćwiartka ‘quarter’ and cząstka ‘part’.
All of those expressions are similar to pół in that they require MSSC individu-
als as their inputs. However, they differ in that their denotation consist only of
continuous parts. Therefore, I propose that the suffix -k- in fact introduces the
semantics of the IND element specified in (53), see (57). Thus, the half-word po-
łówka is a complex expression derived from the meaning encoded in a simpler
topology-sensitive partitive word.
(57) Polish individuating suffix -k-J-k-K = JINDK = 𝜆𝑃𝜆𝑥[MSSC(𝜋(𝑃))(𝑥)]
Given both the morphological complexity as well as semantic behavior of po-
łówka discussed in detail in §3.1, I postulate that proportional partitive construc-
tions headed by połówka are derived from partitives headed by pół via the deriva-
tional suffix -k-.33 The resulting expression is a topology-sensitive half-word
with the semantics in (58).
(58) Polish topology-sensitive half-word połówkaJpołówka DPK = J-k-K(Jpół DPK)
Themeaning defined above ensures that połówka not only selects entities that are
MSSC individuals but also denotes only parts that are spatially continuous. The
first aspect is ensured by the integrated individual presupposition encoded in pół,
whereas the semantics of -k- guarantees the latter. In particular, the partitioning
function 𝜋 provides a contextually salient partition of the set delivered by the
partitive headed by pół. Thus, the MSSC operation is relativized to a property
from whose denotation all overlapping parts have been eliminated as a result of
partitioning. Ultimately, the resulting set involves only disjoint integrated parts,
exactly as desired.
At first blush, it might seem odd to propose that the suffix -k- combines with
the entire proportional partitive DP rather than with the sole half-word to which
it linearly attaches. However, there is an independent reason suggesting that such
33More precisely, I assume that in terms of morphology połówka is derived from pół rather than
from połowa and that the element -ów- in połówka is semantically vacuous. Such an analysis
seems to be corroborated by the fact that the morpheme -ów- appears sometimes as a link-
ing element in Polish deadjectival nominalizations such as złoty ‘golden; złoty (Polish cur-
rency)’ ∼ złotówka ‘1-złoty coin’. Notice the ungrammaticality of *złotowy.
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an analysis is on the right track. The suffix -k- in Polish is polyfunctional and
appears also in a number of other morphological environments. Among others,











‘(group of) five girls’
The form pięć in (59a) is a basic cardinal numeral meaning simply ‘five’. Attach-
ing the suffix -k- in (59b) changes it to piątka, which is an obligatorily collective
numerical expression probably best paraphrased as ‘group of five’. Slavic collec-
tivizers of this type are typically analyzed via some sort of group-forming op-
eration, e.g., Landman’s (1989a) ↑ operator (see, e.g. Dočekal 2012; 2013; Wągiel
2015b). In particular, ↑ applies to a sum of entities and returns a group, i.e., a
plural individual consisting of those entities that behaves as a unit in its own
right. This, however, requires the meaning of the suffix -k- to take the entire NP
as its argument rather than the numeral, contrary to what the linear morpheme
ordering suggests. In other words, in order to interpret (59b) as ‘group of five
girls’, -k- needs to be interpreted above ‘five girls’.
For the reason described above, in the next section I will follow the account
in (58). However, it is important to emphasize that having the suffix -k- inter-
preted above the partitive DP is not a crucial assumption of the proposed analy-
sis. Rather its key component is the association of -k- with the semantics of the
individuating element IND, as defined in (53). For instance, an alternative to the
treatment in (57) would be to make the semantics of -k- more complex so that it
can take pół as its argument. For instance, consider (60).35
(60) Polish individuating suffix -k- (alternative)J-k-K = 𝜆𝑅𝜆𝑦 ∶ IMSSC(𝑦) 𝜆𝑥[JINDK(𝑅(𝑦))(𝑥)] =
= 𝜆𝑅𝜆𝑦 ∶ IMSSC(𝑦) 𝜆𝑥[MSSC(𝜋(𝑅(𝑦)))(𝑥)]
The semantics in (60) enables the meaning of IND to compose with a function
from entities to predicates. If 𝑅 is an expression of type ⟨𝑒, ⟨𝑒, 𝑡⟩⟩, we obtain an al-
34Notice that the attachment of -k- triggers standard Polish morphophonological alternations
represented orthographically in (59) as ę : ą and ć : t.
35I would like to thank Peter Sutton for suggesting this.
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ternative analysis of połówka in (61), which does not rely on -k- being interpreted
above the partitive DP and allows it to combine with pół directly.
(61) Polish topology-sensitive half-word połówka (alternative)JpołówkaK = J-k-K(JpółK) =
= 𝜆𝑦 ∶ IMSSC(𝑦)[MSSC(𝜋([𝑥 ⊏ 𝑦 ∧ 𝜇(𝑥) ≈ 𝜇(𝑦) × 0.5]))]
Yet another approach would be to combine -k- with pół via Function Composi-
tion, rather than in terms of the perhaps more familiar Function Application rule.
Though I leave this option unexplored here, I believe that in principle it would
not be a problem to pursue such an alternative.
Having developed all the machinery necessary to account for subatomic quan-
tification in natural language, let us see how the pieces fit together. In the next
section, I will walk through the derivation of different types of partitives includ-
ing German explicit and set partitives and Polish proportional partitives as well
asmultiplier phrases. The sectionwill be concluded by a proposal how the system
developed here could be extended to Italian count explicit partitives involving ir-
regular plurals.
7.6 Composition
In the previous sections, I provided all the ingredients necessary for an analysis
of natural language expressions utilizing subatomic quantification. Now, let us
see how those elements interact. I will start with the simplest cases of explicit en-
tity and set partitives. Next, I will walk through the most complex case of count
explicit partitives, which involves the interplay of almost all postulated compo-
nents. Subsequently, I will discuss the difference between topology-neutral and
topology-sensitive proportional partitives. Finally, I will present the derivation
of multiplier phrases modified by numerals. As in the previous sections, I will
illustrate how the proposed system works on the German and Polish data. For
all partitives, I provide examples involving embedded definite DPs. Though for
the sake of brevity I do not provide explicit derivations, I assume that for specific
DPs nothing changes except from the use of a choice function, see (45), instead
of the maximization operator.
7.6.1 Explicit entity partitives
I begin with a relatively simple example of a German explicit entity partitive as
the one provided in (62). The analysis of this case will allow us to see how the
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essential components introduced in previous sections interact with each other
and as such it will serve as a reference point for other more complex cases.







‘part of the apple’
All things considered, I assume that what gets interpreted at the level of semantic
composition is the structure in Figure 7.1.36 The whole phrase is an expression
of type ⟨𝑒, 𝑡⟩ which gets a part-of-a-singularity reading. The description of the









Figure 7.1: Structure of (62)
(63) Interpretation
a. JApfelK = 𝜆𝑥[MSSC(apple)(𝑥)]
b. JDEFK = 𝜆𝑃[MAX(𝑃)]
c. Function ApplicationJDEF ApfelK = MAX(JApfelK) =
= MAX(𝜆𝑥[MSSC(apple)(𝑥)])
d. JTeilK = 𝜆𝑦𝜆𝑥[𝑥 ⊏ 𝑦]
e. Function ApplicationJTeil [DEF Apfel]K = 𝜆𝑥[𝑥 ⊏ JDEF ApfelK] =
= 𝜆𝑥[𝑥 ⊏ MAX(𝜆𝑦[MSSC(apple)(𝑦)])]
The predicateApfel in (63a) denotes a set of MSSC individuals that have a property
of being an apple. If in a given context this set is a singleton, the maximization op-
eration MAX introduced by the definite article in (63b) selects the unique maximal
element from that set, e.g., it turns {𝑎} into 𝑎, see (63c). Subsequently, the part-
word Teil with the semantics specified in (63d) selects that entity and returns a
36For the sake of simplicity, I ignore the genitive case marking here.
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set of its material parts. Since there are no additional restrictions, the resulting
phrase represented in (63e) denotes all possible divisions of the apple in question
including various overlapping continuous as well as discontinuous parts. This is
exactly what we expect from the extension of a topology-neutral explicit entity
partitive.
7.6.2 Explicit set partitives
The next example to be discussed is the German explicit set partitive (64). An
analysis of such a construction should account for the fact that it can get only a
part-of-a-plurality interpretation.







‘some of the apples’
I assume the semantic structure in Figure 7.2 for the phrase in question. The only
difference between Figure 7.2 and 7.1 from the previous section is that the set par-
titive tree involves the PL node which introduces the pluralization of the predi-
cate whereas the entity partitive tree does not. How the structure corresponding












Figure 7.2: Structure of (64)
(65) Interpretation
a. JApfelK = 𝜆𝑥[MSSC(apple)(𝑥)]
b. JPLK = 𝜆𝑃 ∶ PMSSC(𝑃) 𝜆𝑥[+𝑃(𝑥)]
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c. Function Application: presupposition satisfiedJPL ApfelK = 𝜆𝑥[+JApfelK(𝑥)] =
= 𝜆𝑥[+(𝜆𝑦[MSSC(apple)(𝑦)])(𝑥)]
d. JDEFK = 𝜆𝑃[MAX(𝑃)]
e. Function ApplicationJDEF [PL Apfel]K = MAX(JPL ApfelK) =
= MAX(𝜆𝑥[+(𝜆𝑦[MSSC(apple)(𝑦)])(𝑥)])
f. JTeilK = 𝜆𝑦𝜆𝑥[𝑥 ⊏ 𝑦]
g. Function ApplicationJTeil [DEF [PL Apfel]]K = 𝜆𝑥[𝑥 ⊏ JDEF [PL Apfel]K] =
= 𝜆𝑥[𝑥 ⊏ MAX(𝜆𝑦[+(𝜆𝑧[MSSC(apple)(𝑧)])(𝑦)])]
As in (63), the noun in (65a) denotes a set of individuals that are MSSC relative to
the property apple. Since the plural NP in (64) is semantically interpreted, the
plural marker contributes themeaning in (65b). Specifically, it takes the predicate
apfel and applies the strict pluralization operation +. As a result, the extension
of (65c) consists of sums of apples. Next, the definite article yields the maximal
sum plurality from the set which will serve as the argument of Teil, see (65d)–
(65f). Finally, after the entity variable is saturated as in (65g), the explicit set
partitive denotes a set of overlapping parts of the largest plurality of apples in a
given context. Topology-sensitive transitivity defined in (49) ensures that this set
consists only of parts that are either MSSC entities or sums thereof, i.e., material
proper parts of particular individuals are not included. This is a welcome result.
7.6.3 Count explicit partitives
The last type of explicit partitive construction to be considered here concerns the
significantly more complex example in (66).









‘two parts of the apple’
In general, I assume the structure for count explicit partitives along the lines in
Figure 7.3. Notice that in accordance with the semantics of cardinals proposed
in §7.4.2, the numeral root and CL# form a constituent. Furthermore, unlike in
the explicit partitive examples in Figure 7.1 and 7.2 in order to ensure that count-
ing is possible, I postulate that there is a special IND node present in the tree
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representing semantic composition, see §7.5.6. In the discussed German exam-
ple, IND has no formal exponent. However, I argue that the semantic evidence
implies that though null it is interpreted. In particular, depending on the context,
explicit entity partitives can designate either contiguous or discontiguous parts.
On the other hand, count explicit partitives refer only to pluralities of integrated
parts. Thus, the presence of the numeral licenses the obligatory occurrence of
IND. This of course is in accordance with the counting principles discussed in
Chapter 5 and requires a formal account. The exact step-by-step derivation is
given in (67).
⟨𝑒, 𝑡⟩
⟨⟨𝑒, 𝑡⟩, ⟨𝑒, 𝑡⟩⟩
𝑛
√zw
⟨𝑛, ⟨⟨𝑒, 𝑡⟩, ⟨𝑒, 𝑡⟩⟩⟩
CL#
⟨𝑒, 𝑡⟩












Figure 7.3: Structure of (66)
(67) Interpretation of (66)
a. JApfelK = 𝜆𝑥[MSSC(apple)(𝑥)]
b. JDEFK = 𝜆𝑃[MAX(𝑃)]
c. Function ApplicationJDEF ApfelK = MAX(JApfelK) = MAX(𝜆𝑥[MSSC(apple)(𝑥)])
d. JTeilK = 𝜆𝑦𝜆𝑥[𝑥 ⊏ 𝑦]
e. Function ApplicationJTeil [DEF Apfel]K = 𝜆𝑥[𝑥 ⊏ JDEF ApfelK] =
= 𝜆𝑥[𝑥 ⊏ MAX(𝜆𝑦[MSSC(apple)(𝑦)])]
f. JINDK = 𝜆𝑃𝜆𝑥[MSSC(𝜋(𝑃))(𝑥)]
g. Function ApplicationJIND [Teil [DEF Apfel]]K =
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= 𝜆𝑥[MSSC(𝜋(JTeil [DEF Apfel]K))(𝑥)] =
= 𝜆𝑥[MSSC(𝜋(𝜆𝑧[𝑧 ⊏ MAX(𝜆𝑦[MSSC(apple)(𝑦)])(𝑧)]))(𝑥)]
h. J√zwK = 2
i. JCL#K = 𝜆𝑛𝜆𝑃 ∶ PMSSC(𝑃) 𝜆𝑥[*𝑃(𝑥) ∧ #(𝑃)(𝑥) = 𝑛]
j. Function ApplicationJ√zw CL#K = 𝜆𝑃 ∶ PMSSC(𝑃) 𝜆𝑥[*𝑃(𝑥) ∧ #(𝑃)(𝑥) = J√zwK] =
= 𝜆𝑃 ∶ PMSSC(𝑃) 𝜆𝑥[*𝑃(𝑥) ∧ #(𝑃)(𝑥) = 2]
k. Function Application: presupposition satisfiedJ[√zw CL#] [IND [Teil [DEF Apfel]]]K =
= 𝜆𝑥[*JIND [Teil [DEF Apfel]]K(𝑥)
∧ #(JIND [Teil [DEF Apfel]]K)(𝑥) = 2] =
𝜆𝑥[*(𝜆𝑤[MSSC(𝜋(𝜆𝑧[𝑧 ⊏ MAX(𝜆𝑦[MSSC(apple)(𝑦)])(𝑧)]))](𝑤))(𝑥)
∧ #(𝜆𝑤[MSSC(𝜋(𝜆𝑧[𝑧 ⊏ MAX(𝜆𝑦[MSSC(apple)(𝑦)])(𝑧)]))](𝑤))(𝑥) =
2]
The steps in (67a)–(67e) are exactly the same as in the case of the explicit entity
partitive derived in (63), i.e., starting from the predicate of MSSC individuals we
end up with the node denoting a set of overlapping continuous and discontinu-
ous parts of a contextually unique apple. Given the counting principles of non-
overlap, integrity, and maximality, that expression cannot serve as the domain
of quantification since its extension resembles those of mass terms. In particular,
it includes both scattered entities and entities that are not disjoint. In Chapter 5, I
argued that the deeply rootedmechanism of counting is based upon an algorithm
that establishes a one-to-one correspondence with numbers only for discrete ob-
jects, i.e., non-overlapping integrated entities in their mereological maximality,
and that the same applies to subatomic quantification. Therefore, if parts are to
be counted, it needs to be ensured that they constitute entities of that sort. This
is what the individuating element IND introduced in (67f) is for. IND combines
with the set of overlapping parts and partitions it in such a way that the new set
consists only of disjoint parts. However, non-overlap itself does not guarantee
that parts are integrated. This is why IND restricts the denotation of (67e) even
further by applying the MSSC constraint. As a result, the expression in (67g) de-
notes a set of objects that are MSSCwith respect to the property of being a disjoint
proper part of a contextually unique apple. In other words, (67g) refers to a set of
integrated parts that can be put in a one-to-one-correspondence with numbers.
As proposed in §7.4.2, the cardinal numeral zwei is a complex expression con-
sisting of a numeral root simply naming the integer 2, see (67h), which serves
as an argument for the classifier element CL#, see (67i). As indicated in (67j), the
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whole cardinal is a predicate modifier that for a predicate of MSSC entities returns
a set of two-element sums of such individuals. This is ensured by the following
elements. The individuation presupposition restricts the predicate arguments to
those that denote only MSSC entities. On the other hand, the first conjunct of
the assertion of CL# pluralizes the predicate by means of the classical * operator,
and thus provides sums for the #(𝑃) measure function which yields the number
of individuals that are MSSC relative to the property the whole cardinal modifies.
After the predicate variable gets saturated by the entity partitive individuated by
IND, the resulting count explicit partitive in (67k) returns a set of pairs of non-
overlapping integrated parts of a contextually unique apple. And that is exactly
what we want.
Though the computation in (67) gets quite complex, I believe that the under-
lying mechanism deriving count explicit partitives is quite simple. Its great ad-
vantage is that it allows us to account for the semantic subtleties concerning
topological issues highlighted by the novel data I presented in Chapters 2 and
3 via the interplay of the semantics of partitives, the individuating element, and
cardinals. In the following sections, I will go in detail through the proposed ac-
count for the contrast between Polish topology-neutral and topology-sensitive
half-words discussed in §7.5.7.
7.6.4 Topology-neutral proportional partitives
Let us now turn to Polish proportional partitives. First, I will discuss the step-
by-step derivation of the least complex case, i.e., entity partitives involving the
topology-neutral half-word połowa exemplified by the phrase in (68).





‘half of the apple’
In general, such expressions are very similar to German explicit entity partitives
such as those discussed in §7.6.1. The semantic tree corresponding to (68) is pro-
vided in Figure 7.4 and (69) demonstrates how the structure is interpreted.37
(69) Interpretation of (68)
a. JjabłkoK = 𝜆𝑥[MSSC(apple)(𝑥)]
b. JDEFK = 𝜆𝑃[MAX(𝑃)]













Figure 7.4: Structure of (68)
c. Function ApplicationJDEF jabłkoK = MAX(JjabłkoK) = MAX(𝜆𝑥[MSSC(apple)(𝑥)])
d. JpołowaK = 𝜆𝑦𝜆𝑥[𝑥 ⊏ 𝑦 ∧ 𝜇(𝑥) ≈ 𝜇(𝑦) × 0.5]
e. Function ApplicationJpołowa [DEF jabłko]K = 𝜆𝑥[𝑥 ⊏ JDEF jabłkoK
∧ 𝜇(𝑥) ≈ 𝜇(JDEF jabłkoK) × 0.5] =
= 𝜆𝑥[𝑥 ⊏ MAX(𝜆𝑦[MSSC(apple)(𝑦)])
∧ 𝜇(𝑥) ≈ 𝜇(MAX(𝜆𝑦[MSSC(apple)(𝑦)])) × 0.5]
Analogously to German Apfel, the predicate jabłko in (69a) is true of entities that
are MSSC with respect to the property apple. Though Polish lacks articles, as indi-
cated in §7.5.2 I assume the silent definite element DEF specified in (69b) which
applies the maximization operator MAX to the set denoted by jabłko. If it is a sin-
gleton, then the definite DP refers to the unique individual from that set, see (69c).
The denotation of the half-word połowa is very similar to that of a part-wordwith
the exception that it indicates how big the parts it denotes are, see (69d). It takes
the MSSC entity denoted by the definite DP as it first argument, and the resulting
proportional partitive denotes a set of parts of a contextually unique apple. The
mechanism of contextual conditioning accounts for the fact that the generalized
measure function 𝜇 measures its argument in terms of volume. Thus, each part
in the denotation of the whole proportional partitive constitutes approximately
50% of the volume of that apple. Notice that among the members of the set there
are continuous as well as discontinuous halves, many of which overlap. Such a
denotation is incompatible with cardinal numerals. In order to deliver countable
entities, the individuating element IND needs to be applied similarly as in count
explicit partitives discussed in §7.6.3.
Since the half-word połowa is topologically neutral, there are no restrictions
concerning its distribution. Hence, it can also combine with plurals as in (70).
259
7 Mereotopological account for subatomic quantification





‘half of the apples’















Figure 7.5: Structure of (70)
(71) Interpretation of (70)
a. JjabłkoK = 𝜆𝑥[MSSC(apple)(𝑥)]
b. JPLK = 𝜆𝑃 ∶ PMSSC(𝑃) 𝜆𝑥[+𝑃(𝑥)]
c. Function Application: presupposition satisfiedJPL jabłkoK = 𝜆𝑥[+JjabłkoK(𝑥)] =
= 𝜆𝑥[+(𝜆𝑦[MSSC(apple)(𝑦)])(𝑥)]
d. JDEFK = 𝜆𝑃[MAX(𝑃)]
e. Function ApplicationJDEF [PL jabłko]K = MAX(JPL jabłkoK) =
= MAX(𝜆𝑥[+(𝜆𝑦[MSSC(apple)(𝑦)])(𝑥)])
f. JpołowaK = 𝜆𝑦𝜆𝑥[𝑥 ⊏ 𝑦 ∧ 𝜇(𝑥) ≈ 𝜇(𝑦) × 0.5]
g. Function ApplicationJpołowa [DEF [PL jabłko]]K = 𝜆𝑥[𝑥 ⊏ JDEF [PL jabłko]K
∧ 𝜇(𝑥) ≈ 𝜇(JDEF [PL jabłko]K) × 0.5] =
= 𝜆𝑥[𝑥 ⊏ MAX(𝜆𝑦[+(𝜆𝑧[MSSC(apple)(𝑧)])(𝑦)])
∧ 𝜇(𝑥) ≈ 𝜇(MAX(𝜆𝑥[+(𝜆𝑦[MSSC(apple)(𝑦)])(𝑥)])) × 0.5]
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The sole difference between topology-neutral proportional entity and set parti-
tives is that in the case of the latter the noun is pluralized. The plural marker
in (71b) applies to the predicate of MSSC individuals in (71a) and yields a set con-
sisting of sums formed from those singularities. Subsequently, given topology-
sensitive transitivity and the mechanism of contextual conditioning the measure
function 𝜇 in (71g) is interpreted as #, i.e., counts the number of MSSC parts of
its arguments. As a result, the whole construction denotes plural entities whose
cardinality corresponds to approximately 50% of the total number of individuals
of the maximal sum of apples.
Despite the straightforward differences resulting from the distinct semantics
of part- and half-words, the denotations of topology-neutral explicit and propor-
tional partitives are very much alike. If not modified by a cardinal, both types
of expressions can refer to overlapping continuous and discontinuous parts of
a singularity as well as to overlapping parts of a plurality. On the other hand,
topology-sensitive partitives are significantly more restricted. In the following
section, I focus on demonstrating how exactly.
7.6.5 Topology-sensitive proportional partitives
An important insight concerning the Polish topology-sensitive half-word pół pre-
sented in §3.1.1 is that it does not appear in set andmass partitives. It is not aweird
property of one partitive word since the same behavior is shared, e.g., with the
quarter-word ćwierć. In any case, I argue that this distributional constraint re-
sults from a particular topological restriction imposed on the arguments of pół.
An example of a topology-sensitive proportional partitive is provided in (72).





‘half of the apple’
The structure of (72) I assume at the level of semantic composition is given in
Figure 7.6. The complete derivation is presented in (73).
(73) Interpretation of (72)
a. JjabłkoK = 𝜆𝑥[MSSC(apple)(𝑥)]
b. JDEFK = 𝜆𝑃[MAX(𝑃)]
c. Function ApplicationJDEF jabłkoK = MAX(JjabłkoK) =
= MAX(𝜆𝑥[MSSC(apple)(𝑥)])
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d. JpółK = 𝜆𝑦 ∶ IMSSC(𝑦) 𝜆𝑥[𝑥 ⊏ 𝑦 ∧ 𝜇(𝑥) ≈ 𝜇(𝑦) × 0.5]
e. Function Application: presupposition satisfiedJpół [DEF jabłko]K = 𝜆𝑥[𝑥 ⊏ JDEF jabłkoK
∧ 𝜇(𝑥) ≈ 𝜇(JDEF jabłkoK) × 0.5] =
= 𝜆𝑥[𝑥 ⊏ MAX(𝜆𝑦[MSSC(apple)(𝑦)])











Figure 7.6: Structure of (72)
The derivation in (73) is almost identical to its twin counterpart in (69). How-
ever, notice that in (73d) there is a tiny but crucial difference in the semantics
of pół as proposed in (56). Specifically, pół incorporates the integrated individ-
ual presupposition, which requires the first argument to be an integrated entity.
This constrains the distribution of pół to count singulars since plurals and mass
terms denote arbitrary sums and scattered entities, respectively, i.e., things dis-
tinct from MSSC objects. However, pół does not impose any topological restriction
on parts of the relevant individual it yields. The semantics of the whole partitive
in (73e) thus states that the denoted set includes both continuous and discontin-
uous halves. However, as we saw in Chapter 3 there are also partitive words that
are restrictive with respect to the topological properties of entities they deliver.
This brings us finally to the most intriguing case of Polish proportional par-
titives headed by the topology-sensitive half-word połówka such as the one in
(74).





‘half of the apple’
Though I restrict my focus here to the structure and the interpretation of this
example, see Figure 7.7 and (75), respectively, as we saw in §3.2 there are also
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other expressions that behave similarly, e.g., the part-word cząstka and quarter-
word ćwiartka.
⟨𝑒, 𝑡⟩











Figure 7.7: Structure of (74)
(75) Interpretation of (74)
a. JjabłkoK = 𝜆𝑥[MSSC(apple)(𝑥)]
b. JDEFK = 𝜆𝑃[MAX(𝑃)]
c. Function ApplicationJDEF jabłkoK = MAX(JjabłkoK) = MAX(𝜆𝑥[MSSC(apple)(𝑥)])
d. J√półK = 𝜆𝑦 ∶ IMSSC(𝑦) 𝜆𝑥[𝑥 ⊏ 𝑦 ∧ 𝜇(𝑥) ≈ 𝜇(𝑦) × 0.5]
e. Function Application: presupposition satisfiedJ√pół [DEF jabłko]K =
= 𝜆𝑥[𝑥 ⊏ JDEF jabłkoK ∧ 𝜇(𝑥) ≈ 𝜇(JDEF jabłkoK) × 0.5] =
𝜆𝑥[𝑥 ⊏ MAX(𝜆𝑦[MSSC(apple)(𝑦)])
∧ 𝜇(𝑥) ≈ 𝜇(MAX(𝜆𝑦[MSSC(apple)(𝑦)])) × 0.5]
f. J-k-K = JINDK = 𝜆𝑃𝜆𝑥[MSSC(𝜋(𝑃))(𝑥)]
g. Function ApplicationJIND [√pół [DEF jabłko]]K =
= 𝜆𝑥[MSSC(𝜋(J√pół [DEF jabłko]K))(𝑥)] =
= 𝜆𝑥[MSSC(𝜋(𝜆𝑧[𝑧 ⊏ MAX(𝜆𝑦[MSSC(apple)(𝑦)])
∧ 𝜇(𝑥) ≈ 𝜇(MAX(𝜆𝑦[MSSC(apple)(𝑦)])) × 0.5]))(𝑥)]
The only difference between (73) and (75) lies in that in the former the half-word
pół is used whereas the latter involves the derivationally complex połówka. Thus,
the composition in (75a)–(75c) remains unchanged and I will start the discussion
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from the step in (75d). As proposed in (58), the morphological complexity of po-
łówka translates into its semantic complexity. In particular, I assume that the
root √pół is a topologically sensitive expression introducing the integrated indi-
vidual presupposition, see (75d), which ensures that that the half-word combines
only with MSSC individuals. On the other hand, the suffix -k- is interpreted as the
individuating element IND, see (75e), i.e., it restricts the denotation of the parti-
tive to non-overlapping continuous parts. As a result, the whole phrase refers to
integrated halves of a contextually unique apple that can be subject to counting.
This concludes the analysis of distinct types of partitive constructions. The rel-
evance of Polish topology-sensitive individuating proportional partitives is that
they show that IND can be formally expressed. As demonstrated in §3.4, there
are more constructions in different natural languages that can be considered as
involving formal exponents of IND. Though I will refrain here from further in-
vestigation, if the analysis proposed here is on the right track, I expect to find
even more such expressions cross-linguistically. In the next section, I will move
on to another type of construction involving subatomic quantification, namely
multiplier phrases.
7.6.6 Multiplier phrases
In the previous sections, I discussed the composition of different kinds of par-
titives. The only construction involving numerical expressions discussed so far
was the German count explicit partitive in (66) where the cardinal modified an
entity partitive headed by the part-word Teil. In this section, I will discuss in
detail the semantics of constructions involving derived numerical expressions
specialized precisely for subatomic quantification, namely multipliers. In order
to present the overall picture, I will consider multiplier phrases modified by car-
dinals exemplified by (76).








I posit that the semantic structure underlying such expressions is essentially as
in Figure 7.8, whereas in (77) I provide an exact step-by-step derivation of the
main example.
(77) Interpretation of (76)




⟨⟨𝑒, 𝑡⟩, ⟨𝑒, 𝑡⟩⟩
𝑛
√trz
⟨𝑛, ⟨⟨𝑒, 𝑡⟩, ⟨𝑒, 𝑡⟩⟩⟩
CL#
⟨⟨𝑒, 𝑡⟩, ⟨𝑒, 𝑡⟩⟩
𝑛
√𝑑𝑤





Figure 7.8: Structure of (76)
b. J√dwK = 2
c. JCL⊞K = 𝜆𝑛𝜆𝑃 ∶ PMSSC(𝑃) 𝜆𝑥[𝑃(𝑥) ∧ ⊞(𝑃)(𝑥) = 𝑛]
d. Function ApplicationJ√dw CL⊞K = 𝜆𝑃 ∶ PMSSC(𝑃) 𝜆𝑥[𝑃(𝑥) ∧ ⊞(𝑃)(𝑥) = J√dwK] =
= 𝜆𝑃 ∶ PMSSC(𝑃) 𝜆𝑥[𝑃(𝑥) ∧ ⊞(𝑃)(𝑥) = 2]
e. Function Application: presupposition satisfiedJ[√dw CL⊞] hamburgerK =
= 𝜆𝑥[JhamburgerK(𝑥) ∧ ⊞(JhamburgerK)(𝑥) = 2] =
= 𝜆𝑥[MSSC(hamburger)(𝑥) ∧ ⊞(MSSC(hamburger))(𝑥) = 2]
f. J√trzK = 3
g. JCL#K = 𝜆𝑛𝜆𝑃 ∶ PMSSC(𝑃) 𝜆𝑥[*𝑃(𝑥) ∧ #(𝑃)(𝑥) = 𝑛]
h. Function ApplicationJ√trz CL#K = 𝜆𝑃 ∶ PMSSC(𝑃) 𝜆𝑥[*𝑃(𝑥) ∧ #(𝑃)(𝑥) = J√trzK] =
= 𝜆𝑃 ∶ PMSSC(𝑃) 𝜆𝑥[*𝑃(𝑥) ∧ #(𝑃)(𝑥) = 3]
i. Function Application: presupposition satisfiedJ[√trz CL#] [[√dw CL⊞] hamburger]K =
= 𝜆𝑥[*J[√dw CL⊞] hamburgerK(𝑥)
∧ #(J[√dw CL⊞] hamburgerK)(𝑥) = 3] = 𝜆𝑥[*(
𝜆𝑦[MSSC(hamburger)(𝑦) ∧ ⊞(MSSC(hamburger))(𝑦) = 2])(𝑥) ∧
#(𝜆𝑦[MSSC(hamburger)(𝑦) ∧ ⊞(MSSC(hamburger))(𝑦) = 2])(𝑥)
= 3]
In analogy to the previous cases, the noun hamburger is a predicate of type ⟨𝑒, 𝑡⟩
denoting a set of entities that are MSSC with respect to the property hamburger,
i.e., singular hamburgers. On the other hand, as suggested by morphology the
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multiplier in (77d) consists of the classifier element CL⊞ of type ⟨𝑛, ⟨⟨𝑒, 𝑡⟩, ⟨𝑒, 𝑡⟩⟩⟩,
whose number argument, see (77c), is saturated by the number 2 referred to by
the numeral root in (77b). Due to the individuation presupposition in the seman-
tics of CL⊞ the resulting numerical expression is a predicate modifier selecting
only predicates of MSSC individuals. Since the noun hamburger satisfies this re-
quirement, it can serve as the argument for the multiplier. After the two combine
in (77e), the resulting multiplier phrase, i.e., a function from entities to truth val-
ues, denotes a set of singular hamburgers such that each includes two patties.
This meaning stems from the fact that the ⊞(𝑃)measure function defined in (26)
returns 2 as the number of parts that are essential for the property hamburger,
and given the relevant extra-linguistic factors such a part happens to be a patty.
Notice also that the fact that the first conjunct in (77e) is not pluralized, unlike
in cardinals, results in that the multiplier phrase is a predicate of MSSC entities,
i.e., it denotes singular double hamburgers. As such it can be modified by the
cardinal numeral.
Given the compatible expression, the cardinal in (77h) is ready for the satura-
tion of the predicate variable. It itself is a complex expression of type ⟨⟨𝑒, 𝑡⟩, ⟨𝑒, 𝑡⟩⟩
consisting of the numeral root in (77f), whose denotation, i.e., the number 3,
serves as the argument for the classifier element CL#. After the cardinal com-
poses with the multiplier phrase in (77i), what we obtain is a set of triples of ham-
burgers with two essential parts each. Counting is done by the measure function
#(𝑃) which puts MSSC individuals in a one-to-one correspondence with numbers
and yields the integer corresponding to the total number of objects in a plurality
delivered by the * operator introduced in the first conjunct. The result is exactly
what we wanted to derive, i.e., a set of pluralities consisting of three double ham-
burgers.
This concludes the analysis of some of the expressions involving subatomic
quantification. In this study, I focused on several different types of partitives as
well as multiplier phrases. I proposed that though both types of constructions
quantify over parts of entities, they employ different means to achieve the goal.
While partitives employ the proper parthood relation ⊏ and in more complicated
cases also the individuating element IND and cardinals, multipliers utilize a spe-
cial measure function ⊞(𝑃) dedicated to counting essential parts of integrated
wholes. In the next section, I will briefly suggest how the analysis I proposed





The last part of this chapter concerns a brief informal discussion of possible ex-
tensions of the system developed here to other types of constructions in differ-
ent languages. Though mereotopological structures proposed in this book could
interact with other semantic phenomena making the empirical landscape even
more complex, I believe that the perspective argued for in this chapter offers an
inspiring perspective for the study of such possible interactions.
7.7.1 Topology-sensitive partitives in other languages
In principle, a number of distinct kinds of topology-sensitive proportional par-
titives discussed in §3.4 could be accounted for by incorporating the meaning
of the individuating element IND into the semantics of some morpheme. For
instance, if the approach proposed here is on the right track and there are no ad-
ditional facts I have not reported here concerning phrases such as (78), a straight-
forward application of the analysis appears to be plausible. Recall that the phrase
is reported to felicitously refer only to a half of the flag that constitutes a continu-
ous part of the whole, see §3.4. It seems that the morpheme eine is what encodes
IND, which accounts for the reported results of the flag test.











‘the half of the flag’
Similar, in principle the account developed here could be extended to English
constructions such as (79). However, most probably this case would be more
challenging since it might be necessary to capture interactions between the par-
titive word and the determiner, on the one hand, as well as with the preposition
of, on the other.
(79) English topology-sensitive proportional partitive
a half of the flag
Furthermore, it might turn out that a similar analysis is appropriate for the Man-
darin classifier construction in (80). Here, the classifier miàn is arguably respon-
sible for introducing IND.
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‘a half of the national flag’
Of course, much more work needs to be done to verify whether what I proposed
in fact accounts for the data from German, Mandarin, and other languages dis-
playing a similar pattern. However, I believe that at this stage of the research it is
a plausible hypothesis to postulate that what makes topology-sensitive partitives
different from their topology-neutral counterparts is the fact that the former in-
volve a formal exponent of IND.
The next section will be dedicated to the discussion of how the proposed anal-
ysis could be applied to yet another type of expression.
7.7.2 Italian partitives with irregular plurals
The last case of a possible extension of the developed system to be discussed here
concerns count explicit partitives involving irregular plurals in Italian, such as
those in (81).









‘two parts of the walled complex’
In Chapter 2, a considerable amount of attention was dedicated to the intriguing
effect these expressions give rise to. We saw that at least a subset of Italian irreg-
ular plurals does not merely encode plurality but also implies a certain spatial
configuration that the individual entities making up a sum remain in. Arguably,
this kind of behavior can be captured in terms of the topological notion of con-
nection. The Italian data served as a crucial source of evidence for the role of
integrity in quantification over parts. In particular, the evidence strongly sug-
gests that entities are countable as long as they are conceptualized as spatially
continuous regardless whether they are singularities or pluralities.
Given the arguments in favor of the connected nature of pluralities denoted
by the relevant class of Italian irregular plurals, I postulate that it is plausible
to model them in terms of clusters (see Grimm 2012b: p. 144). As discussed in
§6.2.2, a cluster is a special type of plural individual that consists of a number of
topologically arranged objects. It is defined in terms of the TC relation formulated
in (35) in §6.2.2, repeated here as (82). Specifically, the definition in (36) in §6.2.2,
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repeated here as (83), states that an entity is a cluster if it involves a plurality of
individuals that are transitively connected, i.e., form a connected sequence.
(82) Transitively connected (revised)
TC(𝑥, 𝑦 , 𝑃 , 𝐶, 𝑍) ≝ 𝑧1 = 𝑥 ∧ 𝑧𝑛 = 𝑦 ∧ ∀𝑖[1 ≤ 𝑖 < 𝑛 → 𝐶(𝑧𝑖, 𝑧𝑖+1)]
∧ ∀𝑖[1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛 → 𝑃(𝑧𝑖)], where 𝑍 = ⟨𝑧1, … , 𝑧𝑛⟩
(Entities 𝑥 and 𝑦 are transitively connected relative to a property 𝑃 , a con-
nection relation 𝐶 , and a finite sequence of entities 𝑍 , when all members
of 𝑍 satisfy 𝑃 and 𝑥 and 𝑦 are connected through the sequence of 𝑧𝑖s in
𝑍 .)
(83) Cluster (revised)
CLSTR(𝑥, 𝑃 , 𝐶) ≝ ∃𝑍[𝑥 = ⨆𝑍 ∧ ∀𝑧∀𝑧′ ∈ 𝑍∃𝑌 ⊆ 𝑍[TC(𝑧, 𝑧′, 𝑃 , 𝐶, 𝑌 )]]
(An entity 𝑥 is a cluster relative to a property 𝑃 and a connection relation
𝐶 iff 𝑥 is a sum of entities falling under the same property which are all
transitively connected relative to 𝑌 which is a subset of a sequence 𝑍
under the same property and connection relation.)
Intuitively, clusters are entities that are conceptualized as bundled pluralities
whose minimal units are cognitively not salient enough or insignificant to be
considered objects in their own rights. For instance, a pile of rice or a heap of
gravel constitute clusters since each minimal unit, i.e., a grain or a pebble, in
a pile or a heap is connected to another minimal unit. Since TC is relativized
to a connection, clusters can involve bundled pluralities of entities that are ex-
ternally or even proximately connected.38 In the case of Italian irregular plurals,
the former would correspond, e.g., to the referents ofmura ‘walls (in a complex)’,
whereas the latter might be useful to model the denotation of, e.g., ossa ‘bones
(in a skeleton)’.
If the proposed analysis of Italian irregular plurals in terms of clusters is cor-
rect, one would probably need to elaborate on the meaning of cardinal numerals.
Notice that clusters can consist of parts that are MSSC entities, e.g., individual
bones, as well as sequences of individuals, e.g., pluralities of transitively con-
nected bones. This might require to develop a more general device able to cap-
ture more fine-grained shades of integrity than the current formulation of the
individuation presupposition. Though such an enterprise lies beyond the scope
of this study and I leave it for future research, I believe that the account proposed
here provides an inspiring background for such an attempt.
38Those connection can be formally captured by the notions of EC and PC introduced in (30) and
(37), respectively.
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7.8 Summary
In this chapter, I presented a formal account for subatomic quantification in nat-
ural language grounded in the conceptual framework described in Chapter 5. I
rejected atomicity as a useful concept for that purpose and instead proposed an
analysis based on notions developed within mereotopology, i.e., the theory of
wholes extending standard mereology with topological distinctions, introduced
in Chapter 6. The mereotopological account for nominal semantics allows us to
get rid of atomicity as an undesirable notion as well as to distinguish between
singularities and pluralities in terms of the distinction between part-whole struc-
tures that either involve or do not involve the topological notion of connected-
ness. In particular, I adopted a view onwhich singular count nouns denote sets of
integrated objects modeled in terms of MSSC individuals that can be pluralized in
order to yield sets of pluralities of such entities. On the other hand, I postulated
a compositional semantics for numerical expressions such as cardinals and mul-
tipliers that involves numeral roots treated here as names of numbers as well as
classifiers that turn expressions of type 𝑛 into predicate modifiers. In particular,
I proposed that those classifier elements employ measure functions, i.e., opera-
tions that relate entities with integers. While cardinals utilize a measure function
that simply counts MSSC entities, multipliers involve quantification over essential
parts of an individual. Compatibility of the numerical expressions in question is
ensured by the individuation presupposition that requires the nodes cardinals
and multipliers combine with to be predicates of MSSC objects.
Another component of the analysis regarded the semantics of partitive words.
Given the advantages of mereotopology, it was possible to model subatomic
quantification without postulating sorted domain with different parthood rela-
tions defined over them. Instead, particular partitive words were treated as ex-
pressions employing the unified parthood relation. Specifically, what they do is
that they select an entity and return a set of its parts. Different types of partitive
words differ with respect to the nature of those parts. For instance, part-words
denote sets of any proper parts, whereas half-words refer to parts that consti-
tute approximately 50% of the cardinality of a plurality or the volume of an MSSC
individual or a scattered entity such as substance. On the other hand, topology-
neutral partitive words denote all kinds of overlapping continuous as well as
discontinuous parts, and thus are compatible with singular count nouns, mass
terms, and plurals, whereas denotations of topology-sensitive partitive words are
more restricted. For instance, the Polish half-word pół introduces the integrated
individual presupposition, which imposes a constraint that it can only select MSSC
entities. This fact explains why it does not combine with mass and plural comple-
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ments. On the other hand, morphologically complex połówka is a compositional
expression involving the suffix -k-, which I argue is a formal exponent of the
individuating element that partitions the set of parts so that overlapping halves
are excluded as well as removes those parts that are discontinuous. As a result,
the extension of a partitive headed by połówka involves only a set of disjoint
integrated halves that could serve as an argument for cardinals.
Though the individuating element is formally expressed in the morphology of
some Polish partitive words, it can also be silent. I argued that that is the case in,
e.g., German count explicit partitives since, given the counting principles postu-
lated in Chapter 5, one can only count non-overlapping continuous parts as one.
The chapter was concluded by considerations how the proposed system could
be extended to some of the other expressions discussed in this study including
Italian partitives involving irregular plurals, which could be analyzed as clusters,
i.e., bundled pluralities of transitively connected entities. However, the precise




The research on different aspects of quantification and part-whole structures in
natural language is abundant and since the early days of formal semantics it has
continually led to a better understanding of certain properties of the language
faculty. Nevertheless, one perspective seems to be somewhat neglected, namely
to what extent the way in which the relationships between parts within a whole
are conceptualized is relevant for grammar. Themain aim of this bookwas to con-
tribute to our understanding of quantification in natural language by exploring
the so far understudied domain of subatomic quantification, i.e., quantification
over parts of singular individuals. The mainstream perspective is that singular
individuals are atomic building blocks of the denotations of singular count nouns.
The consequence of such an atomicity-based approach is that such entities are
also assumed to lack linguistically relevant internal structure. I provided what I
believe is compelling evidence for an alternative view.
The relevance of the phenomenon of subatomic quantification for natural lan-
guage semantics suggests that the material part-whole structure of singular in-
dividuals is linguistically accessible. Therefore, the denotations of nouns such as
cat and apple are treated as consisting of mereological atoms, i.e., entities with
no proper parts. Instead, I argued for an approach which allows us to distinguish
between different types of part-whole structures based on the way in which parts
are arranged with respect to each other. In order to support this view, I explored
various aspects of meaning of a broad range of linguistic expressions, such as
different types of partitive constructions, certain types of adjectives, as well as
multipliers, from a cross-linguistic perspective.
One of the key findings presented in this book is the significance of the topo-
logical notion of integrity with respect to part-whole structures encoded in nom-
inal semantics. Non-trivial properties of different types of expressions investi-
gated in this book suggest that there is one unified parthood relation for various
types of entities. At the same time, different part-whole structures result from
distinct topological relations holding between particular elements. Entities con-
ceptualized as integrated wholes, i.e., objects whose parts stick together, differ
from those whose parts are not bound by any topological constraints or, alterna-
tively, are arranged in some other type of spatial configuration. This concerns
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both wholes, e.g., the prototypical referents of singular count nouns and regu-
lar plurals, and parts, e.g., spatially continuous pieces as opposed to arbitrary
discontinuous portions of matter.
The major claim of the book is that subatomic quantification is subject to the
very same constraints as quantification over wholes. Specifically, only entities
that are conceptualized as non-overlapping integrated contiguous objects can
be counted as one, be it either wholes or parts. In order to capture this gener-
alization, I proposed a universal mechanism which allows for counting of both
entire objects and their parts. Its formal implementation is based on the theory
of wholes called mereotopology, which extends standard mereological parthood
with topological notions such as connectedness. Building on this framework, I
developed a system which derives the predicted semantics of representative con-
structions discussed in the empirical part of the book. Different aspects of their
meaning arise as a result of the interaction between topology, partitivity, and
numerical quantification. An important advantage of the proposed approach is
that it does not define countability in terms of atomicity, since devising counting
as quantification over mereological atoms, i.e., entities that have no proper parts,
is very problematic for subatomic quantification.
This chapter concludes the book by summarizing its empirical insights as well
as theoretical contributions to the study of quantification in natural language.
First, I will provide an overall summary, then I will discuss some of the open
questions and possible topics for future investigations.
8.1 Overall summary
As outlined in Chapter 1, this book was intended to contribute to the field of
formal semantics by exploring subatomic quantification. Throughout its pages, I
provided a broad range of novel evidence indicating its significance in natural lan-
guage and developed a mereotopological approach accounting for the observed
phenomena. The book is divided into two conceptual parts. In the first part com-
prising Chapters 2, 3, and 4, I provided a broad range of evidence indicating that
natural language involves elaborate means to express subatomic quantification.
The second part involving Chapters 5, 6, and 7 was dedicated to developing a
conceptual framework that would provide means to model quantification over
both wholes and parts, and a formal approach based on it that would account for
a representative subset of the observed phenomena.
The data discussed in Chapter 2 provide cross-linguistic evidence that the
same partitive word, e.g., part, half, and most, can simultaneously appear both
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in entity and set partitives, i.e., constructions that refer to parts of singularities
and pluralities and typically combine with singular and plural DPs, respectively.
This fact indicates that such expressions are able to operate both at the atomic
and subatomic level depending on what structure is provided by the embedded
DP (see Moltmann 1997; 1998). On the other hand, explicit partitives modified by
cardinal numerals can only quantify over material parts of singular individuals,
irrespective of whether the complement DP is singular or plural, see Table 8.1,
where ‘bare’ and ‘count’ refer to bare explicit and count explicit partitives, re-
spectively. This might suggest that since partitive words have distinct properties
in different structures, they differ significantly after all (Schwarzschild 1996).
Table 8.1: Properties of partitive words in explicit partitives
singulars plurals
bare count bare count
subatomic quantification   * 
quantification over wholes * *  *
Nonetheless, the crucial piece of data coming from Italian partitives involving
irregular plurals, i.e., expressions that imply not only plurality, but also cohesion
or integrity of parts (Ojeda 1995; Acquaviva 2008), provides evidence to the con-
trary. In particular, when such a partitive is modified by the cardinal numeral,
the whole phrase can get either a part-of-a-singularity reading or a part-of-a-
plurality interpretation as long as the parts making up the plurality constitute
an integrated entity. Therefore, countability results from the interplay between
the meaning of a particular partitive word and the semantic properties of a sin-
gular or plural DP it combines with. If a plural expression denotes a plural entity
constituted by a cohesive, i.e., spatially related, sum of parts, quantification over
continuous parts of such a sum is possible, see Table 8.2.
Table 8.2: Properties of Italian parte ‘part’ in explicit partitives
singulars regular pl irregular pl
bare count bare count bare count
subatomic quantification   *   
quantification over wholes * *  *  
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Furthermore, I showed that at least in some languages the parallelism between
entity and set partitives cannot be explained in terms of semantic ambiguity of
partitive words. Instead, I argued that what allows for the cross-linguistically
widely attested distribution of those expressions is the fact that singulars and
plurals actually involve part-whole structures that are based on the same unified
parthood relation. Crucially, what distinguishes the two is an additional notion
that is responsible for how parts are topologically arranged with respect to each
other. In other words, I posited that the intuitive distinction between integrated
wholes and arbitrary sums of parts is reflected in grammar by the syntactic dis-
tinction between count singulars and regular plurals, respectively. In addition,
the evidence from Italian irregular plurals shows that there are natural language
expressions designating entities that are similar to plurals in that they comprise
a number of integrated objects, but at the same time their sum is arranged in
such a way that it constitutes a cluster.
Chapter 3 was dedicated to the systematic exploration of the role the topologi-
cal notion of integrity plays with respect to part-whole structures and subatomic
quantification in particular. I provided evidence that shows that the distinction
between topology-neutral and topology-sensitive partitive words is lexicalized
in Polish. Specifically, Polish has three morphologically distinct half-words, i.e.,
połowa, pół, and połówka, all ‘half’. When applied to a DP denoting an entity, they
all yield its part constituting approximately 50% of the whole. However, where
they differ is the type of entity they select for as well as the type of part they
return. Given different distributional and referential properties of each expres-
sion in question, I interpreted the alternation in terms of topological sensitivity.
While the half-word połowa is topology-neutral, i.e., it simply measures halves
of any type of entity and yields a topologically indeterminate portion of a whole,
pół and połówka are semantically more complex. Similarly to its topology-neutral
counterpart, in the case of pół the outcome of quantification is either a continu-
ous or a discontinuous half. However, unlike połowa it selects only for integrated
wholes, i.e., individuated entities that come in one piece. On the other hand, the
meaning of the morphologically most complex połówka is even more restricted.
While it shares selectional restrictions with pół, in addition it imposes topological
constraints on the extension of the resulting partitive construction. As a result,
the whole partitive can only be true of a continuous integrated part constituting
approximately 50% of the volume of an individuated object, see Table 8.3.
Similar alternations are attested in different classes of other partitive expres-
sions in Polish, e.g., piece-words and quarter-words. In each of the examined
cases, the notion of integrity played a crucial role in predicting possible denota-
tions of distinct types of partitives. Even more interestingly, cross-linguistic in-
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Table 8.3: Denotations of Polish half-words




vestigation revealed that the phenomenon observed is not a Polish idiosyncrasy.
Instead, it appears in several other languages. Though the means particular lan-
guages employ to express certain spatial configurations differ, e.g., English uti-
lizes determiners whereasMandarin uses classifier semantics, the resulting effect
is similar and demonstrates the relevance of the topological notion of integrity
in subatomic quantification.
In addition, I discussed the contrast between two types of Polish whole-adjec-
tives (see Moltmann 1997; Morzycki 2002), i.e., cały ‘whole’ and kompletny ‘com-
plete, which emphasizes two distinct aspects of wholeness, namely maximality
and integrity.While the former involves both, the latter does imply that no part is
missing but does not indicate that they remain in a particular topological config-
uration, see 8.4. The significance of the presented data lies primarily in revealing
the relevance of topological relations holding between parts of individuals forc-
ing us to recognize that natural language semantics is sensitive to whether parts
come in one piece or constitute discontinuous entities.




The final piece of data was discussed in Chapter 4. It concerns a neglected
class of numerical expressions, namely multipliers such as English double, that
display non-trivial quantificational properties. Specifically, I provided evidence
demonstrating that multipliers are specialized for subatomic quantification, i.e.,
they count cognitively salient parts that are essential for a whole to be considered
having a certain property. In many cases, those parts are self-sufficient, i.e., have
themselves a property comparable to that of the whole, but sometimes they are
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just intuitively the most salient elements. Though the distribution of multipliers
involves also abstract entities denoted by event nominals as well as role nouns, I
argued that the semantic behavior observed in combination with singular count
nouns constitutes the basic quantificational mechanism that can be further ex-
tended to other types of entities. Interestingly, when the multiplier combines
with the mass term, it forces a portion, i.e., count interpretation of the modified
noun.
Furthermore, I discussed Slavic multipliers that display morphological com-
plexity suggesting semantic compositionality. For instance, the Russian multi-
plier dvojnoj ‘double’ consists of the numeral root corresponding to the number
2 as well as some additional morphology including a special multiplicative affix.
This fact indicates that multipliers share with cardinals reference to integers, but
differ in that they are devised to count entities of a different type, see Table 8.5.
In particular, cardinals are semantically equipped to count wholes. Though they
can be used in subatomic quantification, e.g., in count explicit partitives, this is
only possible when they combine with a partitive word. In such a case, however,
entities designated by the whole partitive phrase are treated as objects in their
own right. Hence, the source of subatomic quantification is the partitive, and the
cardinal simply counts provided entities in their relative entirety. On the other
hand, multipliers always quantify over parts of objects referred to by a modi-
fied nominal. Given the cross-linguistically widespread appearance of multipli-
ers, the examined data set shows that analogously to cardinals, whose purpose is
to count wholes, natural language developed expressions dedicated to numerical
subatomic quantification.
Table 8.5: Properties of cardinals and multipliers
cardinals multipliers
subatomic quantification * 
quantification over wholes  *
In Chapter 5, I provided a general conceptual framework intended as a basis
for developing a formal account for subatomic quantification in natural language.
I suggested how the linguistic evidence discussed in Chapters 2, 3, and 4 could
be linked with insights provided by cognitive psychology. Specifically, exten-
sive research on perception and cognitive development indicates that since early
childhood we conceptualize objects, i.e., integrated wholes, in a different way
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than other types of entities. Furthermore, even young children possess the abil-
ity to simultaneously perceive a whole as an object in its own right, as well as a
collection of parts, and this capacity guides their linguistic development. Finally,
human number sense seems to be sensitive to the intuitive notion of integrity.
Specifically, young children always count each separate integrated physical en-
tity as one.
Based on both linguistic and psychological evidence, I presented three claims
constituting the conceptual core of the book. I postulated that natural language
is sensitive to the topological notion of integrity, which manifests itself in how
nominal lexicon is classified into different grammatical categories. For instance,
count singular nouns designate entities conceptualized as integrated wholes. On
the other hand, plural nominals presuppose parts of their referents to be inte-
grated wholes but impose no topological constraints on them, i.e., denote arbi-
trary sums of individuals. The second claim concerns the general counting prin-
ciples, i.e., a set of rules constraining what can be counted. Specifically, the prin-
ciple of non-overlap ensures that enumerated entities are disjoint, i.e., each thing
can be counted once and once only. The principle of maximality demands that
counting involves entities in their mereological entirety, i.e., no part is left out.
Finally, the principle of integrity guarantees that an entity that can be put in
a one-to-one correspondence with numbers needs to be conceptualized as an
object that comes in one piece. All things considered, the general counting prin-
ciples ensure that only sets consisting exclusively of elements that are concep-
tualized as discrete integrated objects can be enumerated. Importantly, there is
no reference to atomicity in the postulated quantificational mechanism. Finally,
the third claim extends the general counting principles to subatomic quantifica-
tion. I posit that the set of constraints described above is a universal mechanism
applicable both at the level of wholes and at the level of parts.
In Chapter 6, I introduced a theory of wholes called mereotopology which
enhances standard mereology based on the parthood relation with additional
topological features (Casati & Varzi 1999; for linguistic application, see Grimm
2012a,b). Within this framework, the primitive notion of connectedness enables
us to derive complex notions capturing distinct configurations of parts within a
part-whole structure. One such notion is a property of being maximally strongly
self-connected (mssc), which allows us to capture an intuition on what it means
to be an integrated whole. Specifically, an mssc entity is an object whose ev-
ery part overlaps the whole, and anything else that has a relevant property and
overlaps it is part of it. Such a perspective seems to correspond neatly to the intu-
itive view on individuals as configurations of parts arranged in a certain manner
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rather than atomic elements with no proper parts, and thus constitutes an advan-
tageous alternative for accounts based on atomicity. This alternative view turns
out to be of significant value in modeling quantification over both wholes and
parts.
Finally, in Chapter 7 I developed a formal account for subatomic quantifica-
tion based on the conceptual background and mereotopological notion of mssc
discussed above. In particular, I argued that an approach building on mssc enti-
ties instead of atoms is more auspicious in modeling quantification over parts.
For instance, a significant advantage of a mereotopological account is that it
does not require postulating sorted domains with different parthood relations
defined over them (Link 1983). The distinction between part-whole structures as-
sociated with singular count nouns and regular plurals can be recast in terms of
connectedness. While the former encode that the elements of their denotations
are mssc entities, the latter require parts of their referents to be such individu-
als but impose no topological constraints on pluralities thereof. Furthermore, I
proposed that numerical expressions including cardinals andmultipliers are com-
plex semantic expressions derived from names of numbers via different overt or
covert classifiers specialized in counting distinct types of objects, e.g., mssc enti-
ties and cognitively salient parts thereof, respectively. The last piece of the puzzle
concerned how to capture different semantic interpretations of distinct types of
topology-neutral and topology-sensitive partitive words. For this purpose, I pro-
posed a special individuating element that can be either expressed formally, e.g.,
as a special suffix on Polish topology-sensitive partitive words, or remain null.
In any case, what this individuating element does is that it partitions the set of
entities denoted by a partitive and introduces the mssc constraint relative to a
given partition. This guarantees that the extension of a whole partitive involves
only non-overlapping continuous parts. Such integrated parts are conceptualized
as objects in their own right within a part-whole structure of an individual, and
thus can be quantified over, similarly to other mssc entities. With these compo-
nents in place, I provided step-by-step derivations of multiplier phrases as well as
different types of partitives that account for distinct interpretations of construc-
tions involving topology-neutral and topology-sensitive partitive words. In the
proposed system, distinct semantic effects arise as a result of different interac-
tions between partitivity, topology, and quantification. Its great advantage is that
it provides an explanation for the topological phenomena concerning reference
to continuous and discontinuous parts in different types of partitives, an issue
that previous approaches failed not only to account for but even to acknowledge
(e.g., Chierchia 2010).
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8.2 Open questions and future research
The account developed in this book provides an explanation for a number of
phenomena in natural language. I believe its contribution is valuable both from
a theoretical perspective and in terms of data it covers. However, some questions
remain and many issues require further investigation. One of the most serious
challenges concerns the interpretation of count explicit partitives with the em-
bedded plural DP, as discussed in §2.2.3. Unlike standard explicit set partitives,
such expressions only get a part-of-a-singularity reading. I argued that this ef-
fect is due to the general counting principles which require that a counted entity
constitutes an integrated whole. Since pluralities fail to satisfy this condition, the
only possibility how a relevant phrase could be interpreted involves quantifica-
tion over material parts. Nonetheless, the issue concerning the interpretation of
the morpho-syntactic plural on the downstairs nominal remains open. The ques-
tion of what the exact semantic contribution of number in such a structure is (if
any) requires further investigation. It might be the case that in such construc-
tions the plural is semantically void. However, there is the intuition that within
a set of parts denoted by a count explicit partitive each element is part of a differ-
ent object. At this point, I can only hypothesize that the mechanism deriving this
effect is pragmatic in nature. However, it might also be the case that the plural is
interpreted as a distributive operator, analogously to what has been postulated to
account for covariational uses of different (see, e.g., Beck 2000; Brasoveanu 2008;
Dotlačil 2010). Before a detailed analysis could be proposed, definitely more re-
search is required.
As indicated in §7.7, the proposed account can be easily extended to topology-
sensitive partitives in other languages than Polish and German as well as to other
types of constructions involving subatomic quantification. However, the ques-
tion whether such an extension is empirically appropriate will in each case re-
quire careful consideration. After examining the cross-linguistic data presented
in §3.4, at first sight it seems plausible that, e.g., in English explicit and propor-
tional partitives it is the determiner that introduces the individuating element.
It appears that the same semantics is associated with a special classifier that fol-
lows a partitive word in Mandarin. However, more tests need to be applied to
reveal the real nature of the interaction between topology, partitivity, and the
determiner or classifier semantics, respectively.
A further issue concerns a detailed analysis of Italian irregular plurals (Ojeda
1995; Acquaviva 2008). Though the data from count explicit partitives involving
such expressions were of great significance for capturing the nature of the in-
teraction between partitivity and numerical quantification, the proper semantic
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treatment of such constructions would require accommodating more complex
topological notions. Although this task calls for another enterprise, I believe this
study provides a neat framework for pursuing it, see §7.7.2. A potentially inter-
esting topic concerns the investigation into partitives in languages displaying
the collective-singulative number alternation (Grimm 2012a,b). Moreover, if the
proposed analysis is on the right track, effects similar to what we have observed
in partitives with irregular plurals in Italian should also be detectable in Slavic
partitives with topologically sensitive derived mass nouns that denote a plurality
of discrete objects forming a cluster (Grimm & Dočekal 2021) as well as swarm
nouns (Henderson 2017). A pilot study concerning Czech and Polish suggests
that this is in fact the case, yet more work needs to be done before a conclusion
can be drawn.
So far, whole-adjectives have not received a lot of attention in the semantic
literature. In this book, I argued that different types of Polish expressions of this
kind provide evidence for distinguishing between maximality and integrity, see
§3.5.2. However, a detailed analysis of the meaning of whole-adjectives awaits
to be developed. As a starting point, one could consider an interaction between
universal quantification at the subatomic level and the individuating element
encoding topological integrity or some similar component. The idea that whole-
adjectives could be interpreted as universal quantifiers over parts has already
been proposed (Moltmann 1997). Nevertheless, careful investigations into scope
dependencies and related factors are required in order to test whether such treat-
ment is empirically plausible (see Morzycki 2002 for potentially problematic
data).
Another area where the proposed perspective could be applied concerns adver-
bials quantifying over parts of a singularity such as mostly, wholly, largely (see
Morzycki 2002) as well as all wet (see Schwarzschild 1996: pp. 162–170). Such ex-
plorations would most probably require extending the account advocated here
with the insights of the prolific research on scale structures (e.g., Kennedy & Mc-
Nally 1999; 2005). If both approaches turn out to be compatible, it potentially
opens up a new perspective on the opposition between partial and total predi-
cates, e.g., dirty, wet, and touch, as opposed to clean, dry, and eat (e.g., Yoon 1996;
Rotstein & Winter 2004).
A separate subject concerns the interpretation of multipliers with event nom-
inals, role and abstract nouns as well as collectives. In §4.2, I suggested that ex-
tending ontologywith additional types for events as well as social roles will allow
us to extend the basic mechanism proposed to account for the semantic behav-
ior of multipliers modifying concrete nouns to more abstract types of objects.
However, the exact implementation of the idea requires careful consideration
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and rigorous study. It might turn out that a more general notion is necessary
or, alternatively, that several derived concepts will prove more advantageous in
tackling the distribution of multipliers across the board. In any case, figuring
this out seems to be an intriguing challenge that would almost certainly provide
a novel perspective on quantification in natural language.
If the approach I have argued for is correct, I expect that scrupulous cross-
linguistic investigation will reveal even more types of constructions indicating
the relevance of topological relations within part-whole structures. Though a
number of directions worth examining has already been indicated, e.g., adjecti-
val half-words in German and Romance, I believe that there are even more parts
of the lexicon that are sensitive to topological relations at the subatomic level.
One potential example is a class of expressions I refer to as verbs of separation
such as separate, dismantle, and dissolve, mentioned briefly in §2.3.1. At first blush,
their meaning seems to affect the topological component of part-whole struc-
tures. Examining them from the perspective developed here might be a promis-
ing enterprise that would shed light on subatomic quantification in the verbal
domain. It seems that an especially auspicious area of research concerns Slavic
verbal morphology with its various prefixes and aspectual distinctions (e.g., Filip
1999).
Furthermore, I believe that rigorous experimental investigation could also
shed new light on subatomic quantification, as it did in other areas of the field.
For instance, what would be of significant interest is the exploration of the rela-
tive strength of topological inferences in different types of constructions cross-
linguistically. It might be informative to compare structures that encode the in-
dividuating element formally such as Polish and German topology-sensitive pro-
portional partitives with constructions where a similar effect arises pragmati-
cally.
To conclude, I hope that this study provides a valuable perspective on previ-
ously neglected semantic phenomena in natural language. Though I presented a
number of novel observations concerning distinct types of relativelywell-studied
constructions as well as genuine insights concerning expressions that so far have
not received attention in the study of meaning, I expect that many more obscure
regions await to be explored. I believe that a detailed map of the phenomena
related to subatomic quantification in natural language can only emerge as a re-
sult of careful systematic typological as well as experimental research. This is,
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The goal of this book is to explore the relationship between the cognitive notion of part-
hood and various grammatical devices expressing this concept in natural language. The
monograph aims to investigate syntactic constructions and lexical categories, e.g., par-
titives, whole-adjectives, and multipliers, encoding different kinds of part-whole struc-
tures both in Slavic and non-Slavic languages. It is envisioned to inspire radical rethink-
ing of the ontology of models accounting for nominal semantics. Specifically, it provides
novel evidence for a mereotopological approach to meaning, i.e., a theory of wholes that
captures not only parthood but also topological relations holding between parts. This ev-
idence comes from the phenomenon of subatomic quantification, i.e., quantification
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